Do unilateral trade measures really catalyze multilateral environmental agreements?

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - Unilateralism remains an opaque concept associated with discriminatory or coercive policy implications. Legal controversies...     

Are international environmental agreements enforceable? implications for institutional design

Over the past several decades, European international environmental institutions have evolved, heeding institutionalist calls for stronger institutions backed by sanctioning and dispute settlement mechanisms. This apparent increase in institutional strength has led to a corresponding increase of the behavioral effectiveness, or active compliance management of institutions as observed in the incidence of arbitral tribunal decisions. However, upon closer examination, it is apparent that this behavioral effectiveness has not been exclusively due to provisions for arbitral tribunal decisions within international environmental agreements. Rather, the incidence and enforcement of these arbitral tribunal decisions is linked to the institutional design of the enforcement mechanisms. Most international environmental agreements rely on parties to raise disputes and enforce commitments, causing individual countries to bear the cost of enforcement. In addition, bringing a dispute to an arbitral tribunal requires the accordance of the parties to the dispute. In contrast, the European Court of Justice allows for enforcement to originate from a strong central authority and for the cases of arbitration to be filed unilaterally. International environmental agreements that have been joined by the European Community and have a provision for an arbitral tribunal have stronger enforcement mechanisms, are more likely to result in enforcement action, and are more effective in generating behavioral change.     

The ‘make or buy’ decision in private environmental transactions

A theoretical framework combining the two branches of TCE, i.e., the governance branch (Williamson 2005) and the measurement branch (Barzel 2005) may explain the choice of the governance structure for private environmental transactions. Four case studies, i.e., the market for pure air in polluted cities, the contractual arrangement between La Esperanza and the Monteverde Conservation League, the case of the French mineral water bottler Vittel and the case of land ownership by land trusts are briefly developed in order to support the theoretical framework. Special attention is devoted to the presence (or not) of a 3-D (defined, defended and divestible) property rights system in interaction with the juridical system (civil law vs. common law) and its influence on the way environmental property rights are likely (or not) to be re-arranged. Lessons and policy implications are drawn in order to foster research on these challenging issues.

Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help?

Environmental degradation is increasingly causing cross-border displacement of people, but countries have formed no treaties to facilitate collaboration on the issue. When is such collaboration feasible, and how should environmental displacement treaties be designed? We present a game-theoretic analysis. In our model, countries first decide on ratifying a treaty, and doing so commits them to helping other countries that face cases of environmental degradation in the future. The equilibrium analysis suggests that treaty formation is easier under conditions of mutual vulnerability than if some countries are at a greater risk of environmental degradation than others. Our most important finding is that contrary to the received wisdom, treaties imposing stringent demands on countries are easier to form than treaties that are easy to comply with. We also examine the benefits of using displacement treaties to build capacity for cooperation. We illustrate the utility of the analysis with a discussion of the Kampala Convention on environmental displacement and consider the potential for future treaty formation in Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania.     

How real is the threat of imprisonment for environmental crime?

In this contribution, we investigate whether prison sentences for environmental crime are indeed used in practice, how they are used and whether they imply a real threat to violators. To this end we examine previous studies on the role of imprisonment and confront these models with some empirical data. The empirical application summarizes evidence from several countries, but focuses on detailed data for criminal prosecution of environmental legislation in Flanders (Belgium) between 2003 and 2007. Thus we are able to highlight some interesting policy issues and directions for future research.     

Henry Manne’s subtle but important influences on environmental law

Henry Manne had little to say about environmental law and policy. Yet he had a significant impact on the approach that others took to those topics. These indirect influences on environmental law and policy were threefold. His creation at George Mason University of a highly successful, specialized, law school curriculum demonstrated that law schools could not only survive, but thrive with a subject-matter or methodological focus. His central role in introducing economics to the law school curriculum had a significant and lasting impact on legal education in general and environmental law in particular. And his study and advocacy of markets as effective institutions for the allocation of scarce resources has contributed to the development of environmental law and policy, notwithstanding a predisposition among environmentalists and government officials for a command and control approach.     

Economic analysis of international environmental agreements: lessons learnt 2000–2020

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law & Economics, we...     

Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts

Recent policy initiatives by the European Commission envisage an increased criminalization of offences against the environment, bringing the deterrent power of criminal law to bear on environmental violators in order to increase environmental quality. This paper examines some of the implications of such initiatives from a law-and-economics perspective. We show that increased criminalization does not necessarily lead to higher environmental quality. Budget-constrained regulators mandated with minimizing environmental damages can lose their ability to incentivize violators to report their misconducts in the presence of criminal prosecution. Therefore, some of the damages that otherwise can be remediated go undetected. The mechanism results from the subtle interplay of the current regulatory structure and the incentives of the environmental criminal justice system.     

The European Union in global environmental governance: Leadership in the making?

For well over a decade, the European Union (EU) has proclaimed its leadership role in global environmental governance (GEG). In this article, we examine both the nature of its leadership and the underlying conditions for ‘actorness’ upon which leadership must depend. The EU’s record in the global conferences as well as its influence on the reform of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are also investigated. We argue that the EU has frequently sought to shape international environmental negotiations and promote sustainable development as an organising principle of global governance. Despite its inadequate status at the UN and internal problems, it has had a significant effect on the global agenda. However, due to persistent diplomatic opposition from other coalitions, its real, directly visible influence has been more modest. For genuine directional leadership, which goes beyond the defence of self-interest, the Union will have to make internal policy coherence a greater priority. Moreover, apart from relying solely on its weighty presence in the international system or its potential capabilities, the EU needs to achieve a high level of credibility in order to enhance its powers of persuasion.

Does it pay to pollute? Shareholder wealth consequences of corporate environmental lawsuits

In this paper, we employ the event study methodology to examine shareholder wealth consequences of corporate environmental lawsuits filed in the US Circuit Courts from 1980 to 2001. We find that stocks of defendant firms experience significant negative abnormal returns around the lawsuit filing dates. When the plaintiffs are government entities, the abnormal returns of the defendant stocks are significantly negative. On the other hand, when the plaintiffs are individuals or nonpublic business entities, the abnormal returns are statistically insignificant. When lawsuits are filed under EPA's superfund statute, defendant firms experience significant loss in equity value. For shareholders of the average firm in our sample, the empirical evidence suggests that it does not pay to pollute if the firm is sued.     

A quasi-experimental evaluation of the “environmental corrections” model of probation and parole

Journal of Experimental Criminology - The current study reports the results of a pilot test of the Environmental Corrections model of probation and parole, a framework for supervising offenders in...     

Business to the rescue: private sector actors and global environmental regimes’ legitimacy

In 2006, Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) adopted decision VIII/17 to further involve the private sector in the activities of the Convention. This initiative mainly aims at improving the current regime’s legitimacy. By increasing business involvement, decision VIII/17 can be viewed within the context of the current academic debate on the ‘privatisation’ of environmental governance, which refers to the growing importance of private actors in the formulation of environmental policies. Against this background, this article aims at: (1) assessing the extent to which decision VIII/17 might reverse the CBD’s legitimacy crisis and (2) analysing the issues at stake when private sector actors are involved in environmental regimes. In order to do so, the article analyses the consequences of decision VIII/17 in terms of internal—representation and transparency—and external—institutional efficiency and implementation—legitimacy. The study is based on an extended empirical scrutiny of the negotiations linked to decision VIII/17. While adopting a general conceptualisation of legitimacy, the value added by the study is to broaden the usual understanding of business strategies towards environmental issues. In particular, this article shows how decision VIII/17 has generated several reactions—defensive as well as proactive—among the business community. At the practical level, the article proposes several recommendations to secure a constructive participation of all categories of business actors in biodiversity governance. At the theoretical level, it calls for a change in deterministic visions of economic actors’ interests.

Negotiating environmental protection in trade agreements: A regime shift or a tactical linkage?

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - The prolific literature on the relationship between the trade and environmental regimes suffers from three shortcomings. First,...     

