The Civil Service Under Stress: The Fall in Civil Service Power and Authority

The failures of governments of both parties in the 1970s had prepared for radical changes in the nature of government under Margaret Thatcher. Among them were that ministers resumed greater power over their civil servants. While various aspects of the relationship between ministers and officials changed and despite the introduction of special advisers, close partnership — the Haldane relationship — was largely retained between them until the end of the 1980s. In the 1990s ministers began to operate less closely with the civil service, largely because they found they had less time for departmental work under the Major and the first Blair administrations. Many of the skills for which civil servants had been trained became less in demand because of the ending of the Cabinet style of government, the reduced importance of ministers appearing before parliament and the greater involvement of spin doctors and media handlers in preparing public documents. However, new skills were required: more rapid accessing of information and more skill in implementation and responsibility for it. The Wilson reforms of 1999 were in large part aimed to remedy these shortcomings. There remains a question whether enough of the Haldane relationship survives for government not to be driven towards greater definition of the rules in which civil servants operate.     

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL DISCRETION IN POST‐COMMUNIST CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF HUNGARY

This article addresses the discrepancy between attempts to establish professional, de‐politicized civil services and the politicization of personnel policy at the central government level of post‐communist countries. It develops the concept of formal political discretion as an analytical tool for the assessment of how and to what extent legislative frameworks governing civil services provide institutional conditions for the de‐politicization of personnel policy. The case of Hungary shows that since the change of regime in 1989/90, four civil service reforms have led to the adoption, implementation and revision of civil service legislation that has gradually reduced the possibilities for government ministers to exercise political discretion over personnel policy. Civil service reforms have also led to the institutionalization of various discretionary instruments which ministers can and have used to politicize civil service affairs. The adoption and implementation of civil service laws therefore does not necessarily lead to the de‐politicization of civil services.     

T. H. GREEN AND THE ETHICS OF SENIOR OFFICIALS IN BRITISH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

This article is an attempt to move away from microeconomics in the study of administration and to concentrate on British administrative ethics from a philosophical perspective. Thus, ethics is used here not in the sense of the ethics of managers dealing with accounts but as the ‘science’ of ranking moral values. The intention of the article is to examine how political theory can be used to help illustrate the dilemmas of public servants working in a climate which is distinctly hostile to disinterested ideals. The ideas of T. H. Green, the English Idealist philosopher who contributed so much to our understanding of public service, form the basis of the theoretical discussion, and the work of senior officials in Whitehall is the material used for illustrative purposes. Where do the loyalties of civil servants lie? What are their duties and responsibilities to ministers? To whom, for what, and how are civil servants accountable?     

Interpreting the World of Political Elites

This paper uses an interpretative approach to analyse the relationship between ministers and officials. It argues that generally, the relationship between ministers and civil servants is harmonious. This can be explained by the fact that both sets of actors tend to draw from the same tradition, the Westminster model. The Westminster model can be understood as the building block from which both ministers and civil servants develop narratives that shape and condition their actions. In the case of ministers, the dominant narrative drawn from the Westminster model is what we refer to as that of 'historical impact'. In the case of civil servants, their dominant narrative, again drawn from the Westminster model is conditioned by the need to provide an account that continually emphasizes how they have acted with 'constitutional propriety'. Generally, these two contrasting narratives do not lead to conflict between ministers and civil servants. However, a serious breakdown in the relationship between ministers and civil servants can occur when either one or both sets of actors draw on a tradition other than the Westminster model, or when they appeal to a different narrative within the Westminster model which shapes their subsequent behaviour and actions.     

CHANGES IN PUBLIC SERVICE BARGAINS: MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN DENMARK

The concept of public service bargain (PSB) has been reintroduced in recent times to the study of public administration to analyse the division of roles between ministers and the civil service in the context of public service reforms ( Hood 2000, 2001, 2002 ; Hood and Lodge 2006 ). The empirical investigation of the concept of PSB in general and changes in PSBs in particular is, however, limited. This article addresses this limitation by investigating what causes changes in public service bargains, particularly with respect to the provision of advice. As argued by Hood, we demonstrate how changes in PSBs can be explained by a combination of changes in the environments of ministries as well as the interests of the political actors. Furthermore, we point to the professional qualifications of civil servants as well as their interests as causes of change which, until now, have not received sufficient attention in the PSB literature. The article is based on a longitudinal case study of PSB between ministers and the permanent civil service in Denmark.     

