The German Lander and EU enlargement: Between apple pie and issue linkage

While the government parties had blamed the lingering burden of unification and the global economic crisis for the bulk of Germany's troubles in the 2002 election campaign, the topic of gridlock and policy reform is re-entering the agenda of German politics. From a scientific view, the analysis of Schröder's potential for policy change imposes some challenges. Germany needs reforms in many policy areas, in particular in the economic and societal domains. We present a new method to measure the positions of political parties on many issues. To identify the structural causes for German gridlock we apply the spatial model for legislative choice, which uncovers the room for manoeuvre. More precisely, we intend to show how much potential for policy change the Schröder government will have in economic, societal and foreign policy, and which policy position will be promoted by the Red–Green coalition in these areas.     

Party Competition and Government Formation in Germany: Business as Usual or New Patterns?

The process of coalition formation following the 2017 Bundestag election was the most difficult in German post-war history. For the first time, Germany saw negotiations fail, a minority government being discussed as a real possibility, and the federal president involved as formateur in coalition politics. The aim of this contribution is to explain why government formation was so intricate after the 2017 election. To this end, we trace patterns of party politics and the development of the German party system since 2013. We then study general patterns of government formation at the regional and national levels since the 1990s and evaluate whether these have changed with the advent of the right-wing populist party, Alternative for Germany. Our analysis of the 2017–2018 government formation is based on a novel expert survey of the policy profiles of German parties on various issue dimensions, conducted in 2017. The results show that the continuation of the incumbent coalition government of Christian and Social Democrats was the most likely outcome, and that the Social Democrats were indeed able to enforce a surpassing share of their policy positions in the final negotiation rounds.     

Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002

We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government.     

Contesting Europe,or Germany's Place in Europe? European Integration and the EU Policies of the Grand Coalition Government in the Mirror of Parliamentary Debates in the Bundestag

This article explores how European integration is contested between political parties in debates of the German Bundestag. Distinguishing between ‘domestic’ debates about the conduct of EU policy-making by the German government and ‘supranational’ debates about the institutions and policies of the European Union, the article asks for thematic objects and patterns of polarisation between parties within these debates. Presenting empirical evidence from the manual coding of 23 plenary debates during the second ‘Grand Coalition’ government, it is shown that the polarisation between parliamentary parties differs greatly at both levels of discussion. Whereas the antagonism between government and opposition appears to determine the polarisation of parties in ‘domestic’ debates, more ambiguous and atypical position patterns emerge on behalf of supranational issues. Therefore, the article suggests that a differentiation of various levels of debate is helpful in capturing the polarisation of political parties over the issue of European integration.     

Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis

Veto player approaches have come to occupy a central role in comparative politics. This article critically reviews the literature, focussing especially on veto player explanations of policy outputs and outcomes. The review highlights three problems empirical veto player studies have to face: 1) identifying the relevant veto players, 2) establishing equivalence between veto players, and 3) specifying (theoretically or empirically) veto players' policy preferences. The article concludes that empirical veto player analyses advance our understanding of political institutions and their effects, but that they should deal more systematically with the three above mentioned problems.     

From ‘Dream Team’ to ‘Marriage of Convenience’? An Introduction

This introduction connects some of the main themes covered in this special issue on Chancellor Merkel's second coalition cabinet, which was formed in October 2009 and ended with the electoral collapse of the FDP in the Bundestag election of September 2013. It starts by setting out an interesting ‘puzzle’: the parties forming the coalition of 2009–2013 (CDU, CSU and FDP) had expressed a strong preference for this coalition in the run-up to the election of 2009. Despite their seeming agreement in many policy areas, the coalition formed in 2009 faced tough negotiations and conflicts between the parties from the beginning. The economic crisis the preceding government faced between 2005 and 2009 and unforeseen events during the course of the CDU/CSU–FDP coalition 2009–2013 (e.g. the Euro crisis and the Fukushima environmental disaster) had altered the policy agenda in important ways and rendered the former ‘Christian–Liberal reform project’ obsolete.     

End of Consensus? The European Leadership Discourse of the Second Merkel Government during the Eurozone Crisis and Its Contestation in Debates of the Bundestag (2009−13)

This article investigates the political discourse on the resolution of the Eurozone of the second Merkel government and its political contestation in plenary debates of the Bundestag. The empirical part demonstrates the high relevance of normative arguments in the debate, both for the case made by the government parties for a Stability Union and related concepts of austerity and economic reform, and for the competing discourse by the opposition parties for investment and debt mutualisation in the Eurozone. Moreover, the analysis reveals that a strong value- and identity-based commitment to European integration continues to be supported by all political parties in the Bundestag. To conclude, the final section discusses party political and institutional factors to explain why the political contestation of the European leadership by the Merkel government in the Bundestag played only a very limited role at the federal election in September 2013.     

