Reason of State and Public Reason

“Reason of state” is a concept that is rarely used in contemporary legal and political philosophy, compared to everyday parlance; “public reason,” in contrast, is ubiquitous, especially in liberal philosophy, as a legitimacy‐conferring device. In this article it is argued that the unpopularity of the notion of “reason of state” is partly due to its notorious ambiguity. Three different usages of the notion can be identified: a “thin” usage (where “reason of state” is equivalent to the common good); an “ironical” usage (where it is used pejoratively to denounce it as a pretext for application of illegitimate or illegal means); and a “pre‐emptive” usage (where “reason of state” functions as a legitimate second‐order exclusionary reason used to override otherwise mandatory first‐order rules of action). It is argued that only the “thin” usage is helpful in a by‐and‐large liberal‐democratic context. The article then discusses the main dilemmas related to the concept of public reason, especially in its most influential, Rawlsian interpretation, and defends the concept against common critiques. Finally, the two concepts of “reason of state” and public reason are compared, and it is argued that a “thin” usage of “reason of state” is functionally equivalent to public reason, and that both resonate with the theory of “input democracy” (focusing, as it does, on the legitimacy of reasons—or motivations—for applying coercive rules to individuals). The article also identifies a problematic feature of “reason of state”: its emphasis on the state as a privileged interpreter of such reasons and/or as identifying the pool of actors within which the “constituency” of public reason is ascertained. There are good reasons to resist both of these consequences: the former because of its potentially authoritarian consequences, the latter because of reasons provided by cosmopolitan political conceptions.     

On Law and Disagreement. Some Comments on "Interpretative Pluralism"

Abstract This paper focuses on the question: Do persisting disagreements in constitutional interpretation affect the legitimacy of “the democratic system as a whole”? According to both Michelman and Waldron, the epistemic indeterminacy of interpretation—that is, the fact that principles do not possess stable meanings beyond, and independent of, their application to concrete cases—puts its finger on a point of the contractualist and prevailing political theory. But, if neither the legitimacy of any democratic order nor the standard of internal criticism can be founded on a broad background consensus on constitutional essentials, “what else makes a deliberative process of legislation and adjudication a generator of legitimacy so that citizens are induced to accept controversial results as ‘worthy of respect’?” The route pursued goes beyond all views that require legitimacy to be based on sharing a set of “thick” ethical beliefs. In this perspective, the author argues that the performative meaning of constitution‐making “provides a thin yet sufficiently strong base,” which corresponds to the minimal requirements inherent in the very practice of framing a constitution.     

Islamic Law in Action: A Historical Discussion

This review essay engages Kristen Stilt's recent book, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt (2011), in a fashion that highlights its contributions to the study of Islamic law. In particular, it underlines the methodological arguments made in the book that might help us think about Islamic legal practice in sophisticated and historically grounded ways. As elaborated in the article, these arguments have important implications for modern as well historical settings. Specifically, Stilt's discussion of “Islamic law in action” reveals the inherent flexibility of Islamic legal practice to accommodate political change. The article also discusses how further research on the topic could benefit from specific approaches and orientations.     

Rawls's Political Liberalism. A Reassessment

Since Rawls's Political Liberalism is by now the subject of a wide and deep philosophical literature, much of it excellent in quality, it would be foolhardy to attempt to say something about each of the major issues of the work, or to sort through debates that can easily be located elsewhere. I have therefore decided to focus on a small number of issues where there is at least some chance that a fresh approach may yield some new understanding of the text: Rawls's distinction between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines; the psychological underpinnings of political liberalism; and the possibility that political liberalism might be extended beyond the small group of modern Western societies that Rawls's historical remarks suggest as its primary focus. I also include a discussion of the much‐debated issue of civility and public reason, which could hardly be avoided given its prominence in the book's reception. This paper should therefore be read not as a comprehensive account of the work but as one person's attempt to grapple, very incompletely and imperfectly, with a book that is as great as any philosophy has seen on this topic of great human urgency.     

Agency,Authority, and the Logic of Mutual Recognition

The “Cartesian” model of the rational subject is central to the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke and is “transcendentally” affirmed in Kant's account of ethics and legality. An influential body of Hegelian inspired critique has suggested, however, that the dialectical deficiencies of the dominant models of Liberalism in late modernity inhere in this “atomistic” or “self‐supporting” characterisation of the individual. The “atomistic” perspective appears as an obstacle not only to the coherent articulation of the compatibility of liberty and equality, but also to the attempt to express the mutuality of recognition between agents that might offer a genuinely communal conception of constitution and subject. Employing as a frame of reference Alan Brudner's analysis of these issues in his comprehensive Constitutional Goods (Brudner 2004) it is argued that legal and political theory might usefully adopt an understanding of Hegel's notion of “recognition” (Anerkennung) in this regard without drastic phenomenological reconstruction of the Cartesian or Kantian subject.     

