Talleyrand and England, 1792–1838: A Reinterpretation

Talleyrand fascinated his contemporaries and later historians alike on account of his wit, style, and epigrams, and perhaps even his policies. Talleyrand drifted across the Channel many times, and so did his policy towards Britain. This article examines his mission to London, 1792–94, and his later attitude towards Britain during the Napoleonic and Restoration periods. In so doing it seeks to demythologise Talleyrand's role as the founder of the Entente Cordiale. His policy, like the Entente itself, was based on ideals rather than realities.     

Keeping a Foot in the Door: Britain's China Policy, 1945-50

Based on Britain and China 1945-1950 (DBPO, 2002), this article examines four major themes in Britain's China policy between 1945 and 1950: British attitudes towards Chinese communism and China's civil war, Anglo-American relations over China, attempts to restore and sustain British commerce in China, and the future of Hong Kong. The central feature of policy was to 'keep a foot in the door', even under a communist government, to protect British interests. Only modest success was achieved. British officials were divided over the issue of Chinese communism and Britain miscalculated the timescale in the ending of the civil war. The US administration proved largely uncooperative over China, and British commerce was eventually squeezed out. Hong Kong survived as a British colony. Amidst the considerable thought given to the future of Hong Kong, and to Britain's ability to defend it, intelligence reported that the communists had no plans to seize the colony.     

A Problem Postponed: Britain and the Future of Austria-Hungary, 1914-18

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907–20

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

South Africa: The Order of Good Hope

Past South African governments already felt the need for honours as instruments of diplomacy in the 1930s, but only instituted the Order of Good Hope in 1973. Inherited British attitudes to honours, the cessation in 1925 of the award of honours bearing titles, and long periods in which civilian honours were not awarded contributed to its frugal use. Wishing to recognize foreign assistance to the liberation movements, from 1994 President Mandela frequently put the Order to use, freely awarding leaders of foreign governments. However, restraint returned after the initial surge. Since instituting new orders in 2003, President Mbeki has emphasised substantial merit as the key to admission.

“Yes, I should have given more praise.” The Duke of Wellington, who defeated Napoleon, became Commander-in-Chief and later Prime Minister of Great Britain, when asked whether there was anything in his life that he could have done better.

     

Austen Chamberlain and the continental balance of power: strategy, stability, and the league of nations, 1924-29

As foreign secretary from November 1924 to June 1929, Austen Chamberlain dominated British foreign policy. Central to his diplomatic strategy was the maintenance of the European balance of power and, in this circumstance, pursuit of a leadership role for Britain within the League of Nations. The foundation upon which Chamberlain based his European strategy lay with his determination to have Britain play the vital role of stabilizing relations between France and Germany, whose mutual antipathy after the Great War, compounded by the severity of the Treaty of Versailles, threatened continental security. By October 1925, his work bore fruit with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements. For the remainder of his tenure at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain used Locarno - and Germany's membership in the League that was part of that settlement - as the diplomatic mechanism to underwrite his strategic conception of the balance of power. This article addresses the neglected issue of the strategic base of Chamberlain's European policy and addresses three criticisms of his record as foreign secretary.     

Climbing off the Back Burner: Lyndon Johnson's Soft Power Approach to Africa

The general historiography of United States–African relations in the 1960s holds that the policies of Lyndon Johnson towards this continent were a failure. Johnson, most historians suggest, generally ignored Africa and, in doing so, squandered the good feelings that many Africans had developed towards his more charming and polished predecessor. However, such views do a disservice to the Johnson Administration, which in fact embarked on a quiet African programme rooted in American cultural and economic power, and which proved to be more successful than is generally believed. Two factors lay at the heart of Johnson's decision to rely on a soft power policy in Africa: the domestic political constraints of the civil rights movement at home; and the belief in modernisation theory that had emerged as a guiding principle for many of his advisors. Johnson, to put it simply, may have lacked his predecessor's style but he compensated with a substantive and imaginative policy that quietly produced a superior method of advancing both American and African interests.     

