Taming the few: Platform regulation,independent audits,and the risks of capture created by the DMA and DSA

In its attempt to better regulate the platform economy, the European Commission recently proposed a Digital Markets Act (DMA) and a Digital Services Act (DSA). While the DMA addresses worries about digital markets not functioning properly, the DSA is concerned with societal harms stemming from the dissemination of (illegal) content on platforms. Both proposals focus on the relative size of platforms. The DMA applies to ‘gatekeeper’ platforms and the DSA has a special regime of scrutiny for ‘very large online platforms’ (VLOPs). Focusing on size, however, can have negative consequences for the enforcement of the DSA: First, risks disseminated by platforms below the VLOP-threshold reside in a regulatory blind spot. Second, VLOPs may leverage their market power against their new mandatory auditors and risk assessors, a threat theorised as ‘audit capture’ in this article. As a result, societal risks may remain undiscovered or downplayed and consumers and citizens may be harmed. This article traces the origin of the size criteria in the legislative history of the DMA and DSA proposals. It argues for safeguards against audit capture and adverse incentive structures in the DSA. The article draws on the debate on audit reform in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 to provide blueprints for fixing the regulatory gap.     

Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre-Accession Conditionality and Post-Accession Conundrums

In the wake of the extensive scrutiny of the human rights credentials of the new Member States under the EU pre-accession conditionality, which itself was riddled with paradoxes, this article considers a rather unexpected irony thrown up by the accession of these countries. It is that the post-communist constitutional courts, which have been applauded for vigorous protection of fundamental rights after the fall of the Communist regime that was marked by nihilism to rights, have come rather close to having to downgrade the protection standards after accession, due to the new constraints of supremacy of EC law. The article will consider the sugar market cases of the Hungarian and Czech Constitutional Courts and of the Estonian Supreme Court, which appear to add weight to the concerns that have been voiced in some older Member States about the fundamental rights protection in the EU. Indeed such concerns were recently also addressed in the concurring opinions to the Bosphorus judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.     

The transformative nature of the EU Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles: Replacing the old paradigm (normative equivalency of rights)

In December 2022 the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union jointly signed the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles, a document aiming to steer the EU digital agenda upon EU constitutional values and fundamental rights. Digital constitutionalism scholars regard the Declaration as a positive step forward within the process of constitutionalization of the digital environment in Europe. The Declaration includes both traditional rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and digital principles. Some of these principles have progressively underpinned the EU digital policy framework while others have been expanded in the Declaration or are of completely new formulation. In this contribution, we assess the Declaration's value in terms of relevance and novelty within the landscape of protection of online needs and interests in the EU. By assessing the Declaration's normative approach and using Lawrence Lessig's distinction between codifying and transformative constitutional regimes, we evaluate the Declaration's progressive and transformative character under a constitutional perspective.     

Trade marks are 'possessions', as are applications

In a landmark judgment, the Grand Chamber of the European Courtof Human Rights (ECHR) partially reversed an earlier decisionof the Second Section of that Court of October 2005 and extendedthe protection of fundamental property rights under Article1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rightsto trade mark applications.     

Incompatibility of the Digital Economy Act 2010 subscriber appeal process provisions with Article 6 of the ECHR

Through case-law research, this paper critically assesses the compatibility of the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA) subscriber appeal process provisions (Section 13 of the DEA) with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law, Ofcom's Initial Obligations Code (the Code), and the DEA judicial review decision, namely, BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and others, this paper focuses on the three Strasbourg Court principles of equality of arms, admissibility of evidence, and presumption of innocence, in an effort to determine whether Section 13 of the DEA infringes them, and whether this constitutes a breach of a subscriber's right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. The paper examines these three ECtHR principles. It contrasts such principles with the Code's provisions, and considers the compatibility of Section 13 of the DEA with Article 6 of the ECHR. It concludes that the DEA subscriber appeal process provisions do indeed infringe these principles, thus constituting a violation of subscribers' right to a fair trial. It also recommends that the UK government start taking seriously human rights in general, and Article 6 of the ECHR in particular.     

Private Law and Housing Justice in Europe

This article explores the different meanings of the right to housing in Europe in public and private relations with housing providers. In light of the fundamental right to housing's meaning in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, we offer a new reading of the CJEU judgments that have hitherto been heralded as extending the social dimension of EU (private) law. We submit that the emphasis on economic and procedural rights risks further ‘economisation’ of housing relations in Europe. While the possibilities to grant direct horizontal effect to the right to housing in EU law currently offer limited potential to counter this trend, private law provides part of the framework for a further balancing of social and economic elements in housing cases. Accordingly, we call for a debate on the specific aspects of horizontal relationships in the complex system of housing justice.     