Legal Aid,Social Workers,and the Redefinition of the Legal Profession in Chile, 1925–1960

This article examines the history of the Chilean Legal Aid Service (Servicio de Asistencia Judicial) from the 1920s until the 1960s. It argues that with the emergence of the “social question”—the concern for improving the lower classes' working and living conditions to promote the nation's modernization and prevent political radicalization—the Chilean legal profession committed to legal aid reform to escape a professional identity crisis. Legal aid allowed lawyers to claim they had a new “social function” advocating on behalf of the poor. However, within legal aid offices, lawyers interacted with female social workers who acted as gatekeepers, mediators, and translators between the lawyers and the poor. This gendered professional complementarity in legal aid offices helped lawyers to put limits on their new “social function”: it allowed them to maintain legal aid as a part‐time activity that did not challenge the structure of the legal system as a whole.     

Gringo: a coming-of-age in Latin America

The classic studies of the authoritarian personality imply that free‐and‐just societies would need a different kind of personality. Social structure and personality are interdependent. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts but the nature of the parts is not irrelevant. Without a truly utopian world, we have to guess at what such personalities would look like—an important, often neglected insight of Marx. So we look for hints in a less‐than‐perfect world. Towards that end novelists have offered, intentionally and unintentionally, certain indices or codes of the kind of personality necessary for a just world. Kazantzakis’ Zorba is one such hint, as seen in his autonomy, manifested most importantly in his anti‐nationalism. In Zorba we see that community is possible where he has become “free” (rejection of nationalism, etc.); it is not possible where he is not “free” (vis‐à‐vis women). The paradox is that the just society needs autonomous personalities. Crudely put, real human community might require personalities who do not need it.     

Rational choice attitudinalism?

This essay reviews Epstein, Landes, and Posner’s The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice. Their book systematically asks how the role of ideology varies across the tiers of the federal judicial hierarchy. A major finding is that the impact of ideology increases from the bottom to the top of the judicial hierarchy. Their typical methodology formulates an ex ante measure of judicial ideology such as the political party of the appointing president, and demonstrates that this measure correlates with later judicial behavior, often voting on case dispositions. Along the way, they investigate a multitude of topics, including some quite under‐explored ones. We argue that ELP’s theory is only weakly connected to their empirical practice, for the latter focuses on the role of ideology in judging while the former says almost nothing about that relationship. In fact, though, their empirical practice does embed a theory of law and ideology, but one quite different from that suggested by the book’s rhetoric. In the penultimate section of the essay, we explore this disconnection between ELP’s theory, practice, and interpretation. Its origin (we argue) lies in an extremely thin conceptualization of law. We conclude with the issue posed in ELP’s final chapter, “The Way Forward,” but suggest a rather different path.     

Liberalism and Its Other: The Politics of Primitivism in Colonial and Postcolonial Indian Law

Liberalism is widely regarded as a modern intellectual tradition that defends the rights and freedoms of autonomous individuals. Yet, in both colonial and postcolonial contexts, liberal theorists and lawmakers have struggled to defend the rights and freedoms of political subjects whom they regard as “primitive,” “backward,” or “indigenous.” Liberalism thus recurrently encounters its primitive other, a face‐off that gives rise to a peculiar set of dilemmas and contradictions for political theory and law. In what ways can postcolonial law rid itself of its colonial baggage? How can the ideal of universal liberal citizenship overcome paternalistic notions of protection? How might “primitive” subjects become full and equal citizens in postcolonial societies? To explore these dilemmas and contradictions, I study the intellectual trajectory of “primitivism” in India from the construction of so‐called tribal areas in the 1870s to legal debates and official reports on tribal rights in contemporary India. Through a close reading of these legal provisions for tribal peoples and places, I explore the continuing tension between the constitutional ideal of liberal citizenship and the disturbing reality of tribal subjecthood produced by colonial and postcolonial Indian states.     