The Press,Public Opinion,Arms Limitation,and Government Policy in Britain, 1932-34: Some Preliminary Observations

One of the least understood issues concerning interwar Britain is the connection between public opinion and the development and implementation of foreign and defence policy. And what is true generally of these crucial elements of interwar British statecraft is doubly so for perhaps their most nettled subset: disarmament. Public opinion polling did not begin in Britain till 1937; yet in 1932-34, when Britain played a leading role in the League of Nations-sponsored World Disarmament Conference, government ministers and their civil service and armed forces advisors sought to produce policy for this conference that would balance between limiting the national armoury and protecting national and Imperial security. Their reading of public opinion was crucial; but so, too, was the reading that the opposition parties and extra-parliamentary interest groups did and the subsequent pressures that they brought to bear on the government. This article offers some preliminary observations on the efficacy of using the national press as a means both of assessing public attitudes and of connecting the public debate over disarmament policy with policymaking within the British government.     

High Hopes,Bold Aims,Limited Results: Britain and the Establishment of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950–1953

Although a great deal has been written about British policy in the Middle East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the reorganization of the Southern flank of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe after the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the assumption of NATO's naval Mediterranean Command by Britain has attracted little attention. This article analyses British aims and policy on the formation of the Mediterranean Command, the talks between London and Washington concerning the appointment of a Naval Commander-in-Chief, the attitudes of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey towards British policy, and finally, the establishment of NATO's Mediterranean Command in conjunction with the reorganization of SHAPE's Southern flank. For strategic as well as prestige reasons, Britain tried to retain its traditional dominant eastern Mediterranean position by encouraging the establishment of an Allied naval Mediterranean Command under a British Commander-in-Chief. However, the decline of British military and naval power and political influence meant that Britain secured a compromise settlement which only partially satisfied its aspirations.     

The Press, Public Opinion, Arms Limitation, and Government Policy in Britain, 1932-34: Some Preliminary Observations

One of the least understood issues concerning interwar Britain is the connection between public opinion and the development and implementation of foreign and defence policy. And what is true generally of these crucial elements of interwar British statecraft is doubly so for perhaps their most nettled subset: disarmament. Public opinion polling did not begin in Britain till 1937; yet in 1932-34, when Britain played a leading role in the League of Nations-sponsored World Disarmament Conference, government ministers and their civil service and armed forces advisors sought to produce policy for this conference that would balance between limiting the national armoury and protecting national and Imperial security. Their reading of public opinion was crucial; but so, too, was the reading that the opposition parties and extra-parliamentary interest groups did and the subsequent pressures that they brought to bear on the government. This article offers some preliminary observations on the efficacy of using the national press as a means both of assessing public attitudes and of connecting the public debate over disarmament policy with policymaking within the British government.     

René Massigli's Mission to London, 1944–1954

René Massigli's considerable contribution to French diplomacy began during the First World War. After being closely involved with many significant developments in French foreign policy during the inter-war years, Massigli then served alongside Charles de Gaulle during the Second World War. Informed by his experience of the 1930s, he adopted a view of western European security that saw him determined to promote greater co-operation between France and Britain to withstand a potential German resurgence and a looming Soviet threat. But following France's efforts after 1950 to promote European integration based on Franco-German co-operation, Massigli re-defined his role of ambassador and openly challenged French initiatives such as the Schuman Plan and, in particular, the European Defence Community, not only because they did not include Britain, but also because they threatened his view of French security. This analysis assesses Massigli's strategic vision and his attempts to overcome the underlying constraints.     

太平洋战争期间英国对缅甸政策出台始末

战前 ,缅甸的民族独立运动已使英殖民当局难以招架 ,英国政府不得不向民族主义者许诺 ,在条件成熟时 ,英国将给缅甸自治 ,但这个许诺不过是一个遥遥无期的长把伞。欧战爆发 ,使英国政府无力顾及它在远东的殖民地 ,缅甸民族主义者再次看到独立的希望 ,但是 ,英国政府逆历史潮流而行 ,仍然采用欧战爆发前的殖民政策来对付缅甸的民族主义 ,特别是在太平洋战争爆发后 ,缅甸民族主义提出联英抗日 ,促进缅甸独立的政治主张遭到英殖民当局的拒绝 ,英国不顾已经变化了的国际形势 ,采取高压政策 ,大肆逮捕民族主义领袖 ,使缅甸民族主义者转向日本 ,以…     

