The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)

Democratic peace studies have traditionally identified Kantian "republicanism" with procedural democracy and largely ignored liberalism and constitutionalism, which are even more fundamental for Kant's reasoning behind the liberal peace. A closer look into his major political works reveals that peaceful relations are expected from states with the protection of individual freedoms (liberalism), the rule of law and legal equality (constitutionalism), and representative government (democracy). Only when all three constitutive elements are jointly considered can we uncover the multifaceted nature of Kant's approach to the domestic sources of international peace. In this way, we not only find that monadic and dyadic expectations are consistent with Kant's theory, but also that both normative and interest-based explanations for international peace can equally draw on Kant as their theoretical precursor. We further demonstrate that it is plausible to infer that the Kantian legacy is related to civil peace as well. The propositions we derive from our theoretical reexamination of the Kantian legacy are strongly supported in our quantitative empirical test. Moreover, constitutional liberalism, rather than democracy, shows to be both more central for Kant's theory and empirically more robustly related to international as well as domestic peace.     

The Wild and the Sublime: Lyotard's Post-Modern Politics

This paper examines the thought of Jean-Francois Lyotard in relation to the problems of justice and the constitution of a post-modern politics. It argues that Lyotard is highly influenced by Kant's aesthetics and specifically by the idea of indeterminate judgement in the formulation of a conception of justice that, in an age of social variegation and fragmentation, underlies a politics which strives to promote different ways of looking at, and living in, the world. The text concludes that Lyotard's conception of justice and its resultant politics are founded upon a skewed reading of Kant's work such that claims of truth and morality are separated from those of judgement. The result is a politics marked by radical individualism which poses the threat of social atomization.     

Guilty Subjects and Political Responsibility: Arendt, Jaspers and the Resonance of the 'German Question' in Politics of Reconciliation

The post-war question of German guilt resonates in contemporary world politics, framing the way actors and observers conceptualize collective responsibility for past wrongs in diverse polities. This article examines the responses of Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers to the 'German question': in what sense are ordinary citizens collectively accountable for state crimes and how should they respond to the legacy of past wrongs? Arendt and Jaspers agree on conceiving collective responsibility in terms of a liability predicated on political association that does not impute blame. However, they disagree on the value of the sentiment of guilt in politics. For Jaspers, a spreading consciousness of guilt through public communication leads to purification of the polity. But Arendt rejects guilt in politics, where publicity distorts it into a sentimentality that dulls citizens' responsiveness to the world. These contrasting responses are employed to consider how members of a 'perpetrating community' might be drawn into a politics of reconciliation. I suggest that Arendt's conception of political responsibility, conceived in terms of an ethic of worldliness, opens the way for understanding how 'ordinary citizens' might assume political responsibility for past wrongs while resisting their identification as guilty subjects by a discourse of restorative reconciliation.     

International Criminal Justice Between Scylla and Charybdis—the “Peace Versus Justice” Dilemma Analysed Through the Lenses of Judith Shklar’s and Hannah Arendt’s Legal and Political Theories

The present article discusses the “peace versus justice” dilemma in international criminal justice through the lenses of the respective legal (and political) theories of Judith Shklar and Hannah Arendt—two thinkers who have recently been described as theorists of international criminal law. The article claims that in interventions carried out by the International Criminal Court (ICC), there is an ever-present potentiality for the “peace versus justice” dilemma to occur. Unfortunately, there is no abstract solution to this problem, insofar as ICC interventions will in some cases be conducive while in others, they will be deleterious to peace. If a tension between peace and justice arises in a particular case, the article asserts, the former must be prioritised over the latter. Such a prioritisation, however, requires a vision of the ICC as a flexible actor of world politics which is situated at the intersection of law, ethics and politics, rather than a strictly legalistic view of the court. Ultimately, then, the present article seeks to probe whether the legal and political theories of Shklar and Arendt—in isolation, but ultimately also in combination—support such a flexible vision of the ICC.     

Queer(y)ing Hannah Arendt,or what’s Hannah Arendt got to do with intersectionality?

Abstract

This article takes an unlikely approach to thinking about intersectionality theory. Exploring key concepts from the writings of Hannah Arendt, such as plurality, conscious pariah, and statelessness, alongside her embodied interrogation of anti-Semitism and the Jewish Question, it suggests a way to transgress the ordinary boundaries of the concepts of queer, international, and feminist and, conversely, to unbound the ordinary ways Arendt’s theories have been interpreted as less relevant, if not antithetical to, feminist, intersectional, and queer theories and politics.     

