Australian Democracy and Priveleged Parliamentary Speech

This article responds to recent cases of parliamentary speech which reflect the ascendancy of a totalising 'mainstream' approach to public discourse and a political leadership that may, at times, be overly attentive to the majority-rule dimension of democracy. These developments spark a more general discussion of the phenomenology of privileged parliamentary speech, the role of speech freedoms in liberal democratic orders and the duties of parliamentary representatives within them. I make two general conclusions. First, the ways in which we normally argue and think about free speech will not generally apply to the speech of parliamentarians because their speech rights cannot be universalised. Secondly, even if parliamentary speech could be treated as standard speech there would be no legitimate defence (from a liberal democratic point of view) for a strictly populist approach to its use since this could undermine the deliberative function of parliament and lead to the violation of other important liberal democratic principles.     

Developments in Danish Parliamentary Democracy: Accountability, Parties and External Constraints

Danish parliamentary developments since the Second World War include the consolidation of minority rule, a reduction in the power of established political parties, and more external constraints on parliamentary actors. They also involve a number of more specific changes to the various steps of delegation and accountability. The evidence tends to support the thesis of a paradox in the development of parliamentary democracy. On the one hand, changes in the constitutional chain of delegation and accountability have, on the whole, favoured the principals (voters, parliament, ministers) compared with their agents (parliament, ministers, civil servants). On the other hand, the established parties have declined somewhat and there are more external constraints than there used to be. This implies that the power of democratic principals has increased within narrower limits of action. In such a situation, the principals can be said to 'decide more about less' because of the stronger national and (not least) international constraints. However, the emergence of a partially new system of governance cannot unequivocally be called better or worse than the traditional Danish system of democratic governance.     

The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy over Mixed Forms

It is often said that parliament shouldrepresent the opinions found in thepopulation and that government should beheld accountable for its political program.It is shown that these two goals rely ontwo different basic models of democracywhich are not fully compatible with eachother: the model of a pure representativedemocracy and the model of a pure two partycompetition. Unaccountable governments,voter alienation, strategic voting, andgovernmental instability are shown to beconsequences of this institutional mix.These problems may be avoided with reformsin the direction of one or the other basicmodel.     

Improving Democracy and Accountability in Ghana: The Importance of Parliamentary Oversight Tools

In this research note, we examine the nature of, and influences on, parliamentary oversight in Ghana. We find that while macro‐institutions are important when examining good governance and legislative effectiveness, meso‐level institutions (such as oversight tools) are more important than previously acknowledged. We also detect a positive relationship between an increase in legislative oversight facilities and the reputation of parliament and its members, the legitimacy of democracy and political institutions, and the success in curbing corruption. And finally, we confirm that the successful functioning of institutions depends on the presence or absence of specific contextual factors. In the case of Ghana, these factors are a relatively low level of partisanship at the committee level, parliament's ability to find alternative sources of information, and the demand for good governance.     

The Changing Finnish Democracy: Stronger Parliamentary Accountability, Coalescing Political Parties and Weaker External Constraints

Examining constitutional and political developments since the Second World War, this article shows that Finland has moved from a system dominated by the president toward a normal parliamentary democracy. Government formation is now based on partisan negotiations and the president is almost completely excluded from the policy process in domestic matters. The chain of delegation from the voters to the civil servants is thus now simpler than before and subject to fewer external constraints. In fact, Finland is probably the only West European country where parliamentary democracy has become less constrained since the 1980s. Leadership by presidents has effectively been replaced with leadership by strong majority governments, which have ruled, without much effective opposition, since the early 1980s. The stronger role of parties in shaping public policy stands in contrast to the weakening of the parties among the electorate. The ability of political parties to effectively align preferences is increasingly in doubt, as indicated by the transforming cleavage structure, lower turnout and declining party membership.