Debt administration in Small Island‐States

Public debt management is an infrequent focus of public administration studies. Yet without appropriate debt management, administrators have few financial resources for public service provision. Island‐state administrators face an enhanced service provision challenge. The peculiarity of island‐state economies, the unpredictability of exogenous events and the state's endogenous choices increase debt administration's importance. Via its focus on debt management office location and the administrative constraints posed by brain drain, transparency and regionalization, this paper goes beyond typical debt management studies to engage debt administration spaces. The result is a framework for studies of debt administration in Small Island‐States.     

The application of new public management doctrines in the developing world: An exploratory study of the autonomy and control of executive agencies in Tanzania

This article examines the agencification of public service in Tanzania. This is discussed with reference to the New Public Management (NPM)‐inspired reforms of which the creation of executive agencies is one of its core features. The article attempts to understand the extent to which executive agencies in Tanzania display characteristic features of an ideal‐agency model as propagated by the NPM reform doctrines. Key features of the ideal‐agency model have been described as structural disaggregation, autonomy and contractualisation. It questions views held by many NPM‐minded reformers, such as the EU and World Bank that this model is universally applicable and can be emulated in different parts of the world. The article's assumption is that the NPM‐agency model is based on a weak empirical foundation and its universal applicability is questionable. To illustrate our arguments we confront the NPM‐agency model with the empirical data drawn from the agencification of public services in Tanzania. Findings indicate that agencies in Tanzania display hybrid characteristics in terms of their autonomy and control. Our conclusion is that the universality of NPM‐agency model is illusive. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in Its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive's governing legitimacy. Inspired by Charles Tilly (1984), the authors compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular, configurations of assigned decision‐making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies, the elected government of Ireland's parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e., democratic) legitimacy, while the executive government of Hong Kong's administrative state favors output (i.e., performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.     

Continuity,change, and priorities: The quality and use of regulatory analysis across US administrations

This paper compares the quality and use of regulatory analysis accompanying economically significant regulations proposed by US executive branch agencies in 2008, 2009, and 2010. We find that the quality of regulatory analysis is generally low, but varies widely. Budget regulations, which define how the federal government will spend money or collect revenues, have much lower‐quality analysis than other regulations. The Bush administration's “midnight” regulations finalized between Election Day and Inauguration Day, along with other regulations left for the Obama administration to finalize, tended to have lower‐quality analysis. Most differences between the Bush and Obama administrations depend on agencies' policy preferences. More conservative agencies tended to produce better analysis in the Obama administration, and more liberal agencies tended to do so in the Bush administration. This suggests that agencies more central to an administration's policy priorities do not have to produce as good an analysis to get their regulations promulgated.     

Public Debt,Economic Growth,and Public Sector Management in Developing Countries: Is There a Link?

The article investigates whether differences in public sector management quality affect the link between public debt and economic growth in developing countries. For this purpose, we primarily use the World Bank's institutional indices of public sector management (PSM). Using PSM thresholds, we split our panel into country clusters and make comparisons. Our linear baseline regressions reveal a significant negative relationship between public debt and growth. The various robustness exercises that we perform also confirm these results. When we dissect our data set into “weak” and “strong” county clusters using public sector management scores, however, we find different results. While public debt still displayed a negative relationship with growth in countries with “weak” public sector management quality, it generally displayed a positive relationship in the latter group. The tests for non‐linearity shows evidence of an “inverse‐U”‐shape relationship between public debt and economic growth. However, we fail to see a similar significant relationship on country clusters that account for PSM quality. Yet, countries with well‐managed public sectors demonstrate a higher public debt sustainability threshold. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top‐Down Self‐Organization: State Logics,Substitutional Delegation,and Private Governance in Russia

This study investigates the counterintuitive emergence of self‐regulation in the Russian construction sector. Despite its proclivity for centralizing political authority, the government acted as the catalyst for the delegation of regulatory powers to private industry groups. The article argues that a factor little considered in extant literature—namely, a weak and corrupt bureaucracy—is key to explaining why the normally control‐oriented executive branch began to promote private governance despite industry's preference for continued state regulation. The article's signal contribution is to theoretically explain and empirically demonstrate how a government's prior inability to establish intrastate control over an ineffective and bribable public bureaucracy creates incentives for political authorities to search for alternative means for policy implementation outside of existing state agencies. These findings are important for understanding the impetus and logic behind particular regulatory shifts in countries where the state apparatus is both deficient and corrupt.     

The Church Committee and a new era of intelligence oversight

Thirty years ago, the Church Committee completed what was and still is the most exhaustive look at any government's secret intelligence agencies. The Committee showed that in times of crisis, even constitutional democracies are likely to violate their laws and forget their values. In this reflection, the Committee's Chief Counsel states that by examining the full record over time, the Committee found that it was insufficient to blame abuses solely on intelligence agencies. Ultimate responsibility was properly fixed with the presidents, attorneys general, and other high executive branch officials. Seven general lessons, including the danger of excess secrecy, are drawn from his experience. These lessons are valuable for the present struggle with terrorism.     

