The regulatory state in developing countries: Redistribution and regulatory failure in Brazil

Following the traditional doctrine of the “regulatory state”, regulatory agencies should be given very focused mandates and stay away from the politicized realm of distributive policies and decisions. An opposing perspective would state that if regulatory agencies can contribute to economic redistribution, positive results such as network expansion, economies of scale, and fiscal efficiency will ultimately lead to lower levels of regulatory failure. This article tests whether, in countries of high socio-economic inequality, such as Brazil, the active incorporation of distributive considerations by regulatory agencies leads to lower levels of failure. Through the analysis of the activities of seven Brazilian network regulatory agencies, the article develops theory-driven expectations and tests these expectations using crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). It concludes that not prioritizing redistribution is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for regulatory agencies' failure. In most types of failure, a lack of priority to redistribution leads to failure when combined with low regulatory capacity and low levels of competence.     

Quality assessment and assurance in hospitals of developing countries

Quality assessment and assurance programmes - although widespread in many industrialized countries, particularly in the United States, and achieving their objectives of improving the quality of care - have not been introduced into hospitals of developing countries. The paper discusses the factors that might have impeded the introduction of such programmes into these hospitals. The structure, process and outcomes of health care in developing countries are compared with those of developed countries. The attitudes of government agencies are analysed. The difficulties in the applicability of the criteria, standards and techniques - designed in developed countries - to the conditions existing in the hospitals of developing areas, and the reluctance of governing agencies of these hospitals to provide initiative because of anticipation of consequently increased expenditure, are considered to be the two main impeding factors. The paper further argues the need to promote such programmes in these hospitals and suggests guidelines for their development and implementation in terms of general principles, criteria for the assessment of hospital care, and standards appropriate to local conditions.     

Regulatory reform and governance: A survey of selected developing and transition economies

Regulation is now considered an integral instrument in developing policy toolkit to support market‐led, pro‐poor growth in developing and transition economies. Institutional environment in general and regulatory governance in particular have increasingly been viewed as a factor of competitiveness. In search for better governance, regulatory reform is critical. This article assesses regulatory reform in selected developing and transition economies by reporting the results of a survey on the application of regulatory governance policies, tools and institutions. It is found that in these countries regulatory reform has not shifted in approaches and objectives to taking a systematic view of regulatory governance and the means of promoting and enhancing it. It is suggested that, in order to improve regulatory governance, focus should be put on each of the three elements: regulatory policies, tools and institutions, and that centralised and concerted efforts are needed to integrate the elements. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cost-utility assessment: Planning with local decisionmakers in developing countries

In the past decade countries and donor agencies have endorsed health policies which (1) give a very broad definition of health, (2) see the pursuit of health as part of the development process, and (3) emphasize the local community's and local decision-maker's participation in the planning of health projects. Despite these broad principles, health delivery systems in developing countries have access to a very limited set of resources. Health planners are faced with the dilemma of creating cost-effective programmes while recognizing the need to take into account the broad definition of health and the importance of local participation in planning. This dilemma has led to a division between those planners who put greater emphasis on the use of cost analysis techniques in which the decision-making process rests more with professional planners (often outside consultants) vs those who emphasize greater local control of the decision-making process. The purpose of this paper is to present a study in which two alternative approaches to cost utility analysis were used. Consideration was given both to the actual cost analysis strategy and to the integration of the cost variable into the total decision-making process. Finally, major emphasis was placed on including local decision-makers in the planning process and providing them with feasible and understandable decision-making tools.     

Policy and regulatory design for developing countries: a mechanism design and transaction cost approach

The first-generation literature on policy design has made considerable contributions over the last 30 years to our understanding of the process, politics and implications of policy design and instrument choice. This literature, however, has generally treated institutions as a black box and has not developed a coherent set of frameworks, theories and models of how institutions matter to policy design. In this paper, I unpack the black box of institutions using transaction cost and mechanism design to show how regulations can be better designed in developing countries when institutions are weak, unaccountable, corrupted or not credible. Under these conditions, I show that efficient regulatory design has to minimize transaction costs, particularly agency problems, by having incentive compatible (self-enforcing) mechanisms. I conclude with a second-generation research agenda on regulatory design with implications for environmental, food and drug safety, healthcare and financial regulation in developing countries.     

