Reflections on Japan's past

Fifty years after the devastation of World War II, Japan's remarkable long‐term, export‐driven economic success is known as the East Asian development model and East Asian economies have become the engine for the world's economic growth. Yet the collapse of Japan's 1980s over‐inflated “bubble economy” has created apathy and pessimism, says former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. In May 1995, on the occasion of his seventy‐seventh birthday, after more than 45 years in the Diet, IIPS Chairman Nakasone reflects on Japan's modern history and issues a call for renewal in the following speech. Above all, he says, “Japan does have a few mavericks” and “people with true convictions [should] come forward . . . the Japanese are waiting for genuine leadership.”     

The ending of Japan's ODA loan programme to China—All's well that ends well?

Official Development Assistance has been the most important instrument of Japan's foreign policy towards China since 1979 and has been useful in softening many difficulties in the bilateral relationship. Most of Japan's ODA to China consists of yen loans. Usually the Japanese government adheres to certain economic indicators set by the international banking institutions in order to phase out ODA programmes. However, in 2005 the Japanese government decided abruptly without applying the usual guidelines to end its loan aid to China by 2008, the year China will stage the Olympic Games. The article concludes that the decision was taken for political reasons, taking into consideration the criticism of certain Chinese policies, the deterioration of Japan's relations with China, the fast economic development of China with its implications for Japan's interests, and a general aid fatigue of public opinion against the backdrop of Japan's economic and budgetary problems. The process leading to this decision throws an additional light on all the complexities of the bilateral relationship, including the historical legacy.     

A new phase in Japanese economic cooperation

The merging of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the ExportImport Bank of Japan to form the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signals a new phase in Japanese economic cooperation. In this article, Akira Nishigaki, former president of the OECF , describes the role and significance of Japan's official development assistance and considers recent policy trends and issues. It is essential for the peace and prosperity of Japan and of the world as a whole, he says, that Japan maintain favorable relations of interdependence in the international community. In this spirit, he expresses his hope that in funding and implementing assistance the JBIC will continue to strengthen Japan's considerable contribution to the development of developing countries.     

Why Japan's Development Aid Matters Most for Dealing with Global Environmental Problems

It is evident that Japan has made global environmental issues a top priority in its foreign policy agenda since the early 1990s. Although Japan's “environmental ODA” decision-making copes with numerous hurdles arising on both external and internal fronts, this world's largest donor nation has already shouldered a great financial responsibility to help resolve such problems on a global scale. Moreover, Tokyo has played a prominent role in efforts to establish major legally binding international agreements on environmental issues. This study argues why Japan with its economic prowess, extensive experience, and modern technologies is one of the most important actors contributing to the environment, despite the recent withering trend of Tokyo's ODA volume. Although the environment is just the kind of global dilemma the UN is perfectly positioned to address, there is actually a startling array of environmental concerns in which enhanced participation and cooperation by Japan could really make a difference. Therefore, as Japan has the goal of attaining a niche in world environmental leadership, the country needs to elevate the strategy, efficiency, and effectiveness of its aid diplomacy in the days to come.     

Chinese and Japanese development co-operation: South–South,North–South,or what?

This article compares the evolution and characteristics of Chinese and Japanese aid, assessing the impact of their aid policies in sub-Saharan Africa from the 1950s to the present. It argues that China and Japan's aid programmes share more similarities than dissimilarities. Both pursue aid strategies that spread allocations across a region rather than concentrating upon specific countries. The article seeks to clarify the following questions. In what way are Chinese and Japanese aid strategies different from each other and Western donors? Should their aid be seen as a form of South–South co-operation that provides an alternative to the West's hegemony in Africa? Or is aid from these donors simply another strategy to control African resources and state elites in the guise of a partnership of equals?     

The evolution of Japan's role in ‘Lusophone’ Africa: From inertia to action

This article explores Japan's relations with Lusophone Africa over the past 60 years. It asks what factors have propelled Japan's shift from a foreign policy based on inertia to a more proactive one. Arguably, colonialism and postcolonialism linked to the Cold War politics had a negative impact on Japan's relations with the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) and Africa as a whole; this contrasts with Japan's process of ‘Africanisation’ after 1990, reflective of changing external and internal circumstances. The question arises as to whether Japan's relations with the specific PALOP states, and with the group as a whole, have been influenced by, or have had influence over, Japan's long-term approach to other African states. Lastly, what characterises Japan's approach to the PALOP? Findings show mutual gains beyond the simple exploitation of natural resources towards broad-based sustainable growth. Still, from the perspective of the poorest PALOP, development cooperation and trade benefits are unbalanced and insufficient.     