Truth and Politics: Thinking About Evidence‐Based Policy in the Age Of Spin

Evidence‐based policy and the contemporary politics of spin are said to characterise contemporary politics and policy. The paper asks firstly what sense is to be made of this coincidence, and then documents this coincidence. It then asks how credible is the conception of ‘evidence’ espoused by advocates of evidence‐based policy when it is conventionally represented as an ‘objective’ counter to ideology, spin or opinion? It points to major problems with the conventional understandings of ‘evidence’. It is suggested that while the evidence‐based policy literature relies on the associations ‘evidence’ is presumed to have with ‘sensory data’, this is neither the case nor all that defensible. The paper reprises arguments advanced by Henry Mayer and Hannah Arendt that the relationship of politics to the empirical was and is a far more complex relationship than is conventionally understood to be the case.     

Nietzsche on Autonomy and Morality: the Challenge to Political Theory

Nietzsche's challenge to political theory can be located in his claim that autonomy and morality are mutually exclusive. In this paper an examination of Kant's attempt to ground a notion of autonomy through constructing a metaphysic of morals is followed by a consideration of Nietzsche's understanding of autonomy in terms of a notion of supra-moral sovereign individuality. A genealogy of morals represents an attempt to historicize the key notions of moral and political theory. Nietzsche's aristocratic conception of sovereign individuality is seen in terms of the value-basis on which sovereign individuals are to construct a common ethical and political identity and enter into social relationships. Foucaultian and feminist attempts to construct an ethics and politics of difference and a recent attempt to construct a post-modern conception of agency based on a synthesis of Nietzsche's philosophy of power and Kant's ethics are examined.     

Kant and the critique of the ethics-first approach to politics

Abstract

Contemporary ‘realists’ attack the Kantian influence on political philosophy. A main charge is that Kantians fail to understand the specificity of politics and neglect to develop a ‘distinctively political thought’ that differs from moral philosophy. Instead, the critics say, Kantians are guilty of an ‘ethics-first approach to politics,’ in which political theory is a mere application of moral principles. But what does this ethics-first approach have to do with Kant himself? Very little. This article shows how Kant’s approach to political theory at a fundamental level includes political institutions, power, and coercion as well as disagreement, security, and coordination problems. In contrast to realists, Kant has a fundamental principle, which can explain why and guide how we ought to approach the political question, namely the norm of equal freedom. Yet, Kant’s theory does not take the form of a moralistic ought addressed to the isolated individual, but concerns a problem that we share as interdependent beings and that requires common institutions. The fruitfulness of the Kantian approach, then, is that it can take the political question seriously without being uncritical of actual politics and power, and that it can be normative without being moralistic.     

Project for a Kantian Europe

Immanuel Kant’s political treatise Perpetual Peace can be seen as a project for world peace with practical value. Applied to contemporary word politics, the United Nations is commonly seen to be the closest approximation of this project. This article argues that such a view is misguided and fails to perceive that the United Nations lacks crucial elements of a Kantian peace federation. Kant’s argumentation for perpetual peace rests on two pillars: peace through law and peace through institution. Both of these are necessary conditions that must be supplanted by an exclusive peace federation of republican states in order to make a sufficient guarantee for lasting peace. Viewed from this perspective, the European Union comes closest to a real-world Kantian peace federation, even though it remains a regional organization, and despite the current challenges it faces.     

Freedom,Equality and Fraternity in Kant’s Critique of Judgement*

At least during his critical period, all of Kant’s philosophical works have a secret political dimension. Among other things, following the analysis of Hannah Arendt, the Critique of Judgment – paragraph 40 in particular – became a main text of political philosophy. In looking at the Critique of Judgement from a political perspective, I shall refer not to paragraph 40 but to the Kantian discussion of pure aesthetic judgement. In my opinion, one can understand Kant’s remarks on aesthetic judgement, and especially transcendental anthropology, as meaning that Kant philosophically attributes the three political ideas of the French Revolution (liberty, fraternity and equality) to the whole human being as such, and not just to the intelligible man.     

What is Politics? Robinson Crusoe, Deep Ecology and Immanuel Kant

This article considers the nature of politics. Robinson Crusoe is used to show that even the broadest understanding of politics found in the literature is inadequate, for the situation of Crusoe on his island is a political situation even though he is completely alone. An analogy is drawn between the deep ecological understanding of politics and the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kantian ethics, also, is built on the idea of a solitary individual who is at least existentially isolated. It is concluded that what makes any situation political is the fact that in it some policy is required.     

