The military and bureaucracy in Greece – 1967–1974

This article attempts to examine and analyse the Greek military regime's (1967-1974) relations with the country's administrative apparatus. After briefly tracing the historical and ecological dimensions of these two institutions the article analyses their relations during the 7-year period on the basis of Eckstein and Gurr's superordinate-subordinate theoretical framework. The relevant data, which include interviews with senior civil servants as well as military officers, indicate that due to the nature of their profession, which emphasizes discipline and strict subordination, the military as political governors create an atmosphere to which the less regimented and more give-and-take-oriented bureaucracies have difficulty becoming accustomed. Military regimes and administrators do not enjoy the best of relations.     

Measuring the democracy–repression nexus

A considerable amount of time and intellectual energy has been expended detailing the nature of the relationship between democracy and a state's use of repressive force against its citizens. This article moves the discussion forward both methodologically and substantively. I use a fully Bayesian structural model with latent variables to mitigate the effects of measurement error in both democracy and repression. Further, I estimate two models, one treating democracy as a single overarching concept, similar to the strategy followed by Davenport and Armstrong (2004), Poe and Tate (1994) and one treating democracy as two-dimensional (voice and veto) as suggested by Davenport (2007b). I find that the two models, though closely related offer substantively different predictions. Statistical measures of fit favor the two-dimensional model. Further, I find that the effects of voice and veto are each strongly conditioned by the other.