Japan's security strategy: Meeting the needs of a new era

A new era has dawned, but the US and Japan remain in a security relationship of parent to child, says Toshiyuki Shikata, professor of inter‐cultural studies at Teikyo University and retired lieutenant general in Japan's Ground Self‐Defense Force. He draws on his familiarity with security issues to examine Japan's strategic challenges in the new era, Japan's role in the alliance, and Japan's defense modernization. He denounces avoiding international security responsibilities due to alleged constitutional constraints, and says that a seat on the UN Security Council would allow Japan to share the full risks and responsibilities in discharging international obligations.     

Ballistic missile security risks facing Japan

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's strategic value to the United States has undergone a qualitative shift, leaving uncertainty about how much the US can be depended upon to complement Japan's defense capacity. North Korean, Chinese, and Russian arsenals contain TBMs that could destroy major Japanese cities, yet Japan virtually lacks any independent means to counter them. Lieutenant Colonel Atsumasa Yamamoto was seconded to IIPS by the Japan Defense Agency. In this study, he analyzes Japan's current ability to deal with TBM risks. He also assesses the US TMD program and the extent of US support that Japan can expect.     

Japan in the coming century: Looking East or West?

The modernization of Japan's trade policies and social structure, argues Professor Ronald Dore of the London School of Economics, will increase Japan's social instability. The continuation of the outdated Japan‐US alliance, he states, only inhibits the growth of the international order; he warns that the day may come when Japan's interests lie with China rather than the US. Dore advocates that Japan adopt a proactive foreign policy, using military force not for reasons of national interest, but only to contribute to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts.     

Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater: Futenma Relocation,the G-8 Summit,and Okinawa

In late 1995, a culmination of events on Japan's southernmost island of Okinawa, home to over 70 percent of U.S. military facilities in Japan, both threatened the future of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and posed a direct challenge to the contradictory legacies of Japan's postwar system of constitutional democracy. Almost five years later, in July 2000, in anticipation of the gathering of heads of state at the Okinawa 2000 G-8 Summit, Bill Clinton became the first U.S. president to visit the island in over forty years. Speaking at the Cornerstone of Peace, a monument built in memory of the only ground war fought on Japanese soil between Japanese and U.S. forces in World War II, Clinton reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance – and Okinawa's role within it – to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet in Okinawa the nature and constitution of peace itself has never been a political given. This article traces the politics surrounding the U.S. military presence over this period, delving into the deeper historical, political, and social issues at stake for both this small island prefecture and for parts of the world beyond.     

Australia and Japan's Admission into the Colombo Plan

In October 1954 Japan was admitted to the Colombo Plan as a donor country with Australia's sponsorship. The dramatic shift in Australia's position on Japan's involvement in the Colombo Plan, from strong opposition to sponsorship, was recognised by the Japanese government as the first Australian initiative to improve the bilateral relationship since the resumption of diplomatic relations in April 1952. This article examines Japan's attempts to participate in the Colombo Plan and considers how Australia's actions and reactions determined the course of events. The episode provides an insight into how Australian diplomacy was conducted towards Japan and the Japanese view of its relations with Australia at the initial stage of the bilateral relationship.     

The Future of the Japanese–Chinese Relationship: The Case for a Grand Political Bargain

Compared with the strained relationship during the Koizumi era, Japanese-Chinese relations today seem to prove that despite many bilateral problems, a solution can always be found. This attitude is too complacent as a closer examination of the three main disputes shows: the history-related issues, the territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and Taiwan. Bilateral agreements, understandings, or protracted negotiations may provide temporary relief but may turn out to be very costly in the long run to Japan's national interests and to regional stability while time is not on Japan's side in view of the shifting comprehensive power relationship between the two countries. Instead, Japan should clarify its position in the Japan–US–China triangle, reform its economy, strengthen its Asian policy and sort out its priorities concerning the three main problems by striking a grand bargain.     

Getting It Right: Japan and Trans-Pacific Partnership

This paper explores the opportunities presented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to Japan to revitalize its trade policy, bolster economic growth, and increase participation in regional multilateral fora for the 21^st century. Despite its strengths, Japan has continued to face problems caused by its economic, political, and strategic policies. The Japanese economy has been stagnant for the last several decades, and Japan needs to take bold steps to ameliorate this situation. Politically, domestic political paralysis has had a negative impact on Japan's alliances and partnerships and eroded Tokyo's ability to act as a major player in the increasing vital and important Indo-Pacific region. Connected to this, it is imperative for Japan to engage itself deeply in Asia in ways that increase strategic trust. This paper will also highlight the necessary reforms Japan must undertake to take full advantage of the benefits of the TPP, as well as what the TPP might mean for its relationship with both the US and other regional partners.     

