问责、惯性与公开:基于97个公共危机事件的地方政府行为研究

以委托代理关系框架来定义公共危机事件中地方政府信息公开问题,以问责和惯性为关键解释变量建立理论模型,形成了研究假设,并以2009—2011年97个公共危机案例数据对研究假设进行检验。研究发现,地方政府危机信息处于普遍的不公开状况,政府响应程度、危机事件级别、政府层级、地方政府既有透明度显著影响地方政府危机信息公开程度,上级是否介入、媒体关注度及危机事件类型对其影响不显著。结果表明问责和惯性是地方政府危机信息公开与否的主要激励来源,信息公开相关制度、信息环境变化并未对其产生实质影响。地方政府隐瞒危机事件信息的制度逻辑在于在上下分治的宏观治理结构中,就危机事件问责地方政府构成了中央政府分散执政风险的一种机制。在既有研究的基础上,本文通过系统的定量研究为公共危机事件中地方政府信息公开问题提供理论解释。由于数据的限制,讨论并未涵盖自然灾害事件。     

问责、惯性与公开:基于97个公共危机事件的地方政府行为研究北大核心CSSCI

以委托代理关系框架来定义公共危机事件中地方政府信息公开问题,以问责和惯性为关键解释变量建立理论模型,形成了研究假设,并以2009—2011年97个公共危机案例数据对研究假设进行检验。研究发现,地方政府危机信息处于普遍的不公开状况,政府响应程度、危机事件级别、政府层级、地方政府既有透明度显著影响地方政府危机信息公开程度,上级是否介入、媒体关注度及危机事件类型对其影响不显著。结果表明问责和惯性是地方政府危机信息公开与否的主要激励来源,信息公开相关制度、信息环境变化并未对其产生实质影响。地方政府隐瞒危机事件信息的制度逻辑在于在上下分治的宏观治理结构中,就危机事件问责地方政府构成了中央政府分散执政风险的一种机制。在既有研究的基础上,本文通过系统的定量研究为公共危机事件中地方政府信息公开问题提供理论解释。由于数据的限制,讨论并未涵盖自然灾害事件。     

我国行政问责问题研究综述

近年来,随着行政问责制在公共危机事件中的运用,对其研究日益受到重视.从研究情况可以看出,责任政府的建立是行政问责的逻辑起点.问责制、行政问责和行政问责制是从不同角度对行政问责的界定.问责主体包括体制内和体制外的有权机构等,问责的客体包括行政机关、行政机关的领导者和公务人员.行政问责的范围是研究的一个重点,有人认为任何违反法律的行政行为都可能遭遇问责;也有人认为行政问责可以包括法律问责、政治问责、等级管理问责和职业道德问责四个方面;等等.在行政问责研究中还存在一些不足,如对异体问责中的具体措施及法律保障研究不够;对问责对象的范围和行政问责的救济方式与途径的研究也有待加强.     

我国公共危机管理中官员问责体系存在的问题分析

近年来,我国公共危机越来越呈现频发的态势.在公共危机管理中政府官员问责是重要的一环.公共危机管理的事前预防和事中应对都需要建立官员问责制,以有效预防和应对危机.目前我国,公共危机管理的官员问责体系在问责主体、问责客体、问责法规、责任认定以及对被问责官员的处理方面还存在若干问题,对此,需要进一步完善官员问责制,以规范而又严格的对官员责任的追究来有效地进行公共危机的管理.     

政治问责及相关概念辨析

基于问责的语义分析与学理阐释可知,作为机制的问责是指问责对象有义务就其行为、政策或职责表现等向问责主体告知、回答、解释与证明,如果问责对象存在失责行为则应接受问责主体的惩罚或制裁。政治以公共决策为重要内容,以行使公共权力为主要方式。在此意义上,可将狭义的政治问责界定为政治官员有义务就其在公共决策与推动公共政策执行中的行为与绩效,向社会公众、代议机关或执政党告知、回答、解释与证明,如果存在违法或不符合民意等失责行为,则应承担政治信任流失甚至公共决策权力丧失的后果。此外,政治问责与行政问责、民主问责、公共问责、社会问责等相关概念既有区别又存在交叉重叠,对其进行比较分析,有助于促进问责领域概念使用的规范化。     

