Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection

One important puzzle in international political economy is why lower‐earning and less‐skilled intensive industries tend to receive relatively high levels of trade protection. This pattern of protection holds across countries with vastly different economic and political characteristics and is not well accounted for in existing political economy models. We propose and model one possible explanation: that individual inequity aversion leads to systematic differences in support for trade protection across industries. We conduct original survey experiments in China and the United States and provide strong evidence that individual policy opinions about sector‐specific trade protection depend on the earnings of workers in the sector. We also present structural estimates that advantageous and disadvantageous inequality influence support for trade protection in the two countries.     

‘Cleaning up’ while cleaning up? Pollution abatement,interest groups and contingent trade policies

This paper analyzes the political economy of environmental-policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection. We argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing. The preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal-institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted. Under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection, there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers.     

Institutional competitiveness in the global economy: Denmark,the United States,and the varieties of capitalism

Despite high taxes, a large welfare state, and much economic regulation, Denmark competes successfully against other advanced capitalist economies. Denmark’s success is based in large part on its institutional competitiveness – its capacity to achieve socioeconomic success as a result of the competitive advantages that firms derive from operating within a particular set of institutions. The institutional basis for successfully coordinating labor markets and vocational training programs are examined for Denmark and the US – two countries that were very different institutionally but very successful in the 1990s and in the 2000s. We show that there is no one best way to achieve success in today’s global economy, except with respect to social inequality; that the mechanisms underlying institutional competitiveness are more complex than often recognized; that institutional hybrids can be as successful as purer political economic cases; and that high taxes and state spending can enhance socioeconomic performance. As such, this paper challenges both neoliberalism and the varieties of capitalism school of comparative political economy.     

Workers, worries and welfare states: Social protection and job insecurity in 15 OECD countries

Abstract.  This article examines a model of the domestic political economy of subjective employment insecurity in advanced industrial societies. Based on data on people's attitudes toward their job as well as levels of and kinds of social protection collected in 15 OECD countries, it shows that there are distinct manifestations of job insecurity that are affected differently by distinct aspects of social protection programs. While the analysis shows that social protection measures reduce employment insecurity, it also reveals that overall levels welfare state generosity do not have any systematic effect on whether workers feel secure. The article's findings suggest the need to decompose the different components of employment insecurity as well as disaggregate national systems of social protection when examining the impact of welfare states on job insecurity.     

Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).     

Taiwan and the geopolitics of late development

Abstract

Through a case study of Taiwan, this paper seeks to address recent debates surrounding the transformation of developmental states in East Asia. Whilst a number of authors have cited the Taiwanese state as being both cautious and resilient in the midst of global restructuring, this paper seeks to critically engage with such arguments by highlighting the dynamic and mutually constitutive relations between the forms of social relations that underpin late development and the wider geopolitical system in which such development occurs. Specifically, Taiwanese industrialisation can be viewed as an outcome of the US intervention in the Chinese civil war and subsequent exclusion of China from the regional political economy in the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Kuomintang (KMT)'s retreat to Taiwan established the basis for the autonomous developmental state, and the US underpinned this state through military protection, aid and access to its own domestic market. However, the relative decline of US hegemony and the readmission of China into the international system have posed significant challenges to Taiwan's developmental state. The US sought to redress its trade imbalance with East Asia by placing pressure on Taiwan to liberalise its political economy. Furthermore, the very process of development itself served to undermine the autonomy of the state as it came under pressure from new social forces. Taiwan has more recently been faced with a dilemma of closer integration with the mainland or the maintenance of its de facto economic and political independence at the risk of becoming isolated from the global trading system.     

Nomenklatura,state monopoly,and private enterprise

Using a behavioral model of political decisionmaking, it is argued that an increasing population size and/or an increasing efficiency of production in a private enterprise economy relative to a centrally planned economy may create the conditions for a self-interested nomenklatura in a Soviet-type economy to consider a transition to a market economy. This transition may be thwarted, however, by the threat for prospective private enterpreneurs of exploitation after the change of regime. Some form of political pluralism guaranteeing sufficient political influence to private entrepreneurs appears to be required for a successful transition. The analysis shows that such a combined political and economic reform can be in the interest of the nomenklatura, thereby providing an endogenous behavioral explanation for a change of regime.     

