Determinants and directions for Chinese weapons imports

This article assesses and presents the determinants and directions of Chinese acquisitions of weapons and weapons technology from abroad, focusing on major conventional weapons and their relevant technologies. Following a brief development of historical themes which continue to affect Chinese military‐related imports today, the study considers the principal contemporary domestic and international determinants which contribute to shaping Chinese arms import policies, and the type of foreign arms acquisitions likely to result from those policies. In analysing past and current security policies, weapons development policies, foreign weapons procurement policies, the study reaches four main conclusions. First, a wide range of problems — including prohibitive cost, political and bureaucratic infighting, absorptive capacities, managerial and administrative roadblocks, and supplier controls — stand in the way of a Chinese military modernization strategy based on foreign procurement. Second, with the exception of Sino‐Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, Chinese arms and arms technology acquisitions from abroad have consistently been relatively modest, sporadic, and problematic. Even in the case of current transfers from such suppliers as Israel and Russia, it is unclear the extent to which these countries are willing to part with significant amounts of top‐of‐the‐line systems and technologies. Third, the impact upon international security of the improvement of Chinese military capability through the acquisition of foreign weapons and technology is not likely to manifest itself in violent military disruptiveness, but rather in the nuanced and steady expansion of Chinese power and influence in parts of East Asia around China's periphery. Fourth, the military capabilities of China's arms clients will probably not be significantly improved through the acquisition of foreign weapons and weapons technologies by China. In sum, Chinese military modernization through arms and technology imports will continue to be a slow and painful process.     

Washington's perceptions and misperceptions of Beijing's anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) ‘strategy’: implications for military escalation control and strategic stability

Washington has become increasingly concerned that Beijing's anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) capabilities will put at risk US military assets and forward forces operating in the Western Pacific region, enabling China to deter, delay and deny US intervention in future regional conflict and crisis. US defence analysts in their assessments have frequently, and often erroneously, conflated a Chinese operational capability with an underlying strategic intention that conceptualises the United States as its primary (if not sole) target. The central argument this article proffers is that US perceptions of A2-AD have been framed by specific analytical baselines that have overlooked the evolution of Chinese operational and doctrinal preferences, and over-reliant upon military material-based assessments to determine Beijing's strategic intentions, and formulate US military countervails. The article concludes that the strategic ambiguities and opacity associated with Chinese A2-AD capabilities and its ‘active defence’ concept reinforced Washington's reliance upon capacity-based assessments that in turn, exacerbated misperceptions confounded by cognitive bias of Chinese strategic intentions. The critical framing assumptions of this article draw heavily upon the ideas and rationale associated with the international relations ‘Security Dilemma’ concept.     

The First China Watchers: British Intelligence Officers in China, 1878–1900

In 1878, Britain developed the first systematic intelligence collection and analysis of China by a Western nation. Undertaken in response to intelligence failure and military defeat, the British Army in India established an intelligence section in Beijing using small numbers of Chinese-speaking British military officers. Their reports reveal their struggles to understand a culture and government radically different than their own and express a strong respect for Chinese military capabilities. The intelligence reports produced are a unique window into British history, intelligence practices and Chinese strategic thinking.     

CHINA: A GROWING MILITARY SPACE POWER

ABSTRACT

During the last few decades, space has gained considerable importance in many facets of military operations. China has always believed proficiency in space technologies to be an essential ingredient of its overall national strength. Since its beginning, the Chinese space programme has had a definite military orientation. This article examines the impact of Chinese manned space missions and their investment in Europe's proposed global navigation and positioning system (Galileo) on their military space capabilities.     

Chinese Capabilities as a Global Space Power

Since the early 1960s, China has been enhancing national power and, in this regard, Chinese space capabilities play a pivotal role. Today, China is second among spacefaring counties, behind the United States, as a measure of human spaceflight, as well as in commercial and military satellite systems. Chinese space technology, in contrast to developed nations, is comparatively cost-effective; China is sharing it with developing nations for their space programs, consequently expanding the pool of spacefaring states. Most significantly, China’s nuclear, military, and space capabilities provide it with an opportunity to reassert itself as a global power, enhancing its strategic outreach and preventing adversaries from contemplating strategies against it.     

Leadership,regime security,and China's policy toward Taiwan: prospect theory and Taiwan crises

Abstract

Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US–China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait.     

Ethnic Peace in the Taiwan Strait

The Taiwan Strait has often been referred to as one of the world’s most dangerous hotspots and many dire predictions have been made about a military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, likely involving the United States. Yet, despite several crises in the Taiwan Strait and numerous war speculations, there has been no major armed conflict between Beijing and Taipei since the 1950s. How do we explain the puzzle that an expected war across the Taiwan Strait did not happen after all? This paper first examines the explanations based on military balance of power. Having found the realist/rationalist explanations less convincing, however, this study explores the explanatory power of the “ethnicity” factor. It suggests that when the Chinese society is no longer divided by ideological differences, the “ethnicity” may provide a more convincing explanation of why a military conflict has not happened in the Taiwan Strait in the past four decades. This paper also considers several counterarguments, including the neo-liberal argument of economic integration as a driving force for peace in the age of globalization. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications resulting from the “ethnic peace” thesis and proposes that when actively promoted by the both sides, the Chinese ethnic identity is likely to be the most important strategic guarantee of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years to come.     

