Debts and Threats: Managing Inability to Repay Credits in Illicit Drug Distribution

This study examines how creditors in illicit drug markets manage debtors’ inability to repay “fronted” drugs. Based on qualitative interviews with 40 incarcerated drug dealers in Norway, we explore four outcomes of unpaid drug debts. Two modes of governance dominated the credit reciprocation processes: Cooperative governance included strategies of accepting loss and refinancing debt and required mutual trust between creditor and debtor. Adversarial governance included extortion of debtors and revenge and was based on threats of violence. We found that creditors preferred refinancing debt or extorting debtors over accepting loss or using violence. We argue that the negotiated outcomes of drug debt have been neglected in research on drug markets, and explore how they require investment from the creditor, either in building trust or in deterring malfeasance through threats of violence. Using insights from economic sociology, the study highlights the importance of social control in illegal drug markets.     

THE TRADE IN TOOLS: THE MARKET FOR ILLICIT GUNS IN HIGH‐RISK NETWORKS

Illegal guns circulating among high‐risk networks represent a threat to the security and well‐being of urban neighborhoods. Research findings reveal that illegal firearms are usually acquired through a variety of means, including theft and diversions from legitimate firearms commerce. Little is known, however, about the underground gun markets supplying the gang and drug networks responsible for a large share of gun violence in U.S. cities. In this article, we take a mixed‐methods approach, combining trace analyses of recovered handguns with ethnographic interviews of high‐risk gun users to develop new insights on the entry of guns into three criminal networks in Boston. We find that guns possessed by Boston gang members are of a different character compared with other crime guns; these guns are more likely to be older firearms originating from New Hampshire, Maine, and I‐95 southern states. The results of our qualitative research reveal that gang members and drug dealers pay inflated prices for handguns diverted by traffickers exploiting unregulated secondary market transactions, with significant premiums paid for high‐caliber semiautomatic pistols. Taken together, these findings provide an analytic portrait of the market for illicit guns among those most proximate to violence, yielding novel empirical, theoretical, and practical insights into the problem of criminal gun access.     

THE FUNNY SIDE OF DRUG DEALING: RISK,HUMOR, AND NARRATIVE IDENTITY

In this study, we explore the role humor plays in the narrated identities of drug dealers, in their negotiation of the threat of formal punishment, and in their cultural membership and authority. By drawing from interview and observation data gathered from 33 active drug dealers residing in St. Louis, Missouri, we find that humor facilitates identity work among illicit drug dealers in several ways. Humor is an important symbolic boundary marker distinguishing dealers from others they consider “stupid” or less circumspect. It also indicates dealers’ identities as “smart” and simultaneously establishes and validates their subcultural authority and membership in the symbolic group of “smart” dealers. Furthermore, drug dealers use denigrating humor in their narratives to distance their former and virtual identities from their present identities. Finally, humor also reduces dealers’ perceptions of the threats posed by police and potential snitches by casting dealers’ present identities and former reactions to the threat of punishment in a positive light. We conclude by discussing implications for narrative criminology, extant humor research, and current understanding of symbolic boundaries, identity work, and deterrence.     

Do police crackdowns disrupt drug cryptomarkets? A longitudinal analysis of the effects of Operation Onymous

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of online illicit markets where participants can purchase and sell a wide range of goods and services such as drugs, hacking services, and stolen financial information. Second-generation markets, known as cryptomarkets, provide a pseudo-anonymous platform from which to operate and have attracted the attention of researchers, regulators, and law enforcement. This paper focuses on the impact of police crackdowns on cryptomarkets, and more particularly on the impact of Operation Onymous, a large-scale police operation in November 2014 that targeted many cryptomarkets. Our results demonstrate that cryptomarket participants adapt to police operations and that the impact of Operation Onymous was limited in time and scope. Of particular interest is the finding that prices did not increase following Operation Onymous, even though many dealers retired shortly after it occurred.     

