Strategic Anticipation of En Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

The quest for empirical evidence of strategic judicial behavior has produced mixed results. This study finds such evidence in the decisions made while crafting an opinion. Central to any opinion is which precedents are cited and whether their scope is limited (negative treatment) or expanded (positive treatment). I look for evidence of strategic anticipation of en banc review in these decisions using an original dataset of published search and seizure cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1953 to 2010. A panel is less likely to negatively treat a precedent with which the full circuit is more closely aligned. Circuit preferences also have an effect on citation itself, but only when the panel is at least moderately aligned with a precedent. Moreover, the panel's own ideology is only a significant predictor of citation when the full circuit is favorably disposed toward a particular precedent.     

Judicial Specialization and Ideological Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals

We investigate the influence of subject matter expertise, opinion specialization, and judicial experience on the role of ideology in decision making in the courts of appeals in a generalized, as opposed to specialized, setting. We find that subject matter experts and opinion specialists are significantly more likely to engage in ideological decision making than their nonspecialist counterparts and that opinion specialization is a particularly potent factor in ideological decision making. Further, increased judicial experience has no effect on the conditional use of ideology. We discuss the potentially wide‐ranging implications of our findings for both theory and policy.     

Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?

This article investigates possible ideological differences between circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. It looks at the distribution of three‐judge panel ideologies on the circuits and at differences in decisionmaking patterns, testing several theoretical approaches to circuit differences: the attitudinalist approach, arguing that different judicial ideologies account for intercircuit differences; historical‐institutionalist approaches that argue that circuit norms lead to differences in the proportion of conservative decisions and in the effects of judicial ideologies; and the rational‐choice institutionalist argument that overall circuit preferences constrain three‐judge panel decisions through the en banc process. Using a multilevel logit model, the study finds some support for the attitudinalist and historical‐institutionalist accounts of circuit differences. It also finds that intercircuit ideological differences contribute comparatively little to the prediction of appeals court outcomes.     

Institutional Arrangements and the Dynamics of Agenda Formation in the U.S. Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals

The manner in which agenda change occurs demonstrates how institutional arrangements influence agenda priorities in the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals. A neo-institutional theoretic perspective is employed to examine the dynamics of agenda formation in these courts. The article finds that the Supreme Court's agenda choices influence the decisions of litigants, interest groups, and lawyers to appeal certain cases to the Courts of Appeals. While the Supreme Court's agenda primarily is influenced by internal factors, it is constrained by agenda changes in the appeals courts. Critically, it is shown that these federal appellate courts exist within an endogenous system with respect to agenda formation, as both courts respond to agenda changes made in the other over time.     

Small‐Group Dynamics,Ideology, and Decision Making on the US Courts of Appeals

There is some evidence that judges who specialize in particular legal areas vote in more ideologically consistent ways than do nonspecialists. Upon replicating those individual results across multiple legal areas in the US courts of appeals, we assess how this increasing reliance on ideology by specialists affects decision making by others on a three‐judge panel. We find that judges who serve with a specialist are especially likely to vote in a manner consistent with the ideological position of the specialist with whom they serve. These results suggest that specialization has the potential to facilitate panel effects across numerous legal policy areas.     

Is the Sum Greater than Its Parts? Circuit Court Composition and Judicial Behavior in the Courts of Appeals

Building on strategic models and the collegial nature of the U.S. courts of appeals, this article assesses the influence of a circuits' composition on individual judges' behaviors and the president's role in shaping the courts. As partisanship is one of the few signals of a nominee's ideology known to an executive administration at the time of appointment, it is important to measure partisan composition as a factor in individual behavior as well as other measures of overall ideology of the circuit. This article finds that the composition of the circuits influences individual behavior, even after controlling for individual ideology, panel effects, and other contextual factors. This remains true whether we examine composition based on partisanship or on more nuanced ideological measures. Noting that presidents, on average, create new partisan majorities within two circuits per four‐year term, these findings suggest turnover on circuit courts may have influences on case outcomes outside of a particular new appointee's voting record.     

The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts'Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R.

Historians and political scientists have noted that appointments of judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals are not determined by senatorial courtesy alone. What has not been adequately explained is why and when a president defers to a senator's choice rather than seek to control the selection. This article attempts to understand the politics of federal appellate court appointments. The author first identifies a major change in the work of the courts of appeals during the years 1900-1945—the growth in review of the actions of newly created federal regulatory agencies. Then, by examining Justice Department files and presidential correspondence, he discoveres three patterns of appointment emerging in the same period. The patterns vary with presidential perceptions of the role of the federal government and of the courts of appeals' ability to affect accomplishment of administration goals. Appointments during the first years of the presidencies of Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and during the Harding and Coolidge administrations were dominated by patronage concerns. Those administrations yielded to the recommendations of senators and demonstrated no interest in the policy-making potential of these courts. In the two other patterns the White House played a more active role, with senators more often deferring to the president's selection. Concerns about professionalism dominated selections in Taft's and Hoover's administrations: because they recognized the policy importance of those judgeships but saw the role of government as limited, they sought judicial craftsmen who would make policy only incrementally. Policy concerns dominated selections during Wilson's administration and the latter years of both the Roosevelts' administrations: Justice Department officials screened nominees to determine their policy orientation, because federal appellate court judgeships were perceived as crucial policy positions that could affect the president's ability to implement his reform programs.     

Expertise,Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

What roles do prior expertise and accumulated experience play in shaping ideologically consistent voting on a specialized court? Using a dataset of obviousness patent cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit spanning 1997–2007, we show that prior expertise enhances the influence of ideology on judicial decisionmaking, but that accumulated experience does not. In addition, we build on previous work and show that ideology is a factor in decisionmaking in technical areas of law, contrary to the received wisdom on patent cases.     

Appeals to Reason

This article considers how statistical reasoning changes conceptions of evidence and proof. Beginning with three Court of Appeal judgments in which proof is quantified, it traces the implications of statistical ways of thinking about proof through the law of criminal evidence. This leads to the bizarre conclusion that proof is, by and large, impossible. The argument then takes a more constructive turn. The way in which the presumption of innocence is conceptualised in statistical argument is criticised and it is suggested that proof depends on a precondition of trust in the way suspects are selected by the police. For that trust to be deserved, police suspects must be chosen in a legitimate manner.     

美国州法院统一预算体制及其借鉴——以法院预算过程的内部组织为重点

1970年代以来,美国州法院体系逐步确立了理性、集中的预算管理体制.在法院经费管理领域导入科层模型的原因是多元的,既包括一些改革者意识到的优点,也包括一个可能并未充分意识到的制度环境.针对科层化的预算管理体制可能产生的缺陷,美国州法院体系采取了一系列的应对措施,这些措施的核心是创建一个可以吸引法院体系内部和外部的个人和机构共同参与的治理结构.美国州法院统一预算体制对于我国当前正在开展的法院经费保障体制改革具有两个方面的借鉴意义.     

中国呼唤司法独立

在中国，司法独立已被作为一项宪法原则提出，但很难说现实社会中有真正的司法独立存在。司法之所以要独立，是市场经济规律在法律上的反映，是法治的逻辑必然。司法只有独立才能防止来自外界的不当干扰，确保公正裁判。20年改革开放的进行，为我国司法独立奠定了经济、政治和思想条件。