Limits of regulatory governance change in the post-developmental state: Korean telecommunications market restructurings from a comparative perspective

This study explains the limits of institutional transformation in Korea from the developmental state to a post-developmental state, in terms of regulatory institutions instead of developmental institutions. The Korean state has taken advantage of the government's discretionary policy changes and power formed by both informal state institutions and informal policy networks, while the regulatory state has placed a special emphasis on social consensus as well as political support for changes of market institutions. New market rules and laws have also been inefficient and ineffective for fair market competition. Limits of regulatory governance change have occurred due to misalignments between informal regulatory institutions in the developmental state and formal regulatory institutions in the post-developmental state. State managers have created discretionary state intervention in policy implementation, politicized the roles of regulatory agencies, and brought ministry-type regulatory state institutions back in. The establishment of effective market institutions has failed due to informal market institutions (unfair and illegal market practices) that have interfered with the policy implementation of new formal market regulations.     

The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal Institutions in Transitional Regimes

How do informal institutions influence the formation and function of formal institutions? Existing typologies focus on the interaction of informal institutions with an established framework of formal rules that is taken for granted. In transitional settings, such typologies are less helpful, since many formal institutions are in a state of flux. Instead, using examples drawn from post-communist state development, I argue that informal institutions can replace, undermine, and reinforce formal institutions irrespective of the latter’s strength, and that the elite competition generated by informal rules further influences which of these interactions dominate the development of the institutional framework. In transitional settings, the emergence and effectiveness of many formal institutions is endogenous to the informal institutions themselves.     

Revolution without regime change: The evidence from the post-Euromaidan Ukraine

What effects does a revolution have on the stability or change of a hybrid regime? Has the Ukraine's regime changed since the 2014 revolution? To answer these questions I examine the changes in formal and informal institutions and the quantitative and qualitative composition of elites after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014. I argue that despite greater than in the post-orange period quantitative renewal of elites, qualitative change has not occurred. Meanwhile, the old operational code, or modus operandi, of elites' political culture, composed of clientelism, secretive deals and quota based nominations to government positions continues to operate. The lack of elites' renewal and the dominance of informal rules over formal procedures – two factors that keep the institutional core of Ukraine's hybrid regime unchanged.     

Political Corruption and Institutional Stability

This article is the first to statistically examine the reciprocal relationship between formal political institutions and political corruption. We argue that political corruption is an informal institution that allows nondemocratic leaders to build political support, act as a substitute for liberalizing concessions in the formal institutions of the state, and thereby extends the longevity of non-democratic regimes. Yet, whereas high corruption level will prevail in nondemocratic regimes, we expect the electoral constituency in democratic regimes to have the formal power to curb political corruption. We demonstrate that these expectations hold by estimating a dynamic multinomial regression model on data for 133 countries for the 1985–2008 period. Our model shows that high-corruption autocracies and hybrid regimes are more stable than their low-corruption counterparts, but that low-corruption democracies are more stable than high-corruption ones. For autocratic and hybrid regimes, the stability is due both to corruption making the formal institutions more resistant to democratization and that the formal institutions prevent reductions in corruption. Consistent democracies, on the other hand, are able to reduce corruption and become more stable as a result.     

Constructing a social safety net in Africa: An institutionalist analysis of colonial rule and state social policies in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

This article attempts to explain why, despite nearly identical cultural and economic landscapes and the potentially homogenizing pressures of globalization, social policies differ in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, two neighboring countries in West Africa. In Ghana, the government has generally attempted to strengthen the informal social welfare systems of the extended family and community through a more decentralized social policy, whereas the government in Côte d'Ivoire has tried to replace these informal social networks with the centralized arm of the bureaucracy. The article shows how different legacies of colonial rule produce these divergent social policies in a complex and iterative process over time. While domestic institutions do mediate the effects of globalization, the domestic factors highlighted in this article are not the formal political institutions cited in most studies. Rather, the analysis reveals the critical role of informal institutions, or normative frameworks, that existed under colonial rule and continue to endure in the post-colonial state. The article also contributes to current theories of institutions by showing how formal and informal institutions dynamically interact in the construction of the state and the African family.     