Youth Gangs — A Special Problem

Beginning in the mid-1980s, some youth gangs with origins in the large urban centers of Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, Detroit, and New York, became major criminal entrepreneurs in the supply of illicit drugs. In a very short time, many of these gangs have developed intrastate and interstate networks for the purpose of expanding their highly profitable participation in the state, regional, and national illegal drug sales market. Significant levels of violence and related criminal behavior have accompanied this phenomenon. Youth have always been distributors and sellers of drugs within their local peer groups, whether these groups were informal or organized as “gangs.” Most youth who are involved with illicit drugs have not had direct contact with drug dealers. Their street, school, or neighborhood suppliers have been friends and acquaintances. The onset of domestically-produced drugs or drug compounds presented an opportunity for youth to be in control of the supply. Domestically grown marijuana represented such an opportunity. Clandestine laboratory-produced methamphetamine and PCP increased it. And, finally, domestically-manufactured “crack” or “rock” cocaine opened the floodgates for serious youth participation in the huge profits available through illicit drug trafficking.     

Where Size Matters: Agglomeration Economies of Illegal Drug Markets in Philadelphia

There is a debate over whether police attention focused on an illegal drug market causes dealers to spatially displace their activities “around the corner” therefore having no positive impact on the aggregate level of illegal drug sales in the city. The alternative perspective is that focused police attention lowers the rate of illegal drug sales in the city. Recent research in Jersey City, New Jersey has demonstrated that focused police attention does not simply move illegal drug dealing around the corner. The present analysis explains why this finding is likely to be common in other cities using the economic theory of “agglomeration economies.” Agglomeration economies illustrate that taking the largest and most profitable site from illegal drug dealers will make dealing in the surrounding neighborhoods less rather than more profitable and lead to a smaller marketplace overall. The empirical analysis focuses on Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.     

WOMEN'S GENDER PERFORMANCES AND CULTURAL HETEROGENEITY IN THE ILLEGAL DRUG ECONOMY

Based on interviews with 32 female drug dealers in Norway, this study investigates different gender performances among women situated in the illegal hard drug economy—a context with strong gendered “rules of the game.” Using grounded theory methods, I have identified four predominant patterns in which women enact their gendered identities being part of the drug economy: performing emphasized femininity in the context of marginalization; performing street masculinity; employing a feminine business model; and last, flexible use of cultural repertoires. The findings suggest that different gender performances among dealers are rooted in variations in the cultural tool kits they have at their disposal. I find that the content of women's cultural tool kits varied with three sociodemographic factors: 1) age, 2) time of entrée to the drug economy, and 3) educational and employment history. Combined, these influenced the type of gender performances the dealers tended to use as well as their position in the drug market hierarchy. The research suggests that those dealers using cultural repertoires flexibly are the most successful as they skillfully employed the model best suited for the context they were in.     

Violent Conduct and Victimization Risk in the Urban Illicit Drug Economy: A Prospective Examination

A small but growing body of criminological research examines the nature of social control mechanisms in the context of urban illicit drug markets in order to understand patterns of violence. Several studies find that merchants operating in this economy experience relatively high rates of violent victimization. Existing theoretical and empirical research suggests, however, that an aggressive posture serves a deterrent function in the illicit marketplace. Merchants with a violent persona will have significantly lower rates of victimization compared to their less-violent counterparts. Using a within-person design applied to prospective longitudinal data from a sample of urban males, this paper examines the proposition that violent conduct attenuates the relationship between participation in the illicit drug marketplace and risk for violent victimization. Combined, the results offer partial support for this proposition. We discuss the implications of this study for research on violent behavior, illegal drug markets, and victimization.     

