National Parliaments and EU Fiscal Integration

This article analyses the impact of the euro crisis on national parliaments and examines their response to the deepening of EU fiscal integration and the correspondent limitation of their budgetary autonomy. It argues that the sovereign debt crisis has provoked the emergence of new channels of parliamentary involvement in EU economic governance. National parliaments have acquired various rights of approval in the European Semester, strengthened the accountability of national governments, reinforced their scrutiny over budgeting, improved their access to information, and created domestic and supranational avenues for deliberation and political contestation of European integration. In these respects, they have undergone further Europeanisation. While these reforms do not outweigh the centralisation of EU powers, they represent an embryonic step in the parliamentary adaptation to the nascent EU fiscal regime. Yet they are unlikely substantially to influence EMU policy‐making processes, because of the democratic disconnect inherent in the EU's multilevel constitution.     

Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic Constitutionalism: The Case of the European Community

Within the current debates about Euro‐constitutionalism, the conventional options are either to defend a vision of the European Union (EU) which separates global economic law from national sovereignty, and thus relies on the legitimizing powers of free markets, or to regard the legitimation problem (at least under current conditions) as beyond solution: This view argues that any further progress towards an ever closer Union would inevitably increase the legitimation deficit and that therefore the capacity for political action of the nation state should be protected or restored. This paper seeks to break the stranglehold of the, as is argued, false dichotomy (global markets vs. national democracy), and it argues that an extension of democracy beyond the nation state is possible.     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.     

National social spaces as adjustment variables in the EMU: A critical legal appraisal

The article critically engages with the reconfiguration of the role and status of national social spaces within the EU constitutional fabric after the reform of European economic governance. Its main contention is that these reforms have converted national social spaces into adjustment variables whose main function is to contribute to the pursuit of EMU‐related objectives. This transformation alters the balance between the economic and the social dimension in the EU legal order, deforming one of the defining traits of its constitutional identity.     

European Studies and the European Crisis: Legal and Political Science between Critique and Complacency

European Studies used to be dominated by legal and political science approaches which hailed the progress of European integration and its reliance on law. The recent set of crises that struck the EU have highlighted fundamental problems in the ways and means by which European integration unfolds. The quasi‐authoritarian emergency politics deployed in the euro crisis is a radical expression of the fading prevalence of democratic processes to accommodate economic and social diversity in the Union. As we argue in this paper, however, the mainstreams in both disciplines retain a largely affirmative and apologetic stance on the EU's post‐democratic and extra‐constitutional development. While political science contributions mostly content themselves with a revival of conventional integration theories and thus turn a blind eye to normatively critical aspects of European crisis governance, legal scholarship is in short supply of normatively convincing theoretical paradigms and thus aligns itself with the functionalist reasoning of the EU's Court of Justice. Yet, we also identify critical peripheries in both disciplines which intersect in their critical appraisal of the authoritarian tendencies that inhere in the crisis‐ridden state of European integration. Their results curb the prevailing optimism and underline that the need for fundamental reorientations in both the theory and practice of European integration has become irrefutable.     

Europe’s new deal: a new version of an expiring deal

The article elaborates upon the reasons of institutional default (Part 1) and, in turn, upon the implications of economic default in Europe (Part 2). In relation to the reasons of institutional default, the paper cast light on three broadly interrelating elements: First, the conceptual issue that the EU has been operating as a community without democracy, which was clearly illustrated in the case of the economic crisis (Sect. 2.1). Second, the structural issue that EU democracy, where applicable, was deprived of politics, in the sense that founding ideology has been completely superseded by the inflexible dominance of free market (Sect. 2.2). And, third, the technical issue that EU politics, where applicable, especially after the Euro-zone launching, lacked principles that could keep the community intact (Sect. 2.3). In relation to the implications of economic default, the paper reveals three salient features. First, the political impact, namely that Europe seems to be puzzled by a sharp division between stability/cohesion and growth/monetarism, which mutates the essential mainstays of a Community (Sect. 3.1). Second, the social impact, i.e. increase of discrepancies within the EU, mostly as a result of diminution of labour rights and the correlating destruction of cohesion (Sect. 3.2). And, third, the psychological impact, which revolves around two antithetical poles, namely stereotyping and nationalism (Sect. 3.3). The epilogue reflects the view that the current depression is both a disaster and an opportunity for Europe, therefore the old messianic deal of the European integration needs an afresh look within the frame of democratic legitimacy and accountability and with an essential preservation of social state.     

Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the Context of EU Market Integration

European economic integration with a minimalist social policy at EU level was in part made possible by strong domestic labour market and social welfare institutions. The main contention of this paper is that EU market liberalisation was embedded within institutions of social citizenship at domestic level, which served to counter the liberalisation of the internal market. But this settlement has been put under strain. In addition to the challenges posed to the sustainability of European welfare states by the global economic crisis, the internal market jurisprudence of the Court of Justice casts doubt on the sustainability of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’. This paper focuses on the role of the Court, in particular in its jurisprudence on the interaction between (EU) market freedoms and (national) labour law, which undermines the ability of states to retain their regulatory autonomy over labour or social welfare law and, arguably, speeds up the unravelling of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’.     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards

Arguments about Europe's democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature and ultimate goals of the integration process. Those who assume that economic integration must lead to political integration tend to apply to European institutions standards of legitimacy derived from the theory and practice of parliamentary democracies. We argue that such standards are largely irrelevant at present. As long as the majority of voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic integration, we cannot expect parliamentary democracy to flourish in the Union. Economic integration without political integration is possible only if politics and economics are kept as separate as possible. The depoliticisation of European policy-making is the price we pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact. These being the preferences of the voters, we conclude that Europe's 'democratic deficit' is democratically justified.
The expression 'democratic deficit,' however, is also used to refer to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, and this second meaning is much more relevant to a system of limited competences such as the EC. Now the key issues for democratic theory are about the tasks which may be legitimately delegated to institutions insulated from the political process, and how to design such institutions so as to make independence and accountability complementary and mutually supporting, rather than antithetical. If one accepts the 'regulatory model' of the EC, then, as long as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and narrowly defined, non-majoritarian standards of legitimacy should be sufficient to justify the delegation of the necessary powers.     

Between Human Rights and Sovereignty*—An Examination of EU–China Political Relations

This paper will study the differences between the EU and China on the understanding of human rights and national sovereignty and their impact on EU‐China political relations. The paper will be divided into the following parts. The first part will give a review of the concepts of both sovereignty and human rights and the rising concern of human rights in the contemporary world. The second part will study the EU's policy of human rights to see why the EU adheres to its values. The third part will look at China's policy on sovereignty and human rights. The fourth part will examine EU‐China political relations and analyse the difficulties in bilateral relations, due to differences in values between the EU and China. The fifth part will draw some tentative conclusion.     

From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU

As the crisis (and the Union's response to it) further develops, one thing appears clear: the European Union post‐crisis will be a very different animal from the pre‐crisis EU. This article offers an alternative model for the EU's constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the Union's current path‐dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to question, rather than entrench, its future objectives and trajectory. The paper argues that the post‐crisis EU requires a quite different normative, institutional and juridical framework. Such a framework must focus on reproducing the social and political cleavages that underlie authority on the national level and that allow divisive political choices to be legitimised. This reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the European institutions. Rather than seeking to prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of institutional competences and tasks should be rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to internalise within their decision‐making process the conflicts reproduced by social and political cleavages. Finally, a reformed legal order must play an active role as a facilitator and container of conflict over the ends of the integration project.     

Democratic legitimacy in the European Union: Fulfilling the institutional logic

The European Union's delicate institutional balance between intergovern‐mentalism and supranationalism has been the source of both the EU's successes and its problems. This balance is under scrutiny as representatives of Member States and EU institutions pursue their particular visions of democratic legitimacy in the course of the 1996–97 Intergovernmental Conference. This essay examines three competing conceptualisations of democratic legitimacy: the Gaullist view, which associates legitimacy narrowly with national sovereignty; a national culture perspective that posits a unique correspondence of national character and national parliaments; and a parliamentary view that associates legitimacy with the role played by parliaments in scrutinising the behaviour of executives, whether at national or European level. Only the last of these perspectives acknowledges that democratic legitimacy is a continuous variable rather than an all‐or‐nothing concept, and that the EU may therefore accumulate legitimacy by improving both the process and substance of policy making within the logic of existing institutional structures.     

EU Integration and Cultural Diplomacy in Times of Crisis: The Case of Greece

The economic crisis challenges the integration policies of the European Union (EU) and reduces its soft power. Developing from a discussion on cultural values, cultural diplomacy is proposed as a way for the EU and its member states to address the negative effects of the crisis on their soft power and integration process. Cultural values, identity issues, top-down and bottom-up stakeholders, policies, and prospects for cultural diplomacy are explored with a focus on Greece. A proposal based on the balancing of sociocultural with economic principles is presented as a conclusion that would address soft power deficits and further EU integration.     

