我国资本市场新战略目标的相关探讨

打造规范、透明、开放、有活力、有韧性的资本市场是新时代赋予资本市场新的定位和使命,这一新战略目标具有较强的内在逻辑性。其中,规范是根本要求,透明是重要保障,开放是有效措施,有活力和有韧性是最终目标。然而,当前资本市场发展和新战略目标之间存在一定的现实差距,表现为:市场化建设明显不足,难以通过创新提高质量和效率;法制化建设存在诸多挑战,制度潜力难以激发,国际化进展缓慢,难以提升国内竞争力;投资者结构有待完善,居民财富效应不足;市场稳定性有待加强,难以应对经济波动。对此,应全面提升资本市场地位,进一步深化资本市场基础性制度改革,加快金融创新的力度和步伐,积极推进资本市场对外开放进程,加大系统性金融风险的防范。     

对金融工程在我国金融业的运用及问题的思考

金融工程是金融与系统、信息等工程理论方法交叉的新兴学科。我国目前迫切需要引进和实施金融工程以解决现实中存在的种种难题。但由于我国技术水平和金融通讯水平低下、经济货币金融化程度低、基础金融市场体系发育不到位、人才缺乏、金融监管与调控能力有限度等诸多问题,使金融工程在我国的发展空间受到极大限制。为此,应结合我国国情采取相应措施合理、高效地实施金融工程。     

国际金融制度改革雷声隆

将于近期召开的国际金融峰会,其重要性不亚于1944年奠定战后国际金融体制的布雷顿森林会议一场堪比1929年大萧条的金融危机,使改革国际金融制度成为一个紧迫的话题。10月18日,美国总统布什与来访的法国总统萨科齐和欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐商定,将于近期召开一系列国际峰会讨论金融危机。有评论认为,此类峰会的重要性不亚于1944年奠定战后国际金融体制的布雷顿森林会议。10月22日,美国方面正式表示,邀     

影子银行体系的运行机制及监管方式

全球金融危机后,国际社会从一个新的视角——影子银行体系来分析现代金融体系,并重构现代国际金融监管制度.影子银行体系的有效监管必须具有翔实的微观基础,比如体系边界、风险特征及表现形式等.国际上对影子银行体系并无公认的定义.影子银行证券化程度高、信息不透明、杠杆率较高,容易滋生一系列内生性金融风险,国际社会倾向于通过“类银行化”的监管路径对影子银行进行金融盗管,这对我国影子银行监管具有一定的启示.     

后金融危机时代国际金融监管变革对我国的启示

2007年美国次贷危机引发了全球金融危机,金融监管的缺失可谓其爆发根源之一。欧美各国以及欧盟组织等纷纷针对金融危机暴露的金融监管的漏洞和弊端采取变革措施,国际金融组织也纷纷提高了对国际金融监管的标准。我国的金融监管体系还存在一些问题,可以借鉴国际金融监管变革的经验教训完善我国金融监管体系。     

国际金融危机的反思与启示

肇始于美国次贷危机的国际金融危机给世界带来了巨大冲击,将使金融危机后的世界经济与金融体系发生深刻的调整和变化。任何调整和变化都是基于现有的问题而出发的,为此,本文从金融危机的原因出发,提出了全球经济和金融体系可能在未来发生的技术性变化、制度性变化、周期性变化和趋势性变化。同时分析了在这些变化中中国实现崛起的选择。     

互联网金融视域下众筹模式的风险与监管

近几年,市场参与广泛的互联网金融正在如火如荼地开展,其突破传统投融资方式的低成本投入、高效便捷和重视顾客体验的特征使其迅速占领金融市场。众筹模式作为互联网金融的新兴事物,是互联网金融未来发展的主要方向,具有巨大的发展空间,但同时也面临着除传统投融资风险外的技术风险、操作风险和法律风险等一系列复杂性风险。目前,互联网金融视域下众筹模式的实践发展已远远先于理论研究,因此,建立和完善适合中国情境的互联网金融众筹模式的监管路径和政策是一项重要而又迫切的研究课题。     

国际上合作金融发展的新趋势及对我国的启示

合作性金融与商业性金融、政策性金融一起构成了当今的金融体系。经过一百多年的发展,与最初形成的时候相比合作金融已经出现了很多本质性的变迁。而这些变迁及趋势,对于我国合作金融改革与发展有着重要的启示。     

国际上合作金融发展的新趋势及对我国的启示

合作性金融与商业性金融、政策性金融一起构成了当今的金融体系。经过一百多年的发展，与最初形成的时候相比合作金融已经出现了很多本质性的变迁。而这些变迁及趋势，对于我国合作金融改革与发展有着重要的启示。     

国际金融危机考察

2007年美国次贷危机爆发,直接导致全球性金融危机,短短两年时间,金融风暴席卷全球,并对全球经济、政治、社会形势产生严重冲击,时至今日,风暴仍未有停     

民间金融：自由与规制

民间金融具有存在的客观必然性,我国法律应对民间金融采取消极自由和利益平衡的价值取向。对具有较大影响的全国性民间金融组织予以立法规制,达到民间金融秩序法制化。民间金融本质是财产自由和金融民主,应引导民间金融良性发展,强化民间金融监管,防范金融风险,培育民间金融市场。     

Approval regulation and endogenous consumer confidence: Theory and analogies to licensing,safety, and financial regulation

