Political markets, property tax referenda, and local school spending

For better or worse, fiscal decisions made through property tax referenda allow local political markets to work. Demand, supply, and voting process components of such markets are estimated for those Oregon K-12 school districts that held referenda between 1981 and 1986. Various attributes of the median voter were related to school spending, but supply decisions by school boards and administrators were also important. Large districts used state aid to substitute for local property tax revenues on nearly a one-for-one basis, while relying on reversion budgets (inadequate property tax bases and implicit threats of school closures) to extract greater-than-desired spending levels from the median voter.     

Do intergovernmental grants create ratchets in state and local taxes?

A large literature on the ‘flypaper effect’ examines how federal grants to states at time period t affect state spending (or taxes) at time period t. We explore the fundamentally different question of how federal grants at time period t affect state tax policy in the future. Federal grants often result in states creating new programs and hiring new employees, and when the federal funding is discontinued, these new state programs must either be discontinued or financed through increases in state own source taxes. Government programs tend to be difficult to cut, as goes Milton Friedman’s famous quote about nothing being as permanent as a temporary government program, suggesting that it is likely that temporary federal grants create permanent (future) ratchets in state taxes. Far from being purely an academic question, this argument is why South Carolina’s Governor Mark Sanford attempted to turn down federal stimulus monies for his state. We examine both the impact of federal grants on future state budgets and how federal and state grants affect future local government budgets. Our findings confirm that grants indeed result in future state and local tax increases of roughly 40 cents for every dollar in grant money received in prior years.     

Asymmetric Effects of Intergovernmental Grants: Analysis and Implications for U.S. Welfare Policy

Theories of federal grants to states and localities suggestthat these grants have a stimulative effect on spending, causingrecipient governments to expand and contract programs alongwith changes in the grants. However, policymakers may responddifferently to grant decreases than to grant increases becausethey face political and bureaucratic pressures to expand programs.These asymmetric reactions may depend on specific politicalstructures. Pooled time-series regressions of data from theAid to Families with Dependent Children program across 46 statesfrom 1965 to 1994 demonstrate state government responses togrant changes. Bureaucratic pressures and proposals lead statesto expand their welfare benefits upon increases in federal grants,but not to contract them upon decreases in federal grants. Withregard to the 1996 welfare reforms, this study indicates thatthe switch to block grants will lead to little or no state reductionin welfare payments.     

Shifting Priorities: Participatory Budgeting in New York City is Associated with Increased Investments in Schools,Street and Traffic Improvements,and Public Housing

ABSTRACT

In participatory budgeting (PB), residents instead of public officials decide how public money is spent. PB may reveal that residents prioritize different investments than public officials, which could lead to more socially just spending. However, little research has examined whether and how PB shifts spending priorities. This study leverages publicly available records on New York City council districts’ capital project allocations over ten years (2009 through 2018), comparing spending within and across PB and non-PB districts. Multi-level regression models show that, on average, when council districts adopted PB, greater proportions of their discretionary capital budgets were allocated to schools, streets and traffic improvements, and public housing. PB was associated with decreases in spending on parks and recreation projects and housing preservation and development projects. The article shows that priorities shift when residents are directly involved in budgeting. Implications for equity and community well-being, and directions for future research are discussed.     

Local Pork-Barrel Politics in National Pre-Election Dates: The Case of Italy

Political representation in the national assemblies isgeographic and elected representatives care about whogains and who loses in their electoral districts. Since legislators are re-election oriented, theirchances of electoral success are directly associatedwith the net benefits delivered to their constituents. In this perspective, geography is not only the basisfor political organisation and representation, butalso the hallmark of distributive politics. In thiscontext, it is likely that locally elected politiciansand party leaders standing in national elections wouldtend to cooperate in pre-election dates. In thispaper we argue that local administrators have anincentive to manipulate local government outlays inconnection with national election dates to enhance there-election prospects of their national party leaders. In particular, given the matching character ofnational grants with local investment spending, weexpect that in pre-election dates local policy-makerswould be induced to raise investment outlays beyondtheir standard growth rate. This would determineinefficient local public spending as a result of thegeographically-based system of democraticrepresentation. The case study under our investigationis the behaviour of Italian local policy-makers inconnection with national election dates.     

Does the Local‐Option Sales Tax Provide Property Tax Relief? The Georgia Case

This study examines the effect of a one percent local-option sales tax (LOST) on property tax level, millage rate, and total spending level in Georgia counties. The study covers a 13-year period for 136 Georgia counties. The findings suggest that the law, which requires rollback of property taxes when the LOST is used, led to actual property tax relief as well as millage rate reduction. Regression results show that counties collecting the LOST tend to have per capita property taxes that are an average of $12 or 1.8 mills lower than counties that do not collect the tax. Whereas an extra dollar of LOST revenue provides about 28 cents in property tax relief, it leads to an increase in total spending of about 48 cents. In sum, the LOST has achieved the objectives of property tax relief, but on balance it is more an augmentation of than an effective substitute for property taxes in Georgia counties.     

