Restructuring "Germany Inc.": The Politics of Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union

The reform of German company law by the Control and Transparency Law (KonTraG) of 1998 reveals the politics of corporate governance liberalization. The reforms strengthened the supervisory board, shareholder rights, and shareholder equality, but left intra‐corporate power relations largely intact. Major German financial institutions supported the reform's contribution to the modernization of German finance, but blocked mandatory divestment of equity stakes and cross‐shareholding. Conversely, organized labor prevented any erosion of supervisory board codetermination. Paradoxically, by eliminating traditional takeover defenses, the KonTraG's liberalization of company law mobilized German political opposition to the European Union's (EU) draft Takeover Directive and limited further legal liberalization.     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.     

Board composition and corporate governance–A multivariate analysis of listed Danish firms

The article conducts a multivariate analysis using a sample of listed Danish firms in order to examine what describes board composition. This issue also relates to corporate law that stipulates the legal boundaries of board composition. In recent years, several European countries, including Denmark, have issued various codes for good corporate governance, in the form of soft law. Such initiatives have been launched, even though the questions of what describes board composition, as well as, the legal profession's influence on board structure, have not been fully uncovered. This study shows that four factors explain Danish board structure. These factors can be interpreted by the following dimensions; the lawyer oriented, the business person oriented, the internationally oriented and finally the traditionally oriented board. Thus, the paper shows that a higher proportion of insider ownership increases the first dimension, whereas a higher remuneration increases the business person orientation of the board. If firm size increases, the international dimension of the board increases and if a firm experiences less growth board structure becomes more traditional. classification G32 . K22     

论域外公司治理改革实践经验之借鉴

近年来,英美等国开始对其公司治理模式进行了一系列改革,包括制定各种公司治理的原则、指引、章程、鼓励机构投资者参与公司治理、要求公司增强董事会的独立性、在董事会内引入一定数量的独立董事等,希望通过这些措施,增强公司的内部监控力度,以弥补由于外部监控不足所造成的问题.而德日的内部监控模式也开始学习、借鉴和效仿英美的公司治理模式.剖析、借鉴实践中各国公司治理改革经验将对我国公司治理的改进提供有益的帮助.     

勒斯勒尔草案股份公司治理规则及发展

德国学者赫尔曼·勒斯勒尔帮助日本制订了第一部公司法（草案）,其中关于股份公司的一般规则,特别是股份公司机关的法的构造奠定了日本公司治理结构的深厚基础,了解这些可以掌握公司法中董事会、监事会、股东大会的历史流变和股份公司治理结构的发展脉络,并体会公司治理仍存在的制度性困惑。     

Employee representation and board size in the Nordic countries

Several European countries have mandatory employee representation on company boards, but the consequences for corporate governance are debated. We use employee representation rules in the otherwise quite similar Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) to elicit information on shareholder preferences for employee representation and board size. We find that shareholders tend to choose board structures that minimize the proportion of employee representatives. In Denmark and Norway employee representation depends on board size, and shareholders choose board sizes that minimize the number of employee representatives. However, many companies have more employee representatives than is mandatory. In Sweden, where the law mandates a fixed number of employee representatives (two or three depending on firm size), shareholders choose to have larger boards. In Finland, where employee representation is not mandatory, <1 % of companies choose to have it. Whatever, the merits of employee representation, shareholders appear to be mildly averse to it.     

Internationalisation of R&D and embeddedness: the case of Austria

Internationalisation of corporate R&D—driven mainly by multinational enterprises (MNEs)—has received increasing interest recently. As a small open economy, Austria faces special challenges with regard to this on-going process. The share of Austrian R&D financed from abroad is outstanding in international comparison. Indeed, a significant portion of R&D activities in Austria is defined by strategic decisions of international corporations, which are re-assessing their spatial division of labour continuously. In our paper, we analyse the characteristics of these foreign-owned corporations in Austria and demonstrate that they form the more ‘modern’ part of Austrian industry. At the same time, we show that these companies and R&D facilities are embedded in the Austrian national innovation system (NIS) to a large extent. This embeddedness is also explicitly and implicitly supported by the Austrian technology policy. We conclude that this high degree of embeddedness in the NIS may be crucial for the sustainability of foreign-owned R&D facilities.