It's (Change in) the (Future) Economy,Stupid: Economic Indicators,the Media,and Public Opinion

Economic perceptions affect policy preferences and government support. It thus matters that these perceptions are driven by factors other than the economy, including media coverage. We nevertheless know little about how media reflect economic trends, and whether they influence (or are influenced by) public economic perceptions. This article explores the economy, media, and public opinion, focusing in particular on whether media coverage and the public react to changes in or levels of economic activity, and the past, present, or future economy. Analyses rely on content‐analytic data drawn from 30,000 news stories over 30 years in the United States. Results indicate that coverage reflects change in the future economy, and that this both influences and is influenced by public evaluations. These patterns make more understandable the somewhat surprising finding of positive coverage and public assessments in the midst of the Great Recession. They also may help explain previous findings in political behavior.     

Repress or Respect? Precarious Leadership,Poor Economy and Labor Protection

How should insecure leaders deal with labor rights in the face of an economic downturn? Economic theory suggests that suppressing labor rights boosts the economy and that economic growth also dampens violent political opposition. As a result, the suppression of labor rights should contribute to more job security for leaders. However, some other scholars maintain that more repression actually increases the probability of opposition. As a result, the policy implication of this argument is that leaders would be better off if they choose to improve the protection of labor rights. Our simple formal model demonstrates that the second argument is more likely to be the case. The probit analysis of 146 countries from 1984 to 2004 bears out this prediction. We also find that this relationship is stronger in non-democracies than in democracies. Our study appears to provide some support to Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2005) statement that policies that are good for political survival may not necessarily be good for the economy.     

Neo-liberalism,big business and the evolution of interest group activity in Latin America

In the 1980s and 1990s, the confluence of the third wave of democracy, neo-liberal economic reforms and economic crises in Latin America, produced several significant consequences for the region's underdeveloped interest group systems. By using an international political economy approach, this article examines these developments and particularly how neo-liberal policies affected the political fortunes of big business plus the broader political fall-out from neo-liberal policies. In essence, we make the argument that, for three reasons, the consequences of the confluence of these three developments for Latin America's emerging interest group system are mixed in terms of a more pluralist, open-access system. First, the influence of big business persists and in many ways has been enhanced as the economically and politically privileged position of large private companies since the 1980s has given way to economic concentration, transnationalization and the rise of multilatinas (Latin American multinational companies, which primarily operate across the region). Second, political opportunities have been opened for a range of interests, many from the left, that likely would not otherwise have emerged so early in the region. Third, the election of leaders opposed to neo-liberal policies may transform Latin America's political economy and aid in the democratization of its interest group system. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The United States,Japan, and the European Union: comparing political economy approaches to China

Abstract

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US–Japan and US–EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US–Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.     

Governments,trade unions and the macroeconomy: An expository analysis of the political business cycle

We have briefly reviewed the state of the art of research on the political business cycle in the context of a simple textbook model of the macroeconomy. It has been demonstrated that the government-generated political business cycle vanishes as expectations turn rational. Even then, however, non-inflationary policies apparently are time inconsistent. Hence, democracies seem to be stuck with some sort of inflationary bias.Countries with fairly centralized wage bargaining and strong labor unions have to deal with a second political source of instability in the macroeconomy: if the labor union's program contains political items such as equal educational opportunities for working class children, extended co-determination, a more equal distribution of wealth, and the like, they will prefer to see those parties in power who show the best prospects of implementing those items. So the trade union's wage bargaining strategies take into account how bargaining results influence the state of the economy and, hence, the reelection prospects of the ruling government — and they will do so in different ways, depending on whether the union prefers the government to the opposition party or vice versa.     

Elite economic forecasts, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voting intentions in great britain

In order to test the notion that the electorate relies, derivatively, on professional economic forecasts, we consider the entire chain between elite economic expectations, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voter preferences. We find that while elite expectations are based on the objective economy, they are politically biased in the neighborhood of elections. Reports of economic news, while based on the objective economy and on elite expectations, have their own political rhythm in the form of election–related cycles. The pattern in news coverage, in turn, is mirrored by election–related cycles in personal and general expectations formed by the mass public. While the relevance of each of the linkages from elite expectations to news coverage to mass expectations is thus confirmed, our findings challenge the view that the link between mass expectations and voting intentions can be attributed mainly to the dissemination of elite forecasts to the general public. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for an understanding of the ability and functioning of mass electorates.     

Elite economic forecasts,economic news,mass economic expectations,and voting intentions in Great Britain

Abstract In order to test the notion that the electorate relies, derivatively, on professional economic forecasts, we consider the entire chain between elite economic expectations, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voter preferences. We find that while elite expectations are based on the objective economy, they are politically biased in the neighborhood of elections. Reports of economic news, while based on the objective economy and on elite expectations, have their own political rhythm in the form of election–related cycles. The pattern in news coverage, in turn, is mirrored by election–related cycles in personal and general expectations formed by the mass public. While the relevance of each of the linkages from elite expectations to news coverage to mass expectations is thus confirmed, our findings challenge the view that the link between mass expectations and voting intentions can be attributed mainly to the dissemination of elite forecasts to the general public. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for an understanding of the ability and functioning of mass electorates.     

