Public Information and Regulatory Processes: What the Public Knows and Regulators Decide

Because bureaucratic agencies may be less transparent in their decision processes than legislatures, most states have developed processes to incorporate input from regulated communities and other parties potentially affected by regulations. Administrative agencies may encourage democratic practices to increase legitimacy and accountability of the bureaucracy and improve decision‐making processes. However, rules governing the regulatory process vary by state, with some incorporating more open practices than others. Understanding these dynamics is increasingly important, as the rulemaking process has become central to policymaking over the past several decades, with a large portion of policymaking authority delegated to administrative agencies. Drawing from regulatory documents, rulemaking comments, media coverage, and interviews with regulators in 14 regulatory decision processes across five states, this study finds that while states vary in their approach to providing access to information, there are overriding patterns that reduce the role of citizens and the overall transparency of regulatory processes.     

THE POLITICS OF LEGISLATIVE CURTAILMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: OBSTACLES TO POLICE-PATROL OVERSIGHT

State Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs), like their federal counterpart, attempt to even the odds that citizens’rights will be protected as administrative agencies exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. North Carolina is one of several states which has recently attempted to constrain agency power in rulemaking and complaint adjudication. This is a case study of policy outcomes attained by the North Carolina General Assembly in its 1985 revision of the state's APA. Why did some state legislators’efforts to assume stricter oversight over administrative rulemaking fall far short of the kind of control and accountability they aimed for? We explore three types of obstacles to APA reform encountered in North Carolina. Each is relevant to other states. First, direct surveillance or “police-patrol” techniques of legislative oversight impose undesirable political costs on legislators. Second, there is an absence of (or categorical precedence is against) the adoption of such techniques. Third, executive-legislative branch conflict and complex separation of powers issues arise when state legislatures attempt to curtail administrative rulemaking in significantly new and restrictive ways.     

Understanding State Rulemaking Processes: Developing Fracking Rules in Colorado,New York,and Ohio

Rulemaking is an integral component of environmental policy at both the federal and state level; however, rulemaking at the state level is understudied. With this research, we begin to fill that gap by focusing on rulemaking regarding the issue of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in three states: Colorado, New York, and Ohio. This policy issue is well suited to begin exploring state‐level rulemaking processes because the federal government has left fracking regulation to the states. Through semistructured interviews with a range of actors in the rulemaking process across these states, we establish a foundation from which future research in this area may build. This exploratory research yields some valuable insights into the roles different stakeholders are playing in regulating fracking in these three states, and our findings may be useful for explaining state‐level rulemaking more generally.     

The States Come Marching In: Examining State Agency Influence on Federal Rules

Amidst congressional gridlock, administrative rulemaking is the main pathway for environmental policy making. Scholars have assessed the role of the institutions of government (the president, Congress, and the courts) and key interest groups (i.e., business and environmental interests) in shaping rulemaking outcomes. What is missing from this literature is an assessment of the role of key implementers, state environmental agencies. This research fills this gap by assessing the role and impact of state government agencies in three case studies of rulemaking at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Based on original interviews and a public comment analysis, this research suggests that state agencies play an active and influential role in EPA rulemaking. And, in some cases, state agencies wield more influence than other interest groups. Interviewees argued that this influence stems from these agencies’ unique voice as an implementation collaborator. As a result, researchers should incorporate an assessment of the role of these interests to more effectively explain regulatory outcomes at the EPA and potentially across the bureaucracy.     

Are they really so different? Climate change rule development in the USA and UK

Climate change is an increasingly complex and global environmental issue. As a result, scholars have begun to compare the efforts of specific countries such as the UK and the USA in dealing with climate change. However, missing within this comparative literature is a discussion of the important role that administrative agencies play in implementing climate change policy through rulemaking. More specifically, it is unclear how administrative processes may impact or explain variations in the policy implemented within a given country. In fact, it has been over 25 years since Vogel's work compared the regulatory processes of the USA and UK. As a result, this paper's interviews with agency rule writers in both countries provide an updated comparison of their rulemaking processes, which is essential to understanding why countries may vary in the climate change policy they implement. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imposing Procedural Constraints on State Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Explanations

Scholars have offered different explanations for administrative procedures. One general approach stresses the importance of normative theory as a determinant of institutional choice, while two other perspectives emphasize the interests and political influence of pressure groups and legislators. To test these models, this study uses comparative state data to predict the adoption of three types of administrative procedures-legislative rule review, procedural requirements opening up the rulemaking process to public participation, and economic impact analysis. The findings suggest that factors associated with the adoption of one kind of administrative requirement may not be associated with the use of others. The analysis also suggests that, while ideology, political culture, and party competition intermittently affect the adoption of particular administrative procedures, they do not always have the kinds of effects that are suggested by the traditional state policy making literature.     

