Corruption in the Eye of the Beholder: Survey Evidence from Mainland China and Hong Kong

ABSTRACT

This article explores how and to what extent people differ in their level of tolerance for corruption and why some people show a stronger propensity to counter corruption actively, while others seem more willing to accept it. We draw on the original data collected from a survey on perceptions of corruption among university students in Hong Kong and Mainland China to answer these questions. The respondents’ perceptions of corruption are measured by how they identify corruption, understand its causes, and interpret the consequences it may bring to society. Our empirical findings show substantial differences in perceptions of corruption across and within the two regions and also reveal a strong association between the way people perceive corruption and their level of tolerance for corruption and propensity to act against it. We see that, other things being equal, different perceptions of corruption lead to different tolerance levels for corruption and influence people's willingness to take part in the fight against corruption. Our findings also suggest that it is important to address the deficit in people's understanding of corruption in order to achieve desired anti-corruption effects.     

Do Corruption and Social Trust Affect Economic Growth? A Review

Abstract

Two separate literatures suggest that corruption and social trust, respectively, are related to economic growth, although the strengths of the relationships, and the direction of causality, are still debated. This paper reviews these literatures and evaluates the evidence for causal effects of corruption and trust on economic growth, and discusses how corruption and trust are interrelated. The reviews show that absence of corruption and high levels of social trust foster economic growth. The literatures also indicate that corruption has a causal effect on social trust, while the opposite effect is more uncertain. The conclusion offers the suggestion that fighting corruption may yield a “double dividend”, as reduced corruption is likely to have both direct and indirect effects on growth.     

Effects of the Institutional Design of the Civil Service: Evidence from Corruption

ABSTRACT

This research tests the direct effects of civil service structure on perceptions of corruption. Numerous studies suggest a relationship between civil service structure and corruption, but few test this link. It is hypothesized that corruption depends on the presence or absence of civil service policies, including job duties, tenure and security provisions, discipline policy, and rules on rewards and bargaining rights; the impact of government wages, per capita GDP, and democratization on corruption is also assessed. These hypotheses are tested using World Bank data for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and central and eastern European countries. No statistically significant relationships between civil service structure and corruption are found; however, occasional evidence that corruption is higher in countries with higher total government wage bills was obtained. Results additionally indicate that corruption is lower in countries with higher GDP. While the conclusions presented here are largely exploratory, there is a distinct lack of evidence indicating a relationship between civil service systems and public perceptions of corruption.     

Corrupt Governmental Networks

ABSTRACT

This study provides an empirically based analysis of corrupt governmental networks. We conducted 45 interviews in Hungary with different organizational actors who were actually participating in corrupt transactions or at least had first-hand experiences of corruption. Given the secret nature of the topic, this article provides a unique insight into the phenomenon. Our findings show that corrupt elite cliques consciously design and coordinate multilevel structures of corrupt networks within and among organizations that involve a large amount of people. We identified the major network elements and their functions in corrupt transactions. The article also provides a typology of corrupt networks. The networks have different structural characteristics based on location of the “cash cows,” points from where the system is fed, and the actors’ positions of power. Our findings are compared with the already existing literature on dark networks, terrorist, and organized crime formations.     

Can Corruption Be Measured? Comparing Global Versus Local Perceptions of Corruption in East and Southeast Asia

Abstract

Since Transparency International first released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 1995, the CPI has quickly become the best known corruption indicator worldwide. The CPI has been widely credited with making comparative and large-N studies of corruption possible, as well as putting the issue of corruption squarely in the international policy agenda. Despite its enormous influence on both academic and policy fronts, the CPI is not without critics. One often noted critique is that the CPI relies solely on surveys of foreign business people and the expert assessments of cross-national analysts; as such, the CPI mainly reflects international experts’ perceptions, not the perceptions of each country's citizens. This study examines the above critique in closer detail. Data from the Asian Barometer Survey is employed to analyze whether international experts’ corruption perceptions were similar to those of domestic citizens. The Asian Barometer Survey is a public opinion survey on issues related to political values, democracy, and public reform in 13 different areas around East and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam). Data analysis indicates that global and local perspectives are only moderately aligned in the 13 areas studied. International experts and domestic citizens differ, to varying degrees, in their evaluation of the extent of public sector corruption in several areas, suggesting the presence of a corruption perception gap. Four implications about the existence of this gap can be drawn for future corruption measurement.     