Which Institutions are Good for Your Health? The Deep Determinants of Comparative Cross-country Health Status

We extend the literature on the deep determinants of economic development by focusing on life expectancy, instead of income per capita, as an indicator of economic development, and by examining the role of informal, as well as formal, institutions. Our empirical results suggest that formal and informal institutions are substitutes. Improving informal institutions has positive effects on life expectancy that are statistically significant for most countries and stronger than the effects of improving formal institutions. The gains from improving informal institutions are greatest for countries in which institutions are weakest. Geographical factors also help explain cross-country variation in life expectancy.     

Nur Otan,Informal Networks and the Countering of Elite Instability in Kazakhstan: Bringing the ‘Formal’ Back In

As opposed to the current literature which argues that informal politics pervades formal institutions in Kazakhstan and Central Asia more widely, this article argues that Nur Otan, the political party of the President of Kazakhstan, acts as a formal institution to counter the instability generated by informal networks competing for access to political and economic resources. This is achieved by consolidating the political parties associated with these networks into Nur Otan and the synchronisation of the party and the state apparatus. However, the extent to which Nur Otan can provide this stabilising function in the long term is dependent upon regime dynamics.     

TOWARDS GOOD GOVERNANCE: A HALF CENTURY OF INDIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Since independence, India has undertaken a number of efforts to establish an effective development-oriented, citizen-friendly and responsive system of administration to contribute toward good governance. While the traditional system of public administration was appropriate for the pre-independence period, subsequent social, economic and political changes necessitated radical changes in policies and their implementation. A set of new issues called for a thorough reorientation of the system of public administration. Administrative development had, therefore, to be planned and executed in the face of ever-growing conflicts between various non-state actors/institutions and the state. The strategies for administrative development adopted not only included evolving appropriate politico-administrative institutions for democratic governance, but also a consistent effort on reorienting the formal and informal aspects as well as improving the techno-professional skills of bureaucracy at all levels. In addition to this an appropriate balance and cooperation between the public and private sectors was essential in the context of growing liberalization and globalization.The experience of India emphatically demonstrates that an active and consociational association of citizens at all levels of the governmental structure is critical to the process of modernization of the state and administration. The dispersion of political and administrative power among various groups and regions emerges as a useful strategy for ensuring the continuity of the state and democracy in a vast country with numerous ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions.     

Soviet legacies,organized crime,and economic gangsterism: Russia, 1995–2010

In countries like Russia, where legal institutions providing political accountability and protection of property rights are weak, some elite actors accept the use of violence as a tool in political and economic competition. The intensity of this violent exposure may vary depending on the position the province had had in the Soviet administrative hierarchy. The higher the province's position before 1991, the greater the intensity of business violence one is likely to observe there in post-communist times, because the Soviet collapse left a more gaping power vacuum and lack of working informal rules in regions with limited presence of traditional criminal organizations. Post-Soviet entrepreneurs also often find it worthwhile to run for office or financially back certain candidates in order to secure a privileged status and the ability to interpret the law in their favor. Businessmen-candidates themselves and their financial backers behind the scenes may become exposed to competitive pressures resulting in violence during election years, because their competitors may find it hard to secure their position in power through the existing legal or informal non-violent means. To test whether Soviet legacies and Provincial elections indeed cause spikes in commerce-motivated violence, this project relies on an original dataset of more than 6000 attacks involving business interests in 74 regions of Russia, in 1991–2010. The results show that only legislative elections cause increases in violence while there is no firm evidence that executive polls have a similar effect.     

Pussy Riot as a feminist project: Russia's gendered informal politics

This article considers Pussy Riot as a feminist project, placing their actions and the regime's reactions in the context of three post-9/11 developments in gender and sexuality politics in Russia. First, I assert that Pussy Riot's stunts are a logical reaction to the Kremlin's masculinity-based nation-rebuilding scheme, which was a cover for crude homophobic misogyny. Second, Pussy Riot is part of the informal feminism emerging in Russia, a response to nongovernmental organization (NGO) feminism and the regime's repression of NGO feminism, albeit likely to be outflanked by regime-supported thuggery. Third, the members of Pussy Riot were so harshly prosecuted because they – swearing, covered up and disloyal – violated the political cleaner role that the Kremlin has given women in the last few years. Feminist social scientists have long looked for politics outside of formal institutions and processes. The Pussy Riot affair makes clear how much gender is central to the informal politics that gender-blind observers of Russia have come to see as crucial to understanding Russia's regime.     

