Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in multi-level states. A comparative assessment

ABSTRACT

The study of intergovernmental relations (IGR) is a classical research area in scholarship on federalism and territorial politics. However, it has largely ignored the relatively new, and recently decentralized area of immigrant integration. The aim of this Special Issue is twofold. First, it aims to analyse how governments in multi-level states coordinate on immigrant integration. Second, it wishes to explain the dynamics that shape the features of intergovernmental relations. In doing so, we focus on four multi-level states; two of which are federal (Belgium and Canada) and two that are decentralized (Italy and Spain). Whilst we engage with the established literature on intergovernmental relations to formulate hypotheses about the nature and dynamics of intergovernmental relations, we also formulate less explored hypotheses. Our overarching argument is that the scholarship on IGR benefits from in-depth comparative case studies comparing IGR not just across countries, but also across policy areas and over time.     

转移支付对地方财政收入稳定效应的实证分析——基于中国省市县三级面板数据

从理论上讲,政府间转移支付可以作为稳定政策工具发挥作用。尤其自1994年以来,中央对地方的转移支付已成为地方各级政府重要的财政收入来源,然而,对于转移支付在财政收入稳定性方面发挥的作用,无论是政策制定者和学术研究者均没有注意到。为此,本文利用1993-2005年中国7个省861个县（区）的财政面板数据,把偏离趋势值变动的比率作为因变量,运用固定效应模型和Prais-Winsten模型或者Cochrane-Oreutt模型,实证分析了转移支付对省、市、县（区）财政收入稳定效应。实证结果表明转移支付对省、市、县（区）财政收入有较大的拉动作用,而且当财政收入处于下降阶段时,转移支付的稳定效应更加明显。所以,有必要重新反思政府间转移支付的目标,将其稳定作用纳入政策制订目标和实施效果的考虑范围,并考虑把转移支付作为稳定地方财政的一种政策工具。     

American Federalism and the Search for Models of Management

Changes in the United States federal system mean that managers must operate by taking into account multiple interacting governments and nongovernmental organizations; dealing with numerous programs emanating from Washington and state capitols; and engaging in multiple intergovernmental transactions with an expanding number of intergovernmental instruments. Four models of management within this changing system are identified. The top-down model emphasizes executive-branch control and is embedded in enforcement and exchange related to the laws, regulations, funding rules, program standards, and guidelines associated with federal/state grant, procurement, and regulation programs. The donor-recipient model emphasizes mutual dependence or shared program administration, where two-party bargaining or reciprocal interactions among government officials is the norm. The jurisdiction-based model is defined by the initiated actions of local officials and managers who seek out program adjustments and other actors and resources to serve the strategic aims of their governments. The network model highlights the actions of multiple interdependent government and nongovernmental organizations pursuing joint action and intergovernmental adjustment. Although the first two models are long-standing and the latter two are emergent, all appear to be alive and well on the intergovernmental scene, posing complex challenges for public managers.     

论我国地方政府间合作存在问题及解决途径

加强地方政府间合作是公共行政改革的趋势,也是当前行政科学研究的热点。有关地方治理的理念,由旧地方主义向新地方主义转变。回顾了相关的研究文献,总结了地方政府间合作存在问题的宏观分析框架,认为本位主义下的地方保护、尚未建立有效的合作协调机制、缺乏相关法律与制度的保障、财政经费分担问题是地方政府间合作的主要现存问题。针对这些问题,就完善地方政府间合作的途径与措施,从政治、管理、法制3个层面进行设计与创新,并系统介绍和总结了美国地方政府间合作的几种典型管理模式。     

CANADA'S INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SPECIALISTS*

Abstract: Over the last decade the federal government and each of the ten provincial governments in Canada have put in place in their administrations significant numbers of intergovernmental relations specialists. These specialists are public servants up to departmental head level who work solely on intergovernmental business. They are located in separate departments or as separate units within central agencies, and are responsible for the coordination of relations with other governments and of intergovernmental activities within their own government. Coming at a time of increasing intergovernmental tension within the Canadian federation, these specialists have been subject to a great deal of criticism. The critics have charged that the specialists have exacerbated and even produced intergovernmental conflict. Lately, some scholars have come to their defence, emphasizing the positive functions that the specialists perform, and arguing that their influence has, in any case, been exaggerated. Australia has its own relatively small number of intergovernmental relations specialists at both the federal and state levels. And it is possible that in the future additional positions will be created. The variety of the Canadian experience means that there are a number of models from which each Australian government, of whatever size, can learn.     