The Dark Side of Social Capital Re-examined from a Policy Analysis Perspective: Networks of Trust and Corruption

Abstract

This work deepens the analysis of the “dark side” of social capital proposed by Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landlot and revisited by Peter Graeff. For this purpose, it combines the individualistic approach of economic theory with the social perspective of other social sciences to study the economics of corruption embedded in a social structure (a network of trust). It assesses the importance of social relations as a necessary condition to achieve corrupt objectives. To do so, a model of corrupt public contracts embedded in networks of trust is built. Theoretical evidence is found on the importance of networks of trust for the success of corrupt deals between officials and recipients. In addition, seeds are sown for future research and analysis of the role of institutions and monitoring agencies. Finally, the foundation is laid for research in the field of experimental economics to conduct an empirical examination of this proposed model and some policy implications are derived.     

Constraining Political Transformation: The Two Faces of Activist Religious Organizations in the Search for a New Constitution in Kenya

Abstract

Religious organizations are key structural components of Kenyan civil society that have played or continue to play a critical role in socio-political developments. In the last two and half decades especially, religious institutions have been among the principal actors shaping the mechanics and trajectories of Kenya's political order. But religious organizations’ political behaviour, especially in the country's search for a new constitution, was contentious and remarkably inconsistent. There were moments of progressive actions but also behaviour that imperilled progress. This article probes this ambivalence of Kenyan faith groups in the struggles for a new constitution. It is argued that their political behavioural inconsistencies largely reflect an ethnic, class and, to a lesser extent, instrumentalized doctrinal or denominational schism that is ever present in the wider Kenyan society. By analysing how religious leaders and their organizations challenged political elite domination while remaining amenable to its influence, this article illustrates the contradictions of elite pacts in these struggles and how they constrained progressive transformation.     

Fear,greed, or garage sale? The analysis of military expenditure in East Asia

This paper examines the determinants of military expenditures in eight East Asian countries from 1983 to 1993. In a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis, it finds that the security threats (either external or internal) have not been a factor in determining the governments' defence burdens. Instead, economic and bureaucratic budgetary factors are better predictors of their defence decision-making. Military corruption and subsidized defence industries are the main domestic elements driving up the budgets; but this bureaucratic 'irrationality' is checked and balanced by economic rationality, for the defence burdens generally correlate with the availability of economic resources.     

Popular Interpretations of ‘Corruption’ and their Partisan Consequences

Using a large six-city exit poll from 2000, we examine popular judgments of what constitutes “political corruption” in the United States. We find two distinct evaluative dimensions: corruption understood as lawbreaking, and corruption as favoritism. These judgments are heavily conditioned by the voter’s socioeconomic background and are politically consequential. Subjective understandings of “corruption” shape perceptions of how much corruption actually exists in government. Furthermore, and more importantly, these normative assessments play a significant part in voting decisions. Individuals who judged illegal activities such as bribe-taking to be “corrupt” were more inclined to back one of the major party candidates in 2000; those who believed that favoritism in politics was “corrupt” (e.g., an official recommending an unemployed friend for a government job) were more likely to vote for Al Gore or Ralph Nader.     

