Asian multilateral institutions and their response to the Asian economic crisis: the regional and global implications

Asian multilateralism has been a relatively recent development. It differs from that elsewhere and reflects the history and characteristics of the region. It has been important in the growth of regional cooperation, in developing common regional interests and in the development and adherence to norms. These characteristics contributed in responding in a constructive, if limited, way to the Asian economic crisis. Nevertheless, the crisis has revealed the weaknesses of existing regional multilateral institutions and those weaknesses are often seen as raising doubts about whether those institutions can be effective in the future without major reform. Yet, although the response of the regional institutions was clearly inadequate, the region's response overall was far from negligible. Efforts to ensure regional coherence in the future by way of ASEAN, APEC and ASEAN+3 in particular are already being made to ensure greater stability in the financial sector. The region also wants to overcome its under representation in the global arena, but increased global participation, while positive, will remain supplementary to the global institutions, notably the IMF. Greater global involvement would provide, however, a more appropriate balance between regional and global contributions to future crises, since they will need to be better tailored to regional conditions and therefore depend on greater regional involvement from the start.     

Recognizing regions: ASEAN's struggle for recognition

Abstract

Does recognition matter for a region as much as it does for a state and a person? This article examines the power of recognition in shaping regional cooperation. Rather than focusing on the behaviours and interactions between member states, which most studies have done, this article introduces a recognition model to investigate how the social practices of a region with non-member entities promote regional cooperation. By viewing recognition as a tradable commodity and an independent variable, the framework illustrates how the contest for recognition permeates beyond interpersonal and interstate interactions to include the struggle for recognition by regions. The model hypothesizes that the extent of recognition accorded to a region has an influence on its development. Drawing on newly released US declassified diplomatic records, this article tests the soundness of the proposed recognition model for regions by analysing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) struggle for recognition in the 1970s. It discusses how recognition was traded between ASEAN and three foreign powers, namely the USA, Japan and the European Economic Community, during the grouping's formative years. The findings suggest that the strengthening of a regional concept is influenced by the willingness of, and the extent to which, foreign powers recognize the entity. The central theme of this article is that recognition plays an important function in the development of a regional concept.     

A community of practice: explaining change and continuity in ASEAN's diplomatic environment

Despite change in the aims, institutions and informal diplomacy of ASEAN since 1997, the formal diplomatic code of conduct remains locked in a traditionalist mode first outlined in the 1970s. Existing approaches from mainstream International Relations theorising are unable to adequately explain this continuity and change. The recent ‘practice turn’ in theorising offers distinct explanatory advantage, which this article illustrates by arguing that the formation of an ‘ASEAN rationality’ between 1967 and 1997 fundamentally curtailed the ability of regional diplomats to revise ASEAN post 1997, resulting in the coexistence of new and old norms in ASEAN's organisation design.     

Contested Asia's ‘New’ multilateralism and regional order*

Multilateralism has become an increasingly significant part of Asia's international relations. This paper critiques the premise that there are two phases of regional multilateralism, pre- and post-global financial crisis and instead argues that there has been one long 25-year expansion phase. Initially, this was prompted by the risks and opportunities of globalization but was adapted as a strategy to manage a changing regional order. More recently, regional multilateralism has taken on competitive characteristics reflecting Asia's more contested dynamics. The US and its allies are trying to use multilateralism as part of their broader strategy to sustain the prevailing regional order. China is also attempting to use multilateralism as a part of its efforts to change the region to one more in line with its interests and values. Multilateralism has become a sublimated form of contestation over the form and function of Asia's international order. A key consequence of this will be to weaken the policy impact of existing institutional efforts and to promote zero-sum approaches to international policy among many Asian states.     