A study of section 3 of the Maltese Official Secrets Act,its Canadian and British counterparts and its effects on freedom of expression

This article answers the question whether s 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act breaches freedom of expression as contained in art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights is briefly analysed in the light of obtaining case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Section 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act – which finds counterparts in several Commonwealth criminal law statutes – is subsequently studied by reference to United Kingdom and Canadian case law. A freedom of expression impact assessment of s 3(1) of the Official Secrets Act is carried out with the ensuing conclusion being that only s 3(1)(c) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act might, in certain circumstances, constitute a breach of art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta.     

An end to shadow banning? Transparency rights in the Digital Services Act between content moderation and curation

This paper offers a legal perspective on the phenomenon of shadow banning: content moderation sanctions which are undetectable to those affected. Drawing on recent social science research, it connects current concerns about shadow banning to novel visibility management techniques in content moderation, such as delisting and demotion. Conventional moderation techniques such as outright content removal or account suspension can be observed by those affected, but these new visibility often cannot. This lends newfound significance to the legal question of moderation transparency rights. The EU Digital Services Act (DSA) is analysed in this light, as the first major legislation to regulate transparency of visibility remedies. In effect, its due process framework prohibits shadow banning with only limited exceptions. In doing so, the DSA surfaces tensions between two competing models for content moderation: as rule-bound administration or as adversarial security conflict. I discuss possible interpretations and trade-offs for this regime, and then turn to a more fundamental problem: how to define visibility reduction as a category of content moderation actions. The concept of visibility reduction or ‘demotions’ is central to both the shadow banning imaginary and to the DSA's safeguards, but its meaning is far from straightforward. Responding to claims that demotion is entirely relative, and therefore not actionable as a category of content moderation sanctions, I show how visibility reduction can still be regulated when defined as ex post adjustments to engagement-based relevance scores. Still, regulating demotion in this way will not cover all exercises of ranking power, since it manifests not only in individual cases of moderation but also through structural acts of content curation; not just by reducing visibility, but by producing visibility.     

Privacy,Data Retention and Domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications

In Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, the European Court of Justice found the EU Data Retention Directive, which required the retention of communications data for up to two years, to be incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data. It is argued in this note that the decision ought to be taken as one that is concerned with the exercise of arbitrary power, a concern that is captured by the concept of domination.     

The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality

This article analyses the horizontal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Horizontal effect has been an integral part of the Union's application of fundamental rights, especially in the field of equality. However, the codification of fundamental rights in the Charter raises important questions as to how horizontal effect will continue to apply in the EU, particularly in the aftermath of the Court's reticent rulings in cases such as Dominguez and Association de Médiation Sociale. This article argues that the emphasis on prior approaches to horizontal effect in recent rulings fails to address the profound constitutional issues that the horizontal effect of a fundamental rights catalogue raises, which concern the role of private responsibility within the developing constitutional order of the European Union. It therefore calls for a more systematically theorised approach towards the horizontal application of fundamental rights under the Charter framework.     

Corporations as Moral Agents: Trade-Offs in Criminal Liability and Human Rights for Corporations

This article argues that a common way of defending corporate criminal liability creates a dilemma: it provides a strong justification for giving human rights to corporations. This result follows from approaches to punishment and human rights which predicate each on the status of moral agency. In short, if corporations are moral agents in a sufficient sense to attract criminal liability, they are eligible holders of human rights. The article also discusses the doctrinal application of this philosophical claim. Drawing on US jurisprudence, it illustrates how the European Court of Human Rights might deploy corporate moral agency as a theoretical foundation for its otherwise weakly-reasoned attribution of human rights to corporations. If proponents of corporate criminal liability are dissatisfied with these conclusions, they face difficult policy trade-offs: they must abandon the doctrine, or adopt alternative approaches to punishment or human rights.     

