Does social capital increase public support for economic globalisation?

The dominant explanation of public attitudes vis‐à‐vis economic globalisation focuses on re‐distributional implications, with an emphasis on factor endowments and government‐sponsored safety nets (the compensation hypothesis). The empirical implication of these theoretical arguments is that in advanced economies, on which this article focuses, individuals endowed with less human and financial capital will be more likely to experience income losses. Hence they will oppose economic openness unless they are compensated by the government. It is argued here that including social capital in the analysis can fill two gaps in explanations relying on factor endowments and the compensation hypothesis. First, generalised trust – one key aspect of social capital – constitutes a personal endowment alongside human and financial capital. Second, structural social capital – another key aspect of social capital – can be regarded as a nongovernmental social safety net that can compensate for endowment‐related disadvantages of individuals. Both aspects of social capital are expected to contribute, for distinct reasons, to more positive views on economic openness. The empirical testing relies on survey data for two countries: Switzerland and the United States. For both countries, the results indicate that generalised trust has a strong, positive effect on public opinion of economic globalisation, whereas structural social capital has no effect.     

Does India's growth matter? Evidence from the SAARC nations

The study estimates the extent of spillover effects that India's real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate has on the growth rates of other countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region for the period 2003–2016. It also identifies whether the conventional trade channel is the means through which growth is transmitted from India to her neighboring countries. Using a random effects model, we conclude that on average, a 1 percentage point increase in India's real per capita GDP growth rate results in 0.46 percentage point increase in the per capita GDP growth rates of other SAARC nations. However, this does not occur through the trade channel primarily due to low levels of intraregional trade. Also, using time dummies, the paper analyzes whether there has been any significant change in the degree of spillover effects in the postfinancial crisis period, where countries have been observed to insulate themselves to a certain extent.     

Does survey mode matter for studying electoral behaviour? Evidence from the 2009 German Longitudinal Election Study

Online surveys are becoming increasingly popular in the social sciences, particularly in electoral research. However, several studies have shown that participants who take part in online surveys differ significantly from those in other surveys. Still, since electoral research aims primarily at explaining voting behaviour (i.e., looks at slopes and intercepts in statistical model output), online surveys are deemed to be useful tools if models based on this data source arrive at similar conclusions than models based e.g. on random-sample face-to-face or telephone surveys. This paper analyses these relationships by comparing models of voting behaviour based on data from various survey modes with different sample selections conducted by the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) 2009. The results indicate that the data quality of the different survey types is comparable; online surveys are thus useful for electoral research.     

Does online voting change the outcome? Evidence from a multi-mode public policy referendum

Do online and offline voters differ in terms of policy preferences? The growth of Internet voting in recent years has opened up new channels of participation. Whether or not political outcomes change as a consequence of new modes of voting is an open question. Here we analyze all the votes cast both offline (n = 5.7 million) and online (n = 1.3 million) and compare the actual vote choices in a public policy referendum, the world's largest participatory budgeting process, in Rio Grande do Sul in June 2014. In addition to examining aggregate outcomes, we also conducted two surveys to better understand the demographic profiles of who chooses to vote online and offline. We find that policy preferences of online and offline voters are no different, even though our data suggest important demographic differences between offline and online voters.     

Does immigration weaken natives’ support for?the?unemployed? Evidence from Germany

Using data from the 1997 and 2002 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel and from official statistics, I study whether natives are less supportive of state help for the unemployed in regions where the share of foreigners among the unemployed is high. Unlike previous studies, I use individual-level panel data, which allows a more convincing identification of a causal effect. I find that the negative bivariate association is mainly driven by observed individual differences, such as East German origin or income. While there remains some evidence of a negative association even after adjusting for observed and unobserved individual differences, the association is relatively weak.     

Does Training Matter? Evidence from Performance Management Reforms

Training is much discussed but rarely studied in public management. Using multiple waves of survey data, the authors examine the effects of training on the implementation of performance management reforms in the U.S. federal government, asking whether those exposed to training are more likely to use performance data and strategic goals when making decisions. Training is positively associated with reform implementation, but there is little evidence that this association can be explained by the development of specific capacities to overcome performance management challenges. The findings offer two implications for the practice and study of training. The authors propose that training is likely to succeed if it is designed and funded to close specific capacity gaps needed for successful reform implementation. However, it is also necessary to better understand alternative causal mechanisms by which training facilitates reform implementation, such as explaining and justifying reforms.

Practitioner Points

• Training can facilitate the implementation of new policies by providing information about the policies, justifying why they are needed, and giving employees the capacity to put the new policies in place.
• Using training to build specific employee capacities is more complex, resource intensive, and rare than using training to provide information and justify reforms.
• Effective training in government requires not just more resources but also better understanding of the specific capacities needed and how to create them—research can help by identifying the most significant capacity gaps in policy implementation.

