Corruption, democracy and the World Bank

In this era of political conditionality and good governance, anti-corruptionhas emerged as a top priority (at least in theory) for all major donors. Thisis almost always linked to support for democratisation efforts, with onenotable exception – the World Bank. The Bank is constricted by anon-political mandate which forbids it supporting one particular politicalsystem through its lending and other activities. Nonetheless, the languageit uses (e.g., accountability, transparency, participation, etc.) and theprojects it supports seem to endorse the spirit of liberal democracy. I arguethat the Bank's mandate is in conflict with a politically sensitive issue likeanti-corruption, and that it is impossible to separate economic issues frompolitical ones in this instance; however, given the lack of consensus on therelationship between democracy, development and corruption, this may bethe best state of affairs for now.     

From the French Citizens' Convention on Climate to the Conference on the Future of Europe: A participatory science and democracy perspective

The Citizens' Convention on Climate (CCC) gathered 150 people, randomly selected but representing the diversity of French society. Its mandate was to formulate a series of concrete measures aimed to achieve at least a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (compared to 1990) while preserving social justice. The citizens auditioned experts on various topics from climate to economics and then formulated their own proposals, thus building an effective consensus, beyond individual specific interests. Moreover, proposals formed a coherent whole, and in this regard fare much better than previous attempts to tackle environmental and climate transition through public debates. This methodology shows how citizen science can produce efficient and quality outcomes. This opens new perspectives for democracy on the basis of new interaction channels between law‐makers, professional experts and citizens. This seems to be the approach chosen for the Conference on the Future of Europe as well. Gathering citizens from all EU countries to work on important topics for Europe and Europeans could be a way to build a common vision, and contribute to the creation of a true European common good. Citizens' direct involvement in science and democracy might be one of the keys to meaningfully and thus successfully address their shortcomings.     

Pretrial publicity,judicial remedies,and jury bias

Although past research has established pretrial publicity's potential to bias juror judgment, there has been less attention given to the effectiveness of judicial remedies for combatting such biases. The present study examined the effectiveness of three remedies (judicial instructions, deliberation, and continuance) in combatting the negative impact of different types of pretrial publicity. Two different types of pretrial publicity were examined: (a) factual publicity (which contained incriminating information about the defendant) and (b) emotional publicity (which contained no explicitly incriminating information, but did contain information likely to arouse negative emotions). Neither instructions nor deliberation reduced the impact of either form of publicity; in fact, deliberation strengthened publicity biases. Both social decision scheme analysis and a content analysis of deliberation suggested that prejudicial publicity increases the persuasiveness and/or lessens the persuasibility of advocates of conviction relative to advocates of acquittal. Acontinuance of several days between exposure to the publicity and viewing the trial served as an effective remedy for the factual publicity, but not for the emotional publicity. The article concludes by discussing the potential roles of affect and memory in juror judgment and evaluating the available remedies for pretrial publicity.     

Shame,Guilt, and Punishment

The emotions of shame and guilt have recently appeared in debates concerning legal punishment, in particular in the context of so called shaming and guilting penalties. The bulk of the discussion, however, has focussed on the justification of such penalties. The focus of this article is broader than that. My aim is to offer an analysis of the concept of legal punishment that sheds light on the possible connections between punishing practices such as shaming and guilting penalties, on the one hand, and emotions such as guilt, shame, and perhaps humiliation, on the other. I␣contend that this analysis enhances our understanding of the various theories of punishment that populate this part of criminal law theory and thereby sharpens the critical tools needed to assess them. My general conclusion is that, in different ways, all of the theories we encounter in this area can benefit from paying renewed attention to the nature of the connection between the state’s act of punishing and its expected or perceived emotional effect on the individual. OB, JD, KM, FT, CEB, KKJ, ASP, JS, AD, NE and the SNF x2.     

BREXIT,democracy and the rule of law

This article employs the image of the antisyzygy, the yoking of opposites, as an analytical tool to understand the dynamic and unresolved tensions built into the very idea of the European Union. It describes the EU as a forming a supranational constitutional space which does not supersede nation states, but instead seeks to preserve their specific identities while promoting and protecting the fundamental values they are called upon to embody as liberal constitutional democracies. The article then critically examines constitutional developments in the UK subsequent to its decision to leave the European Union and suggests that, paradoxically, it may have been the European Union which held the post-War post-imperial United Kingdom together and, without it and outside it, we may anticipate the UK's imminent dissolution into its original constituent nations – Brexit leads inexorably to BreUK-up.     

