The role of criminal record in the federal sentencing guidelines

In this paper my concern is with the collective moral responsibility of criminal investigators for the outcomes of their investigations, bearing in mind that it is important to distinguish collective moral responsibility from, and relate it to, individual moral responsibility. In what sense, if any, are police detectives individually and collectively morally responsible for their success (or, for that matter, their failure) in gathering sufficient evidence to identify, arrest, and charge an offender who has committed a serious crime? Alternatively, in what sense are they morally responsible in cases where they identify, arrest, and charge an innocent person? And in what sense, if any, are police detectives individually and collectively morally responsible for the ultimate outcome of the trial, the finding by the courts of someone they have investigated and charged with a serious crime to be guilty or innocent?     

Baby Doe, Congress and the states: challenging the federal treatment standard for impaired infants

In its amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Congress set forth a strict standard for treatment of impaired infants. The statute, shaped by right-to-life groups and certain medical organizations, calls for aggressive treatment in virtually all cases, regardless of the degree of suffering imposed and the burdens and risks involved. The federal rule evidences deep distrust of parental decisionmaking, relegating most parents to a nonparticipatory bystander role. Congress did not make its rule binding on the states. Rather, it conditioned the receipt of federal funds upon incorporation of the rule into each state's law. Most states have accepted the condition, largely through rulemaking by state child abuse agencies. This article challenges the authority of state administrators to promulgate these rules, and argues that state constitutions, little mentioned in the Baby Doe debate thus far, may prohibit many states from adopting the federal standard. Ordering medical interventions that perpetuate extreme conditions of physical and mental devastation, subjecting infants to grave suffering for uncertain benefits, and depriving parents of virtually all decisionmaking power violates the norm of governments constitutionally committed to individual liberty, human dignity and family autonomy. A constitutionally sound approach to this issue would permit careful, ethical deliberation, attention to the individual circumstances of each infant Doe and a reasonable degree of parental control.     

Building Bridges for Babies in Foster Care: The Babies Can't Wait Initiative

In 2001, the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children, chaired by New York State's Chief Judge Judith Kaye, developed the Babies Can't Wait Initiative to maximize the well‐being and permanency prospects of infants in foster care. This court‐based innovation became a path to healthy development for babies in foster care, a bridge to unprecedented collaboration among the New York City Family Court, child welfare system, and service providers and merged knowledge about child development with court and child welfare practice. This article tells the story of the Babies Can't Wait Initiative—its creation, implementation, successes, and lessons.     

The antiabortion movement and Baby Jane Doe

In the early 1980s, the leadership of the antiabortion movement became involved in a campaign to establish legal rights to extraordinary medical care for seriously handicapped newborns. Armed with political contacts in the Reagan administration and Congress, and allied with advocates for the disabled, the antiabortion movement searched for a test case to guide through the courts. Antiabortion advocate Lawrence Washburn found such a case in Baby Jane Doe, who was being treated at Stony Brook Medical Center. The movement went on to amend the Child Abuse Act to include protections for handicapped newborns. Activists in the movement chose the issue of Baby Jane Doe because they believed it would attract welcome publicity, give them the appearance of supporting civil rights, and enhance their argument as to the legal rights of the fetus and thus strengthen the case against abortion. The movement was partially successful in obtaining its goals.     

Baby Jane Doe in the media

A review of national television, magazine, and newspaper coverage of the case of Baby Jane Doe indicates that most of it lacked perspective and context; stories were generally incomplete and often imprecise; reporting was sometimes inaccurate; and overall, inadequate attention was paid to the medical, legal, philosophical, and social implications of the case. Human-interest and political elements of the story were generally well covered. Even after taking account of the pressures and constraints of daily and weekly news reporting, we conclude that the print press and television could have done a better job without devoting more space or time to the story. This could have been done by assigning reporters with greater expertise and by paying more attention to the needs of a hypothetical "reasonable reader."     

The implementation of California's tobacco tax initiative: the critical role of outsider strategies in protecting Proposition 99

Enacted in 1988, Proposition 99 increased California's cigarette tax by 25 cents per pack and allocated a minimum of 20 percent of the revenues to fund antitobacco education. Tobacco control advocates had used an initiative to secure the tax increase because the legislature had not increased the tobacco tax since 1967, even though public opinion polls showed that the tax was politically popular. Advocates, however, then had to return to the legislature to negotiate implementing legislation. Between 1989 and 1996, the legislature underfunded the Proposition 99 Health Education programs by over $273 million. This underfunding occurred because the public health groups failed to exercise power, ideas, and the leadership needed for legislative success. Even successful litigation against the governor failed to restore the programs. In July 1996, however, the underexpenditures stopped because the issue of the diversions received significant media and public attention. The tobacco control groups used a variety of outsider strategies, including paid advertising, free media, and a grassroots campaign, and the leadership of these groups, in addition to the lobbyists, got involved in the campaign to secure implementing legislation. Without ongoing public pressure, it is likely that policy changes created by tobacco tax initiatives will dissipate into something acceptable to powerful insider interests, such as the tobacco and medical service provider industries.     

澳大利亚联邦法院对专家证据的采纳

I. Introduction
The opinion evidence of experts is an exception to the general rule that witnesses can only give evidence of that which they have seen or heard and may not give evidence of inferences which arise from their observations and from that which they have heard.