The Liberal Democrat Dilemma in Historical Perspective

This article examines Liberal and later Liberal Democrat relationships with other parties, whether through pacts (either electoral or parliamentary) or pursuing realignment. It shows how dilemmas that the Liberal Democrats may face in the future over what to do in a hung parliament have been a constant theme in Liberal politics since the electoral cooperation with Labour in 1906 and the parliamentary arrangement with Irish nationalists in 1910. It then argues that since 1918 the Liberals have been divided between those who were sympathetic to pacts and arrangements with other parties and those who feared compromising their independence. However, it is argued that Liberals fearful of a loss of independence were never able to offer a really effective answer as to how they could succeed in exerting political influence without cooperation. This remains a live debate for the Liberal Democrats.     

Liberal Democrat Leadership: The Cases of Ashdown and Kennedy

Effective leadership of the Liberal Democrats requires a combination of strengths: communications skills, a clear agenda, the ability to manage the party and personal abilities, including stamina, self-confidence and a love for the party itself. This article assesses Paddy Ashdown's and Charles Kennedy's periods as leader. It concludes that the first two phases of Ashdown's leadership were successful: he first ensured the party's survival and then positioned it so that it was able to benefit from the rise in support for the centre-left without being squeezed out by Labour. In the third phase, however, the attempt to deliver a common agenda with Labour was a failure, and Ashdown increasingly lost touch with his own party. Kennedy's first two years as leader were also relatively successful, but after that his leadership fell apart, suffering from a lack of an agenda, a failure of party management, a weakness in communication skills and a lack of self-confidence. His underlying problem was not alcoholism; it was that he was not capable of being an effective leader.     

Social Democracy or Social Liberalism? Ideological Sources of Liberal Democrat Policy

Liberal Democrat policy has been labelled as social democratic, yet the party has been reluctant to so describe itself. Taking Crosland's The Future of Socialism as a reference point, there appears to be much shared ground between social democracy and Liberal Democrat policy. Meanwhile, the party's tax policy adopted in 2006 takes the Croslandite approach of taxing wealth rather than income. Despite this, the article argues that the party is a social liberal rather than a social democratic one. These two political philosophies have so much in common that it is understandable that some commentators see the influence of social democracy where they might instead perceive social liberalism. Yet the two differ in their attitudes to the state. Both see a positive role for the state in furthering social goods. However, social liberalism shares classical liberal concerns about the dangers of an over-mighty state. This approach underpins Liberal Democrat policy.     

Analysing the Liberal Democrats

This article sets the scene for those that follow. It picks out the main themes of each, arguing that the Liberal Democrats could benefit from considering the issues around policy and the nature of political power that arise from the articles. It also argues that debates over relations with other parties are likely to be central to Liberal Democrat politics in the foreseeable future.     

Liberal Democrat Councillors: Community Politics, Local Campaigning and the Role of the Political Party

Liberal Democrats have long displayed the success of community politics since its adoption at the Liberal Party Assembly in 1970. Community politics, however, brings with it not only electoral success but an expectation amongst voters that Liberal Democrat councillors will act in certain ways as local representatives. The article presents the results of national research conducted amongst councillors of the three main parties, and compares the attitudes of Liberal Democrat councillors to aspects of local democracy with those of their Labour and Conservative counterparts. It identifies two types of Liberal Democrat councillor and uses these to explain the attitudinal differences and similarities found with Labour and Conservative councillors.     

The Welsh Liberal Democrats: From Government to Opposition and Then Back Again?

For over 50 years from 1945 onwards, the Liberal Party and then the Liberal Democrats were either in decline in Wales or struggling to survive from election to election. Since 1997, however, there has been a steady evolution in the party's electoral and political strength. Over this past decade, the Welsh Liberal Democrats, as a state party, have experienced a change in electoral fortunes that has on occasions put them into national political power well in advance of their federal counterparts in England. As an autonomous state party within a federal structure, the Welsh Liberal Democrats have been able to take like a duck to water to the arrival of devolution in the form of the Welsh Assembly. This article examines how the evolution of the party has occurred and, in particular, the role that has been played by the Welsh Liberal Democrat Assembly Members in Welsh politics. The article also explores not only the strengths but also the weaknesses that still dog the Welsh party as it seeks once more to become a major force in Welsh politics.     

The Birth and Rebirth of the Liberal Democrats

This article tells the story of the Liberal Democrats from the final days of the Liberal/SDP Alliance to the general election of 1992. Drawing on the author's roles as an MP and as chair of the party's communications operations, it examines the factors that contributed to the party's troubled birth in 1988, and gives an insider's view on how the party survived to grow in the years after 1990. Key issues include the branding of the party and the development of its policy of paying for improvements to education through increasing income tax. It also lays stress on the importance of the party's activist base and its central campaigns expertise in not only surviving in local elections, but also in securing key by-election victories.     

The Environment: A Winner for the Liberal Democrats?

