Interviewing Witnesses: The Effect of Forced Confabulation on Event Memory

After viewing a crime video, participants answered 16 answerable and 6 unanswerable questions. Those in the "voluntary guess" condition had a "don't know" response option; those in the "forced guess" condition did not. One week later the same questions were answered with a "don't know" option. In both experiments, information generated from forced confabulation was less likely remembered than information voluntarily self-generated. Further, when the same answer was given to an unanswerable question both times, the confidence expressed in the answer increased over time in both the forced and the voluntary guess conditions. Pressing eyewitnesses to answer questions, especially questions repeated thrice (Experiment 2), may not be an effective practice because it reliably increases intrusion errors but not correct recall.     

Attribution of crime motives biases eyewitnesses’ memory and sentencing decisions

In court, the basic expectation is that eyewitness accounts are solely based on what the witness saw. Research on post-event influences has shown that this is not always the case and memory distortions are quite common. However, potential effects of an eyewitness’ attributions regarding a perpetrator’s crime motives have been widely neglected in this domain. In this paper, we present two experiments (N?=?209) in which eyewitnesses were led to conclude that a perpetrator’s motives for a crime were either dispositional or situational. As expected, misinformation consistent with an eyewitness’ attribution of crime motives was typically falsely recognised as true whereas inconsistent misinformation was correctly rejected. Furthermore, a dispositional vs. situational attribution of crime motives resulted in more severe (mock) sentencing supporting previous research. The findings are discussed in the context of schema-consistent biases and the effect of attributions about character in a legal setting.     

The effect of repeated questioning on children's accuracy and consistency in eyewitness testimony

Purpose. In police interviews children may be asked the same question many times. We investigated how the number of repetitions and the interval between those repetitions affected the accuracy and consistency of children's responses. Methods. 156 children aged 4–9 years watched a staged event and were interviewed individually 1 week later. Children were asked eight open‐ended questions, which were each repeated a further four times (making a total of forty questions). Half these open‐ended questions could be answered from information in the event, and half were unanswerable (so children should have said ‘don't know’ in response to these questions). The questions were repeated in gist form. The interval between an initial question and its repetitions was varied by use of other questions and twenty non‐repeated filler questions. The intervals between repetitions were immediate repetition, repetition after a delay of three intervening questions, after a delay of six intervening questions, and after ten or more intervening questions. Results. Over a quarter of children's responses to repeated questions changed, usually resulting in a decline in accuracy, particularly after the first repetition. Subsequently, the number of repetitions and delay interval had little effect on responses to answerable questions although accuracy to unanswerable questions continued to decline. Conclusions. Question repetition had a negative affect on children's consistency and accuracy. For unanswerable questions in particular, the more often a question was repeated the more likely children were to invent a response.     

Eyewitness susceptibility to co-witness misinformation is influenced by co-witness confidence and own self-confidence

If an eyewitness is exposed to a co-witness statement that incorrectly blames an innocent bystander for a crime, the eyewitness can be influenced by this statement and also blame the innocent bystander for the crime. This effect is known as blame conformity. In two studies, we examined whether or not this effect is influenced by the degree of confidence a co-witness expresses in her incorrect statement (Study 1) and an eyewitness’s own level of self-confidence (Study 2). Participant eyewitnesses first watched a crime video featuring a perpetrator and an innocent bystander, then read a co-witness statement about the crime that either correctly blamed the perpetrator, incorrectly blamed the innocent bystander, or blamed nobody (a control condition). They were then asked who committed the crime. In Study 1, participants who read an incorrect statement were at increased risk of engaging in blame conformity when the co-witness expressed a high level of confidence, compared to a low level of confidence, in the accuracy of her statement. In Study 2, participants who were lowest in self-confidence were at increased risk of engaging in blame conformity. The theoretical underpinnings of these effects are considered.     