Transgressiveness,civil society and Internet control in Southeast Asia

This paper assesses the potential of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) to catalyze a process of economic and political integration in East Asia. The analysis first illustrates APT participants’ projected views of APT’s opportunities and limitations and then assesses the motives and objectives driving APT cooperation. Following a review of the major achievements of APT, the study gives an outlook on APT’s relevance and prospects. The findings of the article are that most APT states do not advocate ideas of distinctive pan-East Asian regionalism, but rather take an Asia-Pacific perspective. Only Malaysia and China appear to be promoting more exclusive forms of East Asian regionalism. Within APT, China is aggressively pushing a strong China–ASEAN axis, whereas Japan is seeking to balance China’s efforts and step up its political and economic cooperative profile in the region. A look at the achievements of APT does not suggest a rapid spread of pan-East Asian regionalism. On the contrary, the proposed ASEAN–China FTA proposal has triggered fierce competition between Japan and China and thus divided APT even further. Moreover, it is not at all certain whether the ASEAN–China FTA plan is going to work out in the end, due to objections from various ASEAN members, including a somewhat capricious Malaysia. Whereas pan-East Asian integration efforts are unlikely, the APT process is attractive enough to keep Japan and China, who are competing for influence in Southeast Asia, committed to the APT process. Regardless of APT’s internal fragmentation, its dynamic has already begun to change the political and economic landscape of East Asia. Thus, ASEAN has been able to enhance its leverage vis-à-vis Japan and China, profiting from their strategic opposition. Japan’s reluctance to discuss trade liberalization with ASEAN members already appears to be crumbling, as it is struggling to preclude Chinese domination.     

Pipelines,crisis and capital: understanding the contested regionalism of Southeast Asia

Abstract

Via an analysis of the trans-ASEAN gas pipeline project (TAGP), in this article we argue for a reconceptualising of the regional dynamics of Southeast Asia and the forces shaping them. For this task, we propose an analytical framework based upon social conflict theory that delves within and beyond the state, and which places emphasis upon the roles of both material and ideological factors operating across time in the reordering of particular geographical spaces. The framework reveals that the tensions acting within and upon ASEAN and the TAGP influence regionalism in such a way that the gas pipeline project – much like other ‘regional’ projects – is unlikely to ever come close to fulfilling its brief of enhancing regional security and cohesion. What is more probable is that the project's form will continue to be conditioned by entrenched politico-economic realities and the influence of dominant ideologies – factors which have the capacity to exacerbate existing regional animosities and disparities.     

东亚现代化进程中的知识阶层

随着东亚现代化的推进 ,技术和知识日益成为改变人们心智和生活的重要力量 ,增强了东亚知识阶层在经济社会发展中的作用 ,也前所未有地为他们提供了获取经济利益与实现自我价值的历史机遇。 2 1世纪 ,东亚知识阶层面临的主要考验和挑战是 :不再充当西方科技和文化的二传手 ,而要成为带有东亚出产标记的知识文化产品的创造者 ,切实推进东亚现代化模式从引进模仿到开发创新的转变     

The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy

This paper analyses the development of the US approach to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), from 1991 onwards. It examines theories of why a superpower would participate in a multilateral security institution, and investigates the motivations for the attitudes and extent of participation of the George H. Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations towards the ARF. It argues that, in the post-Cold War period and in the face of a rising China, US East Asia strategy has been geared towards retaining the American preponderance of power. Thus, the US has pursued a strategy of containment and deterrence centred upon the regional bilateral alliance structure. Multilateral institutions have been treated as a supplementary means of supporting the secondary strategy of engaging with China. However, the ARF is not viewed as one of the important institutions through which to fulfil this supplementary aim. Because it cannot deal with the key regional security issues, the ARF is seen as a low-stakes arena by Washington. But the paper concludes that US participation in the ARF may nevertheless be crucial in boosting the legitimacy of American security interests in the region, thus helping to safeguard US preponderance.     