Historical review of Taiwan＇s environmental legislative adjustment and its implications under international agreements

After 1960s, the economic developmental explosion in Taiwan had brought serious environmental degradations including the air and water pollution, waste disposal, as well as wildlife problems. Since then, Taiwanese has begun environmental protection movements striving for ＂environmental rights＂. In addition, international environmental agreements have grown with great speed in the past decades. Although Taiwan never signed or joined any international environmental agreements or organizations, the development of international environmental laws still deeply affect Taiwan environmental regulations. Under this global trend, Taiwan has to cooperate with international community and to obey international environmental agreements. Thus Taiwan had passed numerous environmental laws including ＂Air Pollution Control Act,＂ ＂Water Pollution Control Act,＂ ＂Noise Control Act,＂ ＂Waste Management Act,＂ ＂Toxic Chemicals Management Act,＂ ＂Wildlife Protection Act,＂ and ＂Nuisance Dispute Resolution Act.＂ Thus the article will examine Taiwan＇s environmental administration, regulations as well as the implication under international agreements.     

Free trade agreements for the environment? Regional economic integration and environmental cooperation in East Asia

Traditionally, it has been argued that increased economic competition through free trade agreements would bring about environmental degradation. This study, however, argues that recent international free trade agreements have tended to enhance environmental cooperation among participating countries. This study has examined the process by which East Asian countries have developed mechanisms for the extant level of regional environmental cooperation, particularly highlighting the reasons for commonalities and differences in regional environmental cooperation between ASEAN and the dominant economies in the region. It finds that three factors particularly matter for developing regional environmental cooperative mechanisms: networks of intergovernmental organizations, the strong willingness of political leaders which is often embodied in national strategies for regionalism and the establishment, and the institutionalized linkage—particularly through FTAs—between trade and the environment. Tracing the process of policy evolution within three groups of countries sheds light on the political conditions under which the four entities involved (the ASEAN, Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea) have produced and strengthened cooperative environmental mechanisms among them along with free trade agreements. Focusing especially on the environmental policy changes in Japan, China, and the ROK associated with the creation of its FTAs with ASEAN, the study concludes that each of free trade agreements has incrementally developed environmental cooperation, especially when integrated into a vision for regional integration.     

State power and diffusion processes in the ratification of global environmental treaties, 1981–2008

There have been many explanations for why countries ratify global environmental treaties. They range from neorealist theory, to hegemony theory, world society theory, and network embeddedness theory. Drawing on hegemonic transition theory, this paper provides evidence that prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, strong and weak countries ratified a treaty if the USA or the USSR ratified the treaty first. After the fall of the Soviet Union, countries’ proximity to world society institutions increased the likelihood of ratifying a treaty, and only weaker countries emulated the ratifications of the USA and Russia. However, weaker countries also emulated economic, religious, and language peers, diplomatic ties, and neighbors as well. In contrast, more powerful countries ratified treaties more independently. We studied the ratifications of eight universal environmental treaties by 166 countries between 1981 and 2008 and showed that as the geopolitical context changed, the diffusion process changed. The paper argues that the hegemonic transition which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s was an enabling event that helped to explain the new roles that major powers assumed in the 1990s and 2000s and opened the door to the ascendency of global institutions and broader participation in the environmental regime.     

Why is it hard to solve environmental problems? The perils of institutional reductionism and institutional overload

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - Many efforts to solve environmental problems arising at the international or transnational level meet with limited success or...     

Cultivated ties and strategic communication: do international environmental secretariats tailor information to increase their bureaucratic reputation?

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - The past few years have witnessed a growing interest among scholars and policy-makers in the interplay of international...     

Transboundary river basin agreements in the Mekong and Zambezi basins: Enhancing environmental security or securitizing the environment?

Multilateral agreements are emerging as important mechanisms for structuring cooperation in politically and ecologically complex transboundary river basins around the world. While such agreements are offered and legitimized as a means to advance ecological and human security, they instead often promote state-centric environmental securitization. As a result, seemingly progressive agreements grounded in international law are likely to precipitate and mask environmental degradation until it becomes serious or even irreversible, creating both ecological and human security crises at a variety of scales. Case studies of wetland ecosystems in both the Zambezi and Mekong basins reveal the material and discursive linkages between international agreements and security. By drawing on critical approaches that acknowledge both the socially constructed and the multi-dimensional nature of sovereignty, this paper exposes significant institutional barriers to ecologically sustainable transboundary cooperation in the two basins.