A comparison of Chinese judges' and US judges' knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony

Abstract

We surveyed 170 Chinese judges about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of 160 US judges. Although the Chinese judges were less knowledgeable than the US judges, both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony, including for such important issues as whether lay people can distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. Unlike the US judges, greater knowledge of eyewitness factors for the Chinese judges was not related to beliefs that may be necessary to reduce eyewitness error. Compared to the US judges, the Chinese judges were much less likely to believe that they needed additional eyewitness training and that they knew more about eyewitness testimony than lay persons. We also discuss the impact of culture, legal systems, investigative procedures, and judges' function on the Chinese judges' responses, and the legal reforms that China may need to implement to reduce eyewitness error.     

Mock jurors' perceptions of identifications made by intoxicated eyewitnesses

Abstract

Psychology research has generally neglected intoxicated eyewitnesses. The current study addressed this need by exploring mock jurors' perceptions of intoxicated witnesses. Undergraduate participants read summarized sexual or aggravated battery cases in which either the victim or a bystander identified the defendant under varying intoxication levels. They answered questions about the case and provided verdicts. Participants were sensitive to the effect that intoxication may have on witnesses' cognitive ability, but not to varying degrees of intoxication. Neither the role of the eyewitness nor the type of crime committed had an effect on perceptions of witness impairment. Participants' perceptions of witness impairment informed identification credibility ratings, and credibility assessments affected verdicts. Impairment and credibility ratings fully mediated intoxication's effect on verdicts. Unlike much prior research, our results suggest that mock jurors can consider potentially important witness information when rendering verdicts.     

Public Eyewitness Confidence Ratings Can Differ from Those Held Privately

Despite much research on eyewitness confidence, we know very little about whether confidence ratings given in public might differ from those held privately. This study tested a prediction derived from self-presentation theory that eyewitnesses will give lower confidence ratings in public when there is a possibility of their account being contradicted by other witnesses as compared to when they report their confidence in private. In groups of 3 or 4 people, 96 participants watched a videotape of a simulated robbery and then answered 16 forced-choice questions about details from the videotape. In half of the experimental sessions, the participants shared their answers and confidence ratings aloud with the other participants (public condition), and in the other half, the answers and ratings were not shared (private). As predicted, confidence ratings were significantly lower in the public condition than in the private condition, but the privacy manipulation had no effect on response accuracy. These results are consistent with a self-presentation explanation, and they highlight the need to examine public confidence ratings more thoroughly.     

Age differences in eyewitness testimony

This study examined age differences in eyewitness testimony. Children, three and six years of age, and adults interacted with an unfamiliar man for 5 minutes. Four or five days later, the witnesses answered objective and suggestive questions, recalled what happened, and tried to identify the confederate from a target-present photo line-up. The adults and 6-year-olds did not differ in their ability to answer objective questions or identify the confederate, but 6-year-olds were more suggestible than adults and recalled less about the event. Compared to the older age groups, the 3-year-olds answered fewer objective questions correctly, recalled little about what happened, and identified the confederate less frequently. In addition, they were the most suggestible. The experiment extends our knowledge of children's ability to provide accurate eyewitness reports to a very young age group and to a situation in which participants are not merely bystander witnesses but instead directly interact with the confederate.     

Judging guilt and accuracy: highly confident eyewitnesses are discounted when they provide featural justifications

Jurors are heavily swayed by confident eyewitnesses. Are they also influenced by how eyewitnesses justify their level of confidence? Here we document a counter-intuitive effect: when eyewitnesses identified a suspect from a lineup with absolute certainty (‘I am completely confident’) and justified their confidence by referring to a visible feature of the accused (‘I remember his nose’), participants judged the suspect as less likely to be guilty than when eyewitnesses identified a suspect with absolute certainty but offered an unobservable justification (‘I would never forget him’) or no justification at all. Moreover, people perceive an eyewitness’s identification as nearly 25% less accurate when the eyewitness has provided a featural justification than an unobservable justification or simply no justification. Even when an eyewitness’s level of confidence is clear because s/he has expressed it numerically (e.g. ‘I am 100% certain’) participants perceive eyewitnesses as not credible (i.e. inaccurate) when the eyewitness has provided a featural justification. However, the effect of featural justifications – relative to a confidence statement only – is maximal when there is an accompanying lineup of faces, moderate when there is a single face and minimal when there is no face at all. The results support our Perceived-Diagnosticity account.     