Market offenses and limits to growth

The purpose of this article is to explore various factors that may regulate or stabilize levels in market offenses. Instead of assuming that illegal markets are ‘out of control’, evidence is advanced to demonstrate, on the contrary, that there are indeed limits to growth in criminal markets. This is presented along three principal and interconnected arguments. First, social norms limit the ability of suppliers to shape demand for illicit goods and services. Using public opinion surveys, it is concluded that the more objectionable the moral status of an illegal market, the smaller the pool of potential consumers and sellers. Second, there are considerable obstacles that confront suppliers of illegal goods and services accumulating capital and upward mobility. The consequences of product illegality inhibit the organizational growth capacities as well as the geographic expansion of illicit firms. Third, while impunity via corruptible alliances do cancel some of the effects of product illegality, this impunity is not a constant that can always be depended upon. To the extent that corruption varies across jurisdictions and over time, illegal entrepreneurs may come to realize that impunity is intrinsically limited in scope and volatile in nature and over which they essentially have very limited control. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Markets: Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom)

This article studies the effects of accounting fraud on theproduct market. The model presented in this article relies onthe idea that a firm’s financial statements and actionsmust be consistent with each other. If the firm is behavingfraudulently, insofar as its financial statements portray itas relatively efficient, the firm must act accordingly, thatis, increase its market share and/or reduce its prices. If thefirm does not behave in keeping with its fraudulent financials,the market would be able to identify the fraud. As such, themanager will take actions and make pricing decisions that arenot optimal. These actions can have a significant adverse effecton social welfare. This article utilizes the WorldCom case toillustrate the implications of such fraudulent behavior andits economic significance in product markets.     

INFORMAL CONTROL AND ILLICIT DRUG TRADE*

Antidrug legislation and enforcement are meant to reduce the trade in illegal drugs by increasing their price. Yet the unintended consequence is an increase in informal control—including retaliation, negotiation, avoidance, and toleration—among drug users and dealers. Little existing theory or research has explored the connections between informal control and drug trading. This article uses the rational choice and opportunity perspectives to explore the question: How and why does the frequency and seriousness of popular justice—as a whole or for each form—affect the price and rate of drug sales? The proposed theory is grounded on and illustrated with qualitative data obtained from drug dealers. This article concludes by discussing the scholarly and policy implications.     

The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of Organisation in the Colombian Cocaine Trade

For much of the past twenty-five years, the US-led war on drugs has been premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of Colombian drug trade. Instead of being run by a handful of massive, price-fixing ‘cartels’, the Colombian drug trade, then and now, was characterized by a fluid social system where flexible exchange networks expanded and retracted according to market opportunities and regulatory constraints. To support this interpretation, I draw on primary and secondary source data I collected in Colombia and the US, including interviews with several dozen hard-to-reach informants. I analyze these data to analyze the organisational form and functioning of ‘Colombian’ trafficking networks, focusing on how these illicit enterprises communicate, coordinate their activities, and make decisions, with an eye towards deflating some of the more persistent myths that have grown up around these transnational enterprises.     

Discriminatory decision making at the legislative level

This paper is an analysis of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Consistent with value-conflict perspectives, previous research on the social origins of drug legislation suggests that coercive laws occur when the behavior of minority and other subordinate groups become threatening. Liberalizing drug legislation is enacted when the interests of dominant groups seem juxtaposed to existing punitive legislation. The present analysis explores the process of legislative decision making when both subordinateand superordinate groups engage in drug-related behaviors which run counter to dominant norms and values. To do so, a detailed analysis of the congressional committee hearings and floor debates which preceded enactment of the 1970 Act was conducted. This analysis revealed that Congress did not pass a strictly coercive drug control policy at the risk of stigmatizing superordinate groups. Nor did it choose to liberalize drug penalties across the board. Congress perceived that strictly liberal policies might undermine both the instrumental goal of reducing illicit drug activity, and the symbolic goal of expressing general societal disapproval of illicit drug use. Instead, the legislation that emerged from congressional debates contained both liberal and coercive provisions reflecting the requirements of dealing with two targeted populations: young middle and upper class white drug users who became identified as victims of drug traffickers; and large-scale and professional drug dealers who became identified as enemy deviants—the true source and symbol of the drug problem. Liberal, and essentially discriminatory, provisions permitted the protection of the former from stigmatization as criminal felons. Coercive, but apparently nondiscriminatory, provisions provided the threat and potential for severe punishment of the latter. The discriminatory features of the 1970 Act are identified and explicated. And, the implications of the Act's provisions for race- or class-based decisions in the application of sanctions are discussed.     