The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics

Abstract

Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa’s significance on the US–Japan alliance—the “Okinawa effect”—in terms of the alliance’s strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance’s strategic effectiveness, alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies, this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance’s solidarity and effectiveness.     

China: A function of the Japan‐US alliance

China's greatest future strategic concern is the Japan‐US alliance. Hisahiko Okazaki argues that a strong alliance limits China's foreign policy options, and stresses the importance of Japan and the US working together to establish a foreign policy towards China that will promote peace in the region. Okazaki was born in Dalian, China, in 1930. He served in Japan's Foreign Ministry, holding such posts as minister to the United States, chief of the ministry's Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau, and was ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. This article is adapted from an article first published in August 1995 in The Daily Yomiuri and is printed with the permission of the author.     

Australia and Japan's Return to International Society: Negotiating Allies and the Afro-Asian Bloc, 1952–56

In December 1956, Japan gained membership of the United Nations, marking a significant milestone in Japan's return to international society. In approximately five years since the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect in April 1952, this had been a difficult diplomatic issue for the Australian government. This article examines how the Australian government dealt with this issue by focusing upon the intersection of Australia's policy towards Japan and Japan's status as a member of the emergent Afro-Asian bloc. This article argues that Japan's engagement with the rest of the bloc was a rising factor in Canberra's consideration of Japan's place in the world, thereby helping revisit the orthodox historiography of Australia–Japan relations during the early Cold War era which often overemphasises rapid growth of bilateral trade.     

Clarifying the right of collective self‐defense

Since the 1950s the Japanese government has irrationally claimed that the Constitution bars it from exercising the right of collective self‐defense, says Seizaburo Sato, IIPS research director. International law clearly gives Japan the right to exercise both individual and collective self‐defense, says Sato, but the Japanese government's official view does not conform with this law. Sato sees the right to exercise collective self‐defense as essential to Japan's security, and argues that Japan should immediately declare this right. Then, taking all necessary time and in accordance with post‐war Japan's founding ideals, Japan should amend the Constitution.     

Reshaping of Japanese Politics and the Question of Democracy

Japan's need for economic and political reform has been recognized but the means to achieve this has not. In this article, J.A.A. Stockwin, professor of Modern Japanese Studies at the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, considers this question by examining the meaning of democracy then applying the theory to the specific case of Japan. He explains that although not identical to a democracy in a Western sense, Japan's system of government is genuinely democratic. Stockwin argues that Japan is now at a crossroads in her history, but before pressing for reform an understanding of the complexity of the Japanese system is necessary. He concludes that a radical restructuring of Japan's political party system towards a bipolar set of party arrangements is necessary but questions whether Prime Minister Junichirô Koizumi is up to the task.     

A Middle Power's Roles in Shaping East Asian Security Order: Analysis of Japan's Engagement from a Normative Perspective

East Asia is currently in a transitional period. Recognizing the challenges presented by China's rise to the current regional order, existing literature analyses the security situation in Asia by focusing on the material aspects of power distribution between the US and China. Few works substantively discuss the roles played by middle powers such as Japan in shaping the regional order and how they can deal with the challenges of great power competition and threats to the global rules‐based order. By employing Japan's involvement in the South China Sea issues as a case study, this article examines how a middle power attempts to shape or underpin the regional security order and if such attempts are effective. The investigation of Japan's engagement illustrates that a middle power's practical support can indirectly and gradually contribute to sustaining and defending the regional “rules‐based order”.     

Whither Mr Abe's Japan?

This article reviews Japan's strategic options and policy initiatives under Prime Minister Abe, taking into consideration strategic changes in the region; chiefly a rising China and a United States approaching geopolitical retreat, and the policy implications of these developments. Mr Abe's announced goal is to restore Japan to its once great power status, and thus far success is proving elusive.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Hurdles in Mr Abe's path include the differing perceptions between Japan and its neighbours regarding Japan's history, and the deeply entrenched nature of these differences pose a significant barrier. A related aspect is the territorial disputes. A second task is to be a “normal” nation, that is exercising greater independence in security matters and matters of economic policy, and here differences arise with Japan's main ally, the United States. Furthermore Mr Abe also needs to convince the Japanese public as well as Japan's prospective allies about his views regarding Japan's security role in the region. A third task is to increase Japan's economic weight by turning around the Japanese economy from its existing stasis to sustained, robust growth.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Mr Abe is making urgent policy efforts in all directions and the rather uneven outcome experienced thus far has not deterred him, thus creating uncertainty for Japan, and enhancing the feeling of insecurity in the region. The ostensible policy choice facing Mr Abe now is to either persist with his existing policies, hence entrenching the increasing tensions in the region, or to accept a rapidly rising China and formulate policies more accommodative of that development.     