     

Does tenure in office affect regional growth? The role of?public capital productivity

We study the impact of tenure in office on economic performance. We evaluate the relationships between tenure in office and GDP growth, public capital growth, and public capital productivity using data for Spanish regions during the period 1980?C1998. We find that tenure decreases the impact of public capital growth on GDP growth. Our results suggest that tenure affects GDP growth negatively through a decrease in public capital productivity.     

Does Wal-Mart reduce social capital?

Social capital has attracted increasing attention in recent years. We use county-level and individual survey data to study how Wal-Mart affects social capital. Estimates using several proxies for social capital—such as club membership, religious activity, time with friends, and other measures—do not support the thesis that “Wal-Mart destroys communities” by reducing social capital. We measure exposure to Wal-Mart two ways: Wal-Marts per 10,000 residents and Wal-Marts per 10,000 residents aggregated over the years since 1979 to capture a more cumulative “Wal-Mart Effect.” We find that the coefficients on Wal-Mart’s presence are statistically insignificant in most specifications.     

Does fiscal pressure constrain policy responsiveness? Evidence from Germany

Political responsiveness is highly unequal along class lines, which has triggered a lively debate about potential causes of this political inequality. What has remained largely unexplored in this debate are the structural economic conditions under which policymakers operate. In this contribution, we hypothesize that budgetary pressures affect both the level and the equality of political responsiveness. Using a dataset containing public opinion data on around 450 fiscal policy proposals in Germany between 1980 and 2016, we investigate whether policymakers are more responsive on issues with budgetary consequences under conditions of low fiscal pressure than under conditions of high fiscal pressure. We find that responsiveness indeed varies systematically with the degree of fiscal pressure and that policymakers are less responsive on fiscal issues when fiscal pressure is high. This holds for both left-wing and right-wing governments. In contrast, we do not find strong effects of fiscal pressure on political inequality: responsiveness is not more equal in fiscally more permissive times. However, since different types of policy proposals are adopted in times of high fiscal stress, unequal responsiveness has different policy implications in times of high and low fiscal pressure.     

Do citizens care about government debt? Evidence from survey experiments on budgetary priorities

Ever since the Great Recession, public debt has become politicised. Some research suggests that citizens are fiscally conservative, while other research shows that they punish governments for implementing fiscal consolidation. This begs the question of whether and how much citizens care about debt. We argue that debt is not a priority for citizens because reducing it involves spending and tax trade-offs. Using a split-sample experiment and a conjoint experiment in four European countries, we show that fiscal consolidation at the cost of spending cuts or taxes hikes is less popular than commonly assumed. Revenue-based consolidation is especially unpopular, but expenditure-based consolidation is also contested. Moreover, the public has clear fiscal policy priorities: People do not favour lower debt and taxes, but they support higher progressive taxes to pay for more government spending. The article furthers our understanding of public opinion on fiscal policies and the likely political consequences of austerity.     

More political representation,more economic development? Evidence from Turkey

Public Choice - Third-party adjudicators, be they governments, or politicians or academics, can take positions regarding who initiated a conflict, who is to blame for harm or damage, and who has...     

Does counter-mobilization contain right-wing populist movements? Evidence from Germany

Right-wing populist (RWP) movements have been on the rise in Western democracies. Outside of party politics, such movements regularly organize demonstrations against political elites and minority groups. At the same time, civil society coalitions have mobilized against these movements. Yet we know little about the effect of counter-demonstrations on RWP protest activities. We derive competing theoretical expectations from previous work. On the one hand, counter-mobilization reduces mobilization because the original movement is less likely to achieve its goals (expected utility/costs). On the other hand, clashes and standoffs between opposing movements facilitate mobilization through polarization and anger (identity/emotions). We empirically analyze movement–countermovement dynamics using a new city-level event dataset on street protests by the German Pegida movement and its opponents. In our quantitative analysis, we investigate how counter-mobilization is associated with the onset of Pegida protests, their intensity in terms of participant numbers, and their demobilization. Counter-mobilization does not prevent protest onset, but large counter-demonstrations are associated with larger subsequent Pegida protests, and violence against Pegida supporters reduces the likelihood that they will stop protesting.     

Does Administrative Burden Influence Public Support for Government Programs? Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Research indicates that administrative burden influences the behaviors and views of clients and potential clients of government programs. However, administrative burden may also shape mass attitudes toward government programs. Taking a behavioral public administration approach, the authors consider whether and how exposure to information about administrative burden embedded within eligibility-based programs influences citizen favorability toward those programs. It is hypothesized that if information about the existing screening mechanisms is highlighted and made salient, this will lead to greater approval of eligibility-based programs. This expectation is evaluated using a survey experiment that explores administrative burden in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. The evidence shows that being exposed to information about administrative burden increases favorability toward TANF and its recipients, though these effects are conditional on party identification. The results provide insight into a potential consequence of administrative burden, showing the way in which information regarding burden can shape citizens’ support for eligibility-based programs.     

Does E-Voting matter for turnout,and to whom?