Bubbling up or cascading down? Public servants,political advisers and politicization

One of the strands in the growing scholarship on political advisers in parliamentary democracies proposes that advisers can reduce the risk of civil service politicization by furnishing partisan advice to ministers, freeing civil servants to focus on the provision of expert competence. This benign narrative generates a significant hypothesis, which is that the institutionalization of the partisan role diminishes the risk of civil service politicization. That hypothesis has yet to be fully tested. Several studies have assessed the impact of advisers' actions on civil service impartiality, but the consequences of bureaucrats' own agency for that dependent variable have received far less attention. Drawing on data from a survey of New Zealand public servants, this article challenges the assumption in the political advisers literature that civil service politicization is primarily driven by exogenous factors and calls for a more nuanced theoretical approach to endogenous aspects of politicization.     

Devolution and Local Government: Evidence from Scotland

Devolution in Scotland has had a major impact upon local government. Local government, at both political and managerial levels, perceives central government in the shape of the Scottish Executive to be closer (geographically and politically) and more open to local government in terms of access to ministers and civil servants. However, Scottish central–local relations continues to be characterised by a sense of mistrust of local government, especially among civil servants and a continuing desire for central control of key policy agendas. Equally, the policy process continues to display features of fragmentation across major policy areas. Moreover, Westminster has not yet departed the scene of Scottish politics in both financial and policy terms but also in the enduring presence of a Westminster ‘political culture’     

Public administration in hong kong: Crises and prospects

Current studies on Hong Kong public administration have overlooked three emerging crises of the administrative system -- the crises of mediocrity, the public service, and the metapolicy -- which may result in a complete collapse of the colonial regime. The analysis reveals the following. Firstly, operating within a paradoxical context, civil servants find it difficult to maximize their contribution. Hard pressed by the delimma of “to strive for excellence or to observe medicoirty,” many choose the latter. Thus, the overall performance of many Hong Kong public agencies and civil servants is unacceptable. Secondly, at the absence of a political theory which redefines the relationship between the political system and socio-economic system and thus the mission of the public service, many civil servants lack commitment to the public service and therefore the norm of medicority is reinforced. And thirdly, the government has reformulated its metapolicy in a way that system overloading is likely, thus making Citizen insubordination probable. It is conclusded that the future of Hong Kong is bleak and that remedial actions are awaiting: the first task is the quest for a new set of political ideology and public philosohgy; the next is reformulation of a new metapolicy, followed by forceful pulbic sector management reform.     

TIME FOR EU MATTERS: THE EUROPEANIZATION OF DUTCH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

To what extent does the European Union (EU) affect national governments? This article seeks to answer this question by assessing the Europeanization of Dutch central government. Using data from a large‐scale survey among civil servants, we assess to what extent the EU affects the structure and culture of governmental organizations, as well as the activities of individual civil servants. On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that the impact of the EU both on individual civil servants and on organizations in Dutch central government is two‐sided: a small core of civil servants and organizations are deeply involved in EU‐related activities and this exists alongside a much broader base of civil servants and organizations that are less affected by the EU. These differences appear more clearly on the level of daily working practices than on the level of formal organizational structures. Nevertheless, the impact of European integration on government organizations remains limited to particular organizations and particular civil servants within central government.     

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND POLITICS: SENIOR BUREAUCRATS IN FRANCE

Why is new public management reform so difficult to implement in France? In order to answer this question, this article examines the changes that have affected the higher civil service since the late 1970s. Decision‐making networks have been considerably politicized, and public policies are now largely devised by ministerial cabinets staffs. Simultaneously, the tasks of career senior civil servants are increasingly technical and specialized. The management reforms undertaken since 2002 by an economically liberal government might have offered senior bureaucrats the opportunity to regain a more active professional role, but the reforms run counter to their political culture, since the large majority of them still share a leftwing political ideology. Reformers seem to have no other choice than to change the institutional system in order to resolve this contradiction.     