European Integration: Popular Sovereignty and a Politics of Boundaries

The problem raised by popular sovereignty in the framework of the EU is not whether it is relevant to European integration; it is. The problem is another, namely the identity and, thus, the boundary of a democratic polity. The very idea of ‘European’ integration suggests that integration is only imaginable by reference to the closure provided by an identity, a boundary that is normative rather than merely geographical. In this minimal sense, a European people is the necessary presupposition of integration, not merely its telos. Bluntly, there is no integration without inclusion and, also, no integration without exclusion. This, then, is the real problem raised by popular sovereignty in a European context: if there is no such thing as non‐exclusionary integration, how can a reflection on the boundedness of European integration be more than a rationalisation of exclusion?     

Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure

This article seeks to examine the relationship between EU law and the Italian legal order in light of the recent Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)’s jurisprudence attempting to redefine EU core principles. When fundamental rights are at stake, three assumptions are challenged: the determination of direct effect shall be a prerogative of the ECJ; EU directly effective provisions entail the disapplication of conflicting national law; judges have the discretion to refer preliminary references to the ECJ where a clarification on EU law is needed. The contribution argues that the judicial search for a balance between sovereignty and supranationality is undermined by the ICC's new resistance to the well‐established EU jurisprudence. In that respect, the paper posits that the ICC's activism is the result of an unjustified ‘argumentative self‐restraint’ of the ECJ vis‐à‐vis the evolution of EU foundational principles.     

Referendums and the Political Constitutionalisation of the EU

Abstract:  This article argues that European integration has triggered a dual constitutionalisation process in Europe. One is the revision of national constitutions to accommodate the integration project at the national level. The other is the construction of transnational rules to regulate novel inter-state relationships at the European level. EU referendums are contextualised in such a duel constitutionalisation process. At the domestic level, EU referendums handle the debates on national constitutional revision. At the transnational level, these popular votes ratify supranational constitutional documents. The article comparatively analyses three types of EU referendums—membership, policy and treaty referendums—according to this analytical framework, exploring the campaign mobilisation of voters, national governments, and transnational institutions, and examining the legal and political interaction between referendums and European integration. A key finding is that, as the dual constitutionalisation process deepens and widens, entrenched domestic players and restrained transnational actors are under increasing pressure to 'voice' themselves in EU referendums.     

Beyond the European void? Reflections on Peter Mair's legacy

Peter Mair was one of the world's leading scholars of party politics. Though he wrote at some length about the European Union, there has been no systematic exploration of the implications of his comparative work on political parties for European integration. His writings on the EU have generally been studied in isolation from his wider oeuvre, with the result that we have missed the important analytical and logical connections between Mair's work on parties and his writings on the EU. This article argues that Mair's path‐breaking middle‐range theoretical and empirical work on the decline of party democracy can form the basis of a radical reappraisal of the project of ‘ever closer union’. The article studies Mair's arguments against the backdrop of more recent empirical evidence and evaluates the normative implications of his work for the future of the European project.     

Economic Policy Coordination as a Game Involving Economic Stability and National Sovereignty

The economic crisis has paved the way for reconsideration of the Eurozone's constitutional design. This paper shows that what may seem as a massive empowerment of European institutions at the cost of national economic sovereignty in actual constitutional practice has left economic policy coordination largely unchanged. By means of conceptualising its previous and current patterns as a game between supranational and national institutions, it is shown that the scale of change has been widely exaggerated. The new Eurozone design has mitigated in practice the extent to which national economic sovereignty has been undermined, but only at the cost of shifting to the European Central Bank the burden of shoring up the stability of the common currency; such burden the ECB is bound to prove unable to sustain in the long run.     

挑战与回应:全球化视野下的国家主权

全球化是一个涉及到人类经济、政治、文化和社会生活诸领域的世界性历史进程。经济全球化不仅从多方面影响了主权国家的经济职能和经济主权,而且通过法律全球化对国家的法律主权构成了一定的挑战。经济全球化深刻影响到世界政治组织的构成及其活动方式和范围、对以国家为中心的、分散的主权政治架构也会产生广泛的影响。文化全球化推动了全球体系中的文化整合与文化嬗变,影响了人们的主权观念,并在一定程度上制约着人们的行为以及人们之间的关系模式,改变着国家的政治生活形式,深刻影响着国家的文化主权,对民族国家和国际社会的治理及其宪政化提供了新的机遇并带来了新的挑战。因此,为了推进全球法治进程,必须树立新的主权理念,实现主权要素的重构。