Self-Defense,Punishment and Forfeiture

Abstract

According to the self-defense view, the moral justification of punishment is derived from the moral justification of an earlier threat of punishment for an offense. According to the forfeiture view, criminals can justly be punished because they have forfeited certain rights in virtue of their crimes. The paper defends three theses about these two views. (1) The self-defense view is false because the right to threaten retaliation is not independent of the right to carry out that threat. (2) A more plausible account of the right to threaten says instead that the right to retaliate is primary to the right to threaten, and that the former right in turn arises because aggressors forfeit the right not to suffer retaliation. (3) The “fair warning thesis,” according to which just punishment must be preceded by a threat, is less plausible than first appearances suggest and is therefore no serious obstacle to the view of threats described above.     

Punishment,Accountability, and the New Juvenile Justice

The juvenile justice system has undergone radical change in the past three decades. The procedural revolution that began at the end of the 1960s with the Gault decision has more recently evolved into a substantive revolution. The changes in juvenile justice have been many and in some instances drastic, particularly in the apparent demise of the rehabilitative ideal. New theories or models have emerged, incorporating terminology such as punishment, justice, and accountability into the vocabulary of juvenile justice practitioners and the lexicon of state juvenile codes. The transformation in the philosophy and underlying goals of the system has been well-documented over the past decade or so. It is now time to ask critical questions about the significance and meaning of this transformation and to bring attention to unresolved issues. This article suggests the issues that need to be addressed in order to make both practical and philosophical sense out of the changes in the mission of “juvenile justice.”     

Fair and impartial railroad: The jury,the media,and political trials

The clash between social movements and political authority is often played out in the court rooms in criminal cases which are loosely described as “political trials.” While prosecutors, judges, and defendants rarely agree as to the “political” nature of a particular case, all parties usually regard the jury as the pivotal factor. The jury, of course, is enshrined in Anglo-American legal theory as the final check against suppression of liberty by the state. Plea bargaining is out of the question when the very legitimacy of the state is challenged and when dissident defendants are determined to use the trial process as a means of political expression. The crucial question is whether the jury has in fact lived up to its Constitutional role.The article attempts to answer this question at two levels. First, the history of political trials in the United States is reviewed with the general finding that radicals have faced juries which were both grossly unrepresentative of the general population and typically hostile to the ideas, life styles, and social origins of the defendants. Second, the article considers in some detail the impact of media coverage on potential jurors on one particular recent political case, the 1977–1978 trial of accused “guerrilla-bombers” Richard Picariello and Eduard Guilion in the Federal District Court of Southern Maine. The survey opinion data presented for this case strongly indicate that any chance of a fair trial for the defendants was compromised by effects of sustained hostile media coverage before the onset of the trial. Finally, the article considers available remedies in the form of either legislative reforms designed to ensure representative juries, or voir dire procedures aimed at eliminating biased jurors. A review of these remedies offers little hope that future political trials will be substantially fairer than in the past. Moreover, the direction of current criminal justice reforms, as in the proposed S-1722 Federal Criminal Code, promise to criminalize further important forms of political expression.The conclusion is not that jury trials should be avoided or minimized, since judges are apt to be even more predisposed against dissidents. Rather, the point is that the social and ideological biases which intrude especially in political trials are rooted in the political economy of capitalism which underlies the legal system itself. The jury system remains the best available defense against legal repression, but “justice” must ultimately await the outcome of continued social struggle, rather than further refinements of legal process.     

Punishment,Liberalism, and Public Reason

The article argues for a conception of the justification of punishment that is compatible with a modern, politically liberal regime. Section I deals with what some have thought are the obvious social interests society has in punishing criminals, and tries to develop those possible interests somewhat sympathetically. Section II suggests that many of those reasons are not good ones if punishment is regarded (as it should be) from the perspective of political philosophy. Social responses to bad things happening to people cannot be grounded in controversial metaphysical views about what is good for people or what people deserve, but many reasons proffered for punishment are in fact grounded in such views. This constraint, accordingly, limits what individuals can expect in terms of a societal response to crime. Section III develops the appropriate reasons for punishment in a modern, liberal regime. Here the article relies on a—largely undefended—conception of public reason as the most plausible theory of what reasons for punishment are available to liberals. Section IV offers some closing thoughts on why people might adopt a politically liberal view about punishment as their own, personal view about how they should relate to others.     