Empirical evidence suggests that e-voting has no measurable effects on turnout. However, existing studies did (or could) not look at e-voting effects on the individual level. We innovate by analyzing whether and to what extent the availability of e-voting fosters turnout among specific groups of citizens, and how this influences the equality of participation. To that end, we estimate Bayesian multi-level models on a unique set of official data on citizens’ participation covering 30 ballots between 2008 and 2016 in Geneva, Switzerland, which has the most far-reaching experience with e-voting worldwide. Despite the fact that e-voting was added to an easy-to-use form of postal voting, we find that offering e-voting has increased turnout among abstainers and occasional voters. By contrast, the effects of e-voting availability on the equality of participation are mixed with respect to the age cohorts and gender.     

Does public broadcasting increase voter turnout? Evidence from the roll out of BBC radio in the 1920s

There is reason to believe that exposure to public broadcasting can positively affect voter turnout, but these effects are hard to empirically disaggregate. This paper examines the geographically delimited roll out of BBC radio in England, which coincided with successive off-cycle general elections in the 1920s. Combining spatially interpolated census data with constituency-level electoral returns, a matched difference-in-differences design finds that turnout increases with radio exposure. This finding is supported by qualitative examination of the roll out alongside a range of robustness checks. The study makes a contribution to the literature on media and voting behaviour, while enhancing our understanding of how the BBC shapes electoral behaviour in Britain.     

How does organizational task matter for the reputation of public agencies?

The study of organizational task for understanding how organizations behave and evolve has been one of the classic topics in organization theory and public administration. Reputation scholarship has appeared as a promising perspective to understand internal and external organizational dynamics. Reputation scholars, too, emphasize the critical importance of task. Despite this recognition, the literature is characterized by a lack of theorization, and large-scale comparative analyses on how task characteristics are related to reputational dynamics. This study aims to address these concerns, relying on an extensive longitudinal dataset on the media reputation of 40 agencies in two countries to explain organizations' likelihood of attracting reputational threats (both in general and targeting specific reputational dimensions) through different task characteristics. Our main finding is that as agencies perform tasks of a more coercive and authoritative nature (regulatory tasks and, to a lesser extent, redistributive tasks), they are more likely to attract reputational threats (both in general and to all dimensions).     

When do middlemen matter? Evidence from variation in corruption in India

Corruption is a persistent problem in developing countries, and recent scholarship suggests that middlemen play an important role in corrupt acts. Yet, while intermediaries can reduce transaction costs in illicit exchange, they also increase agency costs and reduce benefits to others. The involvement of middlemen may thus vary. I argue that middlemen are most likely to engage in, and benefit from, the subset of corruption transactions that are repeated frequently, but not by the same parties. I test the implications of this argument using survey experiments administered to a large sample of politicians and bureaucrats at multiple levels of government in India. I show that middlemen are critical, but far from ubiquitous. Intermediaries are more relevant where corrupt deals are frequent but involve unfamiliar potential principals. My results suggest that anticorruption efforts must pay greater attention to the type of corruption and the incentives of middlemen.     

Does formal independence of regulators change? Evidence from Portuguese agencies

The rise of the regulatory state has led to the global diffusion of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). IRAs are the result of the tension between the functional demands of regulatory capitalism and the need of politicians to control policies. Their life cycles have not been linear. Their legal statuses have changed over time, affecting their degrees of independence. This article revisits Gilardi's formal independence index, makes an in‐depth diachronic and cross‐sectorial analysis of 11 regulatory bodies in Portugal, and searches for explanations for the observed variations. It concludes that the formal independence of IRAs tends to increase due to external pressure and the need of governments to project credible commitment, but principals only grant as much independence as they see fit to satisfy those (external) demands (for change).     

Are bigger governments better providers of public goods? Evidence from air pollution

Theories explaining government size and its consequences are of two varieties. The first portrays government as a provider of public goods and a corrector of externalities. The second associates larger governments with bureaucratic inefficiency and special-interest-group influence. What distinguishes these alternatives is that only in the former is governmental expansion generally associated with an increase in social welfare. In the latter, the link between government size and public goods provision (or social welfare) is negative. We study the empirical significance of these competing claims by examining the relationship between government size and a particular public good, namely environmental quality (notably, air quality measured by SO₂ concentrations), for 42 countries over the period 1971–1996. We find that the relationship is negative, even after accounting for the quality of government (quality of bureaucracy and the level of corruption). This result may not prove conclusively that the growth of government has been driven by factors other than concern for the public good, but it creates a presumption against the theory of government size that emphasizes public good provision.     

Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudinal Evidence from Colombia

Decentralization is argued to create incentives for local and regional politicians to be more responsive and accountable to their constituents, but few studies have directly tested this claim. We use survey data from Colombia to examine individual‐level evaluations of the degree to which decentralization prompts citizens to view department government as more accountable. We estimate the effect of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization, controlling for participation, political knowledge, confidence in government, education, and income on perceptions of accountability. Our results indicate that administrative and fiscal decentralization improve perceptions of accountability, while political decentralization does not.