从制度上保证审判独立——以司法独立的国际标准为参照

司法独立的国际标准要求法院和法官在行使审判权的时候不受干预,有关各方也不得进行干预,并且还应当为法院和法官独立审判提供积极保障。我国的审判独立原则包含了法院集体独立和法官个体独立的内涵,但无论是在立法上还是在实践中,都与国际标准存在着一定差距。只有以国际标准为指导,对我国不符合审判独立要求的制度和做法进行改革,才能够达到从制度上保证审判独立的目的。     

Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia‐Herzegovina

The role of constitutional courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision‐making and, consequently, undermine judicial impartiality and independence. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia‐Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno‐national affiliation on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court's decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno‐national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long‐term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno‐national affiliation on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that this influence may actually increase as a judge acclimates to the dynamics of a divided court. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.     

Appointment Politics and the Ideological Composition of the Judiciary

Scholars have advanced a wide range of theories regarding the role of Senate confirmation in judicial appointments. In this article, I directly test the predictions of these models using a novel measure of the ideology of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The main results indicate that the filibuster and majority party have predominated in appointment politics. Prompted by recent events, I also conduct a simulation‐based exercise to examine the ideological composition of the judiciary under a confirmation regime in which the filibuster is not present. This exercise suggests that the Senate filibuster induces moderation in judicial appointments; the elimination of the filibuster is likely to result in a more contentious, if less dilatory, confirmation process and a more polarized judiciary.     

Judges and Politics: The Parliamentary Contributions of the Law Lords 1876–2009

There is a common perception that, prior to the exclusion of serving judges from the House of Lords in 2009, a ‘politics convention’ operated which required judges to avoid party‐political controversy and ensured that they contributed to debate only rarely. On this view, the presence of the Law Lords in parliament prior to 2009 presented a judicial independence and separation of powers problem in theory only. An examination of the contributions of serving Law Lords and other judicial peers to debates in the House of Lords from 1876–2009 (and retired judges from 1876–2015) reveals that the convention either did not exist or was frequently ignored. While most judges were infrequent participants in parliamentary debate, some were enthusiastic – a small number among the most active parliamentarians in the Lords. The most active judicial peers were conservative in their politics and the best predictor that a judge would be active in the House was an association with conservative politics or causes.     

Informal Institutions and Judicial Independence in Paraguay, 1954–2011

This article explains how informal institutions have prevented the emergence of autonomous judges in Paraguay between 1954 and 2011. The central argument is that co‐optation, clientelism, and judicial corruption considered as informal institutions, rooted during the dictatorship, have impeded the appearance of an independent judicial branch in the democratic regime. To test this hypothesis, the article relies on historical narratives, surveys, and semistructured interviews. The conclusions suggest that in countries that have experienced the consolidation of informal institutions oriented toward maintaining the ties of subordination of judges to politicians, constitutional reforms and fragmentation of political power are necessary but not sufficient conditions for improving judicial independence.     

Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 1869-2002

When Article III judges conclude active service, they effectivelyabdicate their seat and enable the president and Senate to selecta successor. Some judicial scholars have concluded that politicalfactors—both within and across institutions—largelyinfluence this decision. Analyzing judicial turnover, year byyear, this article finds that judges have increasingly synchronizedtheir departure from active service with qualifying for theirjudicial pension. By comparison, political and institutionalfactors appear to have little influence on turnover rates. Thesefindings contradict much of the existing scholarship on judicialturnover and also offer more viable alternatives for judicialreform.     

The Influence of the EU and the ECHR on ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty Regimes’: Assessing the Impact of European Integration on the British and Swedish Judiciaries

The paper analyses the consequences of European integration processes upon the judicial systems of the so‐called ‘parliamentary sovereignty regimes’, focusing on the British and Swedish judiciaries. The aim is to understand if the influences coming from European integration, favouring the expansion of domestic judicial power, have prevailed, or the traditional distrust of such countries in judicial power has prevented the empowerment of the domestic courts. The influences on the judicial systems are evaluated distinguishing judicial capacity, judicial attitudes and judicial independence. The paper argues that the political relevance of judges has strongly increased. However, while European integration has deeply transformed the formal means at disposal of judges, because of political and judicial culture the changes in actual judges' behaviour have been much more limited. Moreover, the paper highlights some unexpected ways in which European integration can affect the domestic political systems (eg favouring certain legislative reforms or legal principles).     