Accountable or Untouchable? Electoral accountability in Romanian local elections

While retrospective models of voting posit that voters should “vote the rascals out”, a wave of recent research has found that this is rarely the case. We investigate this question in a context in which many sitting politicians have recently been indicted on corruption charges – the municipal level in Romania, a surprisingly under-researched case in this sub-field. Romania provides a good case for electoral accountability. Not only do Romanians deeply detest corruption, the party system also contains many parties that would make it easy for voters to switch from a corrupt to a cleaner alternative. We collected an original data register of electoral and socio-political data on roughly 3200 localities together with all cases of corruption charges published by the Romanian anti-corruption agency, the Direcţia Naţională Anticorupţie (DNA), accounting for magnitude and timing of the scandal as well as the judicial outcome for the indicted mayor. In all, we find that 81 sitting mayors elected in 2012 were charged with corruption prior to the 2016 election. We test the electoral impact of corruption on the incumbent mayors on four outcomes indicating electoral accountability commonly used in the literature – retirement, vote share compared to the previous election, voter turnout, and reelection using difference and difference and a pairwise matching designs, inter alia. The results show that Romanians do punish their corrupt incumbent mayors to a quite high extent compared to the clean mayors. However, due to the large vote margins, the punishment is not severe enough to make them lose more often than similar “clean‟ mayors, although they tend to not run for re-election at much higher rates. Turnout is unaffected by corruption at the municipal level. In line with previous results, we thus find a certain amount of electoral accountability, but not to the extent that the ‘rascals are thrown out’.     

Corruption,Trust and their Public Sector Consequences: Introduction to the Special Edition

Abstract

Corruption and trust are two important determinants of the quality of public sectors. Empirical studies in different literatures suggest that corruption and trust have effects on factors such as economic growth, the quality of democratic institutions, life quality, the size and effectiveness of the public sector and much more. The purpose of this special issue – one that goes to the heart of the comparative policy ethos which is central to the journal's mission – is to draw on a number of country examples to shed light on the state of the literature on the connection between corruption and trust. The aim is to show that these two concepts are highly relevant to each other, and that their interconnections are important to understand the public sector consequences of corruption and trust. By focusing on these concepts, we hope that this special issue can pave the road for further comparative research.     

The Control of Public Networks

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the control of networks, an issue that we believe is critical for explaining the overall effectiveness of public networks. We first discuss why it is important to study the issue and why it has been neglected as a topic by public management and organization scholars. We then present the various types of control and how they are utilized in a network context. Finally, we discuss how the mechanisms of control might be related to network effectiveness, drawing heavily on an understanding of how this relationship is addressed by contingency theorists. We close by posing challenges to researchers for developing new insights into the control of networks and why this knowledge is relevant for public managers and policy makers.     

E‐participation Opportunities and the Ambiguous Role of Corruption: A Model of Municipal Responsiveness to Sociopolitical Factors

Municipalities ostensibly scale the ladder of e‐participation improvement to gain legitimacy. However, research has not yet addressed how e‐participation initiatives are affected by serious legitimacy concerns such as corruption. One municipal response to corruption is to use e‐participation offerings as a remedial effort to gain citizen trust, but window‐dressing strategies might also be used. In this article, the authors attempt to make sense of this ambiguity by hypothesizing that the effects of perceived corruption on e‐participation offerings depend on the type of e‐participation as well as the level of local social capital and local public accountability demand. Analysis of data from 104 municipal websites in South Africa between 2013 and 2017 reveals support for two moderation mechanisms: (1) a positive remedial response to corruption in the presence of strong social capital and (2) a negative avoidance response to corruption in the presence of high demand for accountability.     

Improving the Budget Process in Fragile and Conflict‐Ridden States: Two Modest Lessons from Afghanistan

Both the donor community and scholars have created a cottage industry studying “fragile” states. International nongovernmental organizations that have developed indexes measuring corruption or governance have been unkind to Afghanistan. One index suggests a different and more optimistic story. The International Budget Partnership measures transparency every two years with its Open Budget Index. Afghanistan demonstrated dramatic improvement on this index between 2008 and 2012. The authors use the improvement in Afghanistan's transparency score as an entry point to explore how donors try to intervene and promote transparency as part of broader efforts in public financial management development and how legislative strengthening has also contributed to budget reform. The analysis offers a modest corrective to the overly pessimistic assessments of fragile states by showing that a fragile state can improve its budgetary transparency and enhance governance by strengthening the legislature's involvement in the budget process.     