THE SCOTT REPORT

The Scott report shows that the two most serious allegations made against ministers - that they conspired to sell lethal arms to Iraq in violation of government guidelines, and that they conspired to send innocent men to prison - are unfounded.
The inquiry violated the Salmon guidelines for the conduct of tribunals and is further evidence that an informal tribunal of this type is less well-equipped to examine a matter causing nation-wide public concern and to secure justice to individuals, than a statutory tribunal appointed under the Act of 1921.
Nevertheless, the Scott report raises three issues of fundamental constitutional importance - ministerial accountability to which the final section of the report is devoted, freedom of information which Sir Richard regards as a corollary of ministerial accountability, and the proper relationships between ministers and civil servants.
Sir Richard believes that constitutionally improper things occurred during the period which his inquiry covers. The fact that no minister or civil servant paid any penalty casts doubt as to whether ministerial accountability is a genuine convention of the constitution or a convenient fiction enabling both ministers and officials to evade responsibility.     

Legal reform need not come first: Merit‐based civil service management in law and practice

Introducing merit recruitment of public servants is a central good governance reform. To move towards merit in practice, legislation which mandates merit recruitment is considered a necessary but insufficient first step by many scholars and practitioners. Merit‐based civil service legislation should thus be sought before reform in practice. This article challenges this reasoning. It argues that merit laws are neither sufficient nor necessary: they leave the incumbent's possibility frontier for patronage and meritocracy in practice unaffected. Large‐ and small‐n evidence supports this assertion. Analyses of an original dataset of coded civil service legislation in 117 countries from 1975 to 2015 suggest that countries can attain meritocratic recruitment with and without legal merit requirements. Subsequently, a comparison of Paraguay and the Dominican Republic provides micro‐evidence for the underlying mechanism. Conventional wisdom about the sequencing of governance reforms in developing countries may thus be misleading: legal reform need not come first.     

REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCOTT REPORT FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

The immediate impact of the Scott report was slight because it had no conclusion and led to no ministerial or other resignations. Reasons for this inconclusiveness were examined, including conventions of the judicial process, the difficulty Scott had in defining the offences he was examining, the slipperiness of those offences as constitutional conventions and Scott's lack of grasp of administrative processes.
Yet his report is a mine of information on problems of accountability in the area of government defence sales. It was atypical in that three departments pursuing four policies between them and with another department as policeman had a locus in the process. Given the nearly 100,000 licences being processed at one time, it was a large, complex and fragmented administrative activity which might easily have resulted in more mishaps than it did.
Despite its special features the author argues that it does provide evidence of six areas of difficulty in government accountability which are also of (growing) relevance outside the area Scott surveyed: how one finds who is responsible for policy and policy change; how accountability is secured where confidentiality is justified for national security or other reasons; how one gets operational accountability for executive operations within departments; the accountability of junior to departmental ministers; of junior to more senior civil servants; and of civil servants to ministers.     

The Relationship Between Civil Servants and Politicians in a Post‐Communist Country: A Case of Slovenia

In modern democracies, civil servants have outgrown their classic role as implementors of the orders given by politicians as their masters. They now play an increasingly important role in the exercising of authority – a role which depends to a great degree on politicians themselves. Based on classical politico‐administrative divisions, the main hypothesis of this paper is to claim that, in the case of the post‐communist country of Slovenia, politicians are in charge of policy‐making and possess a dominant role over high‐ranking civil servants, who are mere implementors of policy. To verify this hypothesis, we use several mutually complementary methods and techniques, among them detailed empirical research. We find that the relationship between members of Slovenia's administrative and political elite does show competitive traits, but the conflict between the two groups is not such that would lead to a win‐lose situation. Both high‐ranking civil servants and politicians do in fact have a role as important and irreplaceable actors in the policy‐making process.     

Navigating the dichotomy: The top public servant's craft

How in their day‐to‐day practices do top public servants straddle the politics–administration dichotomy (PAD), which tells them to serve and yet influence their ministers at the same time? To examine this, we discuss how three informal ‘rules of the game’ govern day‐to‐day political–administrative interactions in the Dutch core executive: mutual respect, discretionary space, and reciprocal loyalty. Drawing from 31 hours of elite‐interviews with one particular (authoritative) top public servant, who served multiple prime ministers, and supplementary interviews with his (former) ministers and co‐workers, we illustrate the top public servants’ craft of responsively and yet astutely straddling the ambiguous boundaries between ‘politics’ and ‘administration’. We argue that if PAD‐driven scholarship on elite administrative work is to remain relevant, it has to come to terms with the boundary‐blurring impacts of temporal interactions, the emergence of ‘hybrid’ ministerial advisers, and the ‘thickening’ of accountability regimes that affects both politicians and public servants.     

THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ON WHITEHALL

This article examines whether the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 has changed Whitehall. Based on a two‐year, ESRC‐funded study, it evaluates the impact of FOI on five characteristics of the Whitehall model: the culture of secrecy, ministerial accountability to Parliament, civil service neutrality, the Cabinet system, and effective government. Proponents of FOI hoped that government would be less secretive, more accountable and more effective; critics feared that civil servants would lose their anonymity, and collective Cabinet responsibility would be undermined. Drawing on interviews, media analysis, case law and official documents, the article finds that the impact of FOI is modest at most. It is not powerful enough to do much good or much ill, and the feared ‘chilling effect' on candour and record‐keeping has not materialized. Leaks do more damage than FOI disclosures. But ministers remain apprehensive about the effect of FOI on Cabinet records and discussions.     

CORE EXECUTIVE STUDIES TWO DECADES ON

The concept of the ‘core executive’ was introduced by Dunleavy and Rhodes in 1990. Two decades on, what is the state of core executive studies? This article argues that the language of the study of central government has been transformed. In addition, there is now a much broader consideration of the central government space, incorporating ministers, civil servants, and so on. Within core executive studies, the resource‐dependency approach has become dominant. Arguably, though, with its insistence on a structural element to power and its focus on prime ministerial predominance, much of this work collapses back into an interpretation that is close to the conclusions of the pre‐1990 debate. Currently, only the interpretive, ethnographic approach proposed by Rhodes and his co‐authors challenges the new orthodoxy. This article suggests that a resolutely positivist account of the core executive would provide a similar challenge and spark a lively and very welcome debate.     

ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICIZATION OR CONTESTABILITY? HOW POLITICAL ADVISERS AFFECT NEUTRAL COMPETENCE IN POLICY PROCESSES

There is limited empirical research on the extent to which politicized recruitment of ministerial advisers affects the quality of the policy process. In this article we take a novel step by looking at two possible consequences of increased political recruitment for the policy process: administrative politicization and contestability. We deploy a Most Similar Systems comparison of Denmark and Sweden and include survey answers from 657 civil servants in managerial positions. We find that political recruitment of top civil servants, such as Swedish state secretaries, restricts the access of the civil service to the minister, but it does not substantially politicize the policy process. Danish civil servants perceive themselves as more contested by the relatively few Danish political advisers than their Swedish colleagues. Our results imply that the organization of political advice is a crucial factor for politicization and contestability     

The partisan–professional dichotomy revisited: Politicization and decision‐making of senior civil servants

Politicization has an ambivalent reputation among public administration scholars. While considered an effective instrument to safeguard political control over ministerial bureaucracy, partisanship of senior civil servants is likewise associated with patronage and is deemed detrimental to professionalism and meritocracy. To scrutinize this contradiction, the article examines how the party‐political background of senior civil servants influences their decision‐making behaviour. Two theoretically derived conceptions of loyalty are therefore put to the test: responsiveness and responsibility. Effects are captured by using the vignette technique in 40 in‐depth interviews with former senior civil servants from ministerial departments at federal and state level in Germany. The results are surprising in so far as they reveal that politicized senior civil servants act neither more responsively nor less responsibly than their non‐politicized peers. These findings challenge common assumptions and call for a more refined analysis of the conditions under which politicization leads to negative effects.     

Trust Management in the Finnish Ministries: Evaluation of Management Systems

Abstract

Our purpose was to find out to what extent civil servants—managers, specialists, and experts—in 13 Finnish ministries have confidence in their management systems. We defined trust as a kind of deep sentiment, more fundamental than mere acceptance, satisfaction or legitimacy. Trust and mistrust are strong motivators for cooperation and collaboration. They are logical outcomes of social interaction in terms of management systems and context. We found out that civil servants are more likely to trust management if it acts professionally with no emphasis on political factors. Ministers, for instance, can efficiently earn their trust with administrative experience and behavior norms. Our analysis showed that there are both well‐trusted and ill‐trusted components in management systems implicating that management must be the object of continuous development. As a whole civil servants have more confidence in work community than in strategy, structure, people policies, and administrative processes of the ministries.