古巴社会主义的文化理论和实践

1961年4月16日,古巴时任总理菲德尔·卡斯特罗宣布,古巴革命“是一场贫苦人的、由贫苦人进行的、为了贫苦人的社会主义民主革命”.同年,卡斯特罗宣布古巴是社会主义国家；发表了具有重要意义的《对知识分子的讲话》.这篇讲话被认为是古巴党和政府提出的有关古巴社会主义文化理论的基础,提出“只有参加革命,才能拥有权利；如果反对革命,就没有任何权利”,革命的目标之一和基本宗旨之一,是发展艺术和文化,使艺术和文化成为人民的真正财富,使人民有更好的文化生活,使人民一切文化需要得到满足,革命要求艺术家为人民贡献出最大的力量,要求他们为革命事业贡献出最大的努力.半个多世纪以来,古巴社会主义文化取得了显著成就.然而,古巴社会主义文化的发展也不是一帆风顺的.近年来,古巴不仅在经济社会的发展模式方面进行“更新”,在文化方面也正在实施一系列“更新”措施.     

从马蒂到卡斯特罗:古巴革命的实践与思想轨迹

卡斯特罗继承了马蒂的思想,把它与马克思主义紧密结合起来,形成了古巴革命完整的思想体系。古巴革命是一个长期的发展过程,具有深厚的历史根基。古巴革命的思想是几代革命者智慧的结晶,具有深厚的历史积淀。崇尚思想、原则、价值、理想和尊严是革命的灵魂,革命思想的精髓,民族的精神支柱。正是依靠这种精神,古巴民族带着体面和尊严,顽强地生存和发展起来,并与北方帝国形成了不对称的平衡。失去这种精神,革命便失去了存在的理性,民族便失去了自我。看不到这一深厚的历史根基和思想积淀,不了解革命的传承,就无法深入了解古巴革命的本质,不会感受到古巴革命的生命力,难以合理解释古巴当前的发展。     

古共“六大”与古巴改革的主要特点和前景分析

1959年古巴革命胜利以来,先后经历了民主改革、社会主义改造、对社会主义经济体制的探索、“革命攻势”、确立社会主义经济体制、对社会主义经济体制的调整、“纠偏运动”、“对外开放”、加强外汇管制和个体户管理、劳尔的改革等诸多阶段,其中不乏对生产关系的革命性改造和大调整,更包括对国家对外关系的大调整.纵观古巴革命以来的调整与改革,可以归结为在两种关系的调整中寻找出路:一是对外关系;二是生产关系,即计划(国家)和市场的关系.本文试图结合古巴历史上对生产关系和对外关系的历次调整,分析古巴当前“更新”社会主义经济模式的改革特点,即更注重生产关系计划与市场关系的调整.如果此次古巴顺利完成裁员130万的目标,那么就意味着古巴将形成相当的市场规模.当然,古巴经济改革还受到国内国际诸多因素的制约.     

古共"六大"与古巴经济模式的"更新"

自1959年初革命胜利以来,古巴的社会主义经济发展模式经历了几次变化.革命胜利后初期,古巴进行了一系列经济社会民主改革,并很快开始进行社会主义建设.20世纪70年代初,古巴采用了苏联社会主义的发展模式,并同苏联东欧实行经济一体化.80年代后期和90年代初东欧剧变和苏联解体后,古巴调整了经济模式,通过变革开放,坚持社会主义.进入21世纪以来,特别是自2008年劳尔·卡斯特罗接替菲德尔·卡斯特罗担任古巴国务委员会主席和部长会议主席以来,古巴进一步调整了社会主义经济发展的模式,采取了一些称之为"更新"经济模式的变革措施.古巴的社会主义经济建设取得了显著成就,但也面临不少问题和挑战.2011年4月古共"六大"的召开和"六大"所通过的<党和革命的经济和社会政策纲要>将对古巴经济和社会模式的"更新"起指导和推动作用.     

古巴—美国关系50年四题

古巴革命是美国与古巴双边关系历史的重要转折点,美国对古巴革命及其后续发展的反应和政策则是冷战环境中美国战略思想的典型表露.全球冷战终结并没有改变古美之间的冷战式关系,凸显了美国政策的单边主义性质、意识形态色彩和国内政治主导倾向.     