责联网：大数据驱动的精准问责实现机制

精准问责是全面从严治党和问责实践发展的必然要求。从责任政治理论视角看,责任是精准问责的突破口,大数据时代为精准问责提供了技术支撑。基于责任政治理念和大数据技术提出的促进精准问责实现的责联网模型,它包括风险知识层、责任设计层、责任管理层、责任文化层等四个层级。文章从关键要素和主要机制两个维度介绍了责联网在消防安全管理领域的实践应用,同时对责联网赋能精准问责的技术治理问题进行了反思。责联网为实现精准问责提供了新的分析视角和技术路径,基于大数据技术的责任管理体系可以形成对责任的动态与量化管理,有助于解决精准问责的责任认定与追究等难题。     

“官员问责”呼唤从制度上突破

自2003年“非典”时期一大批各级官员因未能履行职责而被就地免职以来，“官员问责”制开始走进人们的政治生活。这表明我国对重大事故、事件中失职的官员进行问责已经付诸实践，责任政府的形象已深入人心。树立权责对等理念，建立责任政府正在成为我国政治体制改革的一个新的举措。，     

西方国家选民问责政府的路径分析

政府问责是责任政府的必然要求。西方国家的选民通过直接路径、间接路径和复合路径三种类型的方式来向政府问责。这三种类型的问责路径与西方国家的选举活动和选举制度密切相关，选举对政府问责有着很大的影响。西方国家的选举与政府问责的关系对我国的选举制度、人民代表大会制度和政府问责制度的完善有可借鉴之处。     

当代中国决策问责的内在逻辑及优化策略

实现国家治理现代化,建立以决策问责为核心的责任政府是关键。然而,当前中国以责任政府建设为目标的问责实践却呈现出“重执行、轻决策”的特征,对决策失误缺乏有效的责任追究,造成了决策失误多发与决策问责缺乏并存的现象。从主体与责任的视角观察,造成这一现象的根本原因有两个方面:一是决策责任主体的多元性形成了主体间的内在张力,导致责任追究中的“多只手难题”;二是决策责任类型的多样性形成了各责任类型的不同适用情形,导致责任追究中的“多责任混乱”。对此,应当以明晰公共决策的责任主体和明确公共决策的责任类型为着力点,在厘清集体决策责任与个人决策责任界限的基础上,通过建立科学的决策责任终身追究制度和责任倒查机制,实现决策问责制度的优化重构。     

行政问责的理论依据新探

契约理论主要阐述权力行使与责任担当的双向依存关系,责任伦理则强调了对行为过程及其结果负责的伦理诉求,契约理论与责任伦理相结合共同构筑了行政问责的理论基础。"人民主权"是"政府治权"的逻辑前提,当政府行为违背"公意"时,政府的权力就是"非正义"的,人民有权追究政府的责任,这是行政问责最直接的理论资源。责任伦理所蕴涵的"尽己之责"使命、恪尽职守"敬业"和行为后果担当是行政问责的直接理论依据。     

制度问责化与问责制度化

制度是"秀才"和"兵"的结合。"秀才"是制度中的肯定性责任,它告诉人们"路在何方"。"兵"是制度中的否定性责任,它对误入歧途者进行问责。所有的制度,都需强化"兵"的存在,是"制度问责化"。"兵"也容易在情绪决策博弈中迷失方向。由此,需要设置更高位阶的制度,对位阶较低的"兵"予以监管,是"问责制度化"。要实现问责制度化,需在封闭原理的指引下,藉由制度中安排"兵","兵"上安排制度,层层递进,构成一个问责循环系统。从理论回归实践,人民问责权层面的制度、问责权层面的制度、管理权层面的制度,互相运作,形成了实践形态的问责循环系统。其中,只有诉诸制度建设和理性教育,促进管理权的常态监管和非常态监管,人民问责权作为问责循环系统的枢纽才能日趋牢固。     

Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation

Accountability is said to be about the management of expectations. Empirical studies reveal considerable variation in organizational interest, intensity, and investment in accountability relationships. Less is known, however, about what explains these observed variations. Drawing on accountability and reputation‐concerned literatures, this article argues that a reputation‐based perspective on accountability offers an underlying logic that explains how account‐giving actors and account‐holding forums actually manage these expectations and how organizations make sense of and prioritize among accountability responsibilities. Reputational considerations act as a filtering mechanism of external demands and help account for variations in degrees of interest in, and intensity of, accountability. The resulting accountability outcomes are coproduced by the reputational investment of both account‐giver and account‐holder, resulting in distinct accountability constellations and outcomes.     

