The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature

Abstract In this study, we assess the potential for policy change of the German government of Helmut Kohl after unification combining party positions with formal bicameral settings in a spatial model of legislative action. We distinguish between two policy areas and two types of legislation, mandatory and non–mandatory legislation imposing either a symmetric or asymmetric power distribution between both German chambers. In order to identify German legislators' party positions in different policy areas, we use data from ECPR Party Manifesto research covering the period from German unification in 1990 to the end of the government of Helmut Kohl in 1998. We find that the federal government of Helmut Kohl had a policy leadership position until April 1991 with no procedural differences, but the gridlock danger for governmental proposals was higher on the societal than the economic dimension. Afterwards, the government's potential for policy change was considerably determined by the type of legislation, independently from the policy dimension. At the end of the Kohl era, the governmental policy leadership position was limited to policies that left even the opposition majority of German states better off. The procedural settings mattered greatly on the economic dimension, and the danger of gridlock on societal policy was smaller only for non–mandatory legislation.     

Policy making in divided government: A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce ‘gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.     

The green party in German politics

Among the parties emerging from the ‘new social movements’ in Western Europe, the German Green Party represents the most successful of the ‘new type’ parties so far. This article surveys the salient features of the party, its programme, strategy and organisational structure, showing the problems the party faces in all three respects. Attention is also paid to the nature of electoral support given to the Greens as well as to the impact the party is having on the established parties and the political system.     

Partisanship and party preference in government and opposition: The mid-term perspective

Most previous in-depth survey analysis of British political partisanship and party preference has focused upon election times. We use new data from a major panel study covering the years 1965–1974 to investigate trends and patterns in the midterm as well as at general election times.This leads to rather different conclusions about the utility of the party identification concept, about homing tendencies, and about trends in class depolarization and partisan dealignment.The key to political change in Britain is the mid-term of Wilson's 1966–1970 Labour government, not the crisis election of 1974.     

Partisan politics and stock market performance: The effect of expected government partisanship on stock returns in the 2002 German federal election

Rational partisan theory suggests that firms perform better under right- than left-leaning governments. In the pre-election time, investors should anticipate these effects of government partisanship. This is the first study to investigate such anticipated partisan effects in Germany. Applying conditional volatility models we analyze the impact of expected government partisanship on stock market performance in the 2002 German federal election. Our results show that small-firm stock returns were positively (negatively) linked to the probability of a right- (left-) leaning coalition winning the election. Moreover, we find that volatility increased as the electoral prospects of right-leaning parties improved, while greater electoral uncertainty had a volatility-reducing effect.     

Recasting German federalism? The politics of fiscal decentralization in post-unification Germany

Why did the ideas of fiscal decentralization gain such political currency in Germany in the late 1990s but meet such a relatively dismal political fate by the Summer of 2001? In answering this question, I propose a framework centered around the interaction of ideas and state institutions to study the politics of fiscal decentralization in advanced democratic nation-states. First, I show that the new set of politically-charged ideas of fiscal decentralization which gained political weight in Germany in the late 1990s were driven by economic problems associated with German unification, the increasing popularity of “fiscal federalism” in German policy circles, and a centerperiphery conflict within German political parties. Second, my analysis explains the political failure of these ideas despite their apparent popularity among political and policy elites. Here, I focus on the role of the upper house of the German parliament in order to explain why these ideas have had such little policy success. After demonstrating that the long-standing tradition of “cooperative” federalism has largely survived German unification, the paper concludes by discussing the potential impact of the European Union’s 1997 Growth and Stability Pact on German federalism.     

The federal government and medical technology: Crossing policy and management thresholds

This paper reviews the changes in federal government involvement in medical technology in the pastdecade, from prior reliance upon non-governmental decision-making about development, diffusion, anduse, to increasingly centralized decision-making. The case of end-stage renal disease offers contrastsbetween the past and present. The cases of Karen Ann Quinlan and CT scanning indicate the source ofpresent scepticism about benefits and costs of medical technology. Current federal involvement in medicaltechnology decision-making, through health planning, medical device regulation, and increased formalanalysis of safety, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness, is described. Though increased federal involvementin medical technology stems from a desire to compensate for failures of the medical marketplace, theimmediate effect is to place greater decision-making reliance upon formal analysis, bureaucracy, legalprocedure, and politics. It is unclear whether the result of increased federal involvement will producebeneficial outcomes.Prepared for the Technology and Public Policy Workshop, Massachusetts Institute of Technology andAlfred P. Sloan Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Februari 16–17, 1979.     

Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles

Political budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature must typically authorize new debt, divided government can make these fiscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the budget law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.     

Left-right party ideology and government policies: A meta-analysis

Abstract. This paper summarizes how the partisan influence literature assesses the relationship between the left–right party composition of government and policy outputs through a meta–analysis of 693 parameter estimates of the party–policy relationship published in 43 empirical studies. Based on a simplified 'combined tests' meta–analytic technique, we show that the average correlation between the party composition of government and policy outputs is not significantly different from zero. A mutivariate logistic regression analysis examines how support for partisan theory is affected by a subset of mediating factors that can be applied to all the estimates under review. The analysis demonstrates that there are clearly identifiable conditions under which the probability of support for partisan theory can be substantially increased. We conclude that further research is needed on institutional and socio–economic determinants of public policy.     

Two political worlds?: The influence of provincial party loyalty federal voting in Canada

Scholars have known for years that many Canadian voters hold different partisan loyalties at the federal and provincial level. In this paper, I address the question of whether provincial party loyalty has an effect on federal level vote choice above and beyond the effects of federal level party loyalty. I also examine whether provincial party loyalty is enough to explain the persistence of the ‘two-party-plus’ system in Canada. In order to address these questions I construct a series of multinomial logit models of federal vote choice in the 1993 and 2000 Canadian elections. I conclude that provincial party loyalty does have an effect on federal level vote choice, but that this influence is not enough to explain the persistence of the ‘two-party-plus’ system.     

From autocracy to party government: Interpreting regime changes in Spain and Portugal

The Transition to Democracy in Spain. By José Maravall. London: Croom Helm, 1982. Pp.213. £14.95.

Democratic Politics in Spain. Edited by David S. Bell London: Frances Pinter, 1983. Pp.xiii + 203. £15.00.

Spain, Conditional Democracy. Editedby Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents. London: Croom Helm, 1984. Pp. 198. £14.95.

Portugal, A Twentieth‐century Interpretation. By TOM Gallagher. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983. Pp.xii + 278. £18.50.

Portugal Since the Revolution: Economic and Political Perspectives. Edited by Jorge Braga de Macedo and Simon Serfaty. Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. Pp.xiv + 217. £13.25.

In Search of Modern Portugal. The Revolution and its Consequences. Edited by Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1983. Pp.xv + 380. $30.00.