弘扬军人核心价值观 反对历史虚无主义

在弘扬军人核心价值观的过程中,我们一定要坚持反对什么,弘扬什么。在目前思想多元化的状态下,历史虚无主义是消解中共党史和中国革命史的一服毒药。尽管它的表现形式多种多样,但是,目的只有一个,就是虚无中国人民革命、建设的历史,美化殖民统治、帝、官、封统治的历史,我们必须旗帜鲜明地加以反对。     

Vietnam: a case of military obsolescence in developing countries

ABSTRACT

Military obsolescence affects the capability of all militaries as it relates to serviceability and performance when countering potential opponents, and more specifically in the case of developing countries lacking strong indigenous defence industries. The gradual nature of this military concern has not been studied systematically, in contrast to military modernisation. This paper presents a synthetic framework composed of several indicators to examine military obsolescence. Vietnam has been selected for the application of the framework for its large number of Cold War legacies and the strategic pressure from China. Hanoi's ageing assets would undermine its position vis-à-vis Beijing, and its defence investment policies face the dilemma of choosing to spend more on naval and aerial power, or ameliorating its army which is technologically lacking compared to its Chinese counterpart.     

The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare

Space warfare will be an integrated part of battle planning by the Chinese People's Liberation Army in any future conflict with the United States. The People's Liberation Army has carefully absorbed and is reacting to what the American armed forces have published on space warfare and counter-space operations. Chinese strategists and legal scholars are engaged in an internal debate on how traditional ideas of sovereignty and the laws of war apply in space. One authoritative volume explored the importance of ensuring that the People's Liberation Army sets out legal justifications for military actions in advance of any conflict. Chinese scholars believe that many of the concepts surrounding the conduct of war on the “common seas” apply in space. Also, there is disagreement between the United States and China on the American position on outer space. The United States treats “peaceful uses” to mean “non-aggressive,” whereas the Chinese interpretation is that to be peaceful uses, it must be “non-military.”     

A new dynamism in Sino-Japanese security relations: Japan's strategic use of foreign aid

Abstract

In November 2004 a Chinese nuclear submarine cruised into Japan's territorial waters near the Okinawa Islands. In response, the Japanese government dispatched several Japanese naval ships and planes to chase the Chinese submarine until it navigated into international waters. This event, which potentially could have become the first exchange of fire between Japan and China since the Second World War, illuminated increasingly problematic security relations between the two neighbouring countries in the twenty-first century. In fact, deterioration of Sino-Japanese security relations is not a recent phenomenon but has already been evident since the mid-1990s, when Japan imposed a series of economic sanctions on China. Between 1995 and 2000 Japan had suspended its foreign aid to China in protest against: China's nuclear weapons tests; China's large scale war game including the launch of missiles across the Taiwan Strait; and Chinese naval activities in disputed areas in the East China Sea. This article looks at Sino-Japanese security relations since the mid-1990s through three case studies of the aid sanctions imposed by Japan on China. It clarifies the domestic political and bureaucratic interests that motivated aid sanctions and determined the decision-making process leading to these sanctions. The article argues, that with certain politico-security interests, Japanese governments actively used foreign aid as a strategic instrument to counter provocative military actions by China in the East Asian region since the mid-1990s. Despite the limited influence that Japanese aid sanctions have actually had on Chinese military behaviour, Japan's strategic use of foreign aid has undeniably created a new dynamism in security relations between the two neighbouring great powers in Asia.     

沦陷时期"满业"对东北重工业的垄断

"满业"是20世纪30年代后半期到40年代前半期日本在中国东北设立的掠夺东北经济资源的超级垄断组织,全称是"满洲重工业开发株式会社",简称"满业"。"满业"是在日本政府和伪满当局及军方的大力支持下创立的垄断伪满重工业的"国策"会社,服务于日本不断扩大的侵略战争的需求。本文主要从"满业"的建立、"满业"对东北重工业的垄断、"满业"垄断东北重工业的影响三个方面进行了论述。     

Viewpoint: China and Space War

In January of 2007, China knocked one of its weather satellites out of orbit, and threw the international community into panic. Some figured the satellite-killer test was the harbinger of a future war in space that could cripple a technology-dependent United States military. This viewpoint examines the possibilities of a Chinese assault on American satellites.     

Growing tensions in the East China Sea

Continuing tensions between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have fuelled international speculation that the two countries could be drawn into a military confrontation. Incidents such as an alleged ‘lock-on’ of a Chinese radar on a Japanese ship have underlined increasing maritime friction between the two countries.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

‘In God We Trusted,In China We Busted’: The China commando group of the Special Operations Executive (SOE)

In the summer of 1941, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Chinese government began a joint intelligence and special operations project called the China Commando Group. It was meant to be a grand scheme of military operation designed to benefit both the British and the Chinese in their common objective of thwarting the aggressive Japanese advances in Asia. Yet the China Commando Group evolved into a fiasco that lasted only eight months. The demise of the China Commando Group is a story that epitomizes the complex environment in which the war was fought on the East Asian mainland. This article tells a tale of policy failures in London, a thick cloud of mutual suspicions between Britain and Nationalist China, and the chasm between colonial and nationalist mindsets which led to the bitter end of the China Commando Group.     

Creating Shared Responsibility through Respect for Military Culture: The Russian and American Cases

The key problem in civil‐military relations in established polities such as Russia and the United States is not civilian control of the military, but rather how to create a symbiotic relationship of “shared responsibility” between senior military officers and civilian leaders. In such a situation, civilian leaders obtain much needed expertise from the military, but ultimately remain in control. The keys to symbiotic civil‐military relations are a desire on the part of military officers to work with civilians and civilian respect for military culture. When civilians respect military culture—that is, the military’s (1) devotion to clear executive leadership, (2) commitment to corporate identity, (3) drive to increase professional expertise, and (4) dedication to political responsibility—a system of shared responsibility is likely to emerge. This thesis is elaborated by comparing recent civil‐military relations in Russia and the United States.