Plainly Wrong

English law and wider common law jurisprudence have endorsed the condition that an appellate court should reject a trial judge's finding of fact which it believes is ‘plainly wrong’. Courts have not explained what makes a finding plainly wrong, however. Scholars have largely ignored the issue. This article draws on recent work in epistemology to provide a new analysis of the plainly wrong standard. Rationally, a court should not believe both (1) that a judge is a better fact finder and (2) that the judge was wrong to find some fact. If it does believe both, it should abandon the belief it is less confident of. So, a court should reject a judge's finding if it is more confident that it is wrong than that the judge is a better fact finder. This analysis has implications for review of administrative fact finding and for judicial deference generally.     

Lying as a Political Wrong

Law and Philosophy - In Speech Matters, Seana Shiffrin claims that certain lies should be tolerated on grounds of political inclusiveness. If political equality requires perfect compliance with...     

Defending the Right To Do Wrong

Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong’. At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual.     

比较法的现代性歧途

<正> 这个文本的题目会让敏感的读者产生某种警惕——因为它可以被解读为“比较法的现代性出现了歧途”抑或“比较法的歧途归咎于其现代性”,而这似乎表明作者打算对比较法的现代性予以谴责。在读者中立即有一些人开始骚动不安——后现代主义和狼来了！ 对于那些较不熟悉“现代性”(modernity)、“后现代”(postmodern)这些术语的读者而言(尤其是那些研究像法律这种最具现代性品质的事物的人士,这种陌生是相当正常的),则会产生一些疑问——你们所讲的“现代性”到底是指什么?比较法与它有什么关联?读者们更多的追问还会产生——“现代(化)”不就意味着文明、发达和进步,你们为什么还要谴责它?(略带责备口吻的)你们又企图标新立异些什么?     

Confidently Wrong: Police Endorsement of Psycho-Legal Misconceptions

Public beliefs about psychological issues relevant to the legal system have been demonstrated to often be misconceived, but the endorsement of such beliefs in law enforcement samples is largely unknown. This study was the first to compare psycho-legal beliefs between law enforcement officers and the general public in the UK. Participants were presented a 50-item questionnaire measuring five psycho-legal topics; police procedures, courts, tough on crime, mental illness, and memory and cognition. Despite direct involvement and relevant experience, law enforcement officers endorsed just as many empirically contradictory beliefs as those who were not law enforcement officers. Further, law enforcement officers were more confident in their responses. This research has implications for identifying areas of limited knowledge within police samples that can be targeted by police education.     

无固定期限劳动合同的是与非

《劳动合同法》自制定、通过到实施,一直受到社会广泛的关注。人们所关注的热点、难点和疑点并没有随着该法的施行而结束,反倒对实施前该法引起的劳动关系变动、实施后该法的社会效果进行了更多的思考。本期刊发的几篇对热点、难点进行解读,对实施效果进行前瞻的文章,意在为读者准确理解和适用该法提供参考。     

Do C&IT Facilitate the Wrong Things?

There is a simple view of the role of C&IT (computers and information technology) in the legal academy that states, 'C&IT is just a tool. Use it or abuse it as you will. It has no ideology. It can no more be a bad thing than can a car or a chisel'. It is an additional resource on top of whatever we had before. I want to link that claim to a set of analogous claims about the relationship between law and science and law and mathematics, and subject them to scrutiny. I shall call these claims (that science, mathematics and computers are 'just' tools) collectively the 'neutrality claim'. So far as concerns computers, I shall suggest that C&IT in law has a tendency either towards reaction or towards reductionism in how we understand law in the academy. I will finish by considering an area in which computers have been relatively more successful-chess-and trying to work through the similarities and distinctions.     

数额犯中数额认识错误的评判

在我国违法和犯罪分开的二元立法背景下,必然使犯罪概念蕴含着罪量要素,刑法理论和司法实践当中的数额犯、情节犯等概念亦成为绕不开的重要话题,故此数额犯便成为了我国刑法理论上所特有的犯罪形态.因此,有必要对数额犯中数额认识错误的问题进行系统讨论,并提出相应的评判标准,以期能更好的解决司法实践中所遇到的难题.从数额犯所涉及的数额的概念入手,明确数额在数额犯中乃至我国刑法中的定位问题是研究数额认识错误评判的前提,由于数额认定是司法实践中定罪量刑的重要因素,但由于数额在刑事案件中看似具体但又包含着抽象的成分,所以既需要对其进行量的判断,又需要相应的价值判断.有了对数额认识错误的法理评判,就能结合刑法条文以及相关司法解释,对具体案件中行为人的数额认识错误问题作出正确的诠释.     

公证赔偿制度探略

公证错证纠纷已不鲜见,但因现行法律规范对此尚无明确规定,尤使此类纠纷在司法实践中复杂化。本文从公证错证赔偿责任入手,分析指出公证错证赔偿应为民事赔偿;进而以公证法律关系为民事法律关系,依传统现代民事责任理论,对其过错责任作了学理分析,并结合域外各国的立法实战,提出了我国未来公证损害赔偿制度的立法模式选择,责任人界定及错证责任的负担标准等,以期对公证立法的完善有所裨益。     

走出自然权利认识的误区

在自然权利的问题上,存在着人类中心主义与非人类中心主义的尖锐对立,人们遵循着非此即彼的一种思维定势,认为二者水火不容,这是一个认识上的误区。即使作为坚守非人类中心主义立场的观察者也不得不承认发达的人类中心主义是实现自然权利的必由之路。贫穷不是非人类中心主义,只有在与自然和谐的基础上实现人类的生态化的富足,才有实现自然权利的可能。     

民事诉讼案件事实误认之预防机制研究

民事诉讼案件事实的误认不仅直接关系到当事人的权利和义务,而且还间接损害着整个诉讼制度的正当性,甚至成为影响我国当下社会和谐稳定的一个重要因素,因此,对于民事诉讼案件事实误认预防机制的研究便显得尤为必要和重要。要建构有效的民事诉讼案件事实误认预防机制,应当从三个层面入手:一是保障裁判者认定案件事实理性思维进路的有序进行;二是有效导控裁判者非理性因素对案件事实认定的影响;三是完善裁判者认定案件事实的外在程序配置。     

服务贸易游戏规则是与非

服务贸易总协定是世界贸易组织的三大支柱之一.世贸组织成员关于服务贸易的义务除了受总协定的规范外,亦取决于各成员通过具体承诺减让表承担的责任.这就使得如何解释服务贸易总协定和具体承诺减让表成为事关服务贸易市场开放程度和进度的问题.美国赌博案是少数直接涉及服务贸易总协定的案件,故引起国际社会的极大关注.本文通过评析美国赌博案的专家组和上诉机构报告,分析多边服务贸易制度下具体承诺减让表的法律地位、解释具体承诺的参考文件、市场准入务款与限制性国内法规的关系、适用公共道德和公共秩序例外条款的条件和标准等,从而折射出服务贸易总协定面对的挑战和各成员的应对策略.     

误诊偏执性精神病引起法律纠纷1例

偏执性精神障碍是一组以系统妄想为主要症状的精神障碍,在不涉及妄想的情况下,无明显的其他心理方面异常。偏执性精神障碍诊断难度大,而且较多涉及法律纠纷,因此临床及司法鉴定医生对诊断偏执性精神障碍应极为慎重,否则法律纠纷很可能接踵而来。