The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies

The establishment of agencies at the European level is one of the most notable recent developments in EU regulatory policy. This article examines how politics has shaped the design of EU regulatory agencies. Building on the American politics literature on delegation, the article explains how principal-agent concerns and political compromise have influenced agency design in the EU context; shows how conflicts between the EU's primary legislative actors - the Council and the Parliament - and its primary executive actor - the Commission - have influenced the design of new bureaucratic agencies; and discusses how the growing power of the European Parliament as a political principal has changed the politics of agency design.     

Competing for father's love? The politics of central government agency termination in China

It is well known that public agencies are nearly immortal, but what explains their termination? This article argues that apart from conventional antecedents, political salience defined by top leaders largely shapes government agencies' life cycle. In one of the first large‐N analyses of agency termination in a non‐Western authoritarian regime, we used longitudinal data for the central apparatus in China from 1949 to 1976 to test this hypothesis. We specifically used Chairman Mao's written directives to measure political salience and found that agencies that received more directives were less likely to be terminated. In contrast, agencies less attended to the boss were less likely to survive major restructurings. We also found that peripheral agencies (e.g., smaller, lower‐ranking agencies with noncore functions) benefited more from leaders' attention. We compare the results with the existing literature and suggest some theoretical and policy implications.     

Building organizational reputation in the European regulatory state: An analysis of EU agencies' communications

Organizational‐reputation literature has advanced our understanding about the U.S. regulatory state and its agencies. However, we lack contributions on what a reputational account can add to our knowledge about the European regulatory state, the strategic behavior of supranational agencies, and their endeavors to legitimize themselves in a multilevel political system. We know little of how reputation‐management strategies vary across EU agencies and why. The study offers the very first mapping of organizational‐reputation‐management patterns across all EU agencies, as well as the first empirical assessment on how reputational considerations guide supranational agencies' legitimation strategies. The results indicate that EU agencies facing higher reputational threats revert to their avowed raison d'être (i.e., technical conduct). We find that regulatory agencies utilize a more diverse set of reputational strategies by emphasizing the technical, procedural, and moral reputations more than nonregulatory agencies, whereas social‐policy agencies foster their technical reputation more than economic‐policy agencies.     

Politicians and Civil Servants: Unfinished Business—The Next Steps Report,Fulton and the Future*

This article discusses the origins of the Efficiency Unit's ‘Next Steps’ Report, published 20 years ago which recommended the executive agency as an organisation for much of the British government. Within five years more than half the civil service had been transferred to work in agencies but the other major recommendation of the report – improving the management skills of the senior civil service received far less enthusiastic attention. From the Fulton Report, the Next Steps report to the Capability Reviews of current Whitehall the same problem is highlighted: there is still too little management competence within the public service despite the endorsement of the need for improvement by successive governments.     

Fiscal Consolidation and Australia's Public Debt

Australia has experienced one of the fastest growing public debt levels in the world post‐Global Financial Crisis due to a series of large federal budget deficits driven by high government spending. In this paper we examine the balance sheet implications of this escalating public debt, before proposing some macro‐fiscal objectives for determining its sustainable level. These objectives are to (i) restore the federal government's solvency; (ii) eliminate foreign public debt; and (iii) achieve budgetary balance over the business cycle. Empirically, we first examine how much fiscal consolidation is required for debt stabilisation at current levels, before considering what sized budget balances are needed to achieve the target debt to GDP ratios consistent with the proposed objectives. The results show that no target debt to GDP level consistent with the optimal levels will be met on current fiscal settings in the medium term. This implies significantly greater fiscal consolidation is required to minimise future fiscal risk.     

Confidence and Caretakers: Some Less‐Obvious Implications of the Fixed‐Term Parliaments Act

This article explores the 2011 Fixed‐term Parliaments Act's less‐obvious implications. First, it discusses why Theresa May found calling the 2017 election so straightforward, and notes what this implies for how FTPA works. Second, it looks at executive–legislative relations. FTPA removed the government's ability to designate controversial parliamentary votes as matters of confidence, and introduced a fourteen‐day cushion between a no‐confidence vote and Parliament's dissolution. In the process, it shifted the balance of power from ministers to backbenchers, to an extent potentially greater than most observers recognise. Third, it considers the more outlandish possibilities raised by FTPA's imposition of a fourteen‐day waiting period after a government's defeat on a no‐confidence motion before a new election can be called. It is possible, for example, for rebel MPs from the governing party to use the no‐confidence procedure to force concessions from the cabinet. Finally, it assesses FTPA's long‐term survival prospects, and what repeal would involve.     