In defence of FTAs: from purity to pragmatism in East Asia

This paper discusses the shift in East Asia from a focus on multilateral trade liberalization through the WTO to a pragmatic approach since 1999 favouring bilateral and regional FTAs while continuing to support the WTO system. It is argued that such FTAs are a second-best option compared to WTO agreements. However, while economists may seek the ideal solution, governments will focus on the politically attainable, especially as new multilateral agreements require lengthy negotiations beyond the life span of governments. As the WTO negotiating process has become bogged down, even once sceptical governments in East Asia are turning to FTAs. It is contended that such FTAs could form a lattice network within and across regions. In this context, the paper discusses the underlying security rationale for the conclusion of FTAs, highlighting the nexus between security interests and international economic policy in East Asia.     

Ideas,identity, and institution‐building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia‐Pacific way'?

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which the development of multilateral institutions in the Asia‐Pacific region may be viewed as an exercise in identity‐building. It argues that institution‐building in this region is more of a ‘process‐orientated’ phenomenon, rather than simply being an outcome of structural changes in the international system (such as the decline of American hegemony). The process combines universal principles of multilateralism with some of the relatively distinct modes of socialization prevailing in the region. Crucial to the process have been the adaptation of four ideas: ‘cooperative security’, ‘open regionalism’, ‘soft regionalism’, and ‘flexible consensus’. The construction of a regional identity, which may be termed the ‘Asia‐Pacific Way’ has also been facilitated by the avoidance of institutional grand designs and the adoption of a consensual and cautious approach extrapolated from the ‘ASEAN Way’. The final section of the article examines the limitations and dangers of the Asia‐Pacific Way. It concludes with the assertion that while the Asia‐Pacific Way is an over‐generalised, instrumental, and pragmatic approach to regional cooperation, and there remain significant barriers to the development of a collective regional identity that is constitutive of the interests of the actors, it has helped introduce the concept and practice of multilateralism into a previously sceptical region and might have ‘bought’ enough time and space for regional actors to adapt to the demands of multilateralism.     

ASEAN sceptics versus ASEAN proponents: evaluating regional institutions

Since it was founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attracted both sceptics and proponents. With Southeast Asia’s economy growing rapidly and tied into all parts of the global economy and the region geopolitically important to the world’s major powers, how ASEAN manages its internal affairs and East Asian relations is crucial. The differences in how sceptics and proponents perceive ASEAN, and why they take up such contrasting positions, need to be fully appreciated as scholars and commentators review and assess ASEAN’s performance. This analysis uses three analytical criteria – effectiveness, legitimacy and efficiency – to juxtapose and evaluate the competing arguments of the two approaches so as to better understand how and why sceptics and proponents can examine the same institutions and events and reach very different conclusions.     

Introduction: economic security,globalization and governance

Abstract

This introductory article examines different approaches to conceptualizing economic security by drawing on the broader social science literature beyond realism/neorealism. Arguing that traditional conceptions of economic security that see economics as a source, or instrument of state power are insufficient, it draws on a growing literature that looks directly at the economic roots of conflicts, particularly those arising from the manner in which capitalist production is organized in distinct settings. While the paper identifies a range of ways in which scholars, policy practitioners and communities think about economic security depending on the particular circumstances different states and societies find themselves in, the paper, nonetheless, argues for a notion of economic security that also emphasizes issues of justice/fairness and distributive equity. Under conditions of globalization, it is important for us to think of the needs of those made insecure by prevailing systems of market governance but in ways that do not undermine the integrity of the market nor sanction protection for chronically uncompetitive firms. Drawing on insights from International Political Economy and Economic Sociology, the paper suggests one useful way of conceptualizing economic security under conditions of globalization: that of ensuring a low probability of damage to (a) the income and consumption streams that are deemed appropriate for individual well-being; (b) the income-generating potential of an economy; and (c) some minimal level of distributive equity. To this end, appropriately designed national, regional and global institutions can function as mechanisms of governance in the interests of economic security. The rest of the papers in this Special Issue provide empirical case studies drawn from East Asia on many of the points raised in this introduction.     