Informal Countermessaging: The Potential and Perils of Informal Online Countermessaging

Abstract

Online countermessaging—communication that seeks to disrupt the online content disseminated by extremist groups and individuals—is a core component of contemporary counterterrorism strategies. Countermessaging has been heavily criticized, not least on the grounds of effectiveness. Whereas current debates are focused on the role of government and large organizations in developing and disseminating countermessages, this article argues that such approaches overlook the informal production of countermessages. Recognizing the appetite for “natural world” content among those engaged in countermessaging, this article highlights some of the potential benefits of informal approaches to countermessaging. At the same time, the article also acknowledges the risks that may result from closer working between countermessaging organizations and informal actors.     

Mainstreaming Gender in Politics in Bangladesh: Role of NGOs

‘Gender mainstreaming’ has been regarded as one of the strongest approaches to deal with the issue of equality policy for women. In order to mainstream women in the political process, a number of NGOs have been carrying out different programs in Bangladesh for building awareness among women so that they could opt for participation in the political process. The paper analyzes the role of NGOs in the process of mainstreaming gender in politics in Bangladesh in general and in the enactment of the Local Government (Union Parishad) (Second Amendment) Act of 1997 in particular. Based on empirical data collected through an open-ended structured questionnaire and available secondary data, the study findings reveal that despite having no formal access to the policy process, NGOs augment participation of women in the political process through informal means as is exemplified by their training programs that enhance women's social and economic status.     

Violence and Urban Order in Nairobi, Kenya and Lagos, Nigeria

This article examines the interaction between politics and informal institutions of order in two of Africa’s most violent and crime-ridden cities, Nairobi, Kenya and Lagos, Nigeria. In both cities, governments have failed to provide basic public services and security to citizens, especially to those who reside in informal settlements or slums. A variety of informal institutions, including ethnic militia and block-level vigilante groups, fulfill security and enforcement roles in these relatively ungoverned urban spaces. This article examines the differences in the character and organization of these “specialists in violence,” and it argues that these differences are often integrally linked to the political strategies and aims of elites. The article makes two primary contributions to existing understandings of informal order in violent cities in the developing world. First, I find that organizations seemingly organically linked to local communities, such as ethnic militia, are strongly influenced by national-level political struggles. Violent organizations can gain a foothold and degree of legitimacy by appealing to traditional loyalties, including ethnicity, but organizations with these advantages are also attractive targets for cooptation by political actors. Secondly, both direct state repression and electoral use of militia lead to more predatory forms of interaction between these groups and local communities.     

Co-Investment and Clientelism as Informal Institutions: Beyond ‘Good Enough’ Property Rights Protection

How do we explain high rates of investment in the production of oil palm in Indonesia under conditions of legal uncertainty and uneven protection of property rights? This article argues that what are commonly seen as deficiencies in the formal institutional environment actually enabled investment, but only when informal institutions were able to provide investor assurances. Although the finding that informal institutions provide investor assurances is not new, this study addresses outstanding questions about how such informal institutions work. An examination of the micro-level details of informal institutions in the oil palm industry shows that informal institutions frequently grouped under umbrella terms such as ‘patronage’ or ‘relational ties’ are not uniform. Rather, two types of informal relational tie operate to provide investor assurances: clientelistic and co-investment. Although they serve similar purposes, clientelistic ties work well only under restrictive conditions and are vulnerable to decay. Co-investment, in contrast, is a more robust informal institution, especially when political power is fragmented. Although co-investment provides investor assurances under conditions of legal uncertainty, it remains a particularistic solution and does not guarantee generalized public interest protections.     

Formal institutions,informal institutions,and red tape: A comparative study

Firms across the globe are affected by red tape, but there is little academic research on how country‐level institutions shape red tape perceptions. Drawing on institutional theory, we argue that a variety of formal and informal country‐level institutions affect perceptions of red tape in the private sector. We test our hypotheses using six data sources, including the World Economic Forum and the World Bank. Our results indicate that red tape is weakly associated with a country's level of formalization and rule enforcement effectiveness and more prevalent in federal as opposed to unitary states. As for informal institutions, we find that red tape perceptions are more pronounced in countries with an increased conservative political ideology, higher levels of corruption, and cultures that emphasize individualism and uncertainty avoidance. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for theory and practice.     