Criticism of multiparty democracy: Parallels between Wamba‐dia‐Wamba and Arendt

Abstract

The IMF, World Bank, and former colonial powers have put pressure on African countries to adopt multiparty democracy. Because of this pressure, many formerly one‐party states as well as some military dictatorships have embraced Western and Parliamentarian democratic forms. But does this mean that democracy has succeeded in Africa? Ernest Wamba‐dia‐Wamba of the University of Dar‐es‐Saalam and CODESRIA argues that embracing Western paradigms in an unthinking fashion will not bring real democracy, i.e. people's liberation. He advances criticisms of party politics and statism, and suggests that African palaver and people's movements are a surer site of political action. In his criticisms of representative government he parallels the thoughts and criticism of Hannah Arendt. Arendt advocated a council system that shares many of the attributes of African palaver communities. By consulting the criticisms of Arendt and Wamba‐dia‐Wamba, we can see that an easy optimism about the multiparty system is unfounded.     

The Lost Treasure of Arendt's Council System

Abstract

Hannah Arendt's On Revolution offers a critique of modern representative democracy combined with a manifesto-like treatise on council systems as they have arisen over the course of revolutions and uprisings. However, Arendt's contribution to democratic theory has been obscured by her commentators who argue that her reflections on democracy are either an aberration in her work or easily reconcilable within a liberal democratic framework. This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive outline of Arendt's writing on the council system and a clarification of her work outside the milieu of the post-Cold War return to Arendt. Her analyses bring to light a political system that guarantees civil and political rights while allowing all willing citizens direct participation in government. Framing her discussion within the language of the current renewed interest in constituent power, her council system could be described as a blending together of constituent power and constitutional form. Arendt resists the complete dominance and superiority of either element and argues that the foundation of a free state requires nothing less than the stabilization and persistence of constituent power within an open and fluid institution that would resist either the bureaucratization of politics or its dispersal into a revolutionary flux. Although one may conclude that her institutional suggestions are far from flawless, her political principles allow a conceptualization of democracy in more substantial ways than current liberal political philosophy.     

Old right or new right? The ideological positioning of parties of the far right

Abstract.  Since the 1980s, parties of the far right have increased their share of votes in many Western European nations, and some have even participated in governing coalitions. The ascendancy of far right parties has been met with various hypotheses attempting to rationalize their role in the politics of these nations: Are far right parties a manifestation of protest politics, brought about by hard economic times (old right model), or are they representative of the continued political development of Western industrialized nations (new right model)? Most analyses have focused on the voters for these parties; this work focuses on the election manifestos of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), National Front of France (FN), Italian National Alliance (MSI-AN), Lega Nord (LN) and the Germany Republikaner (Reps) in order to reconstruct the dimensions of party competition in each nation and determine where each of these parties fall within the dimensions of party competition. Support is shown for a new right axis of party competition, suggesting that parties of the far right may in fact be part of the political development of Western European nations.     

The New Right and family politics

Political concern for the family has historically been intermittent; the present context is that there are considerable consequences for individuals, families, and personal life. Socioeconomic and cultural changes brought the rise of the New Right; The Thatcher (UK) and Reagan (US) administrations were committed to strengthening the traditional family. The emergence of the family as a social problem and the political agenda are discussed. The costs of liberalism were felt in a recessionary economy. The US political agenda of Carter to hold a White House Conference on the American Family never materialized. Reagan used the restoration of the traditional American family as a way to get the economy back on its feet. Moral crusaders and the new evangelical Christian movement merged with the political right; the "Gang of Four" (Republican Party right) politicians involved morally conservative communities normally outside the political area into the New Right. Grass roots organizations were mobilized on the Right. The British situation is explained; differences existed in that there were no antiabortion and moral lobby groups tied to the Right although their influence was felt. Pressure group politics is relatively novel to Britain. The Moral Majority in the US and right wing pressure groups on the Tory government are but 1 part of the New Right; it is characterized as populist, proclaiming the Radical Conservatism of Adam Smith and Edmund Burke. The approach in this article is to show the complex interactions of theory, biography, and public opinion in the practical politics of the New Right. Policy outcomes are not predictable because of ideological differences in New Right attitudes toward the family. The attitudes of the moral order and the family is exemplified in the work of Roger Scruton's neoconservative stand on social order, Robert Nozick's Kantian proposition that human beings are ends with natural inviolable rights of individual freedom, Hayak and Friedman's efficacy of the market in guarantees of freedom, and Ferdinand Mount's concern for family based in humanist, secular, and anticollectivist thought. Thatcher and Reagan both incorporated the ideological contradictions of the aforementioned positions. The failure of the New Right in implementing policy is explained. The greatest obstacle was the major demographic, economic, social, and cultural shifts which impacted on the role of women. The camp was divided. Economic policies did not strengthen the traditional family. It is likely that the family will remain as a political pressure point.     