Co‐witness information influences whether a witness is likely to choose from a lineup

Purpose. Much crime is witnessed by more than one eyewitness, and witnesses may learn information about other witness's decisions throughout the identification and trial process. The objective of this paper was to investigate whether hearing about a co‐witness's type of lineup decision and subsequent confidence level affects another witness's type of lineup choice. Methods. A total of 304 undergraduate students watched a crime video with a confederate co‐witness. After the video, the witnesses completed an identification task. Prior to completing the task, the participant learned that the confederate co‐witness either chose from or rejected the lineup and was subsequently confident or not confident in that decision (or heard no co‐witness information). Participants completed the identification task using either a target present (TP) or target absent (TA) lineup. Results. Overall, those who heard the co‐witness chose from the lineup were more likely to choose from the lineup than those who heard no co‐witness information or who heard the co‐witness rejected the lineup. In addition, witnesses who chose from the lineup and heard the co‐witness chose from or rejected the lineup expressed more confidence in that choice if the co‐witness was more confident versus if the co‐witness was less confident. Conclusions. In cases of multiple witnesses, identification decisions may not be independent pieces of evidence. Therefore, it is important that police separate co‐witnesses throughout the identification process.     

The Effects of Pre-admonition Suggestions on Eyewitnesses’ Choosing Rates and Retrospective Identification Judgments

Pre-admonition suggestion is an identification-relevant comment made to an eyewitness by a lineup administrator before the lineup admonition. Quinlivan et al. (2012) found that their suggestion inflated mistaken identification rates and retrospective identification. However, the suggestion used was a compound statement, making it unclear which component influenced choosing rates. The current experiment was conducted to parse out the effects. Participants (N = 211) viewed a crime video and received either one component of the compound suggestion (a suggestion to pick or that the witness had paid substantial attention), both components, or no suggestion. All participants received an admonition, made an identification choice, and answered questions about their witnessing experience. The results demonstrated that the pick suggestion increased mistaken identifications from a perpetrator-absent lineup whereas the effects of the attention suggestion were restricted to the retrospective judgments. These results show support for the role of secondary (non-memorial) processes in eyewitness identification.     

Old and very old adults as witnesses: event memory and metamemory

Older people constitute an important category of eyewitnesses. Episodic memory performance in older persons is poorer than in younger adults, but little research has been made on older persons’ metacognitive judgments. Since more persons of advanced age will likely be called upon as witnesses in coming years, it is critical to characterize this population’s metacognitive abilities. We compared event memory metacognition in old adults (66-year-old, n = 74) to very old adults (87 or 90 years old, n = 55). Participants were tested on their memory of a film, using questions with two answer alternatives and the confidence in their answer. As expected, the very old group had a lower accuracy rate than the old group (d = 0.59). The very old group, however, monitored this impairment, since their over-/underconfidence and calibration did not differ from the old group but they displayed a poorer ability to separate correct from incorrect answers (discrimination ability). Possibly, the very old group was able to monitor the level of their over-/underconfidence because they applied general self-knowledge about their memory skills. In contrast, the discrimination of correct from incorrect answers may be more dependent on ability to attend to the features of each retrieved memory.     

Intention in Criminal Law: The Challenge from Non‐Observational Knowledge

Intention is at the heart of criminal law. If it is not the mens rea requirement found most often in offences, it is still the standard against which other grades of fault tend relatively to be judged. It has generated much controversy, as the crucial question, “Did the defendant intend X?” is resistant to clear answers. This paper argues that intention‐questions are difficult because intention is not the thing law takes it to be: Importantly, contrary to law's assumptions, it is neither a state of mind nor is it connected in an exclusive manner to the reasons for which we act.     

