Interview: Gary Hart

Gary Hart was a U.S. senator from Colorado, 1975–87. Sen. Hart was a Democratic presidential candidate in 1984 and 1988. He co-chaired, with Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH), the U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century (1998–2001). The following interview was conducted by Gareth Porter, an independent historian and foreign-policy analyst, on October 12, 2005 (see his article "A Responsible Exit Strategy" in Middle East Policy , Vol. XII, No. 3, fall 2005).     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article: BIRSL, Ursula (2005): Migration und Migrationspolitik im Prozess der europäischen Integration? Opladen: Barbara Budrich, 360 Seiten. BERTOZZI, Fabio, Giuliano BONOLI et Benoīt GAY‐DES‐COMBES (2005). La réforme de l'état social en Suisse. Vieillissement, emploi, conflit travail‐famille. Collection Le savoir suisse. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, 131 pages. BOCHSLER, Daniel, Christophe KOLLER, Pascal SCIARINI, Sylvie TRAIMOND und Ivar TRIPPOLINI (2005). Die Schweizer Kantone unter der Lupe. Behörden, Personal, Finanzen. Bern, Stuttgart, Wien: Haupt, 167 Seiten. DONGES, Patrick (Hrsg.)(2005). Politische Kommunikation in der Schweiz. Bern, Stuttgart, Wien: Haupt Verlag, 224 Seiten. KLÖTI, Ulrich, Christian HIRSCHI, Uwe SERDÜLT und Thomas WIDMER (2005). Verkannte Aussenpolitik. Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweiz. Zürich, Chur: Verlag Rüegger, 322 Seiten.     

The Organization of the Islamic Conference: Sharing an Illusion

Among Dr. Akbarzadeh's latest publications are Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism and Washington's Security Agenda ( London: Zed Books, 2005) and Islam and the West: Reflections from Australia (Sydney: UNSWPress, 2005). Ms. Connor researches Islamic militancy in the West.¹     

Some recent additions to the library

Richard Calland &; Paul Graham (Eds), IDASA's Democracy Index — Democracy in the Time of Mbeki, Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Cape Town, 2005, R150, 252 pages.

Pieter Wolvaardt, A Diplomat's Story: Apartheid and Beyond, 1969–1998, South Africa: Galago Publishing, 2005. ISBN 1–919854–15–0, R225, 336 pages.

Greg Mills, The Security Intersection: The Paradox of Power in an Age of Terror, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2005, 321 pages.

Hugh Pope, Sons of the Conquerors. The Rise of the Turkic World, New York: Overlook Duckworth, 2005. ISBN 1–58567–641–1. 413 pages.     

Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe

In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina(OM), a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economicand political activity in the country’s urban areas. Thisarticle employs a national probability sample survey to analysethe popular reactions of ordinary Zimbabweans to this landmarkevent. It shows that the application of state repression succeedsat some goals, fails at others, and has powerful unintendedeffects. We report that the scope of OM was wide and that themain victims of OM were younger, unemployed families whom statesecurity agents saw as potential recruits for social unrest.Whereas OM undoubtedly disrupted the informal economy, we showthat it did not succeed in banishing urban dwellers to ruralareas or permanently shutting down illicit trade. Moreover,the crackdown thoroughly discredited the police and other stateinstitutions. We also demonstrate that state repression emboldenedits victims, deepening polarisation between political partiesand fortifying the ranks of Zimbabwe’s opposition movement. ^1. Disturbing accounts of the human toll are given by the CatholicCommission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Breaking the Silence,Building True Peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabelelandand the Midlands, 1980 to 1988 (Legal Resources Foundation,Harare, 1997) and Richard Werbner, Tears of the Dead (EdinburghUniversity Press, Edinburgh, 1991). On systematic electoralviolence, see Norma Kriger, ‘ZANU-PF strategies in generalelections, 1980–2000: discourse and coercion’, AfricanAffairs 104 (2005), pp. 1–34. On the violence associatedwith land invasions and crackdowns on journalists, see StephenChan, Robert Mugabe: A life of power and violence (I.B. Taurus,London, 2003) and Andrew Meldrum, Where We Have Hope: A memoirof Zimbabwe (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2004). ^2. For an insightful collection of current analyses by a varietyof Zimbabwean commentators, see David Harold-Berry (ed.), Zimbabwe:The past is the future (Weaver Press, Harare, 2004). ^3. ‘Zimbabwe police target minibuses’, BBC News, 24May 2005. ^4. The Joint Operations Command - comprised of army, police, prisons,and intelligence heads - coordinates military and security affairsand, on these matters, now carries greater policy weight thanthe civilian cabinet. A senior state intelligence officer wasquoted as saying that ‘the operation is meant to reducethe number of people in the central business district so that,if violence erupts, it would be easy to contain.’ ZimOnline (South Africa) www.zimonline.co.za, 24 May 2005. JournalistBaffour Ankomah, usually sympathetic to Mugabe, also reportedthat ‘the operation was the brainchild of Zimbabwe’sintelligence community’ designed to forestall ‘aUkrainian-style revolution’ New African (London), October2005, reprinted in The Herald (Harare), 4–5 October 2005. ^5. Government of Zimbabwe, ‘Response of the Government ofZimbabwe to the Report by the UN Special Envoy on OperationMurambatsvina/Restore Order’ (Harare, 2005). ^6. ‘Rallying cry belies Mugabe’s fear of voter revolt’,The Times (UK), 31 March 2005. ^7. Compared to the 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU-PF’sshare of elected seats rose from 62 to 78, and the MDC’sshare fell from 57 to 41. With the support of an additional30 appointed MPs in the 150-seat House, ZANU-PF therefore enjoyeda two-thirds majority, enough to change the constitution. ^8. Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ‘Statement on the 2005parliamentary elections’, Harare, 3 April 2005. See alsoCarole Andrews and Bryn Morgan, ‘Zimbabwe after the 2005parliamentary elections’, Research Paper No. 05/58 (UKHouse of Commons Library, London, August 2005). ^9. ‘Police in Zimbabwe arrest 9000 traders’, Guardian(UK), 24 May 2005. ^10. ‘Zimbabwe government continues blitz’, AssociatedPress, 5 June 2005. ^11. ‘U.N. condemns Zimbabwe for bulldozing urban slums,’New York Times, 23 July 2005. ^12. United Nations, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabweto Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina bythe UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe,Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka (United Nations, New York, 18 July 2005),p. 7. ^13. ‘UN chief Annan’s statement on Zimbabwe demolitions’,Reuters, 22 July 2005. ^14. ‘Zimbabwe steams ahead with demolitions’, Mail andGuardian (SA), 26 July 2005. ^15. See ‘UN envoy says Zimbabwe’s crisis is deepening’,Business Day (SA), 7 December 2005 and ‘New threat ofurban demolition’, IRIN - Integrated Regional InformationNetworks (UN), 7 April 2006. ^16. For information on country coverage and research methods, seewww.afrobarometer.org. ^17. The sampling frame was the Government of Zimbabwe, Central StatisticalOffice, Census 2000 Zimbabwe: Preliminary results summary (GovernmentPrinter, Harare, 2003). In drawing the national probabilitysample, we followed the standard Afrobarometer sampling protocol,which can be found at http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html.For ease of access to the present article, we did not burdenthe text with extensive methodological apparatus. If readershave queries about data collection or analysis, they are invitedto visit the website or contact the authors directly. ^18. ‘Zimbabwe takes harsh steps in major cities to counterunrest’, New York Times, 2 June 2005. ^19. Action Aid International/Combined Harare Residents Association,A Study on the Impact of ‘Operation/Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’ in 26 Wards of Harare High Density Housing Areas(AA/CHRA, Harare, July 2005). ^20. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission (2005), p. 8. ^21. Ibid., p. 34. ^22. ‘Annan may take up Mugabe invite’, The Scotsman(UK), 26 July 2005. ^23. ‘Mugabe hoping to sidestep Mbeki and Annan’, SundayIndependent (SA), 24 July 2005. Zimbabwe’s Ambassadorto the UN also branded the report ‘exaggerated’,BBC News, 27 July 2005. ^24. The margin of sampling error for a survey with 1048 respondentsis plus or minus 3 percentage points at a 95 percent level ofconfidence. The confidence interval around the point estimateof 54 percent for OM victimization is therefore between 51 and57 percent. This result almost exactly replicates the findingof an earlier survey conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute.Based on a national probability sample of similar size (n =1041) and using the same question, MPOI found in July-August2005 that 55 percent of respondents reported that they or theirimmediate families were affected. See Eldred Masunungure andAnyway Ndapadzwa, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005: Post-Parliamentarysurvey report (MPOI, Harare, August 2005). ^25. Census 2002, p.1. ^26. This guesstimate is conservative compared to the Reserve Bankof Zimbabwe’s claim of 3.4 million Zimbabweans livingabroad in 2004 (www.homelinkzimbabwe.com) and various journalisticaccounts of 3 million or more, for example by Geoff Hill, WhatHappens After Mugabe? (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), p. 2. ^27. The World Bank’s African Development Indicators says 43percent are under age 14 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004),p. 309. ^28. Or, taking sampling error into account, between 2.55 and 2.85million. ^29. Survey respondents may have used an especially broad subjectivedefinition when defining an OM victim as a member of their ‘immediatefamily’. There is also a small risk that some victimswere double-counted as members of more than one respondent’sextended family. Either way, we doubt that we have undercounted. ^30. Squatter settlements were unapproved, but many of them had existingcourt judgments that prevented the government from removingthem without providing alternative accommodation. Some shacksin urban areas even had planning permission. ^31. ‘Msika officially launches operation Garikai’, TheHerald (Harare), 30 June 2005. Also ‘Zimbabwe: operationlive well struggles to take off’, IRIN - Integrated RegionalInformation Networks (UN), 19 August 2005. ^32. In Zimbabwe, as in other African countries, young and unemployedpeople are least likely to vote. ^33. Mass Public Opinion Institute, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005 (MPOI,Harare, 2005) p. iii. ^34. Note: the percentage figures should be treated with cautionas the number of cases is small (n = 56). ^35. Sixty percent of these respondents were urban versus 34 percentrural. ^36. 35 percent among the former versus 37 percent among the latter. ^37. 41 percent among the random sample of adults, 45 percent amongdisplaced persons. ^38. For 2004 estimates of institutional trust, see Michael Bratton,Annie Chikwana, and Tulani Sithole, ‘Propaganda and publicopinion in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary AfricanStudies 23, 1 (2005), pp. 77–108. ^39. According to an official report, ‘Police had been approachedby local authorities to help in enforcing Council by-laws, whichwere being ignored . . . (and) to relocate street kids, vagrants,touts and vendors who were causing chaos in town.’ ZimbabweRepublic Police, ‘Zimbabwe Republic Police response toallegations of deaths suffered during Operation Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’, (Harare, August 2005). ^40. This slight adjustment lies within the margin of sampling errorfor a single survey. ^41. Pearson’s r = 0.271, p < 0.001. ^42. By 9 percentage points: 71 percent for OM victims versus 80percent for non-victims. ^43. ‘Price of basics soars beyond reach of poor Zimbabweans’,Mail and Guardian (South Africa), 20 March 2006. ^44. Pearson’s r = 0.962, p < 0.001. Indeed, these indicatorsare so closely correlated that either could act as a proxy forthe other. ^45. The proportion of MDC supporters who said they did not trustthe ruling party ‘at all’ rose from 49 percent inApril 2004 to 62 percent in October 2005. ^46. Although the results of the bye-election of May 2006 in Budirirosuggest the mainstream MDC headed by Morgan Tsvangirai has littleto fear from the breakaway MDC faction led by Arthur Mutambara. ^47. See International Crisis Group, ‘Post-election Zimbabwe:What next?’ Africa Report No. 93 http://www.crisisgroup.org(7 June, 2005). ^48. Eldred, Masunungure, Anyway Ndapwadza, and Noma Sibanda, ‘Supportfor democracy and democratic institutions in Zimbabwe’,Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 27 http://www.afrobarometer.org(March 2006). ^49. International Crisis Group, ‘Zimbabwe’s operationMurambatsvina: the tipping point?’ Africa Report No. 97,p. 4 http://www.crisisgroup.org (17 August, 2005). ^50. ‘African leaders break silence over Mugabe’s humanrights abuses’, The Guardian (UK), 4 January 2006.     

Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski

Dr. Brzezinski was national-security adviser to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981. He is a trustee and counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor of American foreign policy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. The following interview was conducted by Middle East Policy editor Anne Joyce on April 20, 2005.     

Two Steps Forward,One Step Back: Merkel's CDU/CSU and the Politics of Welfare State Reform

Given its traditional support for conservative welfare state policies, the Christian Democratic Union's embrace of major reform measures in late 2003 seemingly marked a significant shift in the party's direction. The extent of its commitment to this new course became a key question in German politics during the election of 2005 and the early phase of Angela Merkel's Grand Coalition. This article examines the factors that contributed to her CDU's embrace of welfare state retrenchment in light of the literature on the politics of social policy reform. It argues that this shift in party policy was driven mainly by calculations of perceived partisan opportunity and organisational latitude. When the latter appeared to change, the consensus on major reform within the CDU crumbled, which in turn affected the party's 2005 campaign and its role in the Grand Coalition government.     

Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?

Abstract

This article provides a novel conceptual framework to understand the impact of the European Union on Turkish politics and policies in the aftermath of the opening of accession negotiations in 2005. It argues that the post-2005 developments in Turkey not only attest to lesser and more limited Europeanisation, but also entail a process that is increasingly gaining momentum in the country and which is referred to as ‘de-Europeanisation’.     

2005年法国骚乱后的法国移民政策研究

2005年法国骚乱凸显了法国政府在移民问题上的治理危机,作为其移民政策的共和模式亦受到广泛质疑。本文以2005年法国骚乱为切入点,研究法国政府在2005年法国骚乱这一少数族裔群体性事件爆发后,做了哪些政策调整,以及这些调整能否有效地应对2005年骚乱凸显的问题。2005年法国骚乱后的法国移民政策出现了一系列的变化：在对外的入境与入籍政策上进一步收紧,在对内的移民社会融入政策上注重从移民个体和群体两个方面促进移民的社会融入。但总体而言,新政策虽有局部微调,但本质不变且还有加强,技术层面上的变化并不意味着价值层面上的变革。     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article: BECKER, Uwe and Herman M. SCHWARTZ (eds.)(2005). Employment ‘Miracles’. A Critical Comparison of the Dutch, Scandinavian, Swiss, Australian and Irish Cases versus Germany and the US. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 287 pages. CHABAL, Patrick and Jean‐Pascal DALOZ (2006). Culture Troubles. Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning. London: Hurst & Company, 395 pages. KOOPMANS, Ruud, Paul STATHAM, Marco GIUGNI and Florence PASSY (2005). Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 312 pages. OBINGER, Herbert, Stephan LEIBFRIED and Francis G. CASTLES (eds.) (2005). Federalism and the Welfare State. New World and European Experiences. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 380 pages.     

Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement?