Development of the Mekong Region as Part of Japan's Diplomatic Strategy for East Asia

Japan's active engagement in the development of the Mekong region since the 1990s needs to be understood not only from an economic but also from a diplomatic perspective. Japan seeks to collaborate with ASEAN in facilitating multilateral “political dialogue” in the Asia-Pacific region and building an East Asian order based on “universal values” such as democracy and the rule of law, and the Mekong region could be the “weakest link” of ASEAN. After outlining Japan's twenty-year undertaking to cultivate Mekong-Japan cooperation, the author suggests that it is time to broaden the scope of the cooperation and accelerate Japan's “proactive contribution to peace” policy to cope with the changing security environment.     

Japan's Environmental Cooperation with China During the Last Two Decades

Up until now, Japan's environmental cooperation with China has principally been in response to requests by the Chinese government, with Japan making major contributions in the areas of environmental policy, human resource development, and environmental management systems, and the construction of physical infrastructure. Unlike some other Western donors, Japan is heavily engaged in resolving various environmental problems throughout the whole of China, and these contributions will continue to play a powerful role in improving China's environment for many years to come. Moreover, Japan has also made a major contribution to the raising of environmental awareness among the general public throughout China, and has been instrumental in empowering Chinese environmental citizen's groups. Specifically, Japan has been providing the Chinese government with yen loans and technical cooperation, and has supplied it with many new concepts and mechanisms in the areas of environmental policy, management systems and physical infrastructure, as well. Japan has also provided a foundation for the development of China's environmental industry by means of technology transfer and human resources development. By supplying grant aid to different parts of China, Japan has played a pioneering role in the field of environmental protection in China, enabling the expansion of training and educational facilities and programs to which the Chinese government failed, due to putting a premium on a high economic growth, to allocate sufficient budget despite its awareness of the gravity of the problems that it faces. NGO environmental cooperation programs that use Japanese government grassroots and NGO grant aid and assistance of the Japan Fund for Global Environment have been highly significant factors in the resolution at the regional level of the serious environmental problems that have arisen throughout China. The role that these have played in intensifying exchanges and friendly relations at the grassroots level between Japan and the Chinese people has been highly commendable. In particular, environmental cooperation programs with China through the ten-year-old Sino-Japan Friendship Centre for Environmental Protection (SJC) have not been confined solely to solving China's environmental problems, and have accordingly helped to build a foundation for environmental cooperation with China's various neighbors and thus helped to enhance China's standing internationally.     

Geopolitics and Soft Power: Japan's Cultural Policy and Cultural Diplomacy in Asia

Japan's cultural policy and cultural diplomacy in Asia has changed dramatically over the past one hundred years, from actively introducing and imposing Japanese culture during its empire-building period, to essentially avoiding the promotion of Japanese culture in Asia for most of the postwar period due to fears of being seen once again as engaged in cultural imperialism, and more recently, to supporting and encouraging the export of Japanese contemporary culture and lifestyle in order to attain “soft power.” Looking at the fluctuations in Japan's cultural policy over these three periods allows us to understand how Japan has used cultural policy to further its geopolitical goals and more basically how it has viewed the role of “culture” in the context of its relations with Asian neighbors. In a broader sense, the Japanese experience shows that cultural policy, even when inward-looking, is not isolated from a country's geopolitical position and its ambitions in the world, regardless of the political system under which it operates.     

Australia and Japan's Admission into the Colombo Plan

In October 1954 Japan was admitted to the Colombo Plan as a donor country with Australia's sponsorship. The dramatic shift in Australia's position on Japan's involvement in the Colombo Plan, from strong opposition to sponsorship, was recognised by the Japanese government as the first Australian initiative to improve the bilateral relationship since the resumption of diplomatic relations in April 1952. This article examines Japan's attempts to participate in the Colombo Plan and considers how Australia's actions and reactions determined the course of events. The episode provides an insight into how Australian diplomacy was conducted towards Japan and the Japanese view of its relations with Australia at the initial stage of the bilateral relationship.     

Whither Mr Abe's Japan?