府际管理理论与长株潭城市群政府合作机制

城市群政府间合作困境是困扰城市群一体化的主要问题.长株潭(长沙、株洲、湘潭)城市群在一体化过程中,政府间合作受到政治绩效竞争、政府"经济人"部门、经济社会发展差距、府际协调与合作落后等诸多因素制约.但是,经济一体化、上级战略和惠民效应等因素又将继续形成动力,客观上要求政府间形成可行的合作机制,破解当前困境以带来城市一体化的共惠共利.运用府际管理的基本理论,结合中国政治行政体制的特点,提出以构建政务环境、经济环境、生态环境和信息环境为基础平台的网状政府合作模式,其中特别强调从制度设计的角度来制约政府的毁约和不合作行为,要求政府间合作项目必须由以"法规、监督、激励"思想为核心的制约制度来保证实施.这种合作机制是解决当前省域内城市群政府间合作问题的一种新思路,在不实行政治和行政一体化的前提下,可以有效地实现城市群公共事务的合作,并且降低不履行契约和不合作的风险.     

The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy

We evaluate the impact of political forces in the allocation of intergovernmental grants in Portugal, as it matured from a young to an established democracy. Using a large and unexplored dataset we show that political variables condition the granting system, and that their importance changed over time. While tactical manipulation in the distribution of grants among municipalities seems to exist only in the early years of democracy, opportunistic effects are stronger in the latter years. We argue that the latter effect is due to a change in the political environment and to the electorate’s lack of information on intergovernmental grants.     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension

This paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism — intergovernmental collusion in the form of intergovernmental grants. Grants, it is argued, serve to encourage the expansion of the public sector by concentrating taxing powers in the hands of the central government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed on governments forced to self-finance their expenditures. The results reported suggest that intergovernmental grants do encourage growth in the public sector. The results offer further support for the use of monopoly government assumptions in public sector modeling.     

An ACIR Perspective on Intergovernmental Institutional Development

This article traces the creation and demise of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and assesses the prospects for restoring an ACIR‐like capability to the federal system. Recent initiatives by the National Academy of Public Administration, the Big 7 state and local government official associations, and Congress are summarized, and the facilitating and inhibiting factors associated with intergovernmental institutional development are examined. At least three ingredients in the formula that gave birth to the ACIR in 1959 will need to be present more than 50 years later: (1) support from congressional champions, the president, and public interest groups; (2) visibility and urgency of intergovernmental fiscal and management issues and the need for a permanent intergovernmental presence to address them; and (3) “homework and spadework” to enlist potential conservative and liberal interest group and think tank backers.     

LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEM WITH DISASTER MANAGEMENT: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS1

In response to the recent attention given the disaster management responsibilities of local governments, this study asks two questions: how have local governments managed the demands associated with major natural disasters, and what explanation have been offered for the perfor- mance patterns observed? In the first part of the paper the social science disaster literature is reviewed to ascertain performance across four disaster stages (predisaster planning, emergency, early recovery, and long-term recovery). Among the explanations offered for the performance patterns, it was surprising to find little attention devoted to underlying structural factors. In the second part of the paper, “the disaster management problem” is stipulated and a structural analysis of it is undertaken, focusing on the role of local government within both the intergovernmental system and the local power structure. The conclusion is that the disaster management problem has roots deep within American society and culture, and any attempts to redress the problem will require attention to limiting struc- tural realities.     

Reflections on the Spirit and Work of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

What did the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) accomplish before it was disbanded in 1996? Were its accomplishments sufficiently valuable to justify reestablishing the organization? This article reviews the commission’s origins, history, and accomplishments, and addresses future intergovernmental needs. The ACIR’s accomplishments were substantial, but are largely unavailable today. Lessons learned from the ACIR suggest the need to (1) recreate a network of intergovernmental advocates within the legislative and executive branches of the federal government; (2) restart the information flows and high‐level federal, state, and local policy dialogues that withered after the ACIR’s demise; (3) strengthen boundary‐crossing institutions capable of addressing metropolitan and multistate problems; and (4) develop new opportunities to achieve public policy outcomes that can be attained only by the cumulative efforts of federal, state, and local governments working together—often with private parties as well.     

Goal Conflict and Fund Diversion in Federal Grants to the States

Researchers using fiscal choice models have had limited success predicting fund diversion in federal grant programs. The application of a principal-agent framework to questions of fiscal federalism offered a potentially valuable alternative approach, but the traditional model employed by Chubb (1985) neglected potential variability in the degree of goal conflict between principals and agents. This article proposes an expanded framework, which incorporates the possibility of variation in goal conflict between participants in intergovernmental aid programs. The theory suggests that the level of policy congruence between recipient jurisdictions and the national government will determine the amount of grant funding diverted away from targeted policy areas. Findings from analyses of grant programs in two distinct policy areas support the hypothesis that grant effectiveness is partially a function of goal congruence. The relationship between intergovernmental partners is interactive, with the degree of policy agreement determining fund diversion in subnational jurisdictions, as well as the effectiveness of federal oversight activities. The findings have important theoretical implications for understanding both fiscal federalism and principal-agent relationships more generally.     

Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in Spain: The case of Catalonia

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the nature of intergovernmental relations (IGR) on immigrant integration in Spain, a relatively recent immigration country, with a focus on Catalonia. By means of qualitative document analysis and semi-structured interviews at both levels of government, the paper demonstrates that despite the formal existence of multilateral and institutionalized fora for intergovernmental relations, most intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration tend to be informal and bilateral. The paper also highlights that the conflictual nature of IGR on integration varies across sub-policy areas and over time. The paper contributes to strengthen existing hypotheses regarding institutional features (the distribution of competencies and the territorial organization of power) and party politics for explaining the patterns of IGR.     

Crisis Management in Hindsight: Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Control

This article argues that cognition is central to performance in emergency management. Cognition is defined as the capacity to recognize the degree of emerging risk to which a community is exposed and to act on that information. Using the case of Hurricane Katrina to illustrate the collapse of the standard model of emergency management without a clear focus on the role of cognition, the author reframes the concept of intergovernmental crisis management as a complex, adaptive system. That is, the system needs to adjust and adapt its performance to fit the demands of an ever-changing physical, engineered, and social environment. The terms of cognition, communication, coordination, and control are redefined in ways that fit the reality of practice in extreme events. A reframed intergovernmental crisis management system may be conceived as a dynamic interorganizational system that is characterized by four primary decision points: (1) detection of risk, (2) recognition and interpretation of risk for the immediate context, (3) communication of risk to multiple organizations in a wider region, and (4) self-organization and mobilization of a collective, community response system to reduce risk and respond to danger.     

Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches: An Intergovernmental Perspective on Homeland Security

Scholars and practitioners agree that homeland security policy implementation is contingent on a strong system of intergovernmental relations. The responsibilities associated with the homeland security mission, often mandated, cut across federal, state, and local boundaries. Local-level stakeholders are especially important players in the implementation process. This article presents a local perspective on the way intergovernmental relations have changed—and the reasons for those changes—since 9/11. Results of a survey of county and city officials in Florida provide evidence that intergovernmental cooperation has improved as a result of federal and state mandates. These results are refined by an analysis of the effects of specific local characteristics and the quality and quantity of vertical and horizontal networks on intergovernmental cooperation and local preparedness. Homeland security appears to be a policy area in which mandated cooperation and coordination—in a time and place of urgency—have actually strengthened the intergovernmental system.     

Where does learning take place? The role of intergovernmental cooperation in policy diffusion

Although it is widely accepted that a decentralised system can enhance policy learning and the spread of best practices, an under‐researched question is where that learning process takes place. Using data on the diffusion of health care policies in Switzerland, this article analyses the role of institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation and its impact on the spread of successful policies. The results show that joint membership of policy makers in health policy specific intergovernmental bodies is related to the diffusion of best practices.     

The National Renewable Energy Target: An Example of Post‐Machiavellian Policy‐Making?

Since the election of the Rudd Government in 2007 intergovernmental relations have been a major feature of the political agenda. A ‘new federalism’ approach introduced a re‐invigorated Council of Australian Governments (COAG) focused on developing national policies that reflect coordinated and cooperative policy‐making processes. The establishment of COAG working groups provided the means for developing policies that reflect new levels of agreement between jurisdictions and a common approach to reform. The development of the 20% Renewable Energy Target has been one of the first initiatives of this new approach to policy‐making. This research analyses the process behind the development of the target and places it within the context of the post‐Machiavellian approach, and looks at the implications for future intergovernmental relations.     

Overcoming the Barriers to Cooperation: Intergovernmental Service Agreements

Interlocal cooperation through service‐sharing agreements has a long history, but its use has increased in popularity during the last 20 years. The decisions of local government units to collaborate through intergovernmental service agreements are best understood as a two‐stage process. The first stage, in which communities decide whether to consider interlocal cooperation, involves the nature of the immediate problem faced plus specific demands for performance and efficiency gains that can result from service cooperation. In the second stage, communities confront a question of institutional supply, and hence must overcome inherent bargaining and collective action issues in order to forge interlocal agreements. Heckman probit estimates of such complex relationships using data drawn from a 2003 ICMA survey suggest strong support for this model. The authors conclude by discussing the role of network relationships among local actors for reducing transaction costs and facilitating intergovernmental collaboration.     

Public Expenditure Management Reform in India via Intergovernmental Transfers

This paper explores the possibility of using the channel of intergovernmental transfers for Public Expenditure Management reform in India. It seeks to introduce a quantifiable measure of expenditure quality which would influence intergovernmental transfers. The central message of this study is that a Quality Control Fund should be created by the Finance Commission. Inter‐se distribution from this would be in the nature of a reward to the states for their performance in the context of expenditure quality. The funds received from this incentive fund could be tied to spending on education and health. It would be a major change of approach if the Finance Commission mandated the States to set out some realistic output targets which could be monitored (would be reviewed by the next Finance Commission). This would be a big stride toward results‐based output‐oriented transfers and could herald a sea change in the very approach of budgeting and intergovernmental relations in India!