Fiscal institutions of Brazilian municipal borrowing

In an effort to understand subnational borrowing, this article explores how three Brazilian institutions—the 1988 Constitution which mandates revenue and expenditure assignments among the levels of the federation; the national Law of Fiscal Responsibility, which imposes expenditure and debt limitations on all levels and branches of government; and various borrowing arrangements—affect the municipal borrowing environment. These institutions are examined in light of de Mello's (2001) policy recommendations for strengthening efficiency and fiscal discipline in subnational borrowing. The institutions of Brazilian borrowing were found to have some of de Mello's recommendations, with the new Constitution and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility making progress towards increased fiscal responsibility, but the current borrowing arrangements serving to maintain a controlled system that is not conducive to responsible municipal borrowing. Several recommendations are made to improve the borrowing environment and foster fiscal discipline and efficiency Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach

This paper attempts, for the first time, to assess the relationships between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout using a comparative international approach. With this aim, the authors build a comprehensive index of budget transparency encompassing 40 budget features based on international standards for a sample of 41 countries. They find a positive relationship between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency: The more information the budget discloses, the less the politicians can use fiscal deficits to achieve opportunistic goals. The univariate analysis shows a positive relationship between political turnout and transparency. This result gives some evidence of a positive answer to the question raised by James Alt and David Dreyer Lassen: Does transparency affect political outcomes such as turnout? To some extent, that the more transparent the budget reports are, the more incentives people have to vote. With respect to three variables—transparency, government fiscal balance, and electoral turnout—three clusters of countries arise: low transparency–fiscal imbalance, low transparency–small fiscal imbalance and high transparency–fiscal surplus.     

Oil,elections and fiscal transparency

How does governments’ ability to gain financing from oil income affect their behaviour? Numerous studies have explored the effects of oil wealth on countries’ political characteristics, especially the level of democracy. Oil has also been associated with a significant electoral incumbency advantage across different political regimes. However, the relationship between oil wealth and incumbent governments’ behaviour, including election-year fiscal manipulation, has been studied to a lesser extent. This article argues that higher oil rents increase election-year public spending as they provide national governments both with direct revenue and increased financing opportunities. However, fiscal transparency mitigates this effect. Consequently, oil-induced electoral budget cycles decrease as fiscal transparency increases. Using a high-quality measure of fiscal transparency in a panel of countries, robust evidence in favour of this argument is found. The findings suggest that many of the previous results on the political effects of oil, including incumbency advantage, might run through an election-year spending channel, and that fiscal institutions might matter substantially for the political effects of oil.     

Cooperative Federalism?: The Case of the Ministerial Council on Education,Employment, Training and Youth Affairs

New Federalism reforms introduced in Australia in the early 1990s were expected to improve efficiency and reduce duplication through new cooperative intergovernmental arrangements. The reforms were also an attempt to reduce the continuing trend of Commonwealth intrusion in state powers. As well as establishing the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), the reforms created the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) to promote a more coordinated and cooperative approach to the delivery of education. MCEETYA provides the quintessential example of the difficulties of establishing a national approach when the function, education, is squarely within the power of the states. This article investigates the operation of MCEETYA from its inception to 2006.     

A Principles‐based Approach to the Barnett Formula1

This essay argues that the Barnett formula—which determines the block grant paid annually by the UK government to each of the Devolved Administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—be reformulated, guided by the following principles: fiscal equity, accountability, transparency, and flexibility. The rationale for change is that the current fiscal arrangements make little policy sense and may not be sustainable in a changing political and economic context. The formation of a grants commission to help develop data, calculate disparities, and provide public advice to the Chancellor of the Exchequer is also advocated.     

Real Reform or Change for Chumps: Earmark Policy Developments, 2006–2010

In response to widespread perceptions of problems associated with congressional earmarks, reform efforts began in late 2006 and continued through 2010. This essay summarizes those problems, explains the distribution of earmarks within Congress, and documents their rise and relative fall between 1991 and 2010 using government and public interest group databases. The author explains and critiques earmark reform policies, including congressional rules, initiatives taken by the congressional appropriations committees, and reforms pursued by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Congressional rules and committee‐initiated reforms have been most effective, resulting in significant improvements in earmark transparency and accountability. The number and dollar value of earmarks first dropped noticeably in fiscal year 2007 after an earmark moratorium, and then stabilized as reforms were implemented. It is premature to conclude that these levels will continue or that reforms will alter the policy content of earmarks or their distribution among members of Congress.     

Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence

Until recently, most research on political budget cycles was based on the (often implicit) presumption that these cycles do not differ across countries. However, more recent studies focus on heterogeneity. This paper surveys studies examining the factors conditioning the occurrence and strength of manipulation of fiscal policy for electoral purposes, at the aggregate level or at the level of a particular type of government expenditure. Conditioning factors discussed include: the level of development, institutional quality, age and level of democracy, electoral rules and form of government, transparency of the political process, the presence of checks and balances, and fiscal rules.     