The rise of China as a constructed narrative: Southeast Asia's response to Asia's power shift

This article examines the rise of China from the perspective of three selected countries – the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia – in Southeast Asia. I argue that their perceptions of China's rise are political constructs: while the objective reality may be an increasingly powerful China, their responses have been far from uniform. They vary in ways that are shaped by their domestic politics. These constructed narratives serve their respective political agenda, from leadership legitimacy to the supremacy of a party faction. Since theories of international relations tend to fixate on power politics between great powers, this article explains how and why small regional powers add to the process of understanding China's rise. In short, regional states’ domestic politics affect their narratives of China, and therefore affect how China's rise is being understood in the region and beyond.     

Institutional transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN,TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968–1976

Abstract

Many international relations (IR) scholars discuss whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) possesses institutional utility in maintaining security in Southeast Asia or East Asia. While this has important implications for both academics and policy-makers, ASEAN's role has been too often evaluated in terms of what has persisted within the association rather than what changed. Yet, exploring the causes and processes of institutional transformation are particularly important because they have made ASEAN expand its security utility by creating security dialogues and fostering security cooperation in the region. In this context, the crucial question is: when and how has ASEAN changed?

Focusing on the causes and processes of institutional transformation which have occurred within ASEAN, this article explores ASEAN's transformation from 1968 to 1976, by using a theoretical model, developed from historical institutionalism and the punctuated equilibrium model. Applying this approach to institutional transformation of ASEAN in the political-security field, three transformation processes are constructed. First, ASEAN member states’ expected changes in the external security environment triggered internal discussions regarding ASEAN's political-security function; second, these internal political discussions fostered institutional consolidation of ASEAN during this period; and third, such direction of institutional transformation was fundamentally guided by ideas provided by institutional norm entrepreneurs (INEs), especially Malaysia's neutrality proposal.

In particular, this article examines the process of ASEAN's creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Bali Concord in 1976, and argues that this model shed light on the significance of ZOPFAN that created a foundation of TAC and the Bali Concord, for which conventional wisdom has dismissed as an insignificant institutional concept by academics and practitioners.     

ASEAN and human rights: resisting Western pressure or emulating the West?

Abstract

Observers of Southeast Asian affairs commonly assume that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are reluctant to pursue liberal agendas, and that their main concern is to resist pressure from Western powers to improve their human rights practice. This article, however, argues that such a conventional view is too simplistic. The Southeast Asian countries have voluntarily been pursuing liberal agendas, and their main concern here is to be identified as ‘Western’ countries – advanced countries with legitimate international status. They have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rights which is championed by the advanced industrialized democracies, with the intention of securing ASEAN's identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states. Ultimately, they have been pursuing liberal agendas, for the same reason as cash-strapped developing countries have luxurious national airlines and newly-independent countries institute national flags. Yet it should be noted that the progress of ASEAN's liberal reform has been modest. A conventional strategy for facilitating this reform would be to put more pressure on the members of ASEAN; however, the usefulness of such a strategy is diminishing. The development of an East Asian community, the core component of which is the ASEAN–China concord, makes it difficult for the Western powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries. Hence, as an alternative strategy, this article proposes that ASEAN's external partners should ‘globalize’ the issue of its liberal reform, by openly assessing its human rights record in global settings, with the aim of boosting the concern of its members for ASEAN's international standing.     

Explaining the failure of the ASEAN economic community: the primacy of domestic political economy

All reliable indicators suggest that ASEAN's (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Economic Community (AEC) will not be successfully established by its 2015 deadline. Why? Against technocratic, realist and constructivist accounts, this article offers an explanation rooted in the political economy of ASEAN's member-states. Economic liberalisation agreements promote the rescaling of economic governance, involving regulatory changes that may radically redistribute power and resources. Consequently, they are heavily contested between coalitions of social and political forces, without outcomes reflecting the outcome of these struggles. The argument is demonstrated by exploring the uneven sectoral liberalisation achieved under the AEC, the constrained integration of ASEAN's energy markets, and the limited deregulation of skilled labour migration.     