Destructive decision-making in developing countries

In most developing countries strategic decision-making has been largely based on false premises that have led to destructive results. One set of false premises stems from the assumption that development can be dissociated from the destructively exponential growth in developed countries, from the limits on the planet's physical resources and from complex ecological linkages. Another set is grounded on the popular myths of entrenched development economics: particularly, the enshrining of GNP as the overall indicator of progress, and the concomitant withdrawal of attention from poverty and concentrated wealth, unemployment, and the injurious effects of many modern technologies. These destructive premises tend to reinforce the evolving institutions of new-style empire and oligarchy.More successful development requires standing present development policies on their head through development goals calling for (1) a recognition of redistributive and nonmaterial growth possibilities, (2) redistributive, material and nonmaterial growth in developing countries, (3) redistributive, nonmaterial growth in overdeveloped countries, with a major slowing down of material consumption, (4) large-scale employment projects in developing countries, and (5) the fostering and use of more constructive technologies. All such shifts, however, would require—and tend to lead toward—substantial, long-term changes in the sociopolitical structure of developing countries and the world society.This paper is based on and adapted from The Limits of Development Administration, the keynote paper presented in October 1972 at the U.N. Public Administration Division's conference on development administration in Kiev, USSR, and Unemployment: The Snag in Development, prepared at Kiev and published in The Nation, Dec. 11, 1972.     

Rent-seeking and institutional stability in developing countries

We are grateful to Mark Toma, Gordon Tullock, Stephen Drew Smith, Bob Collinge and participants of the rent seeking panel held at the 1990 meetings of the Southern Economic Association for their helpful comments. Remaining errors are our responsibility.     

The Regulatory Gift: Politics,regulation and governance

This article introduces the “regulatory gift” as a conceptual framework for understanding a particular form of government‐led deregulation that is presented as central to the public interest. Contra to theories of regulatory capture, government corruption, “insider” personal interest, or profit‐seeking theories of regulation, the regulatory gift describes reform that is overtly designed by government to reduce or reorient regulators’ functions to the advantage of the regulated and in line with market objectives on a potentially macro (rather than industry‐specific) scale. As a conceptual framework, the regulatory gift is intended to be applicable across regulated sectors of democratic states and in this article the empirical sections evidence the practice of regulatory gifting in contemporary United Kingdom (UK) politics. Specifically, this article analyses the 2011 UK Public Bodies Act, affecting some 900 regulatory public bodies and its correlative legislation, the 2014 Regulator's Code, the 2015 Deregulation Act, and the 2016 Enterprise Bill. The article concludes that while in some cases the regulatory gift may be aligned with the public interest – delivering on cost reduction, enhancing efficiency, and stimulating innovation – this will not always be the case. As the case study of the regulatory body, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, demonstrates, despite the explicit claims made by legislators, the regulatory gift has the potential to significantly undermine the public interest.     

Mobilizing local resources in developing countries

Many developing countries are putting increased pressure on local governments to mobilize resources, especially to meet the recurrent costs of operating and maintaining locally sited capital projects. Local taxes, user charges and voluntary contributions are all possible mechanisms to carry out these efforts. Yet several important issues arise whenever these mobilization instruments are contemplated and evaluated. Several, often competing, objectives must be considered when evaluating fiscal instruments including the ability of the mechanism to raise revenues, its effect on economic efficiency, its equity implications and its administrative feasibility. After discussing each of these objectives, we show how numerous constraints, including those imposed by the political/legal system, administrative structure, the economy and the culture of the country, must be recognized while searching for a workable set of reforms that will mobilize additional resources without doing great harm to the other objectives. The key to these reforms would seem to be incentives or disincentives inherent in the revenue structure. Without recognizing these incentives or attempting to alter them, resource mobilization efforts are likely to go astray.     