The effect of school district and municipal government financial health information on local tax election outcomes: evidence from fiscal stress labels in Ohio

A key informational asymmetry in local public finance is the lack of information available to local residents regarding the financial status of the school districts and local governments in which they reside. Given that voters in many states must approve property and income tax increases for these local entities, the lack of full information on the financial status of these local entities may lead to sub-optimal voting decisions. State financial intervention systems have begun to make financial problems more salient to residents, potentially alleviating these informational asymmetries. This paper examines the effect of the Ohio fiscal stress labeling program on voting outcomes and the tax-setting behavior of local officials for school district and municipal government tax referendums. We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine data from over 3000 school district and 2300 municipality property tax elections from 2004 to 2012. While we find minimal evidence that the yes vote share changed for school district referendums following fiscal stress label receipt, we find very large increases (15 to 23 percentage points) in the likelihood of referendum passage for school districts following label receipt. We do not find much evidence of changes in the likelihood of passage or the yes vote share following label receipt for municipalities, but we do find that these voting outcomes rise following label removal. We also find that local officials do not appreciably change their tax-setting behavior in response to these labels, as the size and likelihood of property tax proposal are largely unchanged following label receipt or removal.     

Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States: The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures

This paper uses a survey experiment to examine differences in public attitudes toward ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ government spending. Federal social welfare spending in the USA has two components: the federal government spends money to directly provide social benefits to citizens, and also indirectly subsidizes the private provision of social benefits through tax expenditures. Though benefits provided through tax expenditures are considered spending for budgetary purposes, they differ from direct spending in several ways: in the mechanisms through which benefits are delivered to citizens, in how they distribute wealth across the income spectrum, and in the visibility of their policy consequences to the mass public. We develop and test a model explaining how these differences will affect public attitudes toward spending conducted through direct and indirect means. We find that support for otherwise identical social programs is generally higher when such programs are portrayed as being delivered through tax expenditures than when they are portrayed as being delivered by direct spending. In addition, support for tax expenditure programs which redistribute wealth upward drops when citizens are provided information about the redistributive effects. Both of these results are conditioned by partisanship, with the opinions of Republicans more sensitive to the mechanism through which benefits are delivered, and the opinions of Democrats more sensitive to information about their redistributive effects.     

The Fiscal Impact of Federal and State Aid to Large U.S. Cities: An Empirical Analysis of Budgetary Response

This article examines four types of aid programs to thirty-nine large U.S. cities federal revenue sharing, federal categorical aid, state general aid, and state categorical aid. The central finding is that there is significant variation in the magnitude of property tax reduction resulting from different types of state general aid. Property tax credits and exemptions are less effective approaches in reducing local property taxes than are state lump-sum aid or city use of piggybacked taxes Categorical state and federal aid mostly fund additional city spending and have small but important stimulative effects on the revenue side These results suggest that differences in the design of aid programs have important implications for their fiscal impact and their effectiveness in reducing property taxes.     

Tax decentralization and local government size

This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments. While many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it, they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy. The paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments (tax-separation), rather than on tax-base sharing, would restrain local public expenditures. Using an unbalanced panel of OECD countries, the key finding is that only property taxes—mostly based on a “tax-separation” scheme—seem to favor smaller local governments. Thus, while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments, it does not appear sufficient, as tax-separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required.     

State Tax and Expenditure Limitations: There is No Story

Out of the troubled economic atmosphere of the late 1970's grew a discontent with government in general and taxation in particular. The tax revolt took hold at the local level and placed limits on the growth of the property tax through celebrated citizen initiatives like Proposition 13 in California. At the national level, uneasiness with the role of government and a sense that taxation was too high culminated in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan. The electorate embraced promises of less government and lower taxes. For states, the tax revolt resulted in a number of state tax and expenditures limitations (TELS). Most had several things in common: they were adopted before 1983, they addressed state appropriations, and they were largely a western phenomenon spreading from California. The overall condition of state economies and structure of state tax systems, in combination with the sensitivity of policymakers to anti-tax sentiment, have done more to limit state spending than have imposed restrictions.     

State aid programs for equalizing spending across local school districts: does the structure of the program matter, or only it’s size?

This paper provides interesting insights into an important causal mechanism underlying Murray, Evans and Schwab’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 88(4):789–812, 1998) finding that court mandated reforms result in less inequality in spending per pupil levels across rich and poor school districts within a state. Treating the choice of an education program’s structure as endogenous, following the analysis of Leyden (Public Finance/Finances Publiques 47:229–247, 1992; Public Choice 115(1–2):83–107, 2003), yields empirical results suggesting that court mandated reforms increase the likelihood that a program’s structure will include a price effect and that the inclusion of a price effect in turn results in a decrease in spending inequality.     