Safety regulation – in the form of pre-market approval, licensure, screening, and product entry limitations – governs numerous market realms, including consumer finance. In this article, we ask whether the effects of safety regulation go beyond safety and affect consumers' beliefs about the distribution of products they can use. We model “approval regulation,” where a government regulator must approve the market entry of a product based upon observable, unbiased, and non-anticipable experiments. We show that even if regulator and firm disagree about only quality standards, the disagreement induces the firm to provide more information about its product than it would in the absence of regulation. Put differently, purely first-order disagreements in regulation generate second-order consequences (more certainty about product quality). These second-order consequences of regulation are sufficient to generate first-order effects among end-users (more consumption of superior products), even when users are risk-neutral. In other words, even if approval regulation produces little or no improvement in safety or quality, it still aggregates information useful to “downstream” product users; these users will exhibit higher consumption and will more readily switch to superior products. In contrast with libertarian analyses of entry regulation and licensure, the model predicts that entry restrictions may be associated with greater product or service utilization (consumption) as well as with greater price sensitivity among consumers. Because contemporary cost–benefit analyses ignore these second-order effects, they are unlikely to capture the possible confidence effects of approval regulation.     

The Political Origins of the Financial Crisis: The Domestic and International Politics of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

For much of the last decade it was clear that the commercial operations of the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were creating an increasing systemic financial risk. That risk was compounded by the fact that the Japanese and Chinese central banks were acting as cheap creditors. The Bush administration and some Republicans in Congress made efforts from 2001 to create a tougher regulatory framework for Fannie and Freddie. Fannie and Freddie were able to defeat these attempts to constrain their operations by a four-fold political strategy involving campaign contributions to members of Congress, a vast lobbying apparatus, the cultivation of a political language around affordable housing for minorities, and abusing and smearing their regulator. Since Japan and China understood that the US government would have to assume Fannie and Freddie's liabilities in a crisis they had no incentive to expose the political fiction that it would not.     

风险规制中的信息沟通及其制度建构

风险社会中,信息沟通作为规制工具具有独特的比较优势,但我国目前风险规制实践中对信息沟通工具的应用及相关研究才刚刚起步。风险信息沟通工具具有广阔的应用前景,有必要发展出一套体系化的制度机制,帮助规制机构有效运用信息沟通工具,通过提供、传达信息而达成所追求的规制目标。     

中德公共外交新趋势

中德两国的公共外交与中德政治、经济往来相比稍显滞后,但在近几年来两国领导人的推动下大大改观。今年来两国公共外交以青年人为主力,以来华交流为主要方式,同时配合以两国媒体间对话,给中德关系的良性发展源源不断地注入"正能量"。     

Introduction to Neumann: law and socialist political theory

Abstract

Regulators attempt to understand financial markets and their risks in terms of categories of knowledge and datasets that are defined and produced by the markets. However, regulators cannot adequately interpret or utilize such knowledge, for reasons including their social distance from the sites of knowledge production, the diversity of financial firms’ proprietary risk models, firms’ abilities to game the rules thus rendering the ‘metrics’ meaningless and several backfiring aspects of global regulatory networking and reform. Calls for yet more information about trading, posed in terms of the merits of transparency, result in information swamping of regulators. Meanwhile, while policy-makers tinker with regulatory structures (‘architecture’), political reaction to the crisis de-legitimizes public regulation as a project. Yet there is one positive aspect of the reforms – enhancing powers for ‘resolution’ of financial firms in ways that impact upon investors while minimizing wider destabilization – upon which the regulatory information requirement can and should be refocused. To protect the public interest, legal transparency is required, trading transparency is not. This paper introduces these issues by drawing on critical work on transparency and markets.     

优化规制:中国政府规制改革的现实选择

在西方放松规制的潮流下,中国政府规制改革应何去何从?本文首先对规制的意义进行区分和界定,并追溯美国政府规制的发展轨迹,然后结合我国的情况,提出了中国规制改革的取向--优化规制.     

威尔逊的规制政治理论述评

20世纪80年代,美国学者詹姆斯.威尔逊对经济学界的规制理论,尤其是对规制俘虏理论的普适性提出了质疑。为了弥补经济理论的不足,威尔逊以规制成本与收益的分布为主要依据,将规制政治分为四种类型,并提出了影响规制过程的内外变量。威尔逊认为,在规制研究中经济利益和理念都是不可或缺的变量,因为它们都会直接影响规制政策的形成。威尔逊的规制政治理论为解释多种规制政策的形成提供了有效的分析工具,但其理论中的制度制约等部分内容有待进一步补充和完善。     

论法规批准制度

法规批准制度是指有关主体制定的法规范性文件需经特定主体的批准才能生效的法律制度。现行法规批准制度存在批准范围小、批准程序缺少操作性等不足。完善法规批准制度需合理设置批准范围、完善批准程序等,并对经批准的法规性质进行了法理考察。     

The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards

Accounting standards are the foundations of the financial regulatory edifice, and global financial governance is no more stable than the asset valuations that feed it. Yet for two decades and up to this day, no international accounting rule for financial instruments – the bulk of banks' balance sheets – has emerged that was more than a temporary fix, to be succeeded by further reforms. We show how banking regulators have been central to this dynamic and how their support for applying fair value accounting to financial instruments, the cornerstone of regulatory debate, has oscillated throughout the whole period. The two common international political economy approaches to global financial governance, which analyze it either as interest‐based bargaining or as ideas‐driven expert governance, fail to account for this pattern. In contrast, we show how the contingency of financial valuations itself has made it impossible for regulators to embrace or reject a stable set of accounting rules.