中国在国际气候谈判中面临的新挑战及其应对

德班平台建立后,国际气候谈判由“双轨制”变为单轨,发达国家和发展中国家自此将在一个共同的平台上就未来国际气候机制展开谈判,过去相对稳定的国际气候谈判格局发生演变.在这种情况下,中国面临着发展中国家身份的集体认同的变化,以及中国所一贯坚持的“共同但有区别的责任”原则的重新解读,这些变化将给中国的身份定位及国家利益带来影响.因此,中国一方面要把握在未来国际气候机制制定中的话语权,积极参与全球气候治理体系的改革与建构,使其适应中国国内中长期发展目标;另一方面也要承担相应的减排责任,做负责任的大国,为全球气候治理贡献力量.     

换一种眼光看“低碳”

所谓低碳,很可能是一些有心人拿人们的良知做武器,去扼杀别人发展进程的一种方式我们仍然要谈及低碳——这个词听起来非常美丽,而且无懈可击,以保护气候、保护地球为目的。但我仔细一想,却品     

完善我国低碳经济法制的思考

地球生态环境变化越来越受到全球关注,特别是温室气体排放过量,全球变暖的情形越来越严重,甚至影响到人类生活。我国同样也面临着严峻的现实,保护生态坏境,发展低碳经济是我国经济转型与可持续发展的当务之急。本文通过分析我国现行法律制度的现状与缺陷,借鉴各国低碳经济法制经验,提出完善我国低碳经济法制的相关思考,以期有所裨益。     

从TRIPS的谈判历程看知识产权国际规则的制定

<与贸易有关的知识产权协议>(TRIPS)自1995年签订以来,一直成为世界贸易组织(WTO)成员间经济交往中的争议焦点.通过审视TRIPS缔结的历史背景和谈判历程,分析TRIPS谈判前后成员国间特别是发达国家和发展中国家的利益冲突,以及促使TRIPS缔结的若干因素,可以为理解围绕TRIPS争议和为发展中国家更有力地参与TRIPS将来的谈判提供史鉴.     

浅谈国际经济法在低碳经济环境中的变化

在当下全球变暖的时代背景下,无论发达国家还是发展中国家都一边追求着可持续发展的理念,一边为巩固自身在世界上的经济地位,发起新一轮倡导低碳经济模式理念的战略思想,争取世界经济有利地位和利益,这也无形中对原有的各项经济体制和制度提出新的问题和更高的挑战.     

低碳经济 世纪救赎

迎接低碳未来 过去一个世纪，气候变暖带来了海平面上升，冰川融化，灾害的增加，疾病的流行，生物多样化的破坏越来越严重…… 作为发展中国家的中国，是气候变暖的最大受害者之一，但中国始终是一个负责任的大国。     

低碳经济，中国可持续发展之路

发展低碳经济、建设低碳型社会，是在气候变化大背景下，全球正经历的一场经济和社会发展方式的重大变革。无论是从国际社会政策走向、全球气候变化的趋势，还是从我国实现可持续发展的内在要求，走低碳经济发展之路，中国没有选择。尽管哥本哈根大会“不欢而散”，给人们心头蒙上一层阴影，但世界各国人民选择低碳经济是不可阻挡的潮流。     

浅析“低碳经济”对国际经济法的影响

近期，国际社会对哥本哈根气候大会的关注使得“低碳经济”再次成为学术界讨论的热点问题。作为一项实践性的提议，“低碳经济”不仅对全球及各国的经济发展模式有了明确的指导，更重要的是，它对于国际经济法这门学科有了深刻的影响。本文即是从这一点出发，浅析了“低碳经济”对于国际经济法的基本原则、体系以及制度的影响。     

未来气候变化国际立法谈判中的中国立场思考

"后京都时代"的来临对中国而言既是机遇也是挑战。机遇在于中国等国的努力将有可能促成一个更有利于本国可持续发展的国际法环境,挑战在于中国等国将担负越来越重的温室气体减排压力。如何应对未来的国际立法谈判,本文将对此提出一些个人建议。     

律师业要为低碳经济服务

哥本哈根全球气候大会召开后,经济领域最热的名词当属低碳经济。在全球变暖、资源短缺、金融危机等多重背景下,一场能源变革悄然兴起。低碳经济是以低能耗、低污染、低排放为基础的经济模式,其实质是能源高效利用、清清能源开发和发展绿色GDP,核心是能源技术和减排技术创新、产业结构优化升级、制度创新以及人类生存发展观念的根本性转变。作为为经济发展提供法律服务的律师业,为低碳经济服好务更是责无旁贷。     

气候变化背景下国际投资规则的发展趋势及我国对策研究

传统国际投资条约与应对气候变化存在一些矛盾和冲突,因此应实现国际投资条约与气候变化应对条约之间的衔接,兼顾投资自由化与政府管制.要实现这一目标,最佳方式是通过改变国际投资条约以顺应应对气候变化的低碳运动,改变国际投资条约将促进和保护投资作为唯一重心的现状,并采纳环境保护等其他领域的国际法规则.近年来国际投资领域呈现可持续发展的投资政策趋势.目前一些投资保护协定范本和新签订的双边和区域性投资协定已经纳入并不断完善环境保护等有关东道国管制外资内容的条款,逐步实现投资者利益与东道国利益保护的平衡.我国对现有国际投资条约进行调整、修订以及新投资条约的谈判,应考虑国际投资条约的这一发展趋势,以顺应国际投资的可持续发展政策.     

‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B_?US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.     

Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements

Scientific and economic consensus points to the need for a credible and cost-effective approach to address the threat of global climate change, but the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change appears incapable of inducing significant participation and compliance. We assess the Protocol and alternative policy architectures, with particular attention to their respective abilities to induce participation and compliance. We find that those approaches that offer cost-effective mitigation are unlikely to induce significant participation and compliance, while those approaches that are likely to enjoy a reasonably high level of implementation by sovereign states are sorely lacking in terms of their anticipated cost effectiveness. The feasible set of policy architectures is thus limited to second-best alternatives.     

The Devilish Details: Key Legal Issues in the 2015 Climate Negotiations

The ongoing UN negotiations for a 2015 climate agreement have yet to resolve two fundamental legal issues on which its effectiveness will hinge. The first is the precise legal form this agreement will take. Parties had agreed to work towards a ‘protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties’. This leaves scope for a range of possible legal forms, only some of which are legally binding. Second, they have yet to determine the legal nature of the ‘nationally determined contributions’ submitted by Parties. This article addresses these two critical issues: on ‘legal form’, it identifies the instruments that could form part of the Paris package, focussing on their legal status, significance and influence; and on the ‘legal nature’ of nationally determined contributions, it considers their nature and scope, the range of options for ‘housing’ these contributions as well as their relationship to the core 2015 agreement.     

气候变化的国际法之秩序价值初探

价值理念贯穿于法律运行的整个过程 ,并对法律运行起着相应的指导作用。气候变化的国际立法活动 ,也必然受到相关价值理念的指导。在气候变化问题日益严峻的挑战面前 ,气候变化的国际法应当执著地追求秩序价值。而要真正实现秩序价值 ,就必须及早将气候变化的国际法所向往和追求的秩序价值外化为具体的、有效的应对气候变化问题的措施、手段和行动     

WTO新的多边贸易谈判的矛盾及前景

在经济全球化及多边贸易体系的推动下，全球贸易自由化趋势不断加强，WTO新的多边贸易谈判已经启动，但是谈判面临许多难题，各方在许多议题上还存在较大的分歧，这些分歧反映了经济全球化与各国国家主权及民族利益的冲突以及由此导致的各种矛盾，展望谈判前景，虽然会有许多曲折和困难，但其意义是十分深远的，我国作为WTO的正式成员，将积极参与和推动新的多边贸易谈判，努力维护我国和整个发展中国家的利益。     

Biotic Carbon Sequestration and the Kyoto Protocol: The Construction of Global Knowledge by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

This paper explores the dynamics of the production of global knowledge by an international knowledge organization, in this case the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Based on previous notions of international boundary organizations, the idea of international knowledge organizations emphasizes the knowledge generation function of such organizations rather than their convening function. Using the case of controversial Kyoto Protocol biotic carbon sequestration policies, I argue that boundary work and uncertainty management are the essential dynamics in the successful construction of global knowledge by international knowledge organizations. This uncertainty management occurs in a manner broadly, although not completely, in conformance with the institutional preferences of powerful policy actors. Global knowledge can legitimate and help refine global policies, but the process of its construction must be iterative and transparent if it is to be credible for global environmental governance over the long-term.     

国际调节与国际经济法学科理论新视角

伴随市场国际化产生国际调节机制。国际调节同市场调节、各国的国家调节互相配合、制约 ,相辅相成 ,共同构成国际市场调节机制体系。国际调节需要相应的法律予以规制和保障。这种规范国际调节、调整国际经济调节关系的法律 ,即为国际经济法。国内外国际经济法学界普遍认为 ,国际经济法调整国际经济关系。他们把平等主体间一般商品货币关系即商事关系也纳入进去 ,是一种大国际经济法观点。大国际经济法观点的产生有其历史根源。以WTO为代表的国际调节及其立法的产生和发展 ,将促使人们对传统国际经济法理论作反思 ,并在国际经济调节及其立法的基点上重构国际经济法学科理论体系。     

Attainability of International Environmental Agreements as a Social Situation

This paper applies the theory of social situations to study whether international environmental agreements (IEAs), mainly those on greenhouse gas emission reductions, can be attained. A game theoretic model is generally a black box for decision makers, where the mechanisms, which lead to solution(s) of the game, are not explicitly pointed out. This paper opens this black box by making the (institutional) move rules explicit. The usual pessimistic outcome with an ineffective and small size of stable coalitions among world regions is countered. Our model challenges conventional wisdom in the sense that large coalitions are possible outcomes of the cartel game, namely by incorporating: (1) farsightedness, and (2) coalitional moves with commitment as an alternative to myopic and individual moves which characterise the cartel game. We show that even if the international negotiations on climate change mitigation are modelled as an n-person prisoner's dilemma, one cannot rule out cooperation among world regions as a solution of the game. Indeed, in most analysed situations the grand coalition is among the solutions of the game. This shows that predictions based on cartel stability may be too pessimistic if it comes to analysing incentives to cooperate in implementing international environmental policy. Moreover, in an empirically calibrated model, we find three out of six instances where Russia (with or without the US) has an incentive to sign the Kyoto protocol.