Crisis and Response: Treasury Cash Balance Crisis in Thailand 1980-1982

The author traces the treasury cash balance crisis in Thailand from 1980-1982 and finds that the crisis was a result of economic, political and technical factors. The world recession had a significant impact on revenues, as did the inability of the government to accurately project revenues. Politically, budget participants evaded prescribed procedures and resorted to emergency spending, which resulted in expenditures beyond budget planning. The Thai government resorted to borrowing, spending cuts, adjusting corporate tax payments and increasing taxes to cope with the crisis. The author calls for legal reforms to limit discretionary spending.     

Are Overlapping Local Governments Competing With Each Other When Issuing Debt?

Local public services are produced through various overlapping jurisdictions. This study examines how the issuance of municipal general obligation bonds is affected by the tax policies of overlapping local governments. The findings challenge the hypothesis that the shared tax base would be overused in a common-pool resource scenario. Instead, the empirical results show that the issuance of general obligation bonds is more likely in jurisdictions where counties and school districts make more intensive use of the property tax. These findings highlight the importance of the signals local governments receive from their overlapping neighbors regarding voters’ demand for additional public spending.     

Do State‐Funded Property Tax Exemptions Increase Local Government Inefficiency? An Analysis of New York State's STAR Program

This study tests the effects of a growing form of indirect state aid—state‐supported property tax exemptions—on local government efficiency. We hypothesize that larger exemptions, by lowering the effective tax price paid by local homeowners and thus their incentive to monitor efficiency, will reduce local government efficiency. We test this hypothesis by examining the introduction of New York State's large state‐subsidized property tax exemption program, which began in 1999. We find evidence that, all else constant, the exemptions have reduced efficiency in districts with larger exemptions, but the effects appear to diminish as taxpayers become accustomed to the exemptions.     

Do Industrial Tax Abatements Spur Property Value Growth?

Despite ongoing debate regarding the effectiveness of tax abatements, Michigan's Industrial Facilities Tax (IFT) abatement program has been widely and extensively used to boost local economic development. In this article, we estimate the effects of industrial property tax abatements on industrial, residential, and commercial property value growth in the context of regional competition for a panel of 152 communities in the five counties surrounding Detroit from 1983 through 2002. We find that: (1) offering tax abatements yields statistically significant positive impacts on industrial property value growth; (2) the impacts are larger in high tax than in low tax communities; (3) there are positive spillover effects of industrial tax abatements on residential and commercial property value growth; (4) tax abatements offered in competitor communities do not appear to influence own industrial property value growth; and (5) changes in the own as well as competitor property tax rates are important determinants of industrial property value growth. However, the fiscal benefits of tax abatements are quite small as compared with the costs of offering abatements even when spillover benefits to residential and commercial properties are considered.     

Measuring Municipal Borrowing Costs: How Missing Cost Information Biases Interest Rate Calculations

A substantial literature exists on federal tax expenditures, but almost no empirical research has been done on state tax expenditures. This article examines Michigan tax expenditures, with an emphasis on comparison to findings from the federal level. Three major topics are addressed: (1) allocation of resources by policy area, (2) distribution of tax expenditure benefits by income class, and (3) tax expenditure growth over time. Only the findings on resource allocation are consistent with findings from the federal level, suggesting that simple theories may be insufficient to systematically describe tax expenditures.     

Simulating Massachusetts Municipalities' Recession Readiness: Early Warning of a Perfect Storm?

We simulate effects of two recessions on Massachusetts municipalities in light of their relative dependence on state aid, capacity to increase property taxes under Proposition 2½ constraints, growth, and nondiscretionary costs. We also explore the efficacy of local government stabilization funds in light of current literature on stabilization funds, slack resources in general, and the state–local fiscal relationship. We found substantial variance in Massachusetts municipalities' recession readiness. Fifty‐five (16 percent) municipalities have insufficient resources to weather a severe recession scenario without significant sacrifice due to reliance on state grants‐in‐aid, low property tax revenue growth, erosion of property tax revenue increments by increases in nondiscretionary expenditures, and inadequate stabilization funds.     

Comment on Donald A. Krueckeberg's “The Lessons of John Locke or Hernando de Soto: What if Your Dreams Come True?”

Abstract

Krueckeberg's critique of de Soto's paean to homeownership in Third World countries is well taken; his use of John Locke's rationale for private ownership provides support for the critique. But then Krueckeberg puts forward a proposal to extend homeowner‐ship benefits through a National Homestead Trust, with Individual Development Accounts or a tax like Social Security, to help renters accumulate a down payment. Abandoning a broader approach, Krueckeberg reverts to supporting homeownership as a central tenet of U.S. housing policy and wants to extend its real and perceived benefits to low‐income households. He recognizes the shortcomings of U.S. property law and tax policy that may leave low‐income owners with threats to shelter security.

To provide security for low‐income residents, fundamental changes are required. Attention should be paid to protection from evictions and from foreclosure; income/employment support; guarantee of services from utilities to schools; and, as needed, direct subsidies for housing.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.