Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments

This study examined the interaction between testimonial consistency and eyewitness confidence on mock-jurors' judgments of probability that the defendant committed the crime and verdicts. In a 2 (testimonial consistency) × 2 (confidence) between-groups design, 130 mock-jurors listened to an audio-taped trial of a person charged with armed robbery. Manipulations were contained in the prosecution witness's responses to detailed questioning by prosecution and defense attorneys. Although consistency is considered to be a key marker of accuracy, its impact on judgments was weak and nonsignificant. Witness confidence had a strong influence on judgments, whether testimony was consistent or inconsistent. We suggested that witness confidence may be more likely to emerge as a dominant influence on juror judgments when the testimony is wide ranging rather than relatively brief and concerned only with a specific issue (e.g., identification confidence).     

A Problem with Double-Blind Photospread Procedures: Photospread Administrators Use One Eyewitness's Confidence to Influence the Identification of Another Eyewitness

In Experiment 1, photospread administrators (PAs, N = 50) showed a target-absent photospread to a confederate eyewitness (CW), who was randomly assigned to identify one photo with either high or low confidence. PAs subsequently administered the same target-absent photospread to participant eyewitnesses (PWs, N = 50), all of whom had viewed a live staged crime 1 week earlier. CWs were rated by the PAs as significantly more confident in the high-confidence condition versus low-confidence condition. More importantly, the confidence of the CW affected the identification decision of the PW. In the low-confidence condition, the photo identified by the CW was identified by the PW significantly more than the other photos; there was no significant difference in photo choice in the high-confidence condition. In spite of the obvious influence exerted in the low-confidence condition, observers were not able to detect bias in the photospread procedures. A second experiment was conducted to test a post-hoc explanation for the results of Experiment 1: PAs exerted influence in the low-confidence condition because they perceived the task as more difficult for the eyewitness than in the high-confidence condition. Independent observers (N = 84) rated the difficulty of the confederate's task as higher in the low-confidence condition compared with the high-confidence condition, suggesting that expectations of task difficulty might be driving the effect observed in Experiment 1. Results support recommendations for double-blind photospreads and emphasize that the same investigator should not administer photo lineups to multiple eyewitnesses in an investigation.     

Public Eyewitness Confidence Can Be Influenced by the Presence of Other Witnesses

Four experiments were conducted to examine whether witnesses' public confidence ratings differ from their private ratings when there are social pressures to use confidence as an impression-management tool. In all four experiments, participants answered questions about a source event (a series of faces in the first three experiments and a simulated crime scene in the fourth). Half of the responses and confidence ratings were given privately and anonymously, and half were given publicly in front of one or more mock jurors. Two central findings emerged from the results. First, public confidence differed from private confidence only when there was more than one witness; when there were no other witnesses, public and private confidence were the same. Second, the direction of the change in public confidence in the multiple-witness settings was influenced by whether or not there was a possibility of being contradicted by the other witnesses. When there was no chance that the participants' responses could be contradicted, they raised their confidence ratings in public; when there was a chance that the other witnesses might contradict them, the participants lowered their public confidence ratings. The results are discussed in terms of self-presentation theory and implications for the legal system.     

Eyewitness Memory,Suggestibility, and Repeated Recall Sessions in Children with Mild and Moderate Intellectual Disabilities

This study of eyewitness memory questioned children with mild and moderate intellectual disabilities (ID) about a live staged event 1 day later and, again, 2 weeks later. Children with mild ID performed as well as typically-developing children of the same age in response to free recall instructions, and they were just as able as same age peers to resist misleading questions. However, they performed more poorly on general questions, probing for further information after free recall. The children with mild ID also changed their responses to specific questions more often in the repeated interview. The group of children with moderate ID showed markedly lower performance than peers of the same age on nearly every type of eyewitness memory question. Comparisons of the children with ID to mental age-matched peers indicated that performance was similar, although children with ID gave more information in response to free recall instructions and changed their answers in the repeated interview more often. Standardized measures of verbal memory (TOMAL) and suggestibility (Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale) were modest to moderate predictors of eyewitness memory performance.     

Cueing Confidence in Eyewitness Identifications: Influence of Biased Lineup Instructions and Pre-Identification Memory Feedback Under Varying Lineup Conditions

Students watched a theft video, attempted an identification from a thief-present or thief-absent lineup under unbiased or biased instructions, and rated identification confidence. In Experiment 1, the participants received (bogus) positive, negative, or no pre-identification feedback about a recall test. Biased instructions and positive feedback increased confidence and ratings of eyewitnessing conditions. In Experiment 2, biased instructions increased confidence unless the thief was absent and lineup members were similar, where they decreased confidence. According to the cue-belief model, biased instructions send a positive accuracy cue regarding the most familiar-looking lineup member. If none stands out, instructions conflict with an inclination to reject the lineup. Feedback may create a belief about memory quality that is a cue regarding likely recognition accuracy.