WHEN POLICY COMES TO TOWN: DISCOURSES AND DILEMMAS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A STATEWIDE REENTRY POLICY IN KANSAS

In this case study, we document challenges to reform implementation posed by line staff, supervisors, and managers during a large‐scale realignment of the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) in which they sought to replace a traditional approach of “risk containment” focused on surveillance and incarceration with a new model of “risk reduction” focused on service delivery and reintegration. We draw on interviews, observations, and archival research to document the staff's discursive challenges to the rollout of the new policy. More specifically, we describe how varying challenges to the reforms—“denial,” “dismissal,” and “defiance”—reflect actors’ positions within the organization, the local contexts in which they operate, and more general frames of interpretation of the long‐term orientation of the KDOC. We integrate these perspectives to contribute to the ongoing expansion of conventional models of penal change that highlight the role of actors and local social and institutional context as moderators of the gap between “law on the books” and “law in action.”     

B. F. Skinner's utopian vision: behind and beyond walden two

This paper addresses B. F. Skinner's utopian vision for enhancing social justice and human well‐being as it was introduced in his 1948 novel, Walden Two. In the first part, we address the historical, intellectual, and social context that situates the book in the utopian genre, the critiques of its premises and practices, and the fate of intentional communities patterned on the book. In the second part, we review practices in Skinner's book that advance social justice and human well‐being under the themes of health, wealth, and wisdom, and then focus on contemporary practices that are the legacy of his vision. His vision was neither the a priori truth of a particular premise about human behavior or a necessary practice (blueprint) for an intentional community but rather the use of empirical methods to discover premises and practices that work to advance the health, wealth, and wisdom of individuals and survival of the culture.     

Carl Schmitt on the Secularisation of Religious Texts as a Resacralisation of Jurisprudence?

Carl Schmitt, an increasingly influential German law professor, developed a provocative and historically oriented model of “political theology” with specific relevance to legal scholarship and the authorship of constitutional texts. His “political theology” is best understood neither as an expressly theological discourse within constitutional law, nor as a uniquely legal discourse shaped by a hidden theological agenda. Instead, it addresses the possibility of the continual resurfacing of theological ideas and beliefs within legal discourses of, for instance, sovereignty, the force of law and states of emergency (or “exception”) that present themselves as relentlessly secular, even—in the case of Kelsenian jurisprudence—”scientific”. This article illustrates and then critically evaluates Schmitt’s theory in terms of the authorship of constitutional texts in particular. It includes two case studies—genocidal colonial land appropriation and Kelsenian positivism in order to illustrate aspects of his political theology. Whilst Schmitt is defended against reductionist interpretations, I show that there remains considerable unfinished business before a Schmittian approach to legal theory merits full acceptance.     

Law and the Building Blocks of the Familiar

This article draws on the insights offered by Francesca Polletta, Calvin Morrill, and Elizabeth Chiarello in their comments on my book, Caring for Our Own: Why There Is No Political Demand for New American Social Welfare Rights ( 2014 ) to further specify the conditions that unleash the emancipatory potential of law. I argue that much of law's emancipatory power lies in its capacity to “construct anew”—to demonstrate new solutions to social problems by connecting the familiar with the strange. Drawing on the case of child care, I find that laws do not automatically provide the cultural resources to construct new claims for state intervention, but that existing laws—and the symbols, narratives, and norms that we associate with them—serve as grist for the political imagination and can be transposed to new contexts or institutions. In the absence of cultural resources in one institution (such as work), advocates can use legal discourse to strategically shift responsibility for a social problem to a new institution (such as education), opening up possibilities for new models, organizational actors, constituencies, and frames.     

Hannah Arendt's Moral Ontology: Comments on David Luban's Arendt on the Crime of Crimes

David Luban identifies a tension between Arendt's conception of ethnic identification in a context of persecution and her conception of humanity. That tension pertains to the reality—or realities—that Arendt addresses: the moral reality of her Bildung that appears throughout her work, and is centered on the “dignity of man,” on the one hand, and the divisive, “political” reality that she was forced to face when “attacked as a Jew,” on the other. By implicitly accepting that in a context of persecution one cannot escape the framing relevance of the “political” —an idea that is also present in her imaginary condemnation speech of Eichmann—Arendt betrays a fundamental theme of her work: “forgiveness” and the inherent possibility of a “new beginning.”     

Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World‐Culture or World‐Capitalism?

This article analyzes the phenomenon of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR; specifically: social private regulation) in light of two sociological paradigms of globalization: “world‐culture” and “world‐capitalism.” The study treats three analytically distinct features of CSR: the political contestation over its meaning, the role of business studies in transforming it into a managerial model, and its consolidation as a market of authorities. The study finds that (1) while CSR may be theorized as a emergent “world cultural” model, the culture paradigm does not take sufficient account of the role of corporations in shaping it, and (2) while both paradigms recognize the transition from political contestations over the character of CSR to its deployment by means of private regulation, the world‐capitalism paradigm offers stronger tools for theorizing the mechanisms of change that mediate between political agency and institutionalized regulatory outcomes.     