Caring for the elderly in the family or in the nation? Gender,women and migrant care labour in the Lega Nord

This article aims at gendering our understanding of populist radical right ideology, policy and activism in Italy. It does so by focusing on migrant care labour, which provides a strategic site for addressing the relationship between anti-immigration politics and the gendered and racialised division of work. Three arrangements and understandings of elderly care are analysed, whereby care work should be performed ‘in the family and in the nation’, ‘in the family/outside the nation’ and ‘in the nation/outside the family’. Party documents and interviews with women activists are used to show how the activists’ views and experiences partly diverge from the Lega Nord rhetoric and policy on immigration, gender and care work. The article locates populist radical right politics in the context of the international division of reproductive labour in Italy and suggests the relevance of analysing gender relations in populist radical right parties in connection with national care regimes.     

Totalitarianism and justice: Hannah Arendt’s and Judith N. Shklar’s political reflections in historical and theoretical perspective

We locate Arendt’s and Shklar’s writings within what Katznelson has identified as an attempt to create a new language for politics after the cataclysm of the twentieth century, and Greif has called the new ‘maieutic’ discourse of ‘re-enlightenment’ in the ‘age of the crisis of man’. More specifically, we compare and contrast two related, but in many ways also differing, ways of thinking about totalitarianism and its legal repercussions. To this end, we examine two sets of studies: Arendt’s The origins of totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil and Shklar’s After utopia: The decline of political faith and Legalism: An essay on law, morals, and politics. While The origins of totalitarianism and After utopia discussed totalitarian ideology and its consequences for modern political thought, the Eichmann report and Legalism dealt with the question of whether and how justice is possible after the extreme experience of totalitarianism. We argue that the maieutic impulse led Arendt and Shklar to find distinct routes to address a common concern. Our paper ends with a discussion of some of the surplus meaning that was generated by the different maieutic performances of the two thinkers.     

The Right to Have Rights as a Right to Enter: Addressing a Lacuna in the International Refugee Protection Regime

This paper draws upon Hannah Arendt's idea of the 'right to have rights' to critique the current protection gap faced by refugees today. While refugees are protected from refoulement once they make it to the jurisdiction or territory of a state, they face an ever-increasing array of non-entrée policies designed to stymie access to state territory. Without being able to enter a state capable of securing their claims to safety and dignity, refugees cannot achieve the rights which ought to be afforded to them under international law. Drawing upon both legal theory and political philosophy, this paper argues that refugees today, just as the stateless in Arendt’s time, must be afforded the ‘right to have rights’, understood as a right to enter state territory.     

Framing and reframing R2P—a responsibility to protect humanity from evil

ABSTRACT

This article takes issue with de-politicised and moralistic conceptions of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and, inspired by the political theory of Hannah Arendt, develops a ‘re-politicised’ and ‘de-moralised’ account of R2P. It argues that by relying on a link between a moral responsibility to ‘save strangers’ and practical political action, R2P turns a blind eye to the political interest of powerful actors. And by trying to transform R2P into a ‘blueprint’, ‘roadmap’ or ‘emergency plan’ for political action, many commentators try to render obsolete political deliberation and practical judgement on a case-by-case basis. The present article argues that it is necessary to develop a more realistic view of R2P’s role and potential in world politics. R2P, it is argued, has an important discursive function and considerable potential to influence and guide international decision-making processes. Drawing on Arendt’s conception of ‘evil’ as a crime against humanity itself, this article reframes R2P as a ‘responsibility to protect humanity from evil’. An Arendtian understanding of mass atrocities as crimes against our common humanity (i.e. as evils) facilitates the development of a re-politicised and de-moralised account of R2P: This account recognises its discursive role, it actively seeks to generate political interest for action in the face of harrowing mass atrocities but also acts as a leash on intervention in less severe cases.

Abbreviation R2P: Responsibility to Protect; UN: United Nations; NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; ICISS: International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty