食品安全监管体制变革的契机与挑战

2013年3月10日，《国务院机构改革和职能转变方案》对我国食品安全监管体制做出重大调整。食品安全办、食品药品监管局、质检总局生产环节食品安全监管职责与工商总局流通环节食品安全监管职责整合，组建国家食品药品监督管理总局。食品安全监管职责的整合，标志着我国食品安全体制从分段监管向一体化监管的迈进。此次机构调整，     

我国产品质量监管体制的现状、问题及对策

从法律体系及监管方式两个方面，总结了我国产品质量监管体制的现状。认为我国产品质量监管存在监管主体过多、职责权限不清，有法不依、有法难依现象仍然存在，标准建设滞后、监管效率不强，信息渠道不畅、检测机构作用有限等问题。认为要从构建统一、高效的产品质量监管机构，构建监控体系、强化执法力度，强化信息披露、增强消费者知情权，强化企业责任意识、加强产品检验检测等四个方面，完善我国产品质量监管体制的具体对策措施。     

探索食品药品监管新途径

1．坚持一个确保。在食品药品监管工作中，我们把确保食品药品安全作为监管工作的出发点和落脚点，把维护群众饮食用药权益和生命健康作为根本而长远的目标，大力加强监管，保障食品药品安全，为人民群众把好关、用好权。     

慈善组织监管机构的国际比较与启示

世界各国慈善组织的监管机构基于历史轨迹各不相同,但仍有规律可循,并且未来的发展趋势也较为明晰.英国采用慈善委员会进行集中监管,美国主要由联邦税务局进行集中监管,而我国台湾地区是由各主管部门进行分散监管,澳大利亚在2012年从分散监管转为集中监管具有代表性.我国取消“双重负责”之后正在转为集中监管,需要建立独立的慈善监管委员会.     

论证券市场的行政监管

证券市场行政监管在整个证券市场监管中居于核心地位。证券市场行政监管之所以必要 ,原因是证券市场失灵和证券市场法律的高度不完备性。本文论述了证券市场行政监管的性质、特征、地位及其局限 ,并讨论了证券市场行政监管失灵的问题 ,最后构造了一个证券市场行政监管的均衡模型。     

我国收费公路发展中存在的问题及对策研究

收费公路在公共经济学上被定性为准公共物品，因此收费公路的发展与公权力密不可分。收费公路在迅速发展的过程中存在地方政府权责不明、监管主体缺位、缺乏统一的法规体系等问题。为此，有必要建立一套完善的法律法规体系，明确监管主体及其监管范围，扫清地方保护主义的障碍，建立和完善特许经营制度。     

地方政府环境监管的失衡与平衡

日益频发的环境事故拷问了我国环境法律实效性不足的现状,几起看似突发的环境事件,共同反映了我国地方政府环境监管失衡的现状,环境监管体制不健全、传统政绩考核观的局限、环保问责制度流于形式、环境保护基本制度没有得到根本落实以及环保部门的执法权限欠缺,对违法企业的处罚力度不够导致了我国环境监管的失衡。建议从改革地方政府环境监管体制,实行环保政绩考核、加强对政府第一责任人的问责、建立绿色GDP的国民经济核算体系以及落实环保基本法律制度等层面完善我国地方政府的环境监管。     

我国房地产业的政府监管

房地产业作为国民经济发展的重要组成部分，关乎城市规划和公共安全，直接影响到每个公民的居住权。我国现有体制下房地产业信息不对称问题极为严重，政府土地审批及监管不力，严重影响了房地产业的健康发展和社会的和谐与稳定，因此，亟需探索科学有效的政府监管模式，以确保实现“居者有其屋”的和谐社会建设目标。     