From “War-in-Sight” to Nearly War: Anglo-French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875-1898

The 1904 entente has cast a long shadow across the twentieth century. As a political “myth,” the notion of an entente cordiale between the two longstanding European enemies and overseas rivals France and Britain has overtaken the event itself, in so far as its historical importance is concerned. In this way, the notion of the entente has tended to obscure important aspects of a more complex and ambiguous history of cross-Channel relations. Using a range of British and French diplomatic, naval and private papers, this chapter examines the tensions in Anglo-French relations, caused by balance-of-power considerations in Europe and overseas imperial competition, between the “War-in-Sight” crisis of 1875 and the 1898 Fashoda stand-off.     

Learning to Pull the Strings after Suez: Macmillan’s Management of the Eisenhower Administration during the Intervention in Jordan, 1958

This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan within the study of Anglo–American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain’s economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain’s maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources.     

‘Gunboats of soft power’: Boris on Africa and post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’

As Britain prepares to leave the European Union after the popular vote of June 2016, the government is embarking on the revision of foreign policy. Boris Johnson, or ‘just Boris’, has been entrusted with forging the new ‘Global Britain’ for the post-Brexit era and reinventing British economy around new relationships. Boris has a track record of misrepresenting and offending foreign peoples, leaders and countries. This article assesses the prospects for Africa in Johnson’s vision for ‘Global Britain’ as presented in his foreign policy speeches. The paper unpacks Johnson’s discursive construction of ‘Africa’ and inserts it into a broader historical and political context of British relations with Africa. It argues that, by constructing Africa as a ‘problem’ and offering liberal values as a condition for development, Johnson is continuing British imperial and post-colonial discourses of ‘developing’ or ‘civilizing’ Africa. In the post-Brexit world of a changing global balance of power, democratic conditionality serves to sustain and reproduce British forms of power and policies.     

小泉八云异文化理解中的归属意识

小泉八云于1890年赴日,后加入日本国籍。他的作品洋溢着对日本古老文明的赞美、怀念以及对西方文明的辛辣批判。这使得他在当时倡导"和魂洋才"的明治日本中期成了"日本文化发现的恩人"。经历了从英国、法国、美国、再到日本的流离生活,使得他对异文化有着自己独到的理解,本文将从比较文化论角度通过分析小泉八云对日本文化的受容及其文学作品,探究小泉八云对异文化以及自身归属问题的认识。     

Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British,French, and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy

Post-Cold War military reforms in Britain, France, and Germany have been characterized by patterns of convergence in the objectives, instruments, and institutional forums of defense policy but by divergence in temporality. These patterns of convergence and divergence cannot be fully explained by cultural approaches. Neither can they be explained solely by a focus on the role of international structure, as neo-realism posits, although the post-Cold War distribution of capabilities is driving Britain, France, and Germany toward policy convergence. Instead, the analysis builds upon the insights of neoclassical realism. Culture emerges not so much as a cause of action as instrumental and a resource for policy leaders in the domestic political and temporal management of reform.     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

试论英国在缅甸的早期殖民政策

1885年底英国最终吞并缅甸后,在宗教方面,采取了所谓的“中文化”不干涉政策;在政治方面,采取了“分而治之”的政策和“金字塔型”的行政体系;在经济方面,采取了“单一制”的经济掠夺模式;在文化方面,采取了“世俗化”的殖民文化政策,笔者认为英国殖民者对缅甸采取的各项殖民政策导致了缅甸社会的畸形发展,这也是导致缅甸独立后社会发展及其缓慢的原因所在。     

The red air force in Italy, 1944: A case study in the formation of British Policy to the Soviet Union in world war II

In March 1944, the Soviets requested permission to base some aircraft in southern Italy. As the area was under Anglo-American control, this raised some significant issues concerning wartime cooperation with the Soviets. Once it was set up, the base (at Bari) was used to send an unannounced mission to the Communist part of the Greek resistance movement. This paper considers the development of British attitudes towards these Soviet activities and demonstrates how the issue throws light on the making of British policy towards the USSR at this time: the conflicting views in different departments concerning the best method of handling the Soviets and the strategic significance of Soviet activities in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.