Taxing Times: Taxation,Divided Societies and the Informal Economy in Northern Nigeria

This paper challenges the notion that taxing the informal economy provides a mechanism for increasing popular political voice and rebuilding the social contract. It contends that current arguments for taxing the informal economy suffer from a Eurocentric understanding of taxation and state formation, and a fiscally essentialist and undifferentiated notion of the informal economy. Drawing on fieldwork in northern Nigeria, this paper shows that history, gender, wealth and ethno-religious identity influence how taxing the informal economy shapes governance outcomes. Evidence from Nigeria suggests an inverse relationship between informal economy taxation and political voice, posing the risk that increased taxation will exacerbate social divisions rather than rebuild the social contract.     

Informal rules! Using institutional economics to understand service provision in Turkey's spontaneous settlements

Turkey's spontaneous settlements (gecekondus) house half the urban population and face infrastructure deficiencies that reduce quality of life and economic productivity while increasing the vulnerability of the urban poor. This article reports on research that used the new institutional economics to examine the formal and informal institutional frameworks for infrastructure provision in gecekondus. In theory, formal rules should create incentives that produce behaviour. However, a key finding was that rules are generally irrelevant. In fact, in the absence of credible formal rules, pressures arise that help shape informal rules which then result in behaviour. This has important implications for both institutional theory and daily practice.     

Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: a deal among friends

Since the late 1990s international state builders have paid increasing attention to fighting corruption in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. On the surface this effort has brought significant results, since both countries have adopted legal frameworks modelled on the best practices of Western democracies. In practice, however, corruption remains rampant. This disappointing outcome has several explanations: in reviewing the empirical evidence we consider the two countries as cases involving heavily assisted transition from both socialism and war, highlighting how collusive practices between political and criminal interests have played a role in establishing formally liberal but substantively ‘hybrid’ institutions. We argue that the spread of corruption has been implicitly legitimised by international actors, who have pressured local parties to accept the formal architecture of good governance, including anti-corruption legislation, while turning a blind eye to those extra-legal structures and practices perceived as functional to political stability.     

Risk,Reflexivity and Sub-politics: Environmental Politics in Hong Kong

Increasing attention has been drawn to the risk posed by air pollution, a risk that has wide-ranging effects (on the environment, health, the economy, culture, urban design and politics). New environmental movements and political agendas have emerged in the past 10 years. A growing number of social groups have been formed to express their concerns and challenge established laws and rules. This paper will borrow Ulrich Beck's concepts of risk, reflexivity and sub-politics to analyse the new social movement that addresses air quality in Hong Kong. While previous environmental problems were considered manageable, air pollution is a risk that seems to defy solution. As a result of the institutional failure to deal with this risk, there has been a new alignment of interests and the emergence of a new form of politics—a sub-politics that leads to a sharing of power between established and informal politics, and the government and society. Although established political institutions have been receptive, altering the rules and increasing public participation, the extent of sub-politicization is still limited. This is due, in part, to the overall absence of reflexive self-regulation among individuals in the society, which might lead to a state of ‘disorganized irresponsibility’.     

Civil Society’s Claims to Political Representation in Brazil

Civil society is laying claim to political representation in contemporary democracies, destabilizing long-standing ideas about democratic legitimacy. The participatory governance structures that have emerged alongside classic institutions of representative democracy encompass not only direct citizen participation but also political representation by civil society actors. Using original data from São Paulo, Brazil, we show that most of civil society actors that work for the urban poor claim political representation of their “constituency.” Theirs is more often than not an “assumed representation,” we suggest, because our data show that most lack formal members and do not select leaders through elections. Civil society actors (in contrast to political parties and labor unions) lack historically settled and politically sanctioned mechanisms to authorize and hold accountable their representation. This new layer of political representatives therefore faces a historic challenge—constructing novel notions of democratic legitimacy that can support their forms of representation. We examine what new notions of representations are emerging and trace the historic roots of the most widespread and promising that focus on remedying inequality in access to the state.