Formula budgeting: The economics and analytics of fiscal policy under rules

The dramatic change in aggregate fiscal policy in recent years has contributed to a shift from process rules to allocation rules in federal budgeting. Although the allocation rules inherent in formula budgeting seem to offer fairness in times of fiscal constraint, they actually impose arbitrary program-level budgets that reflect the peculiarities of baselines, accounting conventions, and time horizons. Formula budgeting also changes the analytical environment, forcing policy analysts to pay greater attention to institutional arrangements.     

Understanding the Complex Dynamics of Transparency

This article contributes to the growing body of literature on government transparency by developing a model for studying the construction of transparency in interactions between governments and stakeholders. Building on theories about complex decision making, a heuristic model is developed that consists of a strategic, a cognitive, and an institutional perspective. To test the model's value, it is applied to two empirical cases: Dutch schools and the Council of the European Union. Applying the model to the school case provides insights into the connection between the introduction of transparency and the transformation in arrangements for safeguarding school quality. The case of the Council of the European Union highlights the role of transparency in the transformation of the council from a supranational to an intergovernmental body. The article concludes that the heuristic model, together with in‐depth, longitudinal case studies, helps us understand government transparency in relation to broader transformations in the public sector.     

Organizational Strategy and the Outcomes of Fiscal Retrenchment in Major Cities in the United States

This study examines if organizational strategy—specifically strategy formulation and strategic stance—influences the outcomes of fiscal retrenchment in city governments. Fiscal retrenchment is defined here as the process of responding to a budget crisis. Analysis of data from a 2015 national survey of municipalities in the United States with a population of 50,000 or more indicates that a rational planning process is associated with fiscal recovery, whereas a defender strategy stance, which emphasizes organizational stability and efficiency, correlates with continuing fiscal difficulties. Examining the complex interactions between strategy formulation, strategic stance, and environmental turbulence, the empirical analysis indicates that a rational planning process that results in a defending stance is associated with slower fiscal recovery, but there is limited evidence that the relationship between strategy and fiscal recovery is dependent on external economic conditions.     

Practical Imagination: A Possible Future for Federal Budgeting

To develop a federal budget process that delivers better fiscal outcomes for the nation consistently over an extended period would require new information and analysis, applying these to decisions through properly designed procedures, and strengthening the institutions that support wise fiscal choices. Changes in each of these process components intended to contribute to good fiscal outcomes are described, and obstacles to their adoption and use are noted. Such reforms could yield budgets that deploy public resources today to carry out strategies promising to increase the nation's ability to survive inevitable social and fiscal shocks and to take advantage of expected and unexpected opportunities for its citizens to thrive, grow, and fulfill their dreams.     

Financial Control in Australian Government Budgeting

With the arrival of accrual accounting and "accrual output budgeting," there have been huge changes in the mechanism of central financial control in the budget-dependent Australian public sector. This article outlines and evaluates these changes. The new parliamentary appropriations arrangements are discussed, as is the increased role played by nonappropriated departmental "own-source" funding. The shift of emphasis from legislative to administrative financial controls is noted and analyzed. Consideration is given to the implications of this shift of emphasis, and of the increased complexity of the financial control framework, for fiscal transparency and democratic accountability.     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension

This paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism — intergovernmental collusion in the form of intergovernmental grants. Grants, it is argued, serve to encourage the expansion of the public sector by concentrating taxing powers in the hands of the central government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed on governments forced to self-finance their expenditures. The results reported suggest that intergovernmental grants do encourage growth in the public sector. The results offer further support for the use of monopoly government assumptions in public sector modeling.     

Ukrainian Local Governments’ Finance on the Threshold of a New Millenium: Will Interbudgetary Reform Meet Public Needs?

Since independence, market–oriented reforms have been undertaken in Ukraine. Yet, intergovernmental relations are obsolete, remaining as they were in the Soviet time. In fact, Ukrainian subcentral governments have no significant discretion in revenues and expenditures. First, the article delivers an overview of the current system of intergovernmental finance in Ukraine. Second, the article reveals some negative trends in Ukrainian local governments' fiscal performance through the late 1990s that made a reform of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements timely. Third, the article analyzes recent reform steps as presented by the recent Budget Code, proposing policy options that could strengthen Ukrainian intergovernmental policy.     

Looking Forward to Cuts: A Simulation Decision Tool for Cutback Management

This study addresses managerial strategies to adapt public spending in anticipation of fiscal stress. It simulates a cutback to a federal agency, providing a decision tool that applies normative recommendations from the cutback management literature. Using agency data, we develop a menu of options that illustrate how different distributions of budget reductions affect organizational goals. We show five alternatives that consider the political, legal, and fiscal implications of the agency's responses to anticipated budgetary pressure. This simulation demonstrates that public agencies can apply existing data to generate rational and viable strategic plans for weathering fiscal stress.     