While the Liberal Democrats have a long-standing commitment to environmental sustainability and have over the years developed a range of policies acclaimed by the green NGOs, there remain doubts about the depth of that commitment. In particular, the party's local government environmental record is not notably better than its rivals. With the Conservatives and others now heavily promoting their green credentials, the Liberal Democrats face the dilemma of either being outflanked on the green reputation front or having to adopt much tougher policies that some in the party believe will lose votes. The author argues that one course of action would be to seek cross-party support for achieving agreed environmental targets supported by a menu of tough policies to be introduced if those targets are missed.     

I don't Agree with Nick: Retrodicting the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition

Insider and journalistic accounts of the formation in May 2010 of the Conservative‐Liberal Democrat coalition actually, although not explicitly, rely on types of explanation familiar to those who study politics. They tell us that structure (or at least the economy) was important. So too, they suggest, were institutions (timing and the rules of the game). They also stress the importance of contingency (‘events, dear boy, events’) and agency (who did and said what to whom). While none of these things were unimportant, they only served to make certain an outcome that anyone with a passing acquaintance with the theory and the practice of coalition formation would have predicted—namely a ‘minimum winning coalition’. The only thing that could have made that outcome uncertain was a fundamental ideological difference between the two parties involved; however, it quickly became apparent—to the surprise of those of us who failed to appreciate how much the Liberal Democrats had changed—that no such difference existed. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the coalition formed was not merely minimum winning but ‘minimum connected winning’. As such, its formation was not so much breathtakingly bold and exciting as pretty much inevitable. In the end, the maths and the physics mattered more than the chemistry. Fortunately for the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats seriously underplayed their hand in the negotiations, with possibly disastrous consequences for them in the long term.     

Change and Continuity in the Liberal Democrat General Election Campaign of 2005

This article analyses the Liberal Democrat general election campaign of 2005, with special attention to developments in the party between 2001 and 2005. It argues that there was significant change in policy during that period, towards an agenda emphasising decentralisation and 'tough liberalism'. However, this did not significantly alter the party's overall message from that of 2001, which remained focused on policies such as scrapping university tuition fees. Meanwhile, there was great continuity in campaign strategy and tactics, particularly because of the influence of the party's Chief Executive, Lord Rennard. Tactical innovations in 2005 stemmed from the party's success at fundraising, rather than any decision that new methods of campaigning were necessary. The article concludes with a critical assessment of the campaign, and examines the issues which are likely to arise in forthcoming debates on Liberal Democrat strategy, policy and leadership.     

Grass-roots Influence: Pressure Groups within the Liberal Democrats

This article examines the self-perceived influence of the specified associated organisations and associated organisations within the Liberal Democrats. The analysis is set within the wider theoretical context of political party construction and the dichotomy between the elite and grassroots activists. The article tests the thesis that there is a hierarchical structure of ancillary organisations within the party and that this determines which organisations feel that they have any real influence. It takes a fresh look at the role of the Liberal Democrat ancillary organisations and questions whether or not their party-sanctioned status restricts their ability and willingness to influence the party.     

New Labour,New Protest? How the Liberal Democrats Profited from Blair's Mistakes

Traditionally, the Liberal Democrats and their predecessors have gained seats from Labour and have always seen their support fall during a Labour government. In 2005, and in by-elections from 2003, the party reversed that trend. Yet, apart from particular success amongst Muslims, the resulting change in the social geography of Liberal Democrat support was not accompanied by any major change in the social and ideological character of the individuals who voted for it. The Liberal Democrats remain very much a party whose fortunes rests on its ability to garner protest votes; they are now simply able to secure such support from previous Labour voters too, perhaps because of their perceived ideological proximity to Labour. If the party's support rests once again at the next election on support for centre-left principles, this raises difficult issues if the party appears to be willing to put the Conservatives into government.     

Yellow versus Orange—Never a Fair Fight: An Assessment of Two Contributions to Liberal Politics Separated by Three-quarters of a Century

British Liberals have a thing about colours, especially yellow and orange. Two publications, separated by over seventy years and known by the colour of their respective covers, mark special periods in the history of British liberalism, times when liberals have appeared to be on the comeback trail. The article sets out to make the case that the authors of The Orange Book (published in 2004) have a great deal to learn from their liberal predecessors. Yellow Book liberalism was more radical, better informed and better matched to the most pressing political concerns of its day. It was also more open to arguments and ideas from those who had no particular allegiance to either the Liberal Party or to its political philosophy. Liberals, it is argued, need to be far more concerned about refashioning and revitalising liberalism than about reclaiming or reasserting their exclusive ownership of the fundament of liberal thought.     

How ‘Local’ are the Liberal Democrats? Recent Evidence from Electoral Performance and Campaigning

In order to reclaim a credible place in the British two‐party system, the Liberal Democrats have done much to establish their community credentials. Successfully contesting seats in local elections may offer the best opportunities for a party to exploit limited resources and nurture its grass‐roots support. As a result, the party has been able to build up a reputation for optimising the so‐called snowball effect. This article focuses on two aspects of the Liberal Democrats’ local nature. The first is electoral trends since 1997—in terms of gaining and maintaining council control—and the extent to which this may have acted as a springboard for success in Westminster elections. The second reflects upon the content of campaigning in the 2005 general election. To what extent did the Liberal Democrats prioritise local issues in constituency leaflets? It concludes that the importance of locality to a party like the Liberal Democrats can present a double‐edged sword.     

