Directors’ duties under the 2019 Companies Act of Ghana

The scope of directors’ duties forms perhaps the most important part of corporate governance. This paper considers the trajectory of the regulation of directors’ duties under Ghanaian company law from the Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179) to the Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992). Using the 2017 to 2019 financial institutions’ insolvencies in Ghana as a backdrop, it considers whether the scope, formulation and structure of directors’ duties within the new legislation is capable of promoting corporately-beneficial director behaviour. It also discusses whether the framework is apt to deal with similar lapses in corporate governance marked by reckless and opportunistic director behaviour. It discovers that Act 992 places a greater reliance on specific rules while retaining the largely principles-based regulatory technique adopted for regulating director conduct under Act 179. The overall tenor of the framework of directors’ duties under the new Act points to a firmer legislative view of the serious consequences of reckless director conduct. The paper concludes that the language of the framework regulating director conduct is capable of promoting corporately beneficially director behaviour and is also apt to deal with the kind of lapses in corporate governance which led to mass financial sector insolvencies in Ghana.     

Board composition and corporate governance–A multivariate analysis of listed Danish firms

The article conducts a multivariate analysis using a sample of listed Danish firms in order to examine what describes board composition. This issue also relates to corporate law that stipulates the legal boundaries of board composition. In recent years, several European countries, including Denmark, have issued various codes for good corporate governance, in the form of soft law. Such initiatives have been launched, even though the questions of what describes board composition, as well as, the legal profession's influence on board structure, have not been fully uncovered. This study shows that four factors explain Danish board structure. These factors can be interpreted by the following dimensions; the lawyer oriented, the business person oriented, the internationally oriented and finally the traditionally oriented board. Thus, the paper shows that a higher proportion of insider ownership increases the first dimension, whereas a higher remuneration increases the business person orientation of the board. If firm size increases, the international dimension of the board increases and if a firm experiences less growth board structure becomes more traditional. classification G32 . K22     

Failed Governance: A Comment on Baker and Griffith's Ensuring Corporate Misconduct

This essay evaluates Baker and Griffith's book, Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, as a contribution to the social science literatures on regulation and governance, risk, and insurance. Previous social science work on insurance often took an “insurance on the ground” perspective comparing how insurance actually works with the theory of insurance and scrutinizing the actions of insurers as well as the actions of their policyholders. In line with this perspective, Baker and Griffith find that directors and officers (D&O) insurers do not actually charge premiums that vary with risk or monitor the actions of the officers and directors covered by the insurance. Because insurers and governments share governance tasks (a point Baker makes elsewhere), insurers' failures in fact amount to “failed governance” of the corporate world.     

Gender Diversity in the FTSE 100: The Business Case Claim Explored

This article examines the debate within corporate governance about the appointment of female non‐executive directors (NEDs). The first part tracks the diversity story that corporate governance tells about itself from the Cadbury Report (1992) to the Davies Report (2011). The second sets out the evidence used to support the argument that female appointments enhance profits and corporate profile. The third part presents the authors' empirical analysis of FTSE 100 companies and female nonexecutive board membership, and concludes that there is little evidence that companies with female board membership display different characteristics from those without. Industry sector emerges as a significant factor in female appointments. The idea that women should be appointed to boards to increase corporate profitability and profile is not strongly supported by this analysis. A social justice argument based upon the right of woman to equal economic participation opportunities provides a much superior articulation of the need for boardroom diversity.     

论高管“问题薪酬”的董事问责

如遇高管薪酬,董事就可能基于互惠和群体思维等情景以及单纯接触效应和框定效应下的生物本能,无意识地"董董相护",高管"寻租"如愿以偿,自应对董事问责。理性回路下的注意路径不能对情感回路下的"董董相护"对症下药,实际上放纵了高管"问题薪酬"。以诚信路径予以涵摄,则可以不枉不纵。是否构成"董董相护",需借助于高管薪酬的合理性进行推论。基于高管薪酬合理性边界的模糊性,拿捏高管薪酬的合理性,需以企业价值最大化为指针,借助高管薪酬的标准、水平和结构的合理性,厘定相应的参照系。     

论银行公司治理制度的构建

在银行中,利益冲突的范围不同于实体经济中一般的工商企业,但是,一直以来银行的公司治理制度并没有给予银行中特别的利益冲突以特别关注。美国2007-2009年的金融危机表明,有必要调整和改革银行的公司治理结构。银行功能的社会公益性以及银行中特殊的利益冲突和其它的特点使得在构建银行的公司治理结构时,不能够简单地适用普通公司的治理模式,而要在股权治理、债权治理和监管治理之中寻求平衡。     

论我国上市公司内部监督机制模式的选择--兼及独立董事与监事会的关系

为了完善上市公司治理结构,防止内部人控制,保护中小股东的利益,我国引入了英美法上的独立董事制度.中国引进和移植独立董事制度必须联系中国的实际情况,处理好其本土化问题,特别是要协调好与监事会的关系,这将决定着独立董事制度在中国的移植能否成功.通过对独立董事制度与监事会制度的关系进行比较,指出我国新<公司法>应授权上市公司在其章程中任意选择采用单层制或双层制公司监督机制模式.     

