Size,Power, and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants of Legislative Procedural Choice

I tested hypotheses about the relationship between exogenous institutions and legislative procedural choice using a unique cross‐sectional approach and a dataset gleaned from 55 legislative bodies from around the world. I focused on three entrenched characteristics of legislative bodies that we have theoretical reason to think will shape procedures: size, the relative power of the chamber, and the method by which its members are selected. Relatively small and powerful bodies generally have decentralized procedures. To a lesser extent, we can say the same of chambers that have electoral systems that incentivize the personal vote.     

Electoral Reform and Parliamentary Debates

The early twentieth century saw many democracies adopt proportional representative systems. The textbook explanation, pioneered by Rokkan, emphasize between‐party electoral competition; the rise of the Socialist vote share made Bourgeois parties prefer PR systems to maximize their seat share. While appealing, this account is not entirely compelling. Consequently, scholars are investigating within‐party explanations of support for such reforms. Particularly, Cox, Fiva, and Smith show how list PR enable party leaders to discipline members and build cohesive parties. Relying on roll‐call votes across the Norwegian 1919 electoral reform from two‐round single‐member plurality to closed‐list PR, they show that the internal party cohesion increased following the reform. We investigate how the Norwegian electoral reform changed the content of parliamentary speeches. Comparing speeches from MPs present both before and after the reform, we show how parties become more cohesive in parliamentary debates under list PR than they were under the single‐member‐district system.     

Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws: The Consequences of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform

The paper tests the effects of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform on the behaviour of MPs with the help of personal interviews conducted post reform. The reform was meant to make MPs more responsive to the needs of constituents, which in turn should lead to more constituency input in the legislative process, while at the same time yielding proportional results. The paper finds that there are few channels for the transmission of constituents' needs to MPs, and the existing channels are used for petty requests that have little to do with the legislative procedure. This in turn encourages the development of clientelistic ties between representatives and voters, which benefit wealthier candidates. The study also finds that although the new system translates votes into seats closely, small parties may still be disadvantaged because of what Duverger (1954 Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state, New York, NY: John Wiley. [Google Scholar]. Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: John Wiley) calls the psychological aspects of the wasted vote problem.     

Taking Disagreement Seriously: Courts, Legislatures and the Reform of Tort Law

This article explores the relevance of disagreement about valuesand about the functions and effects of law to debates concerningthe appropriate relationship between courts and legislatures,common law and statute. Recent developments in tort law providea context for the discussion. The argument is that in general,political processes of law-making should be preferred judicialprocesses.     

Legislative Behavior in Romania: The Effect of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform

This article analyzes the impact of electoral rules on legislators’ rate of vote defection from their party position in legislatures while accounting for how party‐leadership strength mediates this impact. To this end it looks at the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform. The reform shifted the electoral system from a closed‐list proportional representation to one in which all candidates run in single‐member districts. The analysis finds that because party leaders have maintained their leverage intact, the impact of the reform was minimal, with legislators being more likely to defect in less important votes only, in which party leaders allow defection. Also, after the reform legislators are more likely to use other means to impress their voters, such as legislative initiation and cabinet questioning. These forms of behavior are more accepted by party leaders.     

Electoral Reform and Changes in Legislative Behavior: Adoption of the Secret Ballot in Congressional Elections

There is widespread agreement that the Australian ballot fundamentally altered the American electoral system. One common approach to test the effects of ballot reform is to examine legislators elected under the party and secret ballot. An alternative research design, which we adopt here, compares changes in the behavior of legislators who were elected under both ballot types. We use this approach to investigate whether ballot reform directly influenced legislators' decisions to seek renomination and their behavior within the institution. Our results raise a number of important implications for understanding the effects of electoral reform on political behavior.     

股改中征集委托投票制度的思考

征集委托投票制度的理论基础是民法上的委托代理,但股权分置改革赋予委托投票诸多特殊性。同时,关于委托授权范围和法律效力在股改中呈现出百家争鸣的趋势,这不利于保护流通股股东的利益。因此,对委托投票进行统一的规范是必要的。     

Electoral Institutions,the Personal Vote,and Legislative Organization

What is the relationship between electoral institutions and the internal organization of legislatures? Existing research on the U.S. Congress suggests that electoral incentives shaped by the candidate‐centered nature of congressional elections explain the emergence of strong committees in that legislature. Exploring the issue from a comparative perspective, it is argued that the impact of ballot structure on committee system structure is dependent on how legislators cultivate personal votes. Committees will be stronger when legislators supply fiscal legislative particularism (pork), but weaker when legislators cultivate support by delivering extra‐legislative constituency service. Statistical analysis, combining original data on committee design in 39 democratic legislatures with measures of ballot structure and mechanism to cultivate a personal vote (MCPV), confirms the expectation.     