Inconsistencies in children's recall of witnessed events: The role of age,question format and perceived reason for question repetition

Purpose. Children's inconsistencies when answering repeated questions about past events are a source of concern in forensic, educational, and other contexts. Theoretical accounts of these inconsistencies have predominantly assumed that children shift because they infer adult dissatisfaction with their initial answer. This study aimed to test this account via examination of the effects of question format on shifting, as well as via direct questioning of children. Method. Four‐, five‐, and seven‐year‐olds (N = 226) were asked 17 recall questions about a recent classroom activity, with eight target questions repeated in one of four formats: no‐correct (mildly misleading questions to which the correct answer was ‘no’), yes‐correct (mildly misleading questions to which the correct answer was ‘yes’), specific open wh‐ questions, and forced‐choice questions. They were then asked about the adult's reasons for repetition. Accuracy, shifting, and interpretations of question repetition were examined. Results. Shifting from accuracy decreased with age, and was affected by question format in 4‐year‐olds only, who shifted more to no‐correct than to forced‐choice questions. Shifting towards accuracy was more common in forced‐choice questions than either no‐correct or open questions, but there were no significant age differences. First‐answer‐unsatisfactory interpretations of question repetition were rare, especially in the two younger groups. The oldest group offered a wider range of interpretations and also showed some evidence of an association between first‐answer‐unsatisfactory interpretations and shifting. Conclusions. Overall, our findings present a challenge to first‐answer‐unsatisfactory explanations of young children's shifting in recall settings, at least where overt pressure to shift is low. Forensic implications are considered.     

Is That What I Said?: Witnesses' Responses to Interviewer Modifications

Modifications occur when interviewers contradict statements made by witnesses or imply that witnesses provided information that they (interviewers) did not provide. Because of their suggestive nature, modifications threaten the reliability of investigative interviews. This study investigated developmental differences in witnesses' responses to modifications during interviews as well as in inclusion of modified misinformation in subsequent answers. Preschool, elementary school, and college students were interviewed about a video presentation. In the experimental conditions, the interviewer contradicted information about the video provided by the participants. Participants then answered two sets of follow-up questions: one immediately following the interview and another 6–8 days later. Results indicated that participants were more likely to ignore modifications than to correct or agree with them. Adult participants were most likely to disagree with modifications. Preschoolers were most likely to incorporate modified misinformation into subsequent answers. Implications of these findings for investigative interviews are discussed.     

Do pre‐admonition suggestions moderate the effect of unbiased lineup instructions?

We examined the additive and interactive effects of pre‐admonition suggestion and lineup instructions (biased or unbiased) on eyewitness identification rates. Participants watched a mock crime video, completed a target‐absent lineup identification, and completed a retrospective memory questionnaire. Prior to attempting an identification, participants were either exposed or not exposed to pre‐admonition suggestions and received biased or unbiased lineup instructions. The pre‐admonition suggestion indicated that it was likely that the perpetrator was in the lineup (surely, you can pick the perpetrator). The pre‐admonition suggestion increased false identification in the unbiased lineup condition. Furthermore, those who received the pre‐admonition suggestion were more certain in their identifications as well as other testimony‐relevant judgments than were those who did not receive the pre‐admonition suggestion. These results suggest that pre‐lineup suggestion can mitigate the beneficial effects of unbiased lineup instructions.     

Inconsistencies across repeated eyewitness interviews: supportive negative feedback can make witnesses change their memory reports

Past work shows that direct negative feedback and suggestive questioning can lead eyewitnesses to change their memory reports. Applying Gudjonsson’s [2003. The psychology of interrogations and confessions: A handbook. West Sussex: Wiley] model of interrogative suggestibility to interviews with witnesses, the present two experiments examined how indirect negative feedback delivered in a supportive manner from an interviewer can make witnesses change what they report they remember experiencing. After viewing a video of a crime, participants were interviewed twice, with either supportive negative feedback (i.e. with the interviewer sympathetically suggesting why many people’s memory may be inaccurate) or neutral feedback between the two rounds of questions. Results showed that people given supportive negative feedback changed significantly more of their responses than those given neutral feedback. Lower confidence ratings were associated with greater response change, but overall, despite having changed more responses, people given supportive negative feedback did not have reduced confidence or perceived accuracy. Type of feedback did not impact accuracy, and accuracy was not systematically related to confidence or perceived accuracy. Given the role that eyewitness reports play in the criminal justice system, better understanding factors that impact consistency and reliability is vital.