The logic of regulatory impact assessment: From evidence to evidential reasoning

Agencies involved in generating regulatory policies promote evidence-based regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) to improve the predictability of regulation and develop informed policy. Here, we analyze the epistemic foundations of RIAs. We frame RIA as reasoning that connects various types of knowledge to inferences about the future. Drawing on Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation, we situate deductive and inductive reasoning steps within a schema we call the impact argument. This approach helps us identify inherent uncertainties in RIAs, and their location in different types of reasoning. We illustrate the theoretical section with impact assessments of two recent legislative proposals produced by the European Commission. We argue that the concept of “evidence-based regulatory impact assessment” is misleading and should be based on the notion of “regulatory impact assessment as evidential reasoning,” which better recognizes its processual and argumentative nature.     

Functional stakes and EU regulatory governance: temporal patterns of regulatory integration in energy and telecommunications

Abstract

One of the most fiercely debated questions about EU regulatory governance is the respective role played by functional and political factors in regulatory integration. This article contributes to this debate by focussing on the functional factor. Based on a refined conceptualisation of functional stakes, it finds that they vary across sectors, evolve over time, and that these variations are reflected in the degree of regulatory integration observed. When member states perceive regulatory integration as a solution to one of their most pressing problems of the moment, they value – and sometimes even actively push for – the delegation of regulatory powers to the EU. This argument is subject to a credibility probe based on two within-sector analyses of temporal patterns of regulatory integration in energy and telecommunications. The empirical analysis lends support to the conditioning role of the functional factor in the design of EU regulatory governance.     

发展中国家的政府职能

发展中国家所面临的问题与西方发达国家不同 ,发展中国家没有建立制度化的政治秩序 ,迫在眉睫的是解决人民群众的基本生存问题 ,更没有建立起市场经济体制 ,也没有健全的法律制度。这些行政生态情况决定了发展中国家的政府职能要比西方发达国家的政府职能强。无论是经济 ,还是社会发展 ,政府主导都是发展中国家发展的必然之路。     

Rethinking economic openness and macro control in developing countries

The Chinese economy is at a critical point in both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform and WTO accession. Both events challenge the stability of Chinese economy. After the hit of Southeast Asian economic crisis, policies toward economic openness and macro control need be considered carefully. This paper provides a review of economic opening policies adopted in developing countries and a review of causes and consequences of the Southeast Asian economic crisis. Lessons for Chinese economy are summarized. A major conclusion of the paper is that although the Southeast Asian type of economic crisis due to the high foreign debt ratio may not happen in China, the internal debt and smoothness of transformation of the economic system to meet the demand of an open economy may be the major challenge. I thank Dr. Xiaobo Hu for his suggestion in restructuring the paper in early stage. Thanks also go to the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. The remaining errors are mine. Early vision of the paper was presented at the Conference of Social Science Development for 21^st Century in China in June 1998 in Beijing. He received his Ph.D in Economics from Ohio State University in 1993. His research interests are in economic development in rural China, international trade policies in Asia, and urban economics. His recent articles are published in journals such asEconomic Development and Cultural Change, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, China Economic Review, andASEAN Economic Bulletin.     

Elections and the structure of taxation in developing countries

This article analyses the impact of the electoral calendar on the composition of tax revenue (direct versus indirect taxes). It thus represents an extension of traditional political budget-cycle analyses assessing the impact of elections on overall revenue. We appeal to the opportunistic political budget model of Drazen and Eslava (2010) to predict the relationship between taxation structure and elections. Panel data from 56 developing countries over the 1980–2006 period reveals a clear pattern of electorally-related policy interventions. Taking the potential endogeneity of election timing into account, we find robust evidence of lower indirect taxes being applied by incumbent governments in the period just prior to an election. Indirect tax revenue in election years is estimated to be 0.3 GDP percentage points lower than in other years, corresponding to a fall of about 3.4% of the average figure in the sample countries, while there is no such relationship with direct tax revenue.     