How platforms govern users’ copyright-protected content: Exploring the power of private ordering and its implications

Online platforms provide primary points of access to information and other content in the digital age. They foster users’ ability to share ideas and opinions while offering opportunities for cultural and creative industries. In Europe, ownership and use of such expressions is partly governed by a complex web of legislation, sectoral self- and co-regulatory norms. To an important degree, it is also governed by private norms defined by contractual agreements and informal relationships between users and platforms. By adopting policies usually defined as Terms of Service and Community Guidelines, platforms almost unilaterally set use, moderation and enforcement rules, structures and practices (including through algorithmic systems) that govern the access and dissemination of protected content by their users. This private governance of essential means of access, dissemination and expression to (and through) creative content is hardly equitable, though. In fact, it is an expression of how platforms control what users – including users-creators – can say and disseminate online, and how they can monetise their content.As platform power grows, EU law is adjusting by moving towards enhancing the responsibility of platforms for content they host. One crucial example of this is Article 17 of the new Copyright Directive (2019/790), which fundamentally changes the regime and liability of “online content-sharing service providers” (OCSSPs). This complex regime, complemented by rules in the Digital Services Act, sets out a new environment for OCSSPs to design and carry out content moderation, as well as to define their contractual relationship with users, including creators. The latter relationship is characterized by significant power imbalance in favour of platforms, calling into question whether the law can and should do more to protect users-creators.This article addresses the power of large-scale platforms in EU law over their users’ copyright-protected content and its effects on the governance of that content, including on its exploitation and some of its implications for freedom of expression. Our analysis combines legal and empirical methods. We carry our doctrinal legal research to clarify the complex legal regime that governs platforms’ contractual obligations to users and content moderation activities, including the space available for private ordering, with a focus on EU law. From the empirical perspective, we conducted a thematic analysis of most versions of the Terms of Services published over time by the three largest social media platforms in number of users – Facebook, Instagram and YouTube – so as to identify and examine the rules these companies have established to regulate user-generated content, and the ways in which such provisions shifted in the past two decades. In so doing, we unveil how foundational this sort of regulation has always been to platforms’ functioning and how it contributes to defining a system of content exploitation.     

Regulating surrogacy--a contravention of human rights?

On the 2nd of October 2000, The Human Rights Act 1998 came into full force, signalling the incorporation of The European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. law. Areas of law believed to be inconsistent with the Convention may now be challenged in both The European Court of Human Rights and domestic courts. This article considers whether existing laws on the regulation of access to infertility services, in particular surrogacy, will be deemed incompatible with the ECHR. Human rights as enshrined within Articles 8 and 12 will be examined in light of recent suggestions that there may arise legal challenges by those who have had access to reproductive services restricted or denied. It will be shown that, although existing and potential future controls may arguably infringe these rights, it is nevertheless unlikely that they will be held to be in contravention of The Human Rights Act 1998.     

论欧洲人权机构对人身自由与安全权的保护

人身自由与安全权是一项重要的基本人权,同时也是实现其他权利的基础.作为<世界人权宣言>发表后诞生的第一个区域性人权保护组织,欧洲人权机构通过其丰富的判例对"人身自由"与"人身安全"内涵作出界定,确立了人身自由与安全权保护的一系列标准,并注重对被依法剥夺人身自由者所享有的权利的保护,但是,欧洲人权机构在保护人身自由与安全权方面存在人权委员会与人权法院对个案的决定相互矛盾的问题,欧洲人权法院对个别案件作出的判决也存在对公约的规定适用不当和对该项权利保护乏力的问题.     

The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides the Union with a 'more evident' (as the European Council of Cologne asked for) framework of protection of the individuals before the public authorities within the European context, after more than thirty years (since the Stauder Case ) of full confidence in the leading role played by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. This new normative catalogue of fundamental rights (included the so called 'aspirational fundamental rights') implies one more instrument of protection which has to find its own place with regard to the protection afforded by the national Constitutions and the international agreements on human rights, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights, which are already a privileged source of inspiration for Court of Justice of the European Communities. It is the main objective of the General Provisions of the Charter to clarify which is that place and the relationship with those other levels of protection as managed by their supreme interpreters (i.e., the Constitutional—or Supreme—Courts of the Member States of the Union and the European Court of Human Rights).     

It's all linked: How communication to the public affects internet architecture

The architecture of the Internet is changing. A novel expansive construction of communication and making available to the public has been shaking the Internet ecosystem. It reaches into basic online activities, such as linking. Departing from well-established international approaches, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently decided a multitude of cases that redesigned the notion of communication to the public in the Internet, while discussing linking activities in particular. This jurisprudence stands against a fluid legal framework searching for the optimal allocation of intermediary liability of information service providers. Communication to the public is at the centre stage of this legislative process as well. EU copyright legislative reform makes Online Content Sharing Service Providers (OCSSP)—the large majority of UGC platforms—communicating to the public. In doing so, the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive changes the fundamental rules under which online platforms operate and UGC content is created for a large portion of the connected world. This, in turn, is forcing online intermediaries to remodel the architecture of the Internet accordingly. Proactive filtering—rather than ex post review of allegedly infringing content and links—is set to become the first commandment governing the Internet of tomorrow.     

Having yes,using no? About the new legal regime for biometric data

The rise of biometric data use in personal consumer objects and governmental (surveillance) applications is irreversible. This article analyses the latest attempt by the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and the Directive (EU) 2016/680 to regulate biometric data use in the European Union. We argue that the new Regulation fails to provide clear rules and protection which is much needed out of respect of fundamental rights and freedoms by making an artificial distinction between various categories of biometric data. This distinction neglects the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and serves the interests of large (governmental) databases. While we support regulating the use and the general prohibition in the GDPR of using biometric data for identification, we regret this limited subjective and use based approach. We argue that the collection, storage and retention of biometric images in databases should be tackled (objective approach). We further argue that based on the distinctions made in the GDPR, several categories of personal data relating to physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics are made to which different regimes apply. Member States are left to adopt or modify their more specific national rules which are eagerly awaited. We contend that the complex legal framework risks posing headaches to bona fide companies deploying biometric data for multifactor authentication and that the new legal regime is not reaching its goal of finding a balance between the free movement of such data and protecting citizens. Law enforcement authorities also need clear guidance. It is questioned whether Directive (EU) 2016/680 provides this.     

Towards a common standard of protection of the right to housing in Europe through the charter of fundamental rights

The trend towards the financialisation of housing since the 1980s and the global financial crisis exposed a dramatic lacuna in the legal protection of the right to housing. Yet, the right to housing features not only in national and international human rights instruments, but also in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Charter rights are increasingly finding expression in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In particular, drawing on the Charter, the CJEU's interpretation of EU consumer law is moving towards a recognition of housing rights as inherent components of consumer protection. On the basis of such developments, this article examines whether there is scope to extend this human rights approach to new areas – namely, to the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014) – a major EU harmonising measure – and to the work of EU institutions now responsible for banking supervision. The article concludes that, if guided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the case law of the CJEU and the practice of supranational banking supervision could significantly enhance the protection of the right to housing, both at EU and Member State level.     

Unblocking the Digital Economy Act 2010; human rights issues in the UK

Through an example of a study utilizing the case-law research method, this paper critically assesses whether taking into account both the findings of Mr La Rue (the United Nations Rapporteur on Human Rights) as well as some Court of Justice of the European Union's (CJEU) case-law, website blocking could be implemented in a way which is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in particular, with Article 10. Drawing upon, inter alia, Ofcom site blocking review, sections 17 and 18 of the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA), section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), and some independent expert evidence, this paper's major argument is that in view of the CJEU SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog, the UK government's decision to repeal the website blocking provisions of the DEA appears appropriate. The paper examines the findings of Fox v BT. It contrasts such findings with the CJEU's case-law and in light of the incompatibility of any website blocking measure with the cumulative three-part test set out in the United Nations Rapporteur on Human Rights discusses a number of implications. It concludes that given that the implementation of content blocking systems, such as Cleanfeed is likely to result in general monitoring being carried out; the UK government could possibly be in breach of EU law, namely, Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31.     

Security,privacy and freedom and the EU legal and policy framework for biometrics

The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon and the granting to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the same legal force as the Treaty has lent a new impulse to the consideration of fundamental human rights by the European Union (EU). The question remains, however, as to how this legal discourse, centred upon human rights, is actually shaping the EU regulatory framework in specific policy domains. The aim of this paper is to critically appraise the ways that the fundamental rights of security, privacy and freedom guaranteed by the Charter are being construed in the context of EU law and policy on biometrics, an ethically and morally sensitive security technology whose development and use are being actively promoted by the EU. We conclude that the interpretation of the pertinent rights, as well as their balancing, owes a great deal to the goals of EU policies for research and development, and under the auspices of Freedom, Security and Justice, shaped largely by political and economic considerations. These considerations then tend to prevail over ethically or morally-based legal claims.