For Both Love and Money: Viviana Zelizer's The Purchase of Intimacy

Viviana Zelizer's recent book, The Purchase of Intimacy (2005), presents an innovative theory of how social and legal actors negotiate rights and obligations when money changes hands in intimate relationships—a perspective that could change how we understand many things, from valuations of homemaking labor to the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. This essay describes Zelizer's critique of the reductionist “Hostile Worlds” and “Nothing But” approaches to economic exchange in intimate relationships and then explains her more three‐dimensional approach, “Connected Lives.” While Zelizer focuses on family law, the essay goes beyond that context, extending Zelizer's approach to transfers of genetic material and concluding that her approach could point toward a more equitable resolution of disputes in and about these markets.     

Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational Space*

Constitutional pluralism has become a principal model for understanding the legal and political structure of the European Union. Yet its variants are highly diverse, ranging from moderate “institutional” forms, closer to constitutionalist thinking, to “radical” ones which renounce a common framework to connect the different layers of law at play. Neil MacCormick, whose work was key for the rise of constitutional pluralism, shifted his approach from radical to institutional pluralism over time. This paper reconstructs the reasons for this shift—mainly concerns about political stability that also underlie many others' skepticism vis‐à‐vis radical pluralist ideas. It then seeks to show why such concerns are likely overdrawn. In the fluid, contested space of postnational politics, a common, overarching frame is problematic as it might inflame, rather than tame, tensions. Leaving fundamental issues open along radical pluralist lines may help to work around points of highly charged contestation and provide opportunities for resistance from less powerful actors.     

On Collective Actions. Some Remarks on the Theory of Legal Actions

In this paper the author deals with collegial judicial decisions as a form of human action. The scope is, however, limited to three questions: (1) What is the structure and the status of the general theory of action; (2) Is this theory applicable to such performative acts as judicial decisions; and finally, (3) Is it possible to speak about action in connection with collective agents such as collegial courts? The author defends the thesis that general theory of action as such is applicable to collective action, too, because the difficulty is not in the structure of that theory, or in its “individual character,” but specifically in the notion of “collective will.” This kind of “will” is epistemologically always a result of a political procedure, and speaking about the “collective will” presupposes the analysis of these procedures, because in practice they and only they formulate “collective motives,”“collective beliefs” and the like.     

马克思主义哲学与马克思哲学

用诠释学的观点解读马克思的文本 ,是文本和解读者之间的“主体间性”的活动。马克思文本的“原意”是一个不可把握的概念 ,也许有但不可知。马克思主义哲学和马克思哲学在内容上有区分 ,但在意义上完全没有必要。“走进马克思”仅是对不看马克思文本而妄谈马克思的人的规劝。马克思主义哲学本身就是一种意识形态 ,用意识形态性来指责马克思主义哲学是对意识形态的偏见 ;但马克思主义哲学也确实在某种程度上被误解为政治理论 ,剥去马克思主义哲学的政治外衣是发展马克思主义哲学的必要。     

Presumptions,Burdens, and Best Interests in Relocation Law

The pure “best interests” approach to relocation law is a failure. It is unpredictable and expensive, increasing conflict and discouraging settlement. The “fundamental questions” proposed by Parkinson and Cashmore in their article will not reform the law. Real reform will require the use of presumptions or burdens to guide best interests. “Presumptions” are not “rules,” but only starting points. No simple presumption “for” or “against” all relocations can be justified, but there are large categories of cases that do warrant presumptions: interim moves, unilateral relocations, shared care, and predominant primary caregivers. The first three involve presumptions against relocation, while the last—the largest category—warrants a presumption that relocation is in the best interests of the child, unless the contrary is proved. There will remain a small minority of in‐between cases where none of these presumptions will operate, recognizing the limits of our general knowledge. It is time to move the relocation reform debate beyond pure “best interests,” to the next stage, to a serious discussion of which cases warrant presumptions, and of what strength.

Key Points for the Family Court Community
• Pure best interests approach to relocation law is a failure
• Presumptions or burdens needed to reform the law, but not just “for” or “against”
• Presumptions are identified for four categories of relocation cases: interim moves, unilateral relocations, shared care, and predominant primary caregivers