How the World Trade Organization shapes regulatory governance

The World Trade Organization (WTO) arguably shapes regulatory governance in more countries to a greater extent than any other international organization. This article provides a new framework for assessing the broader transnational regulatory implications of the WTO as part of a transnational legal order (TLO) in terms of four dimensions of regulatory change that permeate the state: (i) changes in the boundary between the market and the state (involving concomitantly market liberalization and growth of the administrative state); (ii) changes in the relative authority of institutions within the state (promoting bureaucratized and judicialized governance); (iii) changes in professional expertise engaging with state regulation (such as the role of lawyers); and (iv) changes in normative frames and accountability mechanisms for national regulation (which are trade liberal and transnational in scope). In practice, these four dimensions of change interact and build on each other. The article presents what we know to date and a framework for conducting further study of such transnational legal ordering.     

Big audit firms as regulatory intermediaries in transnational labor governance

Due diligence and corporate disclosure initiatives effectively expand the role of professional service firms as regulatory intermediaries in the governance of conditions of production in global supply chains. In this paper, we examine the rise of the “Big Four” audit firms in the market for services connected to transnational labor governance. Through a qualitative case study of audit firms in modern slavery governance, we argue that the Big Four's political repertoire for transnational labor governance expands beyond the roles that are typically linked to their services, and promotes an agenda that touches on key debates on what constitutes proper transnational labor governance. Big audit firms engage in a variety of informal and covert influencing practices and are shown to promote an agenda of incrementalist soft‐law labor governance, opposing concrete performance targets, binding public regulation and an independent watchdog role for civil society.     

Lobbying in developing countries: The Peruvian case

In the transparent exercise of democracy, there is a technique of persuasion called lobbying. The technique involves applying persuasion by representing one's own interests or the interests of third parties. In literature, lobbying is therefore related to interest groups and pressure groups. It is considered a key tool to guarantee equal conditions in the decision‐making process that promotes democracy and citizen control is transparency. Lobbying, also called interest management, is a legitimate activity that in Latin America has a bad press and consequently a bad reputation. However, it is a very important input into the democratic process. According to the NGO Legislative Directory: “It allows the general public to engage in the public decision‐making process, and it has the potential to improve the quality of public decisions by opening channels for diverse opinions and thematic experts.” It is an activity that is put into practice in all countries of the world and that has a regulatory background in most countries of the northern hemisphere and in some South American countries such as Peru and Chile. The general spirit of these norms is to “transform a suspected irregular activity into a deliberation and democratic game,” justify the Legislative Directory.     

Policy coherence versus regulatory governance. Electricity reforms in Algeria and Morocco

The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in utilities sectors in developing countries is underpinned by the idea that IRAs are highly effective institutional devices to signal policy credibility to private investors. But is it really so? Institutional economists tend to confirm the effectiveness of IRAs, while also highlighting the many factors that condition its positive impact on investments. Acknowledging the importance of interaction effects, this paper proposes to shift the level of analysis, moving away from IRAs to look at the overall complementarity between policy objectives, instruments, and the wider political context. In sum, it argues that IRAs are, as such, irrelevant. What matters instead is policy coherence. A comparison between two case studies on electricity policy reforms in Algeria and Morocco lends credit to the policy coherence approach. It shows that policy incoherence may deprive IRAs from any impact on sectoral evolution and that there are effective alternatives to IRA to signal policy credibility and attract investors. The paper concludes by suggesting practitioners to relax the focus on preconceived policy solutions, to be open to alternative policy approaches and to focus on helping developing countries designing coherent policies.     

FDI and the costs of contract enforcement in developing countries

This article examines the relationship between foreign direct investment and host countries’ contracting institutions, the rule systems which govern commercial transactions between private actors. Given their liability of foreignness and costly exit options, we suggest that multinational corporations have incentives to influence the formal contracting environment in host countries. Further, host governments are more likely to respond to multinationals’ wishes when they are more dependent on foreign capital markets. We draw on the World Bank’s Lex Mundi dataset (Djankov et al. 2003) on micro-level contracting environment for private actors. Our analysis of a cross section of 98 developing countries suggests that FDI is associated with lower contract enforcement costs, particularly when the host country is more indebted.