Strategic Re‐framing as a Vote Winner: Why Vote‐seeking Governments Pursue Unpopular Reforms

Most political science accounts assume that governments in Western democracies avoid unpopular reforms to protect their re‐election chances. Nevertheless, governments sometimes embark on electorally risky reforms – even in times when they have no slack in the polls. In this article, it is argued that pursuing unpopular reforms can be a perfectly rational strategy for vote‐seeking governments. Based on a simple game theoretical model that compares strategic framing with the classic blame avoidance strategy, it is demonstrated that unpopular policy reforms allow governments to pursue gains of both policy and votes by opting for a highly visible strategy of reframing the substantive reform issue in question. This general argument is illustrated with the substantial 2011 retrenchment of Danish early retirement benefits. This particular welfare state programme was highly popular. Nevertheless, the incumbent Liberal prime minister proposed to abolish it only a few months prior to a national election while his government was trailing significantly in the polls.     

试论集体行动的困境

集体行动问题是现代经济学中的分支之一——公共选择理论的主要研究对象。美国著名经济学家曼瑟尔·奥尔森（Mancur Olson）1965年出版的《集体行动的逻辑》可谓研究该领域的奠基之作。他站在方法论的个人主义立场,认为集团是由各构成主体的自发意志所形成的,其理论主要阐述的是以谋求集体财富为目的的集团规模问题。其论点为旨在获得集体财富的集团,其规模的大小直接关系到目标能否实现的问题。具体而言,他认为规模小的集团比规模大的集团更能实现集体行动。但在书中,奥尔森认为规模小的集团情况复杂,故其研究的对象为大集团,更为确切地说强调大集团的“集体行动的困境”。     

The Phenomenon of Collective Action: Modeling Institutions as Structures of Care

This essay develops a theory of how institutions can work through the web of social relationships that exist in a place rather than through formal, bureaucratic lines of authority. In contrast to models that characterize institutions as organizational structures, roles, and patterns of exchange, this model depicts institutions as constituted primarily through the active working and reworking of relationships. Rather than adopt the network literature's focus on the overall pattern of relationships and exchanges carried out between policy actors, the author focuses directly on the nature of the relationships themselves and portrays the institution as the playing out of these relationships, employing Carol Gilligan's notion of care. The model of care is used to analyze the evolution, unraveling, and restoration of resource management systems on the Turtle Islands in Southeast Asia. The model provides lessons for institution building, especially for community-centered governance.     

Change—and Scepticism—as a Constant: Anthony King on Parties and Party Systems

Tony King had a healthy disrespect for conventional wisdom but a deep appreciation for common sense. Drawing on an eclectic mix of sources, both qualitative and quantitative, he wore his learning lightly, the better to highlight and explain to academic and non‐academic audiences how shifts in society and public opinion drove change inside parties and in the party systems in which they operated. King asked great questions and provided answers that simultaneously captured complexity and the big picture. His provocative interpretations and analysis were always stimulating—and many of them proved highly prescient.     

Corruption as a Self‐Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica

An influential literature argues that corruption behaves as a self‐fulfilling prophecy. Its central claim is that the individual returns to corruption are a function of the perceived corruptibility of the other members of society. Empirically, this implies that if one were to exogenously increase beliefs about societal levels of corruption, willingness to engage in corruption should also increase. We evaluate this implication by utilizing an information experiment embedded in a large‐scale household survey recently conducted in the Gran Área Metropolitana of Costa Rica. Changes in beliefs about corruption were induced via the random assignment of an informational display depicting the increasing percentage of Costa Ricans who have personally witnessed an act of corruption. Consistent with the self‐fulfilling prophecy hypothesis, we find that internalizing the information from the display on average increased the probability that a respondent would be willing to bribe a police officer by approximately .05 to .10.     

The Quango Conundrum Revisited—Why the Government Still Needs a More Coherent Approach to Arm's‐Length Bodies

There has been substantial reform of public bodies since the Coalition government was formed in 2010. But although numbers have been reduced, there has been no attempt to address the confused landscape—indeed, departments have interpreted criteria for what should be put at arm's length in different ways, introducing further complexity. A clearer link between function and form is needed. This would help address some of the blurred lines over accountability that we have seen in the recent rows over Ofsted and the Environment Agency.     