'Chief Executives' and their Parties: The Case of Germany

Based on a combination of two analytical perspectives on the relationship between chief executives and their parties, this article offers a historical assessment of chancellor/party relations in Germany since 1949. The case study provides only modest support for the popular assumption that the leaders of left-wing governments are generally more constrained by their parties than their 'bourgeois' counterparts. There is also little evidence supporting the view that the formal combination of party chairman and head of government per se determines much of the relationship between chief executives and their parties. Rather, both with regard to the durability of coalitions and the policy-making capacities of German chancellors, it is the relationship between the former and the Fraktion leaders of the coalition parties in the Bundestag that seems to constitute a key variable.     

Las reformas políticas en el gobierno de Sebastián Piñera Chile, 2010-2013

This paper analyzes political reforms carried out by Sebastián Piñera’s government in Chile. Te reforms considered are those that his Coalition for Change campaigned on as part of the presidential and legislative elections in 2009. Tese reforms promised an improvement in the quality of democracy, and promised its consolidation, including increased political participation, in order to counter the most common criticisms of institutions of representation. Throughout this process, the government showed little receptivity to proposals coming from other sectors, both of the ruling coalition and the opposition; furthermore, it paid scant attention to growing citizen protests and their demands voiced since his second year of government. Te information analyzed conveys little progress in decentralization and in the importance that players with veto powers were gaining within the ruling coalition.     

Misleading the German public: The new bundestag law on parliamentarians

This article outlines the history of several attempts to increase salaries and pensions of members of the German Bundestag in the early 1990s. It shows the unethical tactics used by parliamentarians and the way in which public information was in part consciously designed to mislead. It is argued that Bundestag members tend to form a political cartel when decisions concerning their salaries and pensions are made. Similiar tendencies can be observed in all parliamentary decisions involving party finance, providing support for Katz and Mair's thesis that ‘catch‐all’ parties are generally being replaced by ‘cartel parties’. Having analysed the issues involved, the article calls for greater accountability and responsibility on the part of German politicians when their own personal advantage is at issue.     

The Ambiguity of Veto Power in Coalitions: German Liberals' Role as a Watchdog in Justice and Home Affairs and their Failure to Sell Stalemate as Success in the Federal Elections of 2013

The article demonstrates that the rigid use of veto capacity in coalitions causes risks for re-election. Justice was a high-salience domain of the German Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), which occupied this portfolio in its coalition with the Conservative majority in the federal legislative period from 2009 to 2013. By analysing several legislative projects the article shows that their contents or non-adoption were an effect of liberals' vetoes. This policy-seeking strategy provoked conflicts within the coalition and stalemate making it impossible to realise popular measures that would have enhanced the Liberals' reputation and the importance of the domain for the voters who were mainly interested in economic and social policy. Moreover, the Liberals' vetoes led to a loss of support from its major coalition partner in the pre-election campaign. Thus governmental parties have to trade off policy and vote-seeking goals in order to get re-elected.     

From interest groups to parties: The change in the career patterns of the legislative elite in German social policy

Analysing the careers of members of the Bundestag Standing Committee for Labour and Social Affairs, the paper demonstrates that the ties between social politicians and social policy organisations such as trade unions, faith-based social policy organisations, independent charity organisations, works councils and social insurance institutions have become blurred. Since the 1990s social politicians have become more focused on political careers in the party and in parliament than on social policy. The new social politicians are party politicians who have distanced themselves from the interest groups. The qualitative change in parliamentary personnel is explained by changes in electoral politics, parties and interest groups. The author argues that the weakening linkages confirm contemporary research results on change in German neo-corporatism.     

Der Einfluss von Mandatstyp und Wahlkreiseigenschaften auf die inhaltlichen Positionen in Parlamentsreden: Eine Untersuchung anhand der parlamentarischen Debatten im Deutschen Bundestag von 1998 bis 2002

Giving speeches in parliament is a key element of elected representatives for signalling their policy agenda and their ideological positions to their party and their electorate. Taking a specific programmatic position might increase the chances of an MP to get re‐nominated and to win again a seat in the legislature. In this paper, we build on approaches of responsive behaviour of political actors and on principal agent theories and ask which variables can explain the programmatic positions adopted by MPs in their speeches. To answer our research question, we collected all speeches related to economic policy issues given by members of the German Bundestag in the time period between 1998 and 2002. We estimated their individual policy positions with computerised methods of content analysis. We combine this data with information on the characteristics of MPs, their position in party, parliament and government and, in addition, with the socioeconomic structure and former election results within the MPs’ constituency. The results show that German MPs take the characteristics and the economic problem pressure of their constituencies into account when speaking in parliament, so that there is empirical evidence for responsive and vote‐seeking behaviour of German MPs. In addition, political and institutional factors like the membership in committees or in (former) cabinets and the way how an MP was elected – directly or by party list – play a role for the degree of MP's programmatic deviation from the party line.     

Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany

The German Red‐Green government decided to phase out all nuclear power stations and stop the reprocessing of German nuclear fuel in Britain and France. The coalition agreement between the Greens and SPD set out a well‐defined timetable for the implementation of this policy, involving new legislation within the first 100 days and the negotiation of a consensus with the electricity utilities to be achieved within 12 months. While these deadlines passed without political results, an agreement between the government and the nuclear utilities was reached in mid‐June 2000. This analysis of the genesis and development of the policy of phasing out nuclear power focuses in particular on the difficulties of the Green Environment Minister, Jürgen Trittin, to put the anti‐nuclear policies of his party into practice. It is argued that the Greens faced a ‘no win’ situation in their attempt to design a constitutionally and politically viable phasing out policy. The party remains caught in the middle between the radical anti‐nuclear movement that continues its protest against all nuclear operations and an intransigent electricity industry fighting for its commercial self‐interest to keep nuclear stations running as long as possible. A range of theoretical approaches that could help the understanding of these processes is discussed, with an ‘advocacy coalition’ approach appearing to be the most promising option.     

When Investors Enjoy Less Policy Risk: Divided Government,Economic Policy Change,and Stock Market Volatility in Germany, 1970‐2005

How does divided government affect the probability of economic policy change, and thus policy risk on financial markets? In contrast to the standard balancing model we argue that divided government, i.e., partisan conflict between the executive and the legislative branches, negatively affects the possibility of economic policy change. Using a simple spatial model we demonstrate that one should expect divided government to increase the probability of policy gridlock. Since divided government reduces the probability of economic policy change, financial markets can operate under lower policy risk in times of divided than in periods of unified government. For the empirical evaluation we exploit the fact that stock return volatility provides us with a measure of risk. If the gridlock argument does hold, stock return fluctuations should be lower under divided than under unified government. Our results confirm that divided government has a volatility reducing effect on the German stock market. This supports the view that divided government lowers policy risk.     

The Lost Sexenio: Vicente Fox and the New Politics of Economic Reform in Mexico

The 2000 presidential election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox signaled an end to seven decades of Mexico's single-party regime and seemed to herald the advent of truly competitive politics. But by 2003, economic reform had largely stalled, and Fox's party suffered a historically unprecedented midterm' loss in the congress. This article analyzes the underpinnings of policy gridlock in the Fox administration. Fox inherited the need for microeconomic restructuring and increased competitiveness, more innovative and pragmatic state policies, the need to pay attention to the country's sharp income inequalities, and the challenge of crafting a political strategy that could build a middle ground and foster policy consensus. With his party's minority standing in the congress, Fox was constrained from the start by divided government. But more effective statecraft and coalition building would have helped. These will be essential elements for the success of any post-Fox regime.     

Sequenzorientierte Policy-Analyse

Due to the structural characteristics of the German system of government, political scientists often assume that policy-making will be affected by gridlock. Assuming exogenous preferences and stable institutional settings, they tend analytically toward interaction studies based on rational choice. As such studies analyze political decisions isolated from changes in social problems, preferences and institutional settings, their explanatory power focuses on incremental policy change. I suggest viewing political decision-making as a dynamic process. To do this, I examine the innovative pension reform initiated by the former Federal Minister of Labor, Walter Riester, looking at the feedback effects of policies on political action. On the theoretical level, this use of temporality is based on the assumption that policies need to have social integrative effects. My main hypothesis is that sequenceoriented analysis in policy studies would enable us to identify endogenous causes of innovative policy change.     

The New German party finance law

In 1992 the Federal Constitutional Court decided for the sixth time since 1949 that the German legislation concerning political finance was unconstitutional. While the first five cases were important milestones in the development of German law on the public funding of parties and campaigns, this decision was notable for its rejection of key provisions of two laws that were passed in the 1980s and for overturning the Court's previous ban on direct aid to the parties. A commission of experts was formed to study and recommend changes, and a new law was passed by the Bundestag and Bundesrat in November and December 1993. Instead of focusing on reimbursements of parties for their campaign expenditures, the new law provides for direct financing of parties based on one DM for each vote in EU, national, and Land elections and DM .50 for each D‐Mark received in party dues and donations up to DM 6,000 per person (12,000 per couple). For the first five million votes, the parties receive DM 1.30 per vote. To encourage citizen involvement, parties are not to receive more than the sum of all of their own source revenues, and the total support for all parties is not to exceed the DM 230 million (adjusted for inflation) that was given to the parties as reimbursements for campaign expenditures in the period 1989–1992. To those who have followed the controversies over German political financing since the 1950s, it will be no surprise to learn that the new legislation has provoked criticism and sparked plans to bring the new law before the Federal Constitutional Court.