Why information and transparency about electricity matter: Fragmentation of governance and accountability under New Public Management

From 1995, Australian governments pursued efficiency benefits arising from significant structural reforms in the Electricity Supply Industry, including corporatisation and regulation of network monopolies, and introduction of competition for generators and for retailers. The restructure was motivated by the ideology of New Public Management and influenced by the field of neoliberal economics. More than two decades later, prices paid for electricity by residential and commercial customers have escalated sharply, resulting in sustained anger from all consumers. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Chair has admitted that ‘The National Electricity Market is largely broken’. This article documents the reduction in public access to information about electricity supply, the fragmentation in responsibility and accountability for consumer outcomes, and the consequences of these changes for transparency, industry operation, and retail electricity prices. New research enabled the creation of a database of Queensland energy production, consumption, and prices; this facilitated a fresh analysis of Queensland electricity sector performance since the restructure of electricity supply.     

Linking strategy and performance: Developments in the New Zealand public sector

In recent decades, many governments have sought to improve their systems of strategic management and priority setting. Few of these attempts have met with unequivocal success. In particular, the systems for “whole-of-government strategizing” have not been well integrated into the ongoing budgetary processes and departmental performance management systems. In 1993—1994, as part of its comprehensive reforms of the public sector, the New Zealand government instituted a new system of strategic management. The new approach—which in part grew out of the National government's attempt to outline its long-term vision in a document titled Path to 2010—involves the ministers specifying a series of medium-term policy goals, referred to as “strategic result areas” (SRAs), and then translating these into more detailed departmental objectives, known as “key result areas” (KRAs). More specific “milestones” are subsequently identified to serve as benchmarks against which the achievement of departmental KRAs can be assessed. This article describes and evaluates this new approach and considers its possible application in other countries.     

The Impact of the Fiscal Crisis on Public Administration Reforms: Comparison of 14 European Countries

Abstract

This study aims to empirically test a widespread assumption that fiscal crises instigate administrative reforms. The empirical analysis relies upon an international comparative study of the responses of 14 European governments to the fiscal crisis of 2008–2013. It is found that fiscal crisis and public administration reforms are not necessarily closely connected. In the majority of cases, the fiscal crisis did not have an instant effect of triggering structural public administration reforms or substantial shifts in existing reform trajectories. The crisis intensified the pressure to reform public administration to some extent, but the European governments’ responses predominantly followed a combination of straightforward cutbacks and incremental change. More substantial reforms were carried out in countries most severely hit by the crisis and/or where administrative reforms were conditioned by international financial assistance.     

Similar Ends, Differing Means: Contractualism and Civil Service Reform in Denmark and New Zealand

State sector reform was an integral component of the radical economic and social policy changes enacted by New Zealand governments between 1984 and 1991. This reform replaced the traditional tenured public service with a contractual regime. Through a comparison with Denmark, it is shown that New Zealand's reforms were not unique. Similar reforms were enacted in Denmark. But contrary to what occurred in New Zealand, the Danish reforms had already begun in the 1960s, and have since been gradually expanded. The parallel contractual regimes introduced in the two countries are accounted for by an increasing demand among politicians to secure a civil service that is responsive to political executive demands. However, because of institutional differences and diverging regulatory regimes, the strategic approaches in the two countries have been different. Whereas the New Zealand approach was dominated by an appeal to a coherent and sophisticated body of theoretical knowledge, combined with strict formalization, the Danish strategy has been based on political bargaining with the civil service unions. In both cases the reforms rest on critical assumptions regarding their positive and negative implications.     

Why change party finance transparency? Political competition and evidence from the ‘deviant’ case of Norway

This article focuses on the development of a key type of regulation ensuring public surveillance of political finance: party finance transparency rules. It makes two contributions to the emerging theory on the evolution of political finance regulation. First, using previous research, it conceptualises the underlying causal mechanisms that explain when and why party finance transparency regulation changes. Second, it presents the first detailed study of party finance transparency reforms in Norway, which is a deviant case for the introduction of such reforms. It is found that, in the absence of major scandals, an intense political discourse on corruption and political competition are sufficient factors to launch transparency reforms. Whether reforms are enacted depends on the interaction of several factors. Parties that predominantly rely on state funding and grassroots support push for and adopt more constraining transparency regulation, while parties that are close to business oppose it. Experience of regulation in similar contexts and intense discourse on corruption – stimulated by domestic or international events – are necessary for the reform to succeed. Norwegian cooperation with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) further demonstrates that the success of party finance transparency reforms initiated by a foreign actor is a function of the existing tradition of party regulation, the policy position of a governing party and the international reputational costs of non-compliance.