Governance of Terror: New Institutionalism and the Evolution of Terrorist Organizations

A preoccupation with network approaches in terrorism studies has inadvertently marginalized the fact that terrorist groups are subject to many of the same bureaucratic forces that impact all purposeful organizations. Because typical organizations are subsumed in the concept of networks, it is curious that scholars have been so quick to bypass more traditional models of organizations and bureaucracy that may help us understand network topology. This article relies on the new institutional approach to organizational behavior. Using the Coase theorem to explain the costs and benefits associated with different organizational structures, it follows that counterterrorism efforts may drive some groups toward greater autonomy while compelling others to adopt common bureaucratic processes, often referred to as isomorphism. By exploring the different costs that terror groups face and examining the characteristics of terrorists associated with different groups, organizational theory can help explain a divergent trend in terrorism research: leaderless jihad and increased bureaucratization.     

What Is Governance?

This commentary points to the poor state of empirical measures of the quality of states, that is, executive branches and their bureaucracies. Much of the problem is conceptual, as there is very little agreement on what constitutes high‐quality government. The commentary suggests four approaches: (1) procedural measures, such as the Weberian criteria of bureaucratic modernity; (2) capacity measures, which include both resources and degree of professionalization; (3) output measures; and (4) measures of bureaucratic autonomy. It rejects output measures and suggests a two‐dimensional framework of using capacity and autonomy as a measure of executive branch quality. This framework explains the conundrum of why low‐income countries are advised to reduce bureaucratic autonomy while high‐income ones seek to increase it.     

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE

This symposium examines issues related to the links between administrative reform policy and economic development policy. The symposium introduction paper consists of two parts. First, it offers an overview of the background of theoretical and conceptual issues that are important to the connection between administrative reform and economic development. The issues reviewed include the role of government in economic development, the importance of public policy and management to economic development, the contribution of development administration, and the need of administrative reform to remove bureaucratic problems and promote efficiency. Next, the introduction paper provides a brief summary of the research arguments and findings addressed in the following six articles. They include an evaluation of administrative reform in Arab world economic growth, an examination of administrative reform and economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean, a political economy analysis of policy reform in Korea, a study of the implementation of privatization strategies in India's public sector reform, a discussion of the concerns between efficiency and ethics in China's economic development, and the study of administrative and economic development in Mongolia. The implications of the research findings and the need for further study of the linkage between administrative reform and economic development are emphasized in the conclusion.     

Structure and Process: Examining the Interaction between Bureaucratic Organization and Analytical Requirements

Attempts by politicians to control bureaucratic decisions include both structural (how is the agency making the decision organized?) and procedural (what rules must they follow when making the decision?). But how do these two modes of influence interact? This article examines the interaction between bureaucratic structure and one procedural control, the requirement that agencies conduct an analysis of their decisions prior to their issuance. I look at this interaction in the context of two types of analysis, cost‐benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment. I interview 16 individuals in each field and draw from their experiences of conducting and reviewing more than a thousand analyses. The conduct of analysis is affected by where analysts are placed in agencies. In particular, independence of analysts has a trade‐off. The more independent analysts are, the more likely they can challenge preferred decisions in their agency. But independent analysts are brought into decisions later and their independence may limit their long‐term impacts on agency culture. Despite this trade‐off, analysts expressed a clear preference for independence. The interaction between different controls of bureaucratic behavior is a potentially fruitful line for further research.     

Bureaucratic Posture: On the Need for a Composite Theory of Bureaucratic Behavior

This article examines the underlying assumptions and main findings of four streams of research on bureaucratic postures. It explores the utility of each school of thought for understanding how perspectives on bureaucratic postures are associated with the advancement of the public interest and bureaucratic performance. A main conclusion is that, although limited in scope of application, each stream has merit. Nonetheless, the existing research is too narrow: The field needs to consider a more complex model of bureaucratic behavior that draws from these four fields to offer a framework that is widely applicable to the range of motives for work found in the public bureaucracy and the variety of behaviors that individuals exhibit. Some attributes that may characterize such a model are sketched out.     

EXPANDING THE LIMITS OF POWER: The Federal Reserve and the Implementation of Functional Regulation in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Era

Research on bureaucratic behavior suggests that agencies are more likely to use the implementation process to extend their power and influence under particular circumstances. I argue that when an agency has been delegated considerable power by Congress, but provided only vague guidance on how to implement this authority, an atmosphere of uncertainty and competition is created. Under such a circumstance the agency will feel pressured to further extend its power in order to defend its regulatory turf against competitors and protect the authority it was delegated. I test this proposition by examining the behavior of the Federal Reserve as it implements the functional regulation provisions of the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act. Evidence from the Federal Reserve's dealings with the Securities and Exchange Commission during the approval of the Schwab – U. S. Trust merger provides evidence that the Fed is indeed acting to extend its power and influence.     

Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights,Old Questions

ABSTRACT

This article reviews some recent research from political science that speaks to the public service motivation (PSM) literature. Specifically, it discusses research that describes new measures of bureaucratic ideology and agency performance. These new measures might usefully be employed in the PSM literature and a discussion of them highlights some potential pitfalls in PSM research more generally.     

Empirical evaluation of bureaucratic models of inefficiency

Two separate but related strands of literature exist regarding the efficiency of public sector service provision – the theoretical base developed in the bureaucratic models of supply and the methodological base developed in the operations research and economic literatures. Most analyses focus exclusively on either the measurement or causes of inefficiency. This paper seeks to empirically test bureaucratic models of supply by drawing on the measurement literature. In anticipation of the results, it is found that there does exist empirical evidence supporting some of the implications of these models.     

Winners, Losers, and Efficiency: Achieving Multiple Goals in Japan's Financial System Reforms

When giving policy advice, economists often proceed as if efficiency is the only valid social goal. Although efficiency is important, we argue that single-minded pursuit of it is counterproductive. It unnecessarily erects political hurdles to the enactment of efficiency-enhancing reforms because policy proposals that ignore valid, nonefficiency concerns are more likely to meet political and bureaucratic resistance. Moreover, such resistance may be avoided. A number of design principals can be employed to craft proposals that address political goals without abandoning efficiency. We describe three classes of principles: creative design of market mechanisms, maintenance of marginal incentives, and compensation for losers.We then illustrate their practical application in the context of Japanese financial-sector deregulation. This policy area usefully illustrates the importance of considering multiple goals in policy design. While efficiency is a frequently expressed goal, Japan's continued policy paralysis indicates that the bureaucratic and political goals of major stakeholders make the straightforward deregulation of financial markets difficult to achieve. We do not purport to resolve the entrenched barriers to economic reform in Japan, but to the extent that we identify and address valid nonefficiency goals, the conclusions of the analysis are relevant.     

Does Agency Autonomy Foster Public Participation?

Allocation of public resources is an area in which considerations of both economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy are likely to be present. Public administrators are often blamed for being too devoted to the norms of bureaucratic ethos, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and top‐down control, and less so to the norms of democratic ethos, such as inclusiveness and bottom‐up decision making. This article examines whether managers in agencies with greater budget autonomy are more likely to include the public when allocating resources. Because participation offers an opportunity for agencies to enhance the legitimacy of their decisions, it is expected that the value of citizen input will increase with the degree of agency autonomy. Using data on the practices of citizen participation in budgeting in two state departments—transportation and environment—this study finds that agencies with a higher degree of autonomy tend to be more open to public comment than agencies with more centralized budget processes.     

Bureaucratic control and information processing: An institutional comparison

Standard models of bureaucratic control argue that politicians vulnerable to asymmetric information rely on third‐party monitoring to expand information supply. This solution to information asymmetry assumes that politicians can process all information that comes their way. However, advocates strategically oversupply information to crowd out rivals, making such a solution counterproductive. Using data on administrative reorganization in Hong Kong, we examine the alternative proposition that bureaucratic control is contingent not only on how information is obtained but also on how it is processed under two different institutional arrangements: one that splits attention across domain‐specific streams and one that concentrates attention in a single sequence. In both cases, bureaucrats refrain from major changes when politicians break from these arrangements. Moreover, bureaucratic action is significantly more likely to respond to changes in attention allocation when politicians process information in multiple streams.     

The Politics–Bureaucracy Interface in Developing Countries

The political–bureaucratic interface has been the subject of much academic interest. However, research has tended to focus exclusively on wealthy institutionalized democracies, with little attention given to the political–administrative relationship in developing countries. However, recent evidence from reform processes in poorer nations increasingly highlights the importance of interactions between politicians and bureaucrats. This paper provides a systematic overview of the political–bureaucratic relationship in developing countries and in doing so makes two key contributions. First, it introduces a typology of political–bureaucratic relations based on four models—collaborative, collusive, intrusive, and integrated—discussing examples of each. Second, it analyses the main factors associated with different models of political–bureaucratic relations and considers how countries can move from one model of relations to another. The paper provides a much‐needed entry point for scholars and policymakers to better understanding the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in developing countries. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Credible Commitment and Council-Manager Government: Implications for Policy Instrument Choices

The credible constraint of morally hazardous or opportunistic behavior can enhance efficiency. This idea is applied to an examination of local government institutions to identify how council-manager government constrains opportunism in economic development by substituting low-power bureaucratic incentives for high-power electoral incentives. A panel design isolates changes in the use of development strategies or instruments in 516 cities.
The central argument presented here is that the Progressive ideology of the separation of politics and administration, institutionalized in the council-manager plan, allows administrators and elected officers to more easily resist opportunistic behavior. Economic and political forces have significant effects that are different for mayor-council communities than for council-manager communities. The influence of strategic planning is evident in council-manager cities, but not in mayor-council communities. Under council-manager government, development is carried out in a discriminating manner, leading to lower levels of financial incentives but more loan and business-attraction programs. In conclusion, the authors discuss how the career patterns of city managers are shaped by the incentive structures created by the council-manager plan.     