市场主体监管治理的现实困境与优化路径

市场主体监管低效的原因错综复杂,与现有监管体制机制和监管政策制度有关,但其深层次的原因之一是监管碎片化问题。监管部门在市场主体监管过程中依据自身权责进行分割监管,有时可能出现监管自利行为、失管漏管现象以及执法缝隙和监管盲区。传统理论在一定程度上难以规避监管的局限性和碎片化问题,而基于系统方法的复杂巨系统理论通过系统集成为这一问题的破解提供了理论支撑和有益启示。本研究将巨量市场主体监管作为开放的复杂巨系统,探索基于复杂巨系统理论的监管治理逻辑以及通过跨业务融合、跨功能集成、跨领域协同破解监管碎片化问题的优化路径。     

简论我国证券场外交易市场的监管

当前,我国证券场外交易市场监管制度存在一些问题,应立足当前国情,完善我国场外交易监管制度:明确场外交易市场的合法地位;构建自律监管为主,政府监管为辅的监管模式;完善场外交易市场监管制度。     

优化规制:中国政府规制改革的现实选择

在西方放松规制的潮流下,中国政府规制改革应何去何从?本文首先对规制的意义进行区分和界定,并追溯美国政府规制的发展轨迹,然后结合我国的情况,提出了中国规制改革的取向--优化规制.     

Regulatory novelty after financial crises: Evidence from international banking and securities standards, 1975–2016

Financial crises are often presented as triggers for important innovations in international regulation of financial markets, but existing evidence for this claim primarily derive from the analyses of individual initiatives, assessed against noncomparable benchmarks. In order to provide systematic evidence of financial crises' impact on international financial regulatory change, this paper develops a novel text-as-data approach to measure regulatory novelty. We use this approach to analyze the full population of international banking and securities standards between 1975 and 2016. Contrary to theoretical expectations, our empirical findings indicate rules designed by international banking and securities regulators following financial crises are on average as likely to build on existing international regulations as those designed before a crisis. We also find that international banking rules published after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis are an important exception.     

威尔逊的规制政治理论述评

20世纪80年代,美国学者詹姆斯.威尔逊对经济学界的规制理论,尤其是对规制俘虏理论的普适性提出了质疑。为了弥补经济理论的不足,威尔逊以规制成本与收益的分布为主要依据,将规制政治分为四种类型,并提出了影响规制过程的内外变量。威尔逊认为,在规制研究中经济利益和理念都是不可或缺的变量,因为它们都会直接影响规制政策的形成。威尔逊的规制政治理论为解释多种规制政策的形成提供了有效的分析工具,但其理论中的制度制约等部分内容有待进一步补充和完善。     

论法规批准制度

法规批准制度是指有关主体制定的法规范性文件需经特定主体的批准才能生效的法律制度。现行法规批准制度存在批准范围小、批准程序缺少操作性等不足。完善法规批准制度需合理设置批准范围、完善批准程序等,并对经批准的法规性质进行了法理考察。     

Crises and Paradigm Shift

Crises can force leaders and technocrats together, highlight failures and, more rarely, precipitate changes in ideological worldview and the prevailing consensus. In 2007–8, the worst financial and economic crises since the Great Depression of 1929 caused a paradigm shift in financial and regulatory ideology. G20 leaders and central bankers reasserted collective power and authority over financial markets and global banks to an extent and in a manner not seen since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. The retreat of state authority reversed direction. The spell of the ‘mystical Anglo‐Saxon model of liberalisation and deregulation’ was broken. In 2014 the paradigm shift is still underway and still under attack by recalcitrant bank CEOs and their lobbyists, but the shift may be durable—signalling a major change in international regulation of the world's largest financial markets and firms.     