Old master paintings,export veto and price formation: an empirical study

In this paper, we focus on the institutional setting where Old Masters’Paintings (OMP) markets transactions are carried. We develop a preliminary attempt to embody legal provisions in econometric, hedonic pricing models. We consider a particular regulation applicable only in Italy, the “export veto” for art objects that are particularly relevant for the national cultural patrimony. We proxy such legal provision in order to include it in the statistical analysis and to check whether it affects the OMP price differentials between pre-auction estimated price and post-auction hammer price. Preliminary results show that the price differential is affected by the legal variable, therefore suggesting that the country’s institutional framework plays an important role in price dynamics.     

Organizational Social Capital and Performance of Drug Law Enforcement Departments

Supply reduction efforts by drug law enforcement departments are a significant factor in improving the effectiveness of drug control policies. The performance of drug law enforcement departments is one of the most important concerns for policy makers. Therefore, improving the performance of these departments is crucial in order for governments to constrict illegal drug markets and prevent illegal drug distribution. The literature suggests that social capital may have significant impacts on organizational performance. Using survey data from 12 city law enforcement departments in Turkey, this study examines the effects of three social capital dimensions (structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions) on the perceived performance of drug law enforcement departments by using structural equation modeling. The results of this conceptually grounded and empirical study suggest that drug law enforcement departments should pay close attention to promoting social capital among officers in order to fight effectively against drug trafficking.     

On the Resilience of Illegal Drug Markets

This paper argues that the concept of resilience is a fruitful way of understanding the impact of repressive policies on illegal drug markets. For the purpose of this article, resilience is defined as the ability of market participants to preserve the existing levels of exchanges between buyers and sellers, despite external pressure aimed at disrupting the trade. The first part of the paper highlights how some of the core features of illegal drug markets, a decentralized structure and high prices, contribute to increasing their resilience to attacks. The second part develops a framework that can be used to compare markets on the basis of their resilient properties. Some of the empirical and policy implications of the framework are discussed in the conclusion.     

Economic and Sociological Approaches To Institutions: Economy, Society And Law

Examined in this paper are some important paradigmatic differences between novel economic institutionalism as espoused by the new institutional economics and sociological institutionalism as advanced by economic sociology. Just as the old and the new institutional economics, economic institutionalism and sociological institutionalism display important differences in their assumptions, domains and methodologies. The paper also takes a look at the possibility for multidisciplinary integration, in a multiple-paradigm approach, of economic and sociological institutionalism, particularly law and economics (economic analysis of law) and law and society (sociology of law) literatures, in these times of interdisciplinary social analysis. Since in the current literature comparative analyses of economic and sociological institutionalism in general, and economic and sociological approaches to legal institutions in particular, are relatively rare, the paper attempts to fill in a gap in this respect.     

Conditions for Guilt-Free Consumption in a Transnational Criminal Market

It has been widely opined in discussions around a number of transnational criminal markets that where a global economic supply and demand relationship exists, demand reduction by way of consumer education and ‘awareness-raising’ may be an effective intervention in reducing illicit trade. It seems an obvious and sensible suggestion on the face of it, but just how amenable are consumers to being educated away from purchasing illicitly obtained and trafficked goods, and what are the barriers that stand in the way of that process of demand reduction through awareness-raising? This paper approaches these questions by asking what are the conditions for guilt-free consumption in the international trade in illicit cultural objects. The paper identifies seven such conditions, and concludes that in this global market we are witnessing the playing out of a common social story in which a powerful group of market capitalists and end-consumers employs a range of sociologically developed linguistic and performative strategies to obfuscate or legitimise their exploitation of a group of less powerful victims. If that is the context for the so-called debate about illicit antiquities, crime-reduction strategies involving consumer education seem considerably more difficult to achieve than has been widely recognised in policy discussions on transnational crime.