The Eye of the beholder: Background notes on the US-Japan military relationship

Abstract

In the last half century, the pivotal steps in American-Japanese relations have been paced off at roughly ten-year intervals. At the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, American and other Western pressure brought about cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and forced Japan to rely upon uncertain international guarantees for its security. The Manchurian Incident of 1931 dispelled the professed hopes of the twenties, and a full decade later Pearl Harbor marked the total bankruptcy of Japan's relationship with the West. At the San Francisco peace conference in 1951, America led forty-eight other nations in restoring Japan's sovereignty, and five hours after the signing of the peace treaty the U.S. summoned forth shades of the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance by signing its own bilateral military pact with Japan. Nine years later, nationalistic resentment against this security arrangement of 1951 erupted in Japan, forcing cancellation of President Eisenhower's proposed visit. Now another decade has passed, and 1970 is clearly destined to mark yet another watershed in the American-Japanese relationship.     

How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World

This article discusses Japan's contribution to world peace both in the past and in the future. Japan's domestic, historical, and strategic circumstances shaped its concept of comprehensive security focused on international economic cooperation since the 1970s. Three decades of constructive relations with neighbors, including reconciliation with Southeast Asia built a strong foundation for Japan's new security role, one driven by new domestic and external imperatives. The article also documents the evolution of Japan's security policy and role in international peacekeeping, and concludes by arguing that Japan–ASEAN partnership is a key component of Japan's new security role, including permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. In developing this new role, it is critically important that Japan engages its neighbors in ASEAN (and elsewhere) to gain their support for this new role.     

The New Cabinet Crisis Management Center and the Leadership of the Prime Minister

In May 2001, a cabinet crisis management center was set up below the prime minister's new official residence. It is from here that Japan's national crises are now to be managed. In an era of constant flux, questions over the circumstances surrounding Japan's strategic security are being raised. Clearly, the structure of crisis management and legislation are crucial for a nation'ssecurity. In this article, Lt. Gen. Toshiyuki Shikata of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (retired) and professor of Law at Teikyo University, examines 30 international and domestic crises that Japan had to deal with in which the leadership of the prime minister determined the outcome. He describes the history of Japanese crisis management, pointing out the current problems and argues that in a post-Cold War era, Japan needs to confront the discrepancies in the structure of its security if it wishes to become a credible member of the international community.     

Asia's deepening financial crisis: Japan as a critical uncertainty

Japan's response to the economic crisis in East Asia is critical, not only for Japan itself but also for the Asia‐Pacific region and for the world. Kent Calder, Special Advisor to the US Ambassador to Japan, argues that the massive Japanese economy can potentially serve as a locomotive for the region, and as a sturdy fire wall to prevent the crisis from spreading. To do this, Japan must stimulate its economy, open markets further to Asian imports, and strengthen its financial system. If it fails, Japan could become part of the problem, instead of part of the solution.     

Should Japan participate in UN peacekeeping operations?

With the end of the Cold War, the UN has increased the number of peacekeeping operations that it undertakes, and many voices call for Japan's participation. Hisako Shimura, a professor in the International Affairs Department at Tsuda College, analyzes Japan's new Peace Cooperation Law, its Constitution, and the traditional principles that govern UN peacekeeping operations. Shimura finds that Japan's law contains safeguards to ensure that Japan could participate in peacekeeping missions that uphold traditional UN principles, and she also suggests that such participation would be constitutional.     

Why Japan still matters

This article challenges the prevailing view that China is displacing Japan as Asia's leader and the pre-eminent power in Asia. On the contrary, it argues that in understanding the future of Northeast Asia and the broader Asia–Pacific, it would be a mistake to look only to a rising China and to relegate Japan to a diminishing position. China's rise does not automatically herald Japan's decline. Japan is an emerging, not a retreating power. The rise of China is both obscuring and accelerating the transformation in Japan's regional and global position. Japan is increasing its economic power, technological capabilities, military reach, soft power and diplomatic influence. Furthermore, the rise of China makes Japan strategically more important to the United States and to other countries in the Asia Pacific. Japan will become the main regional counterweight to China and an indispensable partner in America's strategy of balancing China.