中国法官独立制度构建探讨

法官独立是司法独立的重要组成部分，是中国司法改革申一项不可回避的课题。本文先阐述法官独立的内涵，指出法官独立应从司法权独立，审判独立和法官身份独立三个方面加以理解，再分析影响中国法官独立的诸多因素，最后提出在中国构建法官独立制度的设想。     

论法官现代化:专业化、职业化和同质化——兼谈中国法官队伍的现代化问题

法官队伍的现代化是实现法治的基本条件之一。现代法治国家的法官队伍以专业化、职业化和同质化为基本特征。我国法官队伍因受观念和体制的制约而与法治发展的要求相去甚远。未来我们应积极汲取国外有益经验 ,从贯彻司法独立入手 ,改革现有的法官培养管理体制 ,以便加速法官队伍的现代化 ,推动中国的法治进程     

Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers—An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court

This paper investigates the Landes-Posner thesis on judicial independence using data on public law decisions in which the government was the defendant decided in the New Zealand High Court over the period 1958–2001. We use survival analysis to examine whether successive New Zealand governments have promoted judges from the High Court to the Court of Appeal (which stands above the High Court) on the basis of political considerations, the quality of the judge's decision-making or both. Our findings suggest that the quality of decision-making has generally been important. Consistent with the weak form of the Landes-Posner hypothesis we find no evidence that governments have used their powers to punish judges who decided cases against them. On the contrary, we find some support for the strong form of the Landes-Posner thesis that governments positively use their powers to secure judicial independence.     

论司法独立

司法独立由司法的本质所决定, 是市民社会与国家对立的必然产物。司法欲独立, 必先独立于立法与行政, 次须独立于社会, 特别是传媒; 上下级法院以及法官之间亦须相互独立。欲保障司法独立, 必使法官任期终身, 享优厚之待遇, 以及司法豁免权等。     

论审判权的独立行使——“让审理者裁判、由裁判者负责”的制约因素与完善

在宪法与其他法律明确规定,相关文件高度强调人民法院独立行使审判权的同时,实践中却呈现出另一番局面。司法行政化和司法地方化的现象依然严重,审判者面临来自其他机关、上级法院、本院领导等多方面因素的影响。审判权独立的核心要义在于确保审理者裁判和裁判者负责。本文在厘清审判权独立基本内涵的基础上,对实践中影响审判权独立的因素进行分析,并针对如何保障审理者裁判和裁判者负责的问题提出自己的见解。     

Can a leopard change its spots? Strategic behavior versus professional role conception during Ukraine's 2014 court chair elections

Do judges respond to institutional and strategic incentives or do they strictly follow dominant professional role conceptions? This article weighs in by exploring whether an ideational shift toward judicial empowerment and independence can germinate from institutional reforms. Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan revolution and the comprehensive judicial reform adopted in its wake provide a test of the competing theoretical accounts. A judicial lustration law sacked all incumbent court chairs, who had been appointed by the executive, and gave Ukrainian judges the right to elect new chairs via secret ballot. I analyze this radical step toward judicial self-government using an original data set with individual- and court-level data. The key finding is that less than a fifth of Ukrainian judges embraced their newly granted agency and elected a new chair for their court, whereas the overwhelming majority followed dominant professional norms of deference and reelected the sacked court chairs. This finding holds for all rungs of the judicial hierarchy and for all regions of Ukraine. Even protégés of ousted president Yanukovych won the secret ballot vote by their peers more often than they lost it. Beyond Ukraine, these results suggest that empowering individual judges in the highly hierarchical structure of a civil law judiciary is unlikely to lead to a judicial behavior shift, at least in the short run.     