诗性、修辞与法律价值预设——制度修辞研究之二

法律价值预设作为法律中提纲挈领、统领全局的内容,在法律作为"制度性修辞"的命题、判断和架构中,有着独特的分析意义。法律价值的抽象性、统领性,提供了诗性思维可以充分发挥作用的空间,同时,诗性思维也把法律价值预设结构在修辞世界。不论作为技术的修辞,还是作为本体的修辞,都对法律价值预设作为制度修辞起着论证作用。如果说法律和法治本身是一种制度性修辞,那么,通过法律价值预设能更好地证立这一判断。     

Electoral reform and the British MEP

After many years in which the subject was of marginal concern, electoral reform has recently become of central importance to politics in the UK. In this paper we examine the consequences for political representation of the electoral reform introduced in Britain for the 1999 elections to the European Parliament. We find that the immediate consequences of reform for the partisan balance and ‘representativeness’ of the British contingent in the EP were very much as expected. However, both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggest that the impact of reform on the representative priorities of British MEPs has been more partial, as parliamentarians have sought to adapt to the challenge of representing multi-member regions.     

Delegation Dilemmas: Coalition Size,Electoral Risk,and Regulatory Governance in New Democracies

This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty‐coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context‐specific findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief executives enjoy only acquires explanatory power when it is interacted with government turnover. Because Brazilian governors have great ability to build oversized majority coalitions, coalition strength influences the governor's strategy when the governor faces credible threats from rival elite groups.     

司法的修辞与行政诉讼受案范围的扩张——以案例分析为切入点

从“中国听证革命第一案”乔占祥个案说起，考查法院怎样通过修辞技术，将看似排除在行政诉讼受案范围之外的诉讼请求纳入司法的权力范围，从而在事实上实现了对行政诉讼受案范围的扩展；另据两起著名的高等教育行诉个案来加以说明，司法权在行政诉讼领域中的实质性扩张并非一帆风顺，而是必然受到现实条件的种种制约，因而面临较大的不确定性的困扰，解决这一问题的最终出路是要诉诸于行政诉讼法的修改。     

Determinants of software piracy: economics,institutions, and technology

This paper determines the various influences on software piracy using a large sample of countries. In particular, our cross-sectional study estimates the effects of economic, institutional and technical factors on the piracy of software. A more comprehensive look at potential determinants of software piracy, including economic and non-economic factors, may be considered as the main contribution to a literature that is still in its infancy. Results show that a country’s stage of development and the quality of governance have the largest impact on the incidence of software piracy. Greater economic and political freedoms are shown to have opposite effects on piracy. Further, greater diffusion of the Internet and of computer technologies, other things equal, actually promote the legal use of software. Higher access prices also reduce piracy, with the impact of telephone charges being more pronounced than that of Internet access fees. There are significant variations in the impacts of different types of legal institutions and of fractionalization on piracy. The influence of digital divide between rural and urban areas does not significantly affect the piracy of software. Overall, economic, institutional, and technological factors exert important influences on software piracy, albeit with some qualitative and quantitative differences. Policy implications are discussed.     

Law and Rhetoric: Critical Possibilities

What contribution can rhetoric make to socio‐legal studies? Though now a byword for deception and spin, rhetoric was long identified with the very substance of law and politics. Latterly radical scholars have foregrounded an understanding of law as rhetoric in their polemics against legal formalism, but it needs to be complemented by a critical perspective which goes beyond simple revivalism, taking account of rhetoric's own blind spots, inquiring into the means by which some speakers and listeners are privileged and others excluded or silenced. The critical potential of legal rhetoric is tested here through a review of the developing law on mental capacity and the best interests of people with disabilities in England and Wales. Much of what is at stake there is properly grasped in terms of a politics of speech: who is addressed, who can speak, who must speak, and how are they represented in judicial and media discourse.     

Ethics of Disenfranchisement and Voting Rights in the U.S.:Convicted Felons,the Homeless,and Immigrants

This paper examines the contemporary ethical issues surrounding voting rights of three disenfranchised groups in the U.S.: convicted felons, the homeless, and immigrants. Even in modern countries like the U.S., voting and other forms of political participation are skewed toward the elite, those with higher incomes, those who are employed, and those with more education. Low voter turnout presents serious challenges to democratic responsiveness, or the ability of leaders to respond to the needs and demands of citizens. Hence, voting should be encouraged in accord with the common interest. An important conclusion is that allowing all citizens – irrespective of their status – to vote would give them a voice in the context of governance. This notion is also associated with distributive justice, a philosophical concept that concentrates on just outcomes and consequences.     

Group Size, Group Heterogeneity, and Voting Rules: An Application of the Buchanan-Tullock Model to the European Union

In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock develop a theory of voting rules in which the optimal rule is determined by minimizing the sum of voters' external and decision costs. Other researchers have extended the Buchanan-Tullock model to include the effects of group size and heterogeneity on external and decision costs and, subsequently, on the optimal voting rule. Despite the prominence of the Buchanan-Tullock model in the constitutional, legal, and public-choice literature, their theory has not (to our knowledge) been tested. In this paper we test the Buchanan-Tullock model by examining the establishment and evolution of voting rules in the European Union. Over the past four decades, the European Union has experienced significant changes in number and heterogeneity, and we interpret the general movement towards, and call for, less inclusive voting rules as support for Buchanan and Tullock's original theory.