Fiduciary duties of interlocking directors within a nonprofit health system

In response to regulatory and financial pressures, entities participating in the healthcare industry have joined with others in order to maintain, even improve, their market positions. In the non-profit sector of the industry, partnerships, mergers, and acquisitions have included arrangements whereby some corporate partners have interlocking directors. After review of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed by corporate board members, and their application to traditional performance and conflict of interest situations, the authors address two scenarios raising interlocking director issues.     

论域外公司治理改革实践经验之借鉴

近年来,英美等国开始对其公司治理模式进行了一系列改革,包括制定各种公司治理的原则、指引、章程、鼓励机构投资者参与公司治理、要求公司增强董事会的独立性、在董事会内引入一定数量的独立董事等,希望通过这些措施,增强公司的内部监控力度,以弥补由于外部监控不足所造成的问题.而德日的内部监控模式也开始学习、借鉴和效仿英美的公司治理模式.剖析、借鉴实践中各国公司治理改革经验将对我国公司治理的改进提供有益的帮助.     

THE LEGAL REGULATION ON BOARD SIZE IN CHINA: RETROSPECTION AND ANALYSIS

The issue of the board size includes sub-issues such as the number of directors and the structure of the board. Most management scholars believe that the number of directors, the proportion of different types of directors, and the power distribution between the board and managers, are important factors affecting the cost and performance of the board. The board size is also an interesting legal issue because it is subject to the company law. The existing Company Law of the People’s Republic of China sets upper and lower limits both on joint stock companies and limited companies. Such a strict legislative model is unique in the world. According to classical political theory, the recognition of free people is the most fundamental origin of the legitimacy of law. Therefore, the companies themselves are supposed to discover corporate governance pattern themselves. Is it necessary for legislators to set a limit on the number of directors? If so, should such limit be or permissive? What are the theoretical basis, the purpose, and the real effects of such a norm? This article attempts to answer the questions raised above.     

从三个“谁”的角度分析中国国有公司治理——鉴于日本的失败经验

在日本,公司治理的效力很早以前就成为较大的问题,很多人认为日本的许多经营者监督机制并没有发挥应有的作用,而是存在很多漏洞,这是因为日本的法律和现实情况之间存在很大的距离,比如日本的法律规定股东大会选任监事和董事,董事会和监事对董事或者代表董事进行监督,而在现实情况中,社长把握着极大的权力,可以选任自己的部下作为监事和董事,甚至在退休之后都可以垂帘听政。因此,20世纪90年代以后,日本引进了美国式的公司治理制度,但是这种公司治理制度改革不能认为是很成功的,以日本的失败经验为基础分析中国大型国有公司的公司治理问题很有参考价值,这就是日本没有从三个"谁"的视点进行改革。     

勒斯勒尔草案股份公司治理规则及发展

德国学者赫尔曼·勒斯勒尔帮助日本制订了第一部公司法（草案）,其中关于股份公司的一般规则,特别是股份公司机关的法的构造奠定了日本公司治理结构的深厚基础,了解这些可以掌握公司法中董事会、监事会、股东大会的历史流变和股份公司治理结构的发展脉络,并体会公司治理仍存在的制度性困惑。     

Las funciones de los consejeros independientes de las sociedades en México: Recomendaciones para el cambio a partir de las asimetrías existentes entre la práctica y la ley

The legal notion of an independent board member was introduced to the Mexican legislation in 2005. The goal was to improve the corporate governance of the corporations listed on the stock exchange. It was thought that including the independent board members would help to better represent the interest of the minority holders, as well as to increase the level of accountability. This article challenges these ideas based on 10 interviews carried out with independent board members. It finds that what the law says is far from what actuatly occurs: they lack of an adequate level of knowledge to perform their tasks, their degree of independence is severely limited by the criteria used to appoint them and they usually ignore essential corporate information, which impede them from participating effectively in the board sessions. The article suggests the creation of an independent board member’s association, a mechanism that, along with a mandatory certification system, would improve the way in which they perform their duties.     