The Abyei Area, straddling the North–South border of Sudan,was the subject of a separate protocol in the ComprehensivePeace Agreement signed between the Sudan government and theSudan People's Liberation Movement in January 2005. One provisionof that protocol was the establishment of a boundaries commissionto define the territory to be included in the special administrationof the area. The commission's decision was to be implemented‘with immediate effect’ on the submission of itsreport in July 2005, but implementation has been blocked bythe National Congress Party, which still controls the centralgovernment in Sudan. The conduct of war in Abyei establishedmany precedents for the conduct of war in Darfur in the useof tribal militias and the forcible displacement of non-Arabpeoples. The failure to implement the Abyei Protocol has implicationsnot only for determining the North–South border (as stipulatedby the CPA), but for the implementation of any Darfur peaceagreement. Douglas H. Johnson (douglas{at}wendoug.free-online.co.uk) was aresource person at the first session of negotiations on theThree Areas at Karen, Kenya, in January 2003 and subsequentlyserved as an international expert on the Abyei Boundaries Commission.He has recently advised the Government of South Sudan on theNorth–South boundary issue.     

Obtuaries

Hiromi Kinoshita is Exhibition Assistant for the First Emperor exhibition and a catalogue contributor. She was co-curator of the Royal Academy exhibition, China: The Three Emperors (1662–1722) held in 2005–6. A graduate of Wellesley College, Mass., she gained a PhD at Oxford University researching the hybrid burial practices of the Liao Khitan (907–1125).     

A Political Economy Forecast for the 2005 British General Election

Recently, we proposed an original statistical model for forecasting general elections in the United Kingdom, based on the observation of a few key indicators of the political and economic system. That vote function model was tested against the results of the 2001 general election. Here we evaluate the results of that test, and offer an appropriately revised model for the forecasting of the upcoming 2005 general election. According to our forecast, a Labour victory appears the most likely outcome.     

Emerging Patterns in Liberia's Post-Conflict Politics: Observations from the 2005 Elections

The 2005 elections were the first Liberian elections in overa century in which the political environment was controlledneither by the settler oligarchy nor, latterly, by the dictatorsSamuel Doe and Charles Taylor. Observers feared that the post-conflictenvironment was not conducive to holding elections and thata serious programme of reconciliation and constitutional reformshould have preceded them. Nevertheless, elections were conductedwith some degree of success, providing an opportunity to identifysome emerging patterns in post-conflict Liberian politics. Thisarticle assesses some of the new or hitherto dormant institutionsand processes that are likely to play a significant role inshaping Liberia's political order in the twenty-first century.     

Yet another coup d'État in Germany? Schröder's vote of confidence and parliamentary government in Germany

According to some political commentators Gerhard Schröder's decision in May 2005 to use a ‘false’ vote of confidence in order to have the Bundestag dissolved was nothing less than a coup d'état. From this vantage point an incumbent chancellor had put party interests above crucial aspects of the Basic Law. The debate ensuing Schröder's decision is, thus, to be understood as a variation of a controversy about the legitimate power of parties in the political system, i.e. about the essence of the parliamentary form of government in Germany. In order to bring these issues to the fore the article first describes the chronology of events triggered by Gerhard Schröder's (and Franz Müntefering's) announcements on 22 May 2005. It then examines the five motions for a vote of confidence that have been brought to the floor of the Bundestag since 1949. Finally, it discusses the question of whether the Bundestag should receive the constitutional right to dissolve itself. Overall the analysis supports the view that the vote of confidence has been totally subsumed under the logic of parliamentary government in Germany.     

Model or deterrence? The United States presidential election campaigns and the bundestag election campaigns

This article focuses on the election of the President of the United States of America in 2004 and on the premature election of the Bundestag in Germany in 2005. The main questions which are discussed are: Where can we currently discern central similarities in campaigning, which remain functionally powerful despite the considerable differences in system and context? What can be learned from the United States 2004 presidential election campaign for future Bundestag election campaigns in Germany? Can we observe developments in the USA which we have already seen in the 2005 Bundestag election? Could these trends be useful for the German parties in the future? This contribution argues that there are some developments in the United States which may prove useful to the German parties in future Bundestag campaigns.     

Structural Impedimentsto Economic Globalizationin the Middle East

Dr. Kamrava is professor and chair of the Political Science Department at California State University, Northridge. His latest book is The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War (University of California Press, forthcoming 2005).