THE STATUTORY CORPORATION—A NOTE ON THE THEORY OF AUTONOMY

Readers of this journal, especially those who watch developments affecting the machinery of government in Canberra, will no doubt have noticed the rehabilitation of the concept of statutory independence—a notion that, in some academic circles, had been virtually written off as having little or no relevance in the real world, where the general tendency has been towards an extension of government control and co-ordination of bureaucratic systems. Although it is much too early to evaluate, with suitable scholarly detachment, the significance of the administrative changes initiated since December, 1972, it seems a safe observation that for a small group of government agencies at least, the Labor Government has committed itself to the idea of independence. This much is clear from its declared aim of giving the Australian Broadcasting Commission more autonomy and the decision, recently announced, to reconstitute the Postmaster-General's Department into two separate statutory corporations.     

INTERNAL COMPETITION OVER FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING: THE CASE OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO IRAN

Two models of foreign-policy making, the bureaucratic politics model and the royal court model, are helpful in explaining U.S. arms sales to Iran in 1985 and in 1986. The bureaucratic politics model is particularly useful in clarifying both the positions taken by the leaders of the foreign policy bureaucracy to the arms sales proposals and the behavior of these officials as the sales were implemented. However, the royal court model best ac- counts for the decisive role of the president and the deference given to those advisers perceived to be acting in his interests.     

论现代官僚制的双重困境

官僚制作为一种政府组织体制,奉行效率优先,体现了时代的工具理性精神.然而它面临着内外双重困境.在官僚政府内,有官僚体制与行政人员之间、行政目的与行政手段之间、政务官与常务官之间、官僚体制内部结构矛盾等四大矛盾;在外部环境上有官僚制与民主政治体制的矛盾、官僚制与资本主义社会之间的矛盾、官僚价值与民主价值的矛盾等三大矛盾.官僚制政府改革必须同整个政治体制的改革联系起来才有望成功.     

Disagreement,Diversity, and Participation: Examining the Properties of Several Measures of Political Discussion Network Characteristics

Recent advances demonstrate that individuals think and act differently depending upon the political views of their discussion partners. However, issues of both conceptualization and measurement remain. We argue that some of these issues result from conflating what are two distinct characteristics of political discussion: disagreement and diversity. The purpose of this paper is to provide clarity to this literature by more formally distinguishing these two concepts. In doing so, we recommend a preferred measure of each. Substantively, we demonstrate that although exposure to disagreement is associated negatively with political participation, including the decision to vote, exposure to diversity is unrelated to participation. The evidence supports our argument that more formally separating the concepts of disagreement and diversity will help scholars better identify how and when social networks matter for political attitudes and behavior.     

Policy Adoption and the Redefinition of Operating Procedures: Comparison Cases at UMTA

Political scientists often consider the place of standard operating procedures (SOPS) in shaping bureaucratic responsiveness to “top-down” direction, but our writing only infrequently considers the processes and ease by which bureaucratic routines, decision standards, and SOPS adjust to produce nm outputs. This article explores the change of routines, decision standards, and SOPs from a behavioral perspective to portray bureaucratic behavior and policy as something other than a static function of extant SOPs or a fully and fluidly malleable function of internal preferences and external incentives. In particular, the role of two organizationally “bottom-up” factors — careerists' policy approval and their policy-relevant working schema — are explored to suggest how readily “top-down” preferences for policy translate into pragmatic working arrangements. The empirical basis for the article is a structured set of cases in the Urban Mass Transportation Administration through the latter 1970s and early 1980s.     

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM

This paper focusses on two issues: the problem of reforming administration so that the bureaucracy in its political decision-making is more firmly responsible to the elected representatives of the people and more responsive to community needs and values, and the interlocking problem of the politics of the reform process itself. Where a government announces its intention to undertake a reform program, its purposes are usually explained in terms of the need for greater efficiency. The process of reform, apart from the stress on efficiency, is usually described in value-neutral terms. The program or the enquiry, it is claimed, will result in the job being done better or more quickly or more cheaply. However, if one looks more closely at the reasons for the establishment of such programs and enquiries, it is clear that underlying the urge to change the administration, there is a dissatisfaction not so much with the way in which decisions are carried out, as with the decisions themselves. The "hidden agenda" of most reforms is to ensure that different decisions are taken and different outcomes in the community result.     

The effects of multiple objectives in the theory of public sector supply

This paper incorporates objectives of both legislators and bureaucrats in a model of public sector decisionmaking. Existing models assume that either bureaucrats control production information and decisions, (Niskanen-type models) or legislators control production decisions (legislative models). My model explicitly incorporates imperfect agent behavior and corresponding preferences of both legislators and bureaucrats to reflect the bilateral nature of appropriations. The analysis shows that output levels generally differ from politically and socially efficient levels and depend on the relative weights of legislative and bureaucratic interests. Accordingly, Niskanen-type and legislative models are viewed as special cases of this more general approach.