Promoting Accountability in Municipalities

Local government financial reporting reforms in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s were promoted on the basis of usefulness for decision making and for enhanced accountability purposes. Persistent criticisms of these reforms continue to be made, including those made by councillors and other ratepayers who often appear to find such information to be too narrow, too complex and often bewildering. A case is made for rethinking the present mentality, requirements and practices, especially with respect to the contrived recognition of ‘community assets’. Instead, an emphasis is placed on advancing broad‐scope accountability and meaningful financial reporting. To this end, the disclosure of a set of factual, reliable and interpretable indicators is proposed to enable a broader, more functional notion of accountability to be applied in Australian local government within prevailing social and organisational contexts. This contribution seeks to present a series of views, questions and proposals that are strictly concerned with ‘promoting accountability in municipalities’ (PAM).     

Contracting Out and Accountability

Governments are increasingly moving to contract out the provision of public services which have previously been delivered by public service departments. Contracting out typically implies provision by private sector contractors. However, it may also include in-house provision by public service departments or other public agencies where the right to provide is won through competitive tendering and is governed by contract. At the Commonwealth level, the trend has been given added impetus by the Coalition government elected in 1996 (Reith J 996; National Commission of Audit 1996).
The main rationale for contracting out is to improve efficiency in service provision by harnessing the virtues of competition, in particular the superior productivity engendered among competitive providers (Industry Commission (IC) 1996, B3.4; Appendix E). At the same time, there is a legitimate expectation that providers of public services paid for by public funds will be publicly accountable (IC 1996, BI). However, contracting out has the potential to reduce the extent of public accountability by transferring the provision of public services to members of the private sector who are generally not subject to the same accountability requirements as public officials. Indeed, reduction in such accountability requirements may be one of the reasons for the greater efficiency of the private sector.     

Equity and Accountability: The Impact of State Accountability Systems on School Finance

Using an 11‐year panel data set containing information on revenues, expenditures, and demographics for every school district in the United States, we examine the effects of state‐adopted school accountability systems on the adequacy and equity of school resources. We find little relationship between state implementation of accountability systems and changes in school finance equity, though we do find evidence that states in which courts overturned the school finance system during the decade exhibited significant equity improvements. Additionally, while implementation of accountability per se does not appear linked to changes in resource adequacy, states that implemented strong accountability systems did experience improvements.     

公共决策中的责任机制

在我国社会转型过程中,传统政府形态发生了很大变化,正在实现由行政型政府向管理型政府转变;由管制型政府向服务型政府转变;由无限政府向有限政府转变。在此过程中,政府决策的范围和方式也发生了很大的变化。在传统全能政府时期,政府决策涵盖到社会生活、经济生活的各个领域,而在社会转型之后,政府则更加注重对社会公共事务的决策和管理。由此,政府决策的责任机制也发生了根本性转变。目前,我国应加快建立起公共决策的责任机制。     

Accountability in the Privatized State

As well as better efficiency and improved services, privatization has also often promised improved accountability. But how does the empirical evidence on this look and what are the lessons here? This article looks at the notion of accountability and the degree to which privatizing public sector activities might improve or worsen such mechanisms. It then looks specifically at the different systems of accountability existing following three privatization activities in Victoria and compares these against that existing previously under public operation. The sale of electricity sector enterprises, the operation of urban rail service franchises, and the implementation of a public–private partnership project to supply transport infrastructure are adopted as case studies. For each case study, accountability systems are articulated and the operation of these systems is discussed. Overall, the article analyses the effectiveness of accountability systems now operating in the privatized state from the perspective of stakeholders. Importantly, the degree to which trade‐offs may have been made under new accountability arrangements is also discussed. Finally, the article draws together some general lessons on accountability for future privatization activities and proposes a conceptual model for a pyramid of accountability.