Defer to national circumstances or follow blindly

With respect to the current amendments to the Company Law, a balance shall be reached between the freedom and compulsion. In the current legal environment of China, it is improper for corporate legislation to adopt the authorized or eclectic capital system, and adequate amendments shall be made to the existing statutory capital system. The independent director regime conflicts with the current corporate governance structure. On the contrary, the enhancement of the legal status of the board of supervisors and the expansion of its authority are the ongoing direction in the reform of the supervisory mechanism in the corporate governance structure of China. The amendments to the Company Law shall separate the corporate legislation and the ruling of state-owned enterprises reform, hence enabling the corporate law back to the nature of private law and neutrality. The Company Law shall be amended to provide for one-person companies and eliminate wholly state-owned companies.     

盲目照搬还是尊重国情——对当前《公司法》修改中几个问题的反思

With respect to the current amendments to the Company Law, a balance shall be reached between the freedom and compulsion. In the current legal environment of China, it is improper for corporate legislation to adopt the authorized or eclectic capital system, and adequate amendments shall be made to the existing statutory capital system. The independent director regime conflicts with the current corporate governance structure. On the contrary, the enhancement of the legal status of the board of supervisors and the expansion of its authority are the ongoing direction in the reform of the supervisory mechanism in the corporate governance structure of China. The amendments to the Company Law shall separate the corporate legislation and the ruling of state-owned enterprises reform, hence enabling the corporate law back to the nature of private law and neutrality. The Company Law shall be amended to provide for one-person companies and eliminate wholly state-owned companies.     

法律社会学的定位问题:Max Weber与Hans Kelsen的比较

德国社会学家韦伯(Max Weber,1864-1920)与奥地利法学家凯尔森(Hans Kelsen,1881-1973)对"法律社会学"(Rechtssoziologie,sociology of law)的定位存在异同。他们一个从社会学家的立场,一个从法学家的立场,探讨了"法律社会学"在19世纪末叶跟着社会学(Soziologie)一起诞生的时候,究竟应该如何对这新兴的学问加以定位的问题。他们两位都是法学家出身,同样受到当时哲学思潮新康德主义(Neukantianismus)的影响,主张划分"实然"(Sein)与"应然"(Sollen),也同样对促进德语世界法律社会学的诞生有积极贡献的"自由法学派"(Freirechtle-hre)与奥地利法律社会学家艾利希(Eugen Ehrlich,1862-1922)提出了批评意见,但是他们对于"法律社会学"这门新兴的学科,却还是有不完全相同的定位。     

Constitutional Review in the United States and Austria: Notes on the Beginnings

Abstract.   Despite far-reaching historical and political differences, and despite legal systems that reflect altogether different traditions, the United States and Austria manifest striking similarities where some aspects of their respective development of constitutional review are concerned. For example, on the constitutional review of federalist issues (competing claims of federal and state law), the review power was there from the beginning in both countries. And both countries developed a power of constitutional review reaching to the enactments of the federal legislature. In a brief sketch of aspects of the early development of constitutional review in both countries, the author looks, in particular, to the kinds of arguments made on behalf of constitutional review in the American and Austrian legal systems.     

论银行公司治理制度的构建

在银行中,利益冲突的范围不同于实体经济中一般的工商企业,但是,一直以来银行的公司治理制度并没有给予银行中特别的利益冲突以特别关注。美国2007-2009年的金融危机表明,有必要调整和改革银行的公司治理结构。银行功能的社会公益性以及银行中特殊的利益冲突和其它的特点使得在构建银行的公司治理结构时,不能够简单地适用普通公司的治理模式,而要在股权治理、债权治理和监管治理之中寻求平衡。     

Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of Its Relative Use

The law and finance literature highlights the role of investorrights in financial development, firm corporate governance,and financing patterns. For a panel of 35 countries, we investigatehow bankruptcy use relates to countries’ creditor rightsand judicial efficiency. Bankruptcies are higher in countrieswith more creditor rights, except for a "no automatic stay onassets" provision. Higher judicial efficiency is associatedwith more bankruptcies and appears as a substitute with morecreditor rights. Although only a first step, our findings suggestcreditor rights are complex, balancing prioritization of claims,ex ante risk-taking incentives, and an efficient resolutionof distressed firms.     