Government Reform,Political Ideology,and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration

This article examines how ideological differences between political officials and agencies may have affected the implementation of an ostensibly nonpartisan, government‐wide administrative initiative: the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review of federal programs. The analysis reveals that managers in agencies associated with liberal programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management resources. Further analysis reveals that differences in reported agency effort can be explained partly by objective differences in the demands that PART placed on agencies—liberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement plans relative to their organizational capacity—and partly by the ideological beliefs of employees—on average, liberal managers reported more agency effort, even after accounting for objective measures of administrative burden.     

Adaptive Management for Oil and Gas Development on Public Lands: An Innovative Approach to Resource Protection,or Symbolic Placation of Public Interests?

Energy development on public lands in the intermountain west is often contentious due to concerns over detrimental impacts to wildlife. To mitigate harm to ungulates and other species, federal agencies often utilize adaptive management, a structured decision‐making framework predicated on “learning while doing.” But in the context of recent energy development, does adaptive management represent an innovative approach to conservation, or is it a largely symbolic policy used to contain the scope of conflict? This article, rooted in the agenda‐setting literature, applies Sarah Pralle's (2006) framework to strategies of conflict containment used by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and industry in three contentious energy development projects in Wyoming. The findings indicate that the BLM's use of adaptive management can be understood as a strategy for conflict containment, rather than as a substantive policy change in public lands oil and gas development.     

Organizational Resistance to Participatory Approaches in Public Agencies: An Analysis of Forest Department's Resistance to Community-Based Forest Management

The organizational resistance of public agencies to participatory approaches is analyzed by means of a case study involving the implementation of community-based forest management (CBFM) in India. Both exogenous and endogenous causes of resistance are identified, and a theoretical model proposed. The model consists of two dimensions of resistance to change (structural resistance and cultural resistance) and three categories of causal factors (organizational, personal, and environmental factors). The model is empirically tested using the perceptions of senior and middle management level members of the state Forest Departments (FDs) of four states in India, collected through a questionnaire survey. The empirical findings are used to suggest strengthening of public management theories on four aspects: the distinction between structural and cultural resistance; inclusion of extra-organizational processes; the distinction between individual and organizational learning; and the need to differentiate between the impacts of the legislative and executive wings on public agencies' organizational resistance. The results are used to suggest some specific measures to deal with the organizational inertia in public agencies.     

The politics of de‐delegation: Regulatory (in)dependence in Turkey

This essay explores the rise and decline of regulatory independence in Turkey. Framing the ongoing process of limiting independence of these agencies as the politics of de‐delegation, it raises the question of why Turkish regulatory agencies have become subject to increasing political intervention. Contending that institutional legacies and mounting illiberal predispositions of the Turkish state facilitate the politics of de‐delegation, the essay focuses on centralization, executive discretion, and politicization of bureaucracy as the major institutional legacies. Then it briefly discusses formal and informal mechanisms of political intervention, which have impaired the independence of the regulatory agencies.     

Digital Government: A Primer and Professional Perspectives

Digital technology is a critical enabler of public administration reforms. It can improve the efficiency and productivity of government agencies and allow citizens to transact with government anytime, anywhere. It can also deepen the democratic process, empowering citizens to participate in policy formulation. In this article Andrew Botros, the director of Expressive Engineering, and Maria Katsonis, from the Department of Premier and Cabinet (Victoria), explore the challenges of the digital world for the public sector. Katsonis presents a primer on digital government tracing its evolution from the e‐government movement of the 1990s to Government 2.0 in the 2000s to today's digital‐by‐default agenda. As technology and its role in public sector reform have progressed, so too have the governance, cultural, and leadership challenges deepened. Botros examines NSW approach to open innovation with the Premier's Innovation Initiative in NSW, the state's open data experience, and Transport for NSW and its management of public transport data. He argues NSW's approach involves a significant innovation trade‐off, requiring fresh thinking in digital‐era collaboration.     

Administrative reform in Haiti: Problems,progress and prospects

A growing awareness among officials in Haiti of the need for public service reforms has resulted in the reorganization and revitalization of the country's Administrative Reform Commission (Commission Administrative). At present there is no uniformity in organization, procedures, regulations or remuneration between the different government agencies. The bureaucrats have little security and the bureaucracy is completely dominated by the executive branch of government. Coupled with this, owing largely to the budgeting system, the public service has developed into virtually two separate services, one dealing with development and the other with recurrent tasks. The number of public servants has doubled in the past decade. The Administrative Reform Commission has identified its priorities including the creation of a unified career service system, a restructuring of the bureaucracy and decentralization. This article comments on the Commission's proposals and the problems of implementing them.