反腐的关键:规制行政裁量权

行政裁量权由于其可能导致肆意和专断,因而成为腐败的重灾区。因此,反腐的关键在于规制行政裁量权,保证行政裁量权在法治的轨道上运行。行政裁量权的规制属于复合规制模式,包括立法规制、行政规制、司法规制以及权利规制四种规制路径。然而规制模式有其内在的局限性,公众参与作为民主理论在行政过程的投射,其所具有的民意表达、利益协商、程序正义等功能和优势,可以实现对行政裁量权的有效规制。建立起公众参与的配套制度,并完善公众参与的程序设计,可以实现对行政裁量权的有效规制,促进反腐倡廉建设的健康发展。     

Procedural Change and the Sources of Ex Ante Constraints in EU Legislation

With 27 member states using a variety of administrative practices and institutions to implement European Union (EU) policy, the EU has been widely used as a natural laboratory for analyzing administrative politics and institutions. This research has largely focused on the institutional relationships as they are at the time of the analysis. However, the EU has used several legislative procedures. Furthermore, there has been little attention given to the administrative and delegatory consequences of changes in the EU's legislative procedures. This article examines how legislative institutions' preferences for limits to the implementing discretion of the Commission and the member states have changed with the shift from the cooperation procedure to the codecision procedure. I find that the European Parliament (EP) responded to the codecision procedure by increasing the share of its amendments that expand the implementing discretion of member states. Furthermore, the Council significantly changed its attitude toward EP amendments restricting Commission discretion.     

Sex-Based Occupational Segregation in U.S. State Bureaucracies, 1987–97

Is the extent of sex-based occupational segregation in U.S. state bureaucracies related to agency policy missions? Drawing on arguments by Lowi (1985), we contend that levels of sex-based occupational segregation in state bureaucracies vary depending on whether an agency's policy mission is distributive, regulatory, or redistributive. We employ data on the distribution of administrative and professional employees by sex in several types of state agencies across all 50 states for 1987–97. Our findings indicate high levels of occupational segregation among administrative cadres in agencies with distributive and regulatory policy commitments; however, professional workforces in these agencies have become less gender segregated over time. We find no evidence of occupational segregation among administrative and professional workforces in redistributive agencies. We argue that researchers need to examine the relationship between glass walls and other kinds of sex-based employment impediments, such as glass ceilings.     

THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977 IN OKLAHOMA: STATE AND FEDERAL COHABITATION

The enforcement of the SMCRA in Oklahoma has led to improvements and transformations in the coal industry, state and federal regulatory agencies and the public. The catalyst for these changes was the federal takeover of inspection and enforcement of the SMCRA in Oklahoma with the state carrying on all other mining regulatory activities from 1984 through 1987. This pattern of cohabitation differed from that in Tennessee where OSM took over all enforcement of the SMCRA or that in states that enter into cooperative agreements to provide state regulation of coal mining on federal lands within the state. Cohabitation in Oklahoma produced a new, more positive attitude toward cooperative federalism by both federal and state regulatory bodies that might serve as a model for other states with OSM maintaining state agency support for policy objectives while allowing the state reasonable decisional discretion.     

GRESHAM'S LAW: THE REGULATORY ANALOGY

The authors argue that delegation of discretion over environmental regulation to the states may trigger a process analogous to Gresham's Law in which lax regulation in one state drives out stringent regulation in neighboring states. This devolution to regulatory laxity is illustrated by the lax pesticide regulations in five Midwestern "agricultural" states. Questions are raised about the effects of the Reagan Administration's commitment to reduce the stringency of federal environmental regulations and delegate more regulatory discretion to the states.     

Organized interests and administrative rulemaking: the state of Wisconsin's lobbyists and coalitions

This study examines interest groups undertaking lobbying activity focused on administrative rulemaking. The analysis utilizes a dataset composed of observations made during the 2009–2010 Wisconsin Legislative Session, including the entire population of groups lobbying during this time period. This research examines the participants, efforts, and coalitions utilized when groups engaged in lobbying activity related to rulemaking. Although scholars have examined interest group activity focused on rulemaking at the federal level, little work has focused on this behavior in the states. This study aims to further the understanding of this activity. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

论完善行政自由裁量权的司法控制

<行政诉讼法>第五十四条中关于对行政自由裁量权司法控制的规定,已不能满足加强对行政自由裁量权司法控制的现实要求.因此,必须完善对行政自由裁量权的司法控制.     