实践《公司治理规则》的法律途径--论修订后的《德国股份法》第161条

自经济合作与发展组织(OECD)制定了《公司治理结构规则》以后,很多国家都相继制定了自己的公司治理规则。德国不仅制定了《公司治理规则》,而且通过对《股份法》的修订,从法律的角度强化上市公司对公司治理规则的遵行,以期达到完善公司治理的目的。     

公司人格本质与社会责任的三种维度

从本质上说,法律塑造的公司人格不过是人与人之间社会关系在法律、社会伦理与自我认识层次上的集中反映。相应地,对公司社会责任也可从三个维度予以解构:法律意义上的社会责任是一切公司应尽的最低限度的法定责任,其约束力最强;伦理意义上的社会责任则是对公司的外在约束,此种约束机制可以是纯粹倡导性的公司伦理,也可以是介于伦理与法律之间的"软法";而公司内生的超出法律与"软法"之上的社会责任则是纯粹自律性的。三种性质的社会责任相互依存并相互转化,因此,仅有法律意义上的社会责任机制是远远不够的。     

Legal Environment,Firm-level Corporate Governance and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in Asia

Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control is substantially enhanced by using pyramid structures and cross-holdings by firms in nine East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (1999, SSRN Working Paper; 2002, Journal of Finance 57(2), 2741–2771) provide empirical evidence regarding expropriation arising from the separation of cash flow from voting rights in Asian firms. Their analysis suggests a high degree of expropriation in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. We re-examine the problem of expropriation in Asian firms reported by earlier research. We explore firm-level governance-control structure interactions, and control-legal environment interaction for a set of Asian firms for which we are able to obtain relevant data for all the required variables. The major contribution of this paper is that it jointly examines ownership-control structure, firm-level governance and country-level legal protection available to external suppliers of capital. Using post-crisis data, we find a strong country effect in governance. In general, high control firms in countries with weak legal protection have lower firm-level governance scores in general. On the other hand, high control firms, in countries which have a stronger legal protection environment, signal their intention to not expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by voluntarily adopting measures to strengthen their discipline and responsibility scores. Contrary to earlier findings, we do not find a relationship between control-ownership wedge and firm value. Furthermore, we do not find any relation between firm-level governance and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q.     

论我国上市公司内部监督机制模式的选择--兼及独立董事与监事会的关系

为了完善上市公司治理结构,防止内部人控制,保护中小股东的利益,我国引入了英美法上的独立董事制度.中国引进和移植独立董事制度必须联系中国的实际情况,处理好其本土化问题,特别是要协调好与监事会的关系,这将决定着独立董事制度在中国的移植能否成功.通过对独立董事制度与监事会制度的关系进行比较,指出我国新<公司法>应授权上市公司在其章程中任意选择采用单层制或双层制公司监督机制模式.     

从三个“谁”的角度分析中国国有公司治理——鉴于日本的失败经验

在日本,公司治理的效力很早以前就成为较大的问题,很多人认为日本的许多经营者监督机制并没有发挥应有的作用,而是存在很多漏洞,这是因为日本的法律和现实情况之间存在很大的距离,比如日本的法律规定股东大会选任监事和董事,董事会和监事对董事或者代表董事进行监督,而在现实情况中,社长把握着极大的权力,可以选任自己的部下作为监事和董事,甚至在退休之后都可以垂帘听政。因此,20世纪90年代以后,日本引进了美国式的公司治理制度,但是这种公司治理制度改革不能认为是很成功的,以日本的失败经验为基础分析中国大型国有公司的公司治理问题很有参考价值,这就是日本没有从三个"谁"的视点进行改革。     

公司治理问题的法学思考——对中国公司治理法律问题研究的回顾与展望

对公司治理相关问题的研究是近20年来学术界最为关注的热点问题之一，其研究范围涉及到经济学、法学、管理学、社会学等诸多领域。这一问题的研究成果直接推动了中国现代企业制度的建立和公司法的修改。以法学研究为切入点，从不同的视角，对国内多年来的公司治理相关研究成果予以条分缕析般的冷静审视和详尽评述，其内容涉及到公司治理的范畴与理念、公司治理的路径，以及公司治理研究中广受关注的公司章程、股东会决议瑕疵、董事会与董事、监事会、职工参与、中小股东利益保护等各个方面。并在此基础上，对未来公司治理研究的方法和重点进行了思考和展望。