Criminal Labelling,Publicity, and Punishment

This paper considers whether publicizing criminal labels is justified as a form of punishment. It begins by arguing that making criminal labels public is inevitably stigmatizing and that stigmatization is not, as is often implied, a defining aspect of censure, but needs independent justification. It argues that justifying grounds for public criminal labelling cannot be found in either the communicative account of punishment or deterrence theory. Rather, public criminal labelling should be understood as undermining of both the communicative and the deterrent functions of punishment. Recent empirical work is drawn upon to support the claims about public criminal labelling and deterrence.     

Class, Status, and the Punishment of White-Collar Criminals

The treatment of white-collar offenders by the criminal justice system has been a central concern since the concept of white-collar crime was first introduced In general, it has been assumed that those higher up the social hierarchy have an advantage in every part of the legal process, including the punishment they receive as white-collar criminals. In a controversial study of white-collar crime sentencing in the federal district courts, Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode contradicted this assumption when they found that those of higher status were more likely to be imprisoned and, when sentenced to prison, were likely to receive longer prison terms than comparable offenders of lower status. While they argued that results were consistent with "what those who do the sentencing often say about it," their analyses failed to control for the role of social class in the sentencing process. In this article we reanalyze the Wheeler et al sentencing data, including both measures of socioeconomic status and class position. Our findings show that class position does have an independent influence on judicial sentencing behavior. But this effect does not demand revision in the major findings reported in the earlier study.     

Free Will,Punishment, and the Burden of Proof

Justifying state punishment presents a difficulty for those who deny that human actions are free in the sense required by moral responsibility. The argument I make in this article, following work done by Double, Vilhauer, and Sehon, is that those who believe that human beings do sometimes act freely face exactly the same difficulty, for no current account of freedom has the sort of evidentiary support that condemning a person to punishment requires; no current account could meet even the most minimal burden of proof. Recourse to purely preventive methods, such as are proposed for a system of quarantine of dangerous individuals, seems undesirable because of the absence of limits under such a system, limits like the requirements of proportionality and guilt. That same objection holds as well against proposals of non-retributive punishment. The adoption of a system of punishment, understood retributively or non-retributively, does not preclude the state even in theory from also adopting a system of preventive measures. The answer that I suggest is a system of limited deprivations of freedom justified in much the way the doctrine of takings is justified, along with the specific exclusion of purely preventive methods for competent individuals.     

Retributivism,Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment

Retributivism is commonly taken as an alternative to a consequentialist justification of punishment. It has recently been suggested, however, that retributivism can be recast as a consequentialist theory. This suggestion is shown to be untenable. The temptation to advance it is traced to an intrinsic good claim prominent in retributive thinking. This claim is examined, and is argued to be of little help in coping with the difficulties besetting the retributive theory, as well as clashing with a desert claim equally central to that theory.     

Juror experience and jury verdicts

Most trial attorneys believe that repeated jury service produces several effects in jurors, one of the most important of which is an increased disposition toward conviction of criminal defendants. However, case law reveals a reluctance to accept the proposition that prior service per se would disquality a juror from sitting on an instant case because of actual or implied bias. The need for direct empirical investigation of the effects of prior jury service prompted the present study, which examined a complete docket of 175 consecutive criminal trials across onecalendar year in a state circuit court which required a 30-day term of its venire. The results indicated that as the number of jurors with prior jury experience increased there was a modest, but significant, increase in the probability of a conviction. Analysis of the relationship between initial verdicts and subsequent service disconfirmed the alternative hypothesis that attorneys deselected jurors on the basis of their first verdicts. Several parameters of experience were also related to foreperson selection. Implications for legal practice and for additional research are discussed.Support for this research was provided, in part, by National Science, Foundation grant No SES-8209479. A portion of this work was conducted while the senior author was a James McKeen Cattell Foundation Fellow.     

Desert, Justice and Capital Punishment

Our purpose in this paper is to consider a procedural objection to the death penalty. According to this objection, even if the death penalty is deemed, substantively speaking, a morally acceptable punishment for at least some murderers, since only a small proportion of those guilty of aggravated murder are sentenced to death and executed, while the majority of murderers escape capital punishment as a result of arbitrariness and discrimination, capital punishment should be abolished. Our targets in this paper are two recent attempts, by Thomas Hurka and Michael Cholbi respectively, to defend the view that ‘levelling down’ (that is, reducing the punishment imposed on a criminal from the punishment he absolutely deserves to a less severe punishment in order to achieve proportionality relative to the criminals who have escaped the punishment they absolutely deserve) is, in the context of capital punishment, morally permissible. We argue that both Hurka and Cholbi fail to show why the arbitrariness and discrimination objection impugns the death penalty.