This article reviews Japan's strategic options and policy initiatives under Prime Minister Abe, taking into consideration strategic changes in the region; chiefly a rising China and a United States approaching geopolitical retreat, and the policy implications of these developments. Mr Abe's announced goal is to restore Japan to its once great power status, and thus far success is proving elusive.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Hurdles in Mr Abe's path include the differing perceptions between Japan and its neighbours regarding Japan's history, and the deeply entrenched nature of these differences pose a significant barrier. A related aspect is the territorial disputes. A second task is to be a “normal” nation, that is exercising greater independence in security matters and matters of economic policy, and here differences arise with Japan's main ally, the United States. Furthermore Mr Abe also needs to convince the Japanese public as well as Japan's prospective allies about his views regarding Japan's security role in the region. A third task is to increase Japan's economic weight by turning around the Japanese economy from its existing stasis to sustained, robust growth.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Mr Abe is making urgent policy efforts in all directions and the rather uneven outcome experienced thus far has not deterred him, thus creating uncertainty for Japan, and enhancing the feeling of insecurity in the region. The ostensible policy choice facing Mr Abe now is to either persist with his existing policies, hence entrenching the increasing tensions in the region, or to accept a rapidly rising China and formulate policies more accommodative of that development.     

How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World

This article discusses Japan's contribution to world peace both in the past and in the future. Japan's domestic, historical, and strategic circumstances shaped its concept of comprehensive security focused on international economic cooperation since the 1970s. Three decades of constructive relations with neighbors, including reconciliation with Southeast Asia built a strong foundation for Japan's new security role, one driven by new domestic and external imperatives. The article also documents the evolution of Japan's security policy and role in international peacekeeping, and concludes by arguing that Japan–ASEAN partnership is a key component of Japan's new security role, including permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. In developing this new role, it is critically important that Japan engages its neighbors in ASEAN (and elsewhere) to gain their support for this new role.     

Japan's Policy for East Asia

Japanese foreign policy six decades after the end of World War II stands at a crossroads. The forces of globalization and the rise of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem to herald the end of the unipolar post-Cold War international system and the emergence of a new era defined by multi-polarity and multilateralism. Such global trends are manifest most clearly in Japan's own backyard, where phenomenal region-wide economic growth, a gradual redistribution of power (in particular the rise of China and India), and the increasingly important role of multilateral cooperation and regional institutions are dramatically transforming East Asia. This trend shows no signs of slowing down, much less reversing itself; nor would it be in Japan's interest to pursue any policy that seeks to do so. Nevertheless, the transformation itself remains almost on auto-pilot, lacking a clear long-term guiding vision. After presenting a brief overview of Japan's past policy toward the region, the goal of this paper will be to articulate such a vision through a series of policy proposals through which to ensure future peace, stability, and prosperity in East Asia.     

Japan and the Middle East

Hirokazu Oikawa, a correspondent in Israel for Jiji News for nearly 20 years and former lecturer and fellow at Hebrew University, discusses the history of relations between Japan and the Middle East and shows how Japan's relative ignorance of the region has affected some crucial diplomatic and domestic policy decisions. He explains that potential misperceptions about the Middle East continue among Japanese policymakers, especially in the areas of energy policy and official‐development aid (ODA). Oikawa is currently a professor at Kyorin University in Tokyo.     

Reshaping of Japanese Politics and the Question of Democracy

Japan's need for economic and political reform has been recognized but the means to achieve this has not. In this article, J.A.A. Stockwin, professor of Modern Japanese Studies at the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, considers this question by examining the meaning of democracy then applying the theory to the specific case of Japan. He explains that although not identical to a democracy in a Western sense, Japan's system of government is genuinely democratic. Stockwin argues that Japan is now at a crossroads in her history, but before pressing for reform an understanding of the complexity of the Japanese system is necessary. He concludes that a radical restructuring of Japan's political party system towards a bipolar set of party arrangements is necessary but questions whether Prime Minister Junichirô Koizumi is up to the task.     

