International environmental agreements with agenda and interaction between pollutants

This paper analyzes how the sequence of negotiating agreements on each pollutant affects coalition behavior in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when multiple and correlated pollutants exist. I consider a model in which countries suffer from two pollutants with different externality characteristics and attempt to cooperate by sequentially negotiating on IEAs. The membership outcome depends on the environmental concern, abatement technology, spillover effect and most importantly the correlation between pollutants as either substitutes or complements. I find that cooperation in the first stage can facilitate later negotiations and that countries are prone to cooperate on a pollutant of common concern. Moreover, except for symmetric countries, different negotiation agendas may result in distinctive participation outcomes when pollutants are complements. Therefore, with systematic policy design, the negotiation sequence can serve as another method to encourage participation and cooperation in IEAs.     

Parallel trade and free trade agreements

Legal context. Free trade agreements seek to remove unjustifiedbarriers to trade. Normally barriers to trade are imposed bystates, such as quotas, tariffs, subsidies and regulatory restrictions.However, sometimes barriers will be imposed by private partiesseeking to prevent parallel trade (arbitrage) of their own products.The aim of this article is to examine the way in which freetrade agreements deal with private barriers to parallel tradeand thus to consider to what extent parallel trade is possiblewithin free trade areas. Key points. The article considers first the situation withinthe European Community, which has long supported parallel tradethrough its provisions on the free movement of goods and competitionlaw, before turning to the approach taken in the Community'sfree trade agreements with third countries. It carries out thesame exercise in relation to the United States and then considershow parallel trade is dealt with by the World Trade Organisation.Finally, as free trade agreements only seek to remove unjustifiedbarriers, it considers possible justifications for the differentapproaches before drawing some tentative conclusions. Practical significance. This article considers the impact whichthe overlap between intellectual property, competition law andtrade law has in relation to parallel trade. As well as reviewingthe current position, which will be of use to businesses andlegal practitioners on both sides of parallel trade, it assessesthe underlying justifications which are relevant to policy makingin this field.     

The effectiveness of international environmental agreements

Many argue that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can alter states’ cost-benefit analyses by providing crucial information about the costs of environmental degradation. Thereby, IEAs may help to effectively curb environmental pollution. However, previous attempts to empirically measure institutional effectiveness found it difficult to provide credible estimates because they have missed to produce convincing counterfactuals. This study empirically estimates the effectiveness of one prominent example of an international environmental institution, the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution agreement (LRTAP). It sets forth a transparent identification strategy in light of latest advancements in the causal inference literature and presents evidence for the non-effectiveness of the LRTAP in changing member states’ behavior in terms of anthropogenic emissions of two substances (NO _x and SO₂). By deriving and illustrating the use of difference-in- differences (DID) design in the context of IEAs, this study provides a general methodological tool kit to drawing causal inferences about the effectiveness of international environmental institutions.     

Physician noncompete agreements must be carefully tailored

When covenants not to compete are used, care must also be taken that they are not viewed as a violation of the Medicare anti-kickback statute, 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7b(b). Some government officials have asserted that, when physicians selling their practices continue to be affiliated with the buyers of those practices, payments to physicians for intangibles (including covenants not to compete) could be disguised payments for future referrals. See Dec. 22, 1992 letter from D. McCarty Thornton, General Counsel to the Office of Inspector General, to T. J. Sullivan at the Internal Revenue Service. Although the anti-kickback statute is beyond the scope of this article, it must be considered in this context, and care should be taken in any event to assure that purchase prices for physician practices in no event exceed fair market value.     

The product-liability-insurance issue in university licensing agreements

As universities become more involved with industry through research and license agreements, and with the change of character of product liability, particularly its becoming a potentially catastrophic event, universities are taking a hard look at product-liability insurance. A brief survey shows universities in three distinct groups in their handling of the issue in their licensing agreements. State schools feel protected and do not generally consider it essential, foundations are more cautious, and private universities are very concerned and require it except in specific cases. Some approaches to the problem are proposed. Previously he was head of the Chemistry Department at Simon Boliver University and director of a university-based industrial research institute. Bertha has also been a research chemist at Dupont Corp. He has a Ph.D. in inorganic chemistry form Florida State University.     

International environmental agreements between developing countries only: learning from the Brazil–Uruguay case over the suspicion of acid rain

This article is about the process of negotiation and implementation of a bilateral environmental agreement between two developing countries. It analyzes the case of the Act of Jaguarão between Brazil and Uruguay on assessing the risk of transboundary air pollution by the President Medici (UTPM) coal-powered thermo-electrical facility in the Candiota region of southern Brazil. The article adds to the scarce literature on international environmental conflict resolution and negotiations between developing countries, especially in Latin America. First, it explains that even with the asymmetry of power between Brazil and Uruguay, negotiation was possible due to a series of factors, such as the interest of Brazilian environmental agencies in improving the monitoring of emissions from UTPM and the international scrutiny of Brazil prior to the upcoming Rio-92 Earth Summit. Both states obtained mutual gains from the agreement by developing ‘joint fact finding’ research and monitoring. Second, different from most of the mainstream literature, the research reveals that weaknesses in institutional agreements, such as a lack of sanctions or deadlines, were not an implementation impediment. In fact, the very weaknesses of the agreement actually enabled authorities in both countries to cooperate in the development of an acid rain monitoring program in the Candiota region, and as a result, to improve air monitoring capacities in both countries. Third, this research shows that the implementation process (1991–2003) produced different results and impacts: it helped to develop technical capacities of environmental agencies in both countries, increased the political power of Brazilian environmental agencies to control UTPM, and pushed for behavioral changes to enable UTPM to respond to the demands of both governments.