From 'My Vote' to 'The Real Alternative': Selling the Liberal Democrats

As the third party in British politics, a compelling message is crucial for the Liberal Democrats. Overcoming a prevailing sense of a wasted vote is key—achieved by, we argue, demonstrating political potency. This article explores the synergy between the Liberal Democrat leader and the message; the relationship of each election message to the political reality in which the party finds itself; and the role of polling in messaging. We explore what is—and is not—a message, and the role of negative messaging by the Liberal Democrats since 1992. We consider the limitations of messaging and the lack of control that a third party has over its message. In conclusion, we reflect on what the lessons learnt by the Liberal Democrats over the last four elections may mean for the messaging at the next general election.     

‘Meeting the Challenge’? The Liberal Democrats' Policy Review of 2005–2006

Even before the 2005 election, the Liberal Democrats' Federal Policy Committee had agreed on the need for a review of party policy, in response both to domestic and international political developments since 2001. Intended to build upon the 2002 policy document 'It's About Freedom', 2005 heralded the launch of a Meeting the Challenge policy review, which provided an unprecedented opportunity for party members at all levels to contribute towards the refinement of Liberal Democrat policies and develop a clearer political narrative. This would enable the party to articulate its principles and goals more effectively in the run-up to the next general election. Through a variety of intra-party channels, conduits and forums, hundreds of responses from party members, and local and regional Liberal Democrat parties, offered analyses and policy suggestions. On various issues, these revealed ongoing debates between the party's ( Orange Book ) 'liberals' and 'social democrats'. The outcome of this intra-party consultation exercise was the 2006 policy document 'Trust in People', which was emphatically endorsed at the party's annual conference. This will now provide the framework for further policy development and clarification during the next two years.     

The Liberal Democrats and the Coalition: Driven to the Edge of Europe

When the Liberal Democrats joined the Coalition government in May 2010, there was an expectation that they would have a restraining effect on the Conservatives, particularly in the area of European politics. But after almost five years as the junior party in the Coalition, the Liberal Democrats struggle to demonstrate their influence over the government's approach to Europe. Not only did they let the Conservatives lead the Coalition's European agenda, but they will be forever associated with the government that brought the UK closer to the exit door of the European Union. The article argues that this outcome is the result of a series of avoidable if surprising mistakes, such as the choice of ministerial portfolios and the party's attitude to the Coalition's monitoring mechanisms, as well as some unavoidable mistakes that could have not been foreseen when the Coalition was formed.     

100 Years On: Who are the Inheritors of the ‘New Liberal’ Mantle?

The 'great divorce' of progressive politics at the end of the nineteenth century permanently altered British politics. While the philosophies of the Labour movement and the Liberal Party had many common elements, ideologically they diverged on issues of the role of liberty and the state in relation to the individual and the community to the point that they became irreconcilable. New Liberalism was one result of that debate. Contemporary political debate reflects many of the same features as the turmoil present a century ago, and the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are again contesting much of the same ground. This article seeks to draw out the salient aspects of this debate to conclude which, if either, party is the inheritor of the New Liberal tradition.     

Interventionism by Design or Failure: The Coalition and Humanitarian Intervention

The Coalition took office in 2010 in what seemed to be a relatively benign foreign policy environment. Since then, the international environment has become far more treacherous and the government has considered war on humanitarian grounds on three occasions. In light of the silence of early Coalition documents on humanitarian intervention, together with the two parties’ different positions on the issue, this article assesses the extent to which the Coalition has adopted a distinctive approach to humanitarian intervention. In so doing, it evaluates the relative importance of Conservative and Liberal Democrat traditions in determining the direction of Coalition foreign policy. The article also considers whether there are other, more pertinent factors driving foreign policy, and offers an explanation for its relative isolation from coalition tensions. It concludes by reflecting on the likely future of humanitarian intervention after the May 2015 general election.     

When Second‐Best is Still a No‐Brainer: Why Labour Should Shoot for a Majority Coalition in May 2015

The chances of Labour winning the 2015 general election with a comfortable overall majority are vanishingly small. It could, however, emerge as the largest party or finish just a handful of seats behind the Conservatives. Either scenario would give it at least a chance—and a bigger chance than many realise, we argue—of forming a government. In that event, Labour may be faced with a choice between getting together with another party (or parties) to form a majority coalition or else forming a minority government (either on its own or with one or more partners), which could assemble different majorities for different pieces of legislation or try to negotiate a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement. Given the precedents from the UK and overseas, we argue that, faced with this dilemma, Labour should do all it can to form a majority coalition. We also argue that Labour can learn some useful lessons from the Cameron–Clegg coalition.