Japan’s Policy Toward China Under Strong Anti-Chinese Sentiment: A Case of Terminating Yen Loans to China

2004 was the year when the Japanese public's affinity with China dropped dramatically, to 37.6?%, due to anti-Japan riots in China. Now more than 70?% of the Japanese public does not feel an affinity with China. How could such a strong anti-Chinese sentiment influence Japan's policy toward China? This paper considers this question by examining Japan's decision-making process on terminating the much-criticized yen loans to China. Yen loans are a type of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the Japanese government to countries lacking sufficient funds for economic development. China is one of the top yen loan borrowers, and the loans have contributed to China's economic growth and increasing openness. However, in March 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura told Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing that Japan intended to phase out the yen loans before the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reached an agreement on the matter. Two-and-a-half years later, Japan terminated its yen loans to China, as the foreign ministers had agreed. Through mainly firsthand documents and interviews with government officials, this paper will clarify the following two points: (1) While it is true that the Japanese government significantly reduced its yen loan package to China from 2001 onward due to domestic criticism of China, as pointed out by previous studies, it was not planning to terminate the yen loans as of summer 2004. Instead, the Japanese government was contemplating how to keep providing yen loans to China; (2) Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, who was appointed in September 2004, had pushed for the termination of yen loans to China only after anti-Chinese sentiment rose dramatically in summer 2004, because he felt that continuing the much-criticized yen loans would not benefit stable Japan-China relations. This paper sheds light on the background of the termination of yen loans to China, a major milestone in postwar Japan-China relations that had been unclear until now. Having said this, the more important point of this paper may be that it also shows the influence of strong anti-Chinese sentiment on Japan's policies toward China.     

Clarifying the right of collective self‐defense

Since the 1950s the Japanese government has irrationally claimed that the Constitution bars it from exercising the right of collective self‐defense, says Seizaburo Sato, IIPS research director. International law clearly gives Japan the right to exercise both individual and collective self‐defense, says Sato, but the Japanese government's official view does not conform with this law. Sato sees the right to exercise collective self‐defense as essential to Japan's security, and argues that Japan should immediately declare this right. Then, taking all necessary time and in accordance with post‐war Japan's founding ideals, Japan should amend the Constitution.     

Ballistic missile security risks facing Japan

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's strategic value to the United States has undergone a qualitative shift, leaving uncertainty about how much the US can be depended upon to complement Japan's defense capacity. North Korean, Chinese, and Russian arsenals contain TBMs that could destroy major Japanese cities, yet Japan virtually lacks any independent means to counter them. Lieutenant Colonel Atsumasa Yamamoto was seconded to IIPS by the Japan Defense Agency. In this study, he analyzes Japan's current ability to deal with TBM risks. He also assesses the US TMD program and the extent of US support that Japan can expect.     

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEATH CULT IN 1930s JAPAN AND THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOM BOMB

In the 1930s Japan developed a death cult which had a profound effect on the conduct of the Japanese armed forces in the Pacific War, 1941–1945. As a result of government directed propaganda campaign after the overthrow of the Shogunate in 1868, the ruling military cliques restored an Imperial system of government which placed Emperor Meiji as the Godhead central to the constitution and spiritual life of the Japanese nation. A bastardised Bushido cult emerged. It combined with a Social-Darwinist belief in Japan's manifest destiny to dominate Asia. The result was a murderous brutality that became synonymous with Japanese treatment of prisoners of war and conquered civilians. Japan's death cult was equally driven by a belief in self-sacrifice characterised by suicidal Banzai charges and kamikaze attacks. The result was kill ratios of Japanese troops in the Pacific War that were unique in the history of warfare. Even Japanese civilians were expected to sacrifice their lives in equal measure in the defence of the homeland. It was for this reason that American war planners came to the shocking estimate that as many as 900,000 Allied troops could die in the conquest of mainland Japan – Operation DOWNFALL. Contrary to the view of numbers of revisionist historians in the post-war period, who have variously argued that the atom bombs were used to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, Francis Pike, author of Hirohito's War, The Pacific War, 1941 – 1945 [Bloomsbury 2015] reaffirms that the nuclear weapon was used for one purpose alone – to bring the war to a speedy end and to save the lives of American troops.     

Japan as the “Indispensable Nation” in Asia: A Financial Brand for the 21st Century

This article addresses Japan's global financial “brand.” It first examines the concept of a national “brand” and the difficulties associated with creating a desirable image of a country among outsiders. It adopts an instrumental concept of branding, which focuses on the behavior that the national image should elicit from foreign countries. It also notes that effective branding must accurately reflect reality. For Japan, the goal should be to promote economic cooperation where mutual interests exist. Efforts should be focused on East Asia, where mutual economic interests are least fully realized, and where Japan's national image appears to be an important stumbling block. Japan should seek to demonstrate the potential for transition to a “post-developmental” financial model and to be the “indispensable partner” for regional cooperative and development initiatives. This will require continued progress in cleaning up and improving the competitiveness of Japan's financial institutions and financial system.