Max Weber, Socialism, and the Space for Time

In Economy and Society Weber provides a detailed criticism of socialism emphasizing the dynamic nature of the formal rationality of economic action, thus indicating the limits of bureaucratic rationality. Unfortunately, Weber's critique has received scant attention, commentators concentrating instead on remarks in his political essays. Weber's main argument against socialism is that it would lead to a decrease in formal rationality. Drawing upon Austrian political economy, Weber attempts to secure a 'realm of freedom' within anarchical capitalist production through emphasizing the dynamic nature of economic decision making which necessarily precludes the possibility of a rational socialist planned economy.     

The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism

We conduct an empirical analysis of data relating measures of economic and political freedom to the occurrence of transnational terrorism 1996–2002. We use binary logistical regression models to predict the probablities that a country will experience transnational terrorist attacks and that a given terrorist originates in a particular country. We find that the extent of political rights and civil liberties is negatively related with the generation of transnational terrorists from a country, but where the former is also negatively related with the occurrence of transnational terrorism in a country, the latter exhibits a non-linear relationship. A number of alternative explanations are disconfirmed: transnational terrorism is unrelated to inequality, economic growth, education, poverty, etc., while a society's fractionalization has mixed importance, and the religious composition has no or little association with attracting or producing transnational terrorism. A more trade-oriented economy seems consistently to associate with smaller probabilities of a country experiencing and generating transnational terrorism.     

Updating the Party Government data set

Scholars have identified the crucial role of government characteristics in studies of political behavior, comparative institutions, and political economy. An invaluable data source for government characteristics is the Woldendorp et al. (2000) Party Government in 48 Democracies data set. We describe our update to this data set from the late-1990s through 2011. We then present a variety of additions to the data set that are intended to increase its usage by reducing the obstacles associated with using the data in conjunction with other popular data sets. We illustrate the utility of this update by providing a variety of means of conceptualizing government stability.     

试析中国政治制度化水平的科学提高

政治的科学发展是现代化的基本要求,构建科学的政治体系,发展科学的民主政治制度,保障权利和维护权力显得尤为重要。从阐述当代中国政治发展特点角度,用中国政治发展的经验,分析了科学调整政治制度的中国政治发展模式,即在保证政治对经济和社会发展有效作用的前提下,不断统筹协调、顺势而动,科学推进政治体制改革,并逐步深化和扩大民主政治进程,以确保政权稳定和国家的全面进步。     

Context matters: Economics,politics and satisfaction with democracy

Economic and political considerations are important in determining citizens' level of satisfaction with their democratic system, but research analyzing which criteria prevail in which contexts is still limited. We examine under what conditions citizens chiefly rely on economic or political considerations in assessing their level of satisfaction with democracy. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems dataset covering 72 elections in 45 unique countries (1996–2016), we show that the relative weight of economic and political criteria in citizens' evaluation of their democratic regime is a function of their nation's affluence. On the one hand, citizens in poorer countries mostly rely on the economy to assess their level of satisfaction with democracy. On the other hand, political considerations are crucial in citizens' evaluations of richer societies. Our results entail strong implications to understand why citizens' recipes for satisfaction for democracy vary across time and space.     

The great transformation and progressive possibilities: the political limits of Polanyi's Marxian history of economic ideas

Abstract

Polanyi's The great transformation remains one of the stand-out texts of twentieth-century political economy, yet it contains important conceptual ambiguities. Perhaps most significantly, the later chapters reveal the influence of Polanyi's own notion of an ‘always embedded economy’, whereas the earlier chapters are constructed around a much more abstract notion of ‘economy’ derived from an essentially Marxian history of economic ideas. Marx worked within the basic Ricardian conception of economy as a method of immanent critique, but then proceeded also to project that same conception backwards onto pre-Ricardian traditions of economics. Polanyi did likewise, I argue, consequently missing the opportunity to connect his own ideas about the non-market influences on all market outcomes to pre-Ricardian studies of the substantive basis of functioning economic relations. I use the following pages to try to restore one such link, in this instance to Adam Smith's account of the moral ‘sympathy’ underpinning the process of market co-ordination. This reconstruction also has implications for progressive possibilities today. Polanyian responses to the ongoing crisis have tended to be framed by the basic Ricardian conception of economy and have accordingly been restricted to a discussion of more market or less, more social protection or less, more austerity or less. By contrast, tracing the lineage from pre-Ricardian concerns to Polanyi's notion of an always embedded economy allows the potentially much more radical question to be asked of what sort of economic relations today best serve essential human needs.