公司治理问题的法学思考——对中国公司治理法律问题研究的回顾与展望

对公司治理相关问题的研究是近20年来学术界最为关注的热点问题之一，其研究范围涉及到经济学、法学、管理学、社会学等诸多领域。这一问题的研究成果直接推动了中国现代企业制度的建立和公司法的修改。以法学研究为切入点，从不同的视角，对国内多年来的公司治理相关研究成果予以条分缕析般的冷静审视和详尽评述，其内容涉及到公司治理的范畴与理念、公司治理的路径，以及公司治理研究中广受关注的公司章程、股东会决议瑕疵、董事会与董事、监事会、职工参与、中小股东利益保护等各个方面。并在此基础上，对未来公司治理研究的方法和重点进行了思考和展望。     

论我国公司董事权利法律规范的完善

董事制度是公司治理中的一个主要方面,要完善董事制度,首先必须处理好董事行使权利的问题.本文围绕一般董事个人享有的权利、独立董事权利的界定、对董事长权利的制约、董事通过董事会行使的权利等四个方面对公司董事的权利进行了分析,并对我国公司董事的权利与其他国家进行了比较.     

国有独资公司董事长的权源结构与运行

国有独资公司董事长作为董事会之常设机构和代表职位 ,在国有独资公司内部居于领导者的地位。但由于目前我国公司法设计上的固有缺陷 ,且在董事长的权力源结构中 ,非规范性法外权力实际大大超过了公司法上赋予的规范性权力 ,致使董事长集董事会职权于一身成为可能 ,权力变型运作成为一种普遍现象。基于此 ,跳出现有制度框架 ,在现行《公司法》之外寻求对国有独资公司内部治理结构的制度创新 ,从规范董事会、董事长之权力源入手 ,改善监事会的结构 ,充实监事会的力量 ,提升监事会的地位 ,建立全新的由监事会→董事会→经理机构的二层制治理结构模式 ,应是解决目前国有独资公司治理结构进退维局面艰较为可行的制度方案。为此 ,把国有独资公司从现行公司法中析出 ,适时制定单行的《国有独资公司法》已十分必要     

论中国公司法的供给侧结构性改革——兼论中国公司法的“服务型”转向

无论是从公司合同主义的理论解说路径出发,还是从优化营商环境改革的实践背景切入,甚或是从商主体治理的制度诉求出发,公司法的基本定位都应当是"服务型"的。以"服务品质"为标准重新检视中国公司法,我们会发现其至少存在"知识源"供给不均衡、公司合同范本"老化"以及过于依赖后置型公司合同"漏洞"填补机制三个层面的问题。这意味着中国公司法需要进行一场深入的供给侧结构性改革。通过引入与更新立法"知识源"、缺省性规范增量扩容、公司法规范的清单式指引设计、程序性规则体系化完善,以及构建创新导向型公司法基础规则、以信息信用为核心统筹公司信用监管体系、打造有助于投资而非投机的公司金融规则等举措,提升中国公司法在私人治理和国家战略两个维度上的服务品质。     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.     

New Governance,Chief Privacy Officers,and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An Initial Inquiry

While the turn from traditional regulation to more collaborative, experimentalist, and flexible forms of governance has garnered significant academic focus, far less attention has been paid to the effects of such “new governance” approaches on regulated firms' understanding of the laws' demands, and on the structures employed within business organizations to meet them. This article targets this analytic gap by examining internal corporate practices regarding consumer privacy, an arena in which the Federal Trade Commission and the states have adopted new governance models. Using data from qualitative interviews with leading corporate Chief Privacy Officers, as well as internal corporate documentation, it examines the way privacy practices have been catalyzed in the shadow of new privacy governance approaches and the combination of regulatory, market, and stakeholder forces they seek to harness. Specifically, it suggests the convergence of a set of practices adopted by privacy officers identified as “leaders,” regarding both high‐level corporate privacy management and the integration of privacy into entity‐wide risk management goals through technology, decision‐making processes, and the empowerment of distributed expertise networks throughout the firm.     

谈对董事会的控制问题--兼谈独立董事制度

董事会的权力日益膨胀,为了防止此种权力的滥用而有必要对董事会的行为进行控制.传统的控制机制以保护股东利益为宗旨,有很多缺陷;为了修正传统的控制机制,职工董事、职工股东、累积投票制、代理投票权竞争、要约收购等控制措施应运而生,但它们也有各自的缺陷.独立董事制度是一种较好的控制机制,其价值目标在于保证董事会的行为符合公司全体相关利益者的要求;但该机制价值的实现有赖于其内容设计的合理性.