Collective Political Action as Civic Voluntarism: Analysing Ethnic Associations as Political Participants by Translating Individual-level Theory to the Organizational Level

This article presents and empirically evaluates an analytical experiment in which we seek to translate individual-level explanations of differences in political participation to an organizational level. Utilizing the Civic Voluntarism Model, we analyse the consequences of voluntary associations’ politically valuable ‘resources’, ‘motivation’, and ‘recruitment networks’. Using data from a survey of ethnic associations in Stockholm, Sweden, results suggest that the overall logic of how associational-level political participation is encouraged resembles corresponding mechanisms on the individual level. We conclude that both our theoretical argument and empirical findings merit further analyses of civil society actors’ political participation with the approach taken in this study.     

State‐Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters

This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.”     

Environmental Policy as a Political Problem

The politics of the environment may not be unique, but they present some distinctive characteristics. In undertaking policy analyses and administrative strategies an appreciation of concepts, assumptions and circumstances, and underlying environmental policy issues is needed. To ignore these fundamentals is to risk superficiality in analysis, and error in findings and conclusions. Yet getting down to basics is often rejected as diversion from the goal of analysis. It deviates from a "straight to the point" approach, adds cost and time to investigation, and seldom interests practical-minded analysts. Even so, this paper will be prefaced by a concise reminder of some basic factors that make environmental policy problematic. Among these are: (1) incompatible concepts of man-nature relationships—notably conflict between perceived facts and values, (2) inadequate comprehension of the complexities of nature, (3) sectoral subdivisions of knowledge, (4) assumptions, situations and motivations in environmental politics, (5) fractionated structure of laws and administration, and (6) short-range perception of time. In addition to these conceptual factors the widely varied subject-matter of environmental politics narrows the scope of generalization for policy purposes.     

Implementation Deficit — Why Member States do not Comply with EU directives?

This article discusses factors effecting the implementation of European policies at the national level. Four main independent variables are distinguished: political institutions, the degree of corporatism, citizens' support for the EU, and political culture in the member states. The impacts of these variables on the success of implementing EU directives in ten policy areas are then tested with the multiple regression model. The results suggest that political culture and the design of political institutions in the member states had the most significant impact on implementation behavior. Countries with a high level of trust and political stability combined with efficient and flexible political institutions had the most success in implementing European policies.     

Globalization and the Retreat of Citizen Participation in Collective Action: A Challenge for Public Administration

Globalization challenges the ability of contemporary public administration to encourage citizen participation in collective action through behaviors such as tax compliance and contributions to public goods. The authors introduce a new individual‐level approach to globalization, arguing that people vary in the extent to which they are globalized and that an individual's level of globalism (ILG) reflects attitudes and dispositions that influence the way he or she resolves the social dilemma of participation in collective action (i.e., the decision to contribute versus follow a “free‐ride” strategy). Using a four‐country sample, the article examines the relationship between ILG and collective action participation decisions in three behavioral experiments. Findings support the hypothesis that regardless of country‐level globalization, a more globalized individual complies less willingly with tax codes, donates less to local nongovernmental organizations, and prefers to adopt a free‐ride strategy in a public goods game. The consequences for public administration are discussed.     

China: Administrative Corruption — Experience in a Comparative Context

As a new world economy emerges what is being learned about the accompanying phenomenon of administrative corruption? To probe this question we combine study of current developments in China with prevailing theories of corruption. The administrative corruption experience, as it has unfolded during the economic development thrust of the Deng reform era, is described and analysed in a comparative context. In specifically interjecting the American experience we suggest that a balanced control response to corruption —rather than an elimination focus—could be a fruitful avenue for policy and research, and that informal, social approaches to corruption control are pregnant with possibilities. China's experience offers a significant opportunity to push the margin of wisdom on these issues as they relate to economic and political development.     

Issue Voting as a Constrained Choice Problem

Prevalent models of issue voting view vote choice as a choice among party policies. Choice sets are implicitly assumed to be the same for all voters, and their composition is left to researchers' discretion. This article aims to relax such assumptions by presenting a model with a varying probability of inclusion in the choice set. We apply the “constrained choice conditional logistic regression” to survey data from the 1989 parliamentary election in Norway to examine the effects of party identification of voters and electoral viability and policy extremity of parties on individual voters' choice set compositions. Further, we look into the effect of parties' policy positions on their electoral fates under alternative assumptions about the composition of voters' choice sets. We find that voters' choice set composition conditions both the effects of their policy considerations on vote choice and those of parties' policy offerings on their electoral fates.