古巴大使罗兰多在拉美所作报告

1987年11月30日,应中国拉丁美洲学会邀请,古巴驻中国大使罗兰多·洛佩斯·德尔阿莫在中国社会科学院拉丁美洲研究所就古巴社会主义建设问题做了报告。洛佩斯大使首先指出,要全面认识古巴的社会主义建设,必须对古巴革命后的国内条件、革命胜利后古巴面临的国际环境有一个深刻了解。从内部条件看,古巴自然资源较为贫乏,革命胜利时,国家缺乏进行现代化建设的基础设施,全国600万人口中,失业者达50万,30％的成年人是文盲。这种状况决定了古巴社会主义建设任务的艰巨性。从     

从古共六大到古共七大：古巴社会主义模式的更新CSSCI

2006年劳尔·卡斯特罗上台后提出了更新古巴模式的思想,并实施了一系列改革措施。2011年4月,古共六大通过了《党和革命的经济社会政策的纲要》(简称《纲要》),为古巴的经济社会改革确定了方向。2016年4月,古共召开了七大,通过了《古巴社会主义经济社会模式的理念》和《到2030年全国经济社会发展计划:国家的建议、轴心和战略部门》,并对六大《纲要》进行了调整和补充,使古巴模式的更新进一步深化,并上升到理论,落实到中长期规划中。自古共六大提出更新社会主义模式以来,更新模式已成为古巴国内不可逆转的共识,古巴在法制、领导体制、经济政策、社会和外交政策等方面都发生了积极的变化。但与此同时,古巴社会主义模式的更新仍面临着新的问题与挑战:模式更新的经济效果不明显,体制更新困难重重;某些观念还需要不断更新,姓"资"姓"社"的问题仍存在争论;经济基础比较薄弱,美国长期的封锁和禁运给古巴造成巨大损失;人口老化和减少将影响经济发展;拉美政局变化对古巴造成消极影响。     

古巴社会主义道路及其发展前景

古巴社会主义道路及其发展前景王萍古巴是西半球惟一的社会主义国家。古巴革命曾经风靡一时，成为世界关注的焦点。进入９０年代，苏联、东欧国家的剧变和美国敌视古巴的活动变本加厉，使古巴再度成为世界关注的焦点。面对严峻的国内形势，古巴政府在坚持社会主义道路的前...     

从古共六大到古共七大:古巴社会主义模式的更新

2006年劳尔·卡斯特罗上台后提出了更新古巴模式的思想,并实施了一系列改革措施。2011年4月,古共六大通过了《党和革命的经济社会政策的纲要》(简称《纲要》),为古巴的经济社会改革确定了方向。2016年4月,古共召开了七大,通过了《古巴社会主义经济社会模式的理念》和《到2030年全国经济社会发展计划:国家的建议、轴心和战略部门》,并对六大《纲要》进行了调整和补充,使古巴模式的更新进一步深化,并上升到理论,落实到中长期规划中。自古共六大提出更新社会主义模式以来,更新模式已成为古巴国内不可逆转的共识,古巴在法制、领导体制、经济政策、社会和外交政策等方面都发生了积极的变化。但与此同时,古巴社会主义模式的更新仍面临着新的问题与挑战:模式更新的经济效果不明显,体制更新困难重重;某些观念还需要不断更新,姓"资"姓"社"的问题仍存在争论;经济基础比较薄弱,美国长期的封锁和禁运给古巴造成巨大损失;人口老化和减少将影响经济发展;拉美政局变化对古巴造成消极影响。     

在何塞·马蒂150周年诞辰纪念会上的讲话

尊敬的阿尔贝托·罗德里格斯·阿鲁菲大使阁下,朋友们,同志们: 今天,我非常高兴有机会参加何塞·马蒂150周年诞辰的纪念活动.何塞·马蒂是世人皆知的古巴民族英雄、杰出的诗人和文学家、卓越的政治家和思想家.他的政治思想和革命精神极大地丰富了古巴和拉美人民的思想宝库,同时造就了一代代的革命者.马蒂为古巴和拉美人民的解放事业做出了不朽的贡献.     

NGOs and Cuba: Opportunity or opportunism?

Reporting on a large gathering of international and Cuban NGOs and other agencies, this article explores the issues faced by Cuban society in undergoing rapid economic change; and examines why the New World Order has not led to any significant involvement with Cuba, either by the inter-governmental agencies or by independent NGOs. It describes the roles of State-sponsored bodies in maintaining the major development gains of the last 30 years; and argues that NGOs which see their role as promoting 'democratisation' must avoid falling into simplistic and inappropriate assumptions about the distinction between the State and 'civil society'.     

Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy

We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coalitions. Many international relations scholars hold that the conventional wisdom explains important variation in leaders’ behavior during crisis bargaining and in the outcomes of international disputes. We evaluate our theory and the conventional perspective by examining rival predictions regarding leaders’ ability to avoid incurring audience costs by conducting crisis negotiations and making concessions outside their coalitions’ view. A reassessment of us-ussr diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a favored case of the conventional wisdom, indicates the plausibility of our theory in the context of security crises.     