Debt in just societies: A general framework for regulating credit

Debt presents a dilemma to societies: successful societies benefit from a substantial infrastructure of consumer, commercial, corporate, and sovereign debt but debt can cause substantial private and social harm. Pre‐crisis and post‐crisis solutions have seesawed between subsidizing and restricting debt, between leveraging and deleveraging. A consensus exists among governments and international financial institutions that financial stability is the fundamental normative principle underlying financial regulation. Financial stability, however, is insensitive to equality concerns and can produce morally impermissible aggregations in which the least advantaged in a society are made worse off. Solutions based only on financial stability can restrict debt without accounting for the risk of harm to persons least able to bear the risk, worsen preexisting inequalities, destroy or impair the net worth of households, and impose unfavorable distributive consequences. This article offers a new approach to assist policymakers in developing and evaluating regulation to take criteria in addition to financial stability into account, but which do not undermine the aim of financial stability. It calls for a luck egalitarian approach, offering policymakers options to take the debtor's choices into account while still accounting for cognitive mistakes people often make in debt decisionmaking. It offers a general framework for the underlying principles for the regulation of debt: its focus is not on any particular forms of debt or its regulation but in structuring debt regulation more generally. It offers a set of recommendations on how regulators can take concerns about luck and equality into account in regulatory design.     

Post‐crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance

Post‐crisis international standards have been agreed on in certain areas of banking regulation, namely capital, liquidity, and resolution, but not others, namely bank structure – why? We articulate a two‐step analytical framework that links the domestic and international levels of governance. In particular, we focus on the role of domestic regulators at the interface between the two levels. At the domestic level, regulators evaluate externalities and adjustment costs before engaging in cooperation at the international level. This analysis explains why regulators in the United States and the European Union act as pacesetters, foot‐draggers, or fence‐sitters in international standard setting; that is to say, why they promote, resist, or are neutral toward international financial standards. At the international level, we explain the outcome of international standard setting by considering the interaction of pacesetters and foot‐draggers.     

Financial Regulation in the United States: Lessons from History

History is institutional memory writ large. One looks at economic history to see what problems recur, what causes them to recur, what solutions have worked best in the past, and which interventions have made the problems worse. The authors argue that a moderately complex interaction between the workings of the financial sector, the way in which the political system is organized, and the administration of regulation makes perfect regulation of the financial sector extremely unlikely. Many of these problems arise as a result of conflicting incentives for those participating in and regulating the financial field. The authors find that some proposed solutions have improved matters but have costs, and that some proposed solutions have actually worsened problems in the financial sector.

Peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.
— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1837

     

Regulation by generalization

Both criminal and regulatory laws have traditionally been skeptical of what Jeremy Bentham referred to as evidentiary offenses – the prohibition (or regulation) of some activity not because it is wrong, but because it probabilistically (but not universally) indicates that a real wrong has occurred. From Bentham to the present, courts and theorists have worried about this form of regulation, believing that certainly in the criminal law context, but even with respect to regulation, it is wrong to impose sanctions on a “Where there’s smoke there’s fire” theory of governmental intervention. Yet, although this kind punishment by proxy continues to be held in disrepute both in courts and in the published work, we argue that this distaste is unwarranted. Regulating – even through the criminal law – by regulating intrinsically innocent activities that probabilistically, but not inexorably, indicate not‐so‐innocent activities is no different from the vast number of other probabilistic elements that pervade the regulatory process. Once we recognize the frequency with which we accept probabilistic but not certain burdens of proof, probabilistic but not certain substantive rules, and probabilistic but not certain pieces of evidence, we can see that defining offenses and regulatory targets in terms of non‐wrongful behavior that is evidence of wrongful behavior is neither surprising nor inadvisable.     

Risking Regulation,Regulating Risk: Lessons from the Transatlantic Biotech Dispute

Debates over the future of new technologies frequently implicate governmental policies and regulation, the purpose of which has traditionally been to mitigate the dangers of new technologies through promotion of conditions of safe use. It is increasingly recognized, however, that regulation is predicated on a particular conception of the nature of risk which may or may not correspond to the views and beliefs held by society. Here I explore three broadly related questions in the context of the debates around agricultural biotechnology. First, what are the implications of varying conceptions of risk for regulatory policy in the United States and in the European Union? Second, what are the implications of differing conceptions of risk and resulting regulatory policy for agricultural trade relations between the two giants of international trade? And finally, what lessons might we draw from contemporary disputes over agricultural biotechnology?