Reining in the Bureaucrats: Democratic Transition and Administrative Procedural Reform in Korea

How do civilian presidents control their bureaucracies after taking over from an authoritarian regime? To answer this question, I develop a “reining in” theory of delegation. I argue that presidents who faces intrabranch conflict over policy issues and cannot appoint—and dismiss—freely will solve their delegation problems through administrative procedure acts (APAs) and related laws. While some scholars argue that APAs are tools for preserving the status quo, I find that APAs help presidents change policy. Building on the delegation literature from economics, my theory represents a more general argument than prior theories for why presidents support APAs. I test the theory through a case study of South Korea's first civilian government (post‐1961), under President Kim Young Sam. Kim initiated an APA to rein in a professionalized civil service that opposed his policy preferences. Strict procedural requirements designed to keep tabs on bureaucratic activities enhanced Kim's control over his bureaucracy.     

AT ARM'S LENGTH WITH DIRTY HANDS: TAXING THE AUSTRALIAN PUNTER

Abstract: Taxes on betting are a major source of revenue for Australian state governments. Specific taxes on the racing industry date from 1915. However, the revenue potential has only been tapped in all the states since the legalisation in the past 30 years of off-course betting through the state-run totalisator (TAB). The introduction of the TAB followed a long period when various states adopted different policies towards off-course betting, ranging from legalisation of bookmakers' betting shops to attempts at complete suppression. In tracing the history of these policies, the focus is on "implementation failure", or the many administrative pitfalls and obstacles that were experienced. These include insurmountable tax evasion by bookmakers, regulatory capture of betting boards by bookmakers and corruption of the law enforcement agencies. State governments also had to accommodate a range of conflicting interests, including the interests of the racing industry itself and the demands of the anti-gambling lobby. The TAB is shown to be a happy and convenient resolution of most, but not all, of these administrative and political dilemmas.     

Transforming the Administrative State: Reform in Hong Kong and the Future of the Developmental State

Hong Kong has been depicted as an administrative state where the civil service is insulated from political and societal forces and enjoys a stable pattern of growth in rewards and status. In these respects, it is similar to other Asian developmental states. In Asia, as in the West, traditions underlying the administrative state are being challenged. The Hong Kong civil service has recently come under serious criticism as a result of a major fiscal crisis and a series of administrative failures, while the unelected status of the chief executive is a focus of growing protest. What is the reform capacity of the Hong Kong bureaucracy in these circumstances? What is the likely trajectory of administrative reform, and can we expect Western models of the neo‐administrative state to be relevant and appropriate to Hong Kong and, by extension, to the rest of Asia?     

Federal and State Public Forest Administration in the New Millennium: Revisiting Herbert Kaufman's The Forest Ranger

Herbert Kaufman's 1960 investigation of federal forest rangers provided important insights into administrative discretion, agency culture, and natural resource policy making. Subsequent studies of Forest Service administration have documented that agency's change over time, mirroring broad changes in federal public administration. But little is known about state forest administration. This article describes results from a survey of line officers in 48 state forest agencies, as well as state forest statute analysis. Results indicate systematic state–federal differences in legal constraints, citizen interactions, and the forest administrators themselves. Though these differences foster state administrator decision making based on professional expertise, they do not encourage the incorporation of stakeholder views into agency policy making, nor do they yield a bureaucracy that represents a diverse constituency. State forest administrators perceive substantial external challenges to their professional discretion, but it remains to be seen whether state forest agencies will change to more closely resemble their federal counterpart.     

For fear of popular politics? Public attention and the delegation of authority to the United States executive branch

Legislators are thought to delegate policymaking authority to administrative actors either to avoid blame for controversial policy or to secure policy outcomes. This study tests these competing perspectives and establishes that public attention to policymaking is a powerful predictor of the extent to which significant United States statutes delegate authority to the executive branch. Consistent with the policy‐concerns perspective, by one calculation statutes dealing with high‐attention issues entail 48 percent fewer delegating provisions than statutes dealing with low‐attention issues – a far stronger relationship than is typically found in the delegation literature. As per the blame‐avoidance perspective, a number of additional analyses yield results consistent with the notion that fears about future public attention motivate statutory delegation if legislative conflict is sufficiently great. Overall, however, the results suggest that conflict typically is not sufficiently great and that legislators are generally more inclined to limit statutory delegation when the public is paying attention.     

行政裁量控制中的裁量基准和公众参与

行政裁量在行政管理领域中被广泛地采用,没有行政裁量就没有行政管理。行政裁量权的合理运行,可以起到维护公共利益和公共秩序,提高行政效率的重要作用。为了规范行政裁量权的行使,确有必要通过裁量控制中的公众参与的三大程序制度对它加以控制。