论法官也需“减负“

我国法院目前存在相对大的法官数量和积案率不断上升的现实,影响司法权威.其中一个主要原因就是法官的社会角色太多、分工不细所造成,这一现实也折射出当前对法官职业内涵认识误区,甚至司法不能独立的无奈.要改变这一点必须从一个认清,两个保障,三个剥离出发,为法官减去许多非职责内涵的负担.     

The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Activism: Judicial Conduct of International Relations and Child Abduction

Judges are increasingly visible in their participation in activities off the bench. This may create difficulties in drawing the line between their duties in court and their other activities. However, if judges are not acutely aware of the importance of this line their extra-curial activities may interfere with their judicial duties. This article considers the failure to observe the importance of this differentiation in the context of international child abduction. It is argued that some judges, on and off the bench, have wrongly taken over the role of the executive in international relations and that such activity jeopardises the independence of the judiciary. This raises broader issues, in particular it suggests that some judges are being seduced into exceeding their proper judicial role, by working with government in policy-making and by their increasing contacts with judges from other countries.     

论法院处理环境纠纷案件中的司法能动

司法能动是法院在案件审理中,不因循先例和遵从成文法的字面含义进行司法解释的一种司法理念以及基于此理念的行动。我国法院在发挥司法能动性,处理环境纠纷案件方面作出了大量努力,为经济社会发展提供了司法保障。但法院在发挥司法能动性处理环境纠纷案件中仍然存在较大的问题。解决这些问题,必须把握法院在环境纠纷案件处理中司法能动的向度,落实司法独立,引导法官正确行使自由裁量权,努力培养环境司法专业人才,发挥法官适用法律的能动性。     

The Mask of Neutrality: Judicial Partisan Calculation and Legislative Redistricting

Do judges ruling on redistricting litigation increase electoral competition in congressional races while simultaneously drawing districts favoring their party's congressional candidates? I offer a novel theory of judicial partisan calculation, arguing that judges draw more competitive districts than legislatures or commissions, but that judge‐drawn districts favor the electoral interests of their copartisans. These claims are reconcilable because judges target districts held by contrapartisan legislators to maximize their copartisans’ fortunes. I find that Democratic judges draw competitive districts by adding Democratic voters to Republican‐held House constituencies. Court‐administered redistricting increases competitiveness, ostensibly due to judicial neutrality. This mask of neutrality, however, conceals sophisticated partisan calculation.     

司法独立结构分析与司法改革

完整的司法独立是由外部结构、内部结构和上下结构构成的三重结构。外部结构的核心是法院独立;内部结构的核心是法官独立;上下结构的核心是审级独立。应该在司法独立的三重结构理念基础上,推进目前的司法体制改革,逐步实现完整的司法独立。     

When “Best Practices” Win,Employees Lose: Symbolic Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Cases

This article provides a new account of employers' advantages over employees in federal employment discrimination cases. We analyze the effects of judicial deference, in which judges use institutionalized employment structures to infer nondiscrimination without scrutinizing those structures in any meaningful way. Using logistic regression to analyze a representative sample of judicial opinions in federal EEO cases during the first thirty‐five years after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, we find that when judges uncritically use the presence of organizational structures to reason about whether discrimination occurred, employers are much more likely to prevail. This pattern is especially pronounced in opinions written by liberal judges. In light of these findings, we offer recommendations for judges, lawyers, and policy makers—including legal academics—who seek to improve the accuracy and efficacy of employment discrimination adjudications.     

审判权缺位和失范之检讨——中国民事诉讼发展路向的思考

民事审判改革是二十年来民事诉讼理论和实践共同关注的课题。审判改革的实践为民事诉讼理论的发展提供了素材和机遇,民事诉讼理论为审判改革进行方向性的指引。但是,把纯粹的当事人主义诉讼模式和纯粹的程序公正等作为理想目标来进行制度建构,以改革职权主义的诉讼模式,却忽视了相关的理念和制度配合,造成了审判权的缺位与失范,现实与理想的距离越来越远。为此,理论上必须重新审视民事诉讼理念,通过确认审判权力和审判义务、承认法官独立等途径实现审判权之规制,完成中国版民事诉讼理论体系建构。