Measuring Local Corruption in China: a Cautionary Tale

The intensification of corruption in China has led to a recent surge of scholarship examining the causes and consequences of corruption within the country. Nevertheless, no consensus exists as to how corruption should be measured at the local level. In this article, I evaluate the internal and external validity of three major groups of measures for local-level corruption in China, namely: perception-based measures, demand-side measures, and supply-side measures. In applying these measures to a model that examines the effect of corruption on local economic growth in China, I show that the results are highly dependent on the choice of the corruption measure. In conclusion, I suggest that future research using local-level corruption as a key variable should at least explore alternative measures to check for the robustness of the findings.     

The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence

This paper examines the reasons whycorruption and policy distortions tend toexhibit a high degree of persistence incertain regimes. We identify circumstancesunder which a firm seeks to evaderegulations through (i) bribery of localinspectors, and (ii) by lobbying high-levelgovernment politicians to resist legalreforms designed to improve judicialefficiency (rule of law) and eliminatecorruption. We show that in some casespolitical instability reinforces thesetendencies. The analysis predicts that inpolitically unstable regimes, theinstitutions necessary to monitor andenforce compliance are weak. In suchcountries, corruption therefore is morepervasive, and the compliance withregulations is low. We test thesepredictions using cross-country data. Theempirical results support the predictionsof the model. Political instability reducesjudicial efficiency, which in turnstimulates corruption. Thus, the effect ofpolitical instability on corruption is notdirect, but occurs indirectly via itseffect on the degree of judicialefficiency. Finally, corruption lowers thelevel of regulatory compliance. Thus,political instability indirectly affects compliance, via judicial efficiency andcorruption.     

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes a four‐cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.     

Laborde,liberalism, and religion

ABSTRACT

In this introduction, we provide a brief overview of the debate on religion in political philosophy. We present the main arguments defended by Cécile Laborde in Liberalism’s Religion and explain how these arguments contribute to the debate.     

Transparency and corruption: Measuring real transparency by a new index

Despite the salience of transparency in policy and democracy debates a global measurement of transparency has always been missing. In its absence, measuring the impact of transparency on accountability and corruption for a large number of countries has been difficult, with scholars using more or less adequate proxies. This paper introduces a new measurement of real transparency—the T-index—using 14 de facto components, based on direct observations of official websites in 129 countries and five de jure components, based on the transparency laws and conventions adopted. The resulting index is a measurement with very good internal and external validity and moderate precision. The paper argues that de facto transparency must be considered alongside de jure (legal) transparency if we are to judge the impact (or lack of) transparency against accountability and corruption, as a large implementation gap exists, in particular in poor countries, between legal commitments and real transparency. The T-index has significant impact on both perception and objective indicators of corruption, including perceived change in corruption over time as measured by the Global Corruption Barometer. An analysis of outliers shows that high transparency alone is not sufficient to achieve control of corruption, especially in countries with low human development and poor rule of law, although transparency is a robust predictor of corruption with GDP controls. The data with all sources is available for download as T-index 2022 dataset: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.7225627 and an interactive webpage developed for updates is available at www.corruptionrisk.org/transparency .     

The Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising

The Gwangju Uprising is fully explained when it is viewed not as a single event for 10 days but as the eruption of socio-economic contradictions of South Korean society in the late 1970s. Located between the Bak Jeong-hee dictatorship and the June Breakthrough of the working class in 1987, it was an explosion of the confrontation between monopoly capitalists and the unruling classes that had been alienated in the process of industrialization in the 1960s to 1970s. This contradiction appeared as the confrontation of troops commanded by the new military coup leaders versus Gwangju citizens demanding democratization.