菲德尔·卡斯特罗的思考

自2007年3月以来,菲德尔·卡斯特罗在古巴共产党中央机关报<格拉玛报>等报刊上先后在"总司令的思考"和"菲德尔同志的思考"专栏标题下,发表了大量文章,阐述自己时国内外重大问题的看法,以此来指导古巴革命.本文介绍卡斯特罗所写的部分文章的主要内容和他对生物燃料、威胁人类的主要问题、美国政策、古巴"特殊时期"、美国大选、极左派、中国、委内瑞拉革命、金融危机、美国"援助"、对罪恶和美德等一系列关系到人类命运的当前重大国际问题以及古巴国内一些问题的精辟见解.     

Russo–Cuban Relations in the 1990s

This analysis re-examines Russo–Cuban relations in the period in which Boris Yeltsin was Russian President using previously unseen documents housed in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba [MINREX] archive in Havana. A number of conclusions offer themselves including that the relationship remained key for Havana throughout the 1990s, despite a Cuban ideological aversion to the Russian reforms of the early to mid-decade and the subsequent “new realities” of Russo–Cuban relations. Cuba desired a relationship that preserved a number of features of Soviet–Cuban relations, which MINREX officials strove to achieve by purposefully creating a political legacy from the Soviet era, whilst also specifically lobbying members of the Russian political elite who had sympathies with the Soviet period. This development has resonance for contemporary Russo–Cuban relations that are at their most robust politically since 1991. Consequently, the Soviet legacy remains both much greater than previously thought and deliberately created by Cuba.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

古巴社会主义经济建设与发展

1959年古巴革命胜利后,逐步建立了社会主义经济体制.到苏东剧变前的30年间,在面对美国封锁的不利条件下,古巴的社会主义经济建设仍然获得了发展,取得了一些难能可贵的成就.20世纪90年代初苏东剧变后,古巴陷入极端困难的境地,进入"和平时期的特殊阶段".1994年以来,古巴经济状况逐步好转,已经走出苏东剧变导致的极端困难时期.经过50年的经济建设,古巴从中央集权计划经济逐渐转变为古巴特色的社会主艾经济,经济和外贸结构也从单一向多元化方向发展.     

Rivalry and Rapprochement in Early Cold War Central America

Under what conditions does a common threat cause rival states to achieve rapprochement? To inform not only contemporary policy debates about coalition-building against terrorism and insurgency, but also theoretical debates about obstacles to cooperation and conflict resolution, this article examines the pattern of rivalry and rapprochement among Central American states—non-Communist allies under the Rio Treaty—in the shadow of the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Given a common threat, why did Honduras and Nicaragua shift from rivalry to rapprochement while Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and El Salvador and Honduras, did not? Drawing on rarely explored published primary sources in English and Spanish, the article argues that the major obstacle to cooperation was the parochial interest of the armed forces in perpetuating the old mission of international rivalry despite the attractive new mission of internal security, and that presidents were able to achieve rapprochement only where state resource constraints compelled a trade-off between the old and new missions. This argument is tested against realist alternatives including balancing and bandwagoning, and liberal alternatives including democratic peace and counterrevolutionary ideology. The article demonstrates that spoilers within the state can perpetuate international conflict, but also indicates conditions under which they can be convinced to support international cooperation.     

Strategic Interaction in the 1994 and Earlier Cuban Refugee Crises

The 1994 Cuban refugee crisis is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma game for Cuba and the United States. A threat power version of the theory of moves yields a cooperative outcome in the game, sustained by mutual threats that deter defections by each player, which is consistent with moves made by the players. After the countries implemented deterrent threats, they agreed that Cuba would patrol its borders and the United States would admit 20,000 Cubans each year. We show that the analysis, suitably adapted, also illuminates strategic choices in the 1965 and 1980 Cuban refugee crises.     

Caribbean Taliban: Cuban American Terrorism in the 1970s

ABSTRACT

Most scholars have not taken Cuban-American terrorism in the 1970s seriously, despite the unprecedented campaign of terror it unleashed. Borrowing a framework of self-identity usually applied to other terrorist groups and using case studies of the Cuban Nationalism Movement in New Jersey and of Alpha 66 in Florida, this article argues that Cuban-American political ideology was the key to its impact and its support from communities in Florida and New Jersey. Militant exiles saw themselves as betrayed by two enemy states, entitled to rule in their homeland, and imbued with a mission of civilizational renewal. In these ways, Cuban-American terrorists were similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan and their reign of terror in the 1970s should be appreciated as a major episode in the history of U.S. and global terrorism.