Thinking strategically about ASEM: The subsidiarity question

Abstract

Aficionados of arcane European Union politics will know the importance of the term ‘subsidiarity’, for it relates to perhaps the most fundamental question facing any federal enterprise. Subsidiarity is supposed to be simple ‐ the notion that issues should be handled at the most effective level of authority ‐ but the devil is in the debate about what is ‘most effective’. The notion of subsidiarity, in all its complexity, is in fact most appropriate for those considering the shape of the agenda for the next Asia‐Europe Meeting (ASEM) in London in 1998. With the proliferation of meetings and organizations devoted to the next ASEM agenda, the time has come to pose and begin to answer the subsidiarity question. That question for ASEM would ask, ‘what is best done at the ASEM level’, as opposed to at a global, other regional, national, or even corporate, local or individual level? If officials and analysts feel that such a question is too tough for the ASEM process, perhaps they would be happier with a subsidiary subsidiarity question: ‘what can also be usefully done at the ASEM level'? If there are good answers to the main question, there is a good basis on which to engage in the ASEM process. If there are only good answers to the subsidiary question, the ASEM agenda will be less ambitious and perhaps even appear contrived.     

Japan’s strategic contrast: continuing influence despite relative power decline in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Since 2008 the Japanese government has become more responsive to the exercise of Chinese economic, diplomatic and military power in Southeast Asia, suggesting an intensifying rivalry. The Japanese government has thrown off any reticence about self-promotion by more forcefully positioning Japan as a sensitive and sustainable strategic partner for Southeast Asian nations in a strategic contrast with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Rather than trying to contain China, Tokyo is seeking to mediate how China turns its material resources into influence. Despite an increasing asymmetry in material resources between China and Japan, this article argues that Japan maintains a surprising ability to influence the preferences of Southeast Asian nations and responses to exercises of PRC power, which in turn has allowed Japan to influence China’s regional strategy.     

Conflict management strategies in ASEAN: perspectives for SAARC

ASEAN has generally been hailed as one of the most successful experiments in regional cooperation in the developing world, particularly in its ability to manage conflicts and maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia. SAARC, its counterpart in South Asia, on the other hand, is perceived as a moribund organization that has made little progress in furthering peace and cooperation in the region. Regionalism is indeed peculiar to its own region making for a different set of challenges, which each regional grouping has to address by evolving suitable modelsof conflict management and regional cooperation. ASEAN and its unique style of functioning are also distinct in that sense. While the experiences of one organization cannot be wholly applied or transplanted on to another, it is useful to understand the logic and dynamics in each region to draw the relevant lessons. Some aspects of cooperation in one region may be worthy of emulation in another if adapted in the right socio-economic and political context. This paper explores areas where SAARC, despite obvious divergences with ASEAN in its geopolitical and economic make-up, could benefit from the ASEAN experience in seeking to create a political climate conducive to improving regional cooperation in political and economic matters. The ASEAN model of conflict management may be of greater significance to South Asia in light of greater imminent regional tensions arising from the current war on South Asia’s border in Afghanistan.     

China,the United States,and order transition in East Asia: An economy-security Nexus approach

A dualistic-order thesis has been emerged as a widely-used concept to describe East Asia’s regional dynamics. According to the thesis, the economic and security spheres of the region have become divorced from one other, whereby China and the United States dominate the economic and security realms, respectively. This paper demonstrates the deficiencies of this thesis, based on a comprehensive assessment of the economic and security developments in the region, as well as the strategic choices of small and middle regional powers. In order to form a more accurate and systematic understanding of regional prosperity and stability, this paper develops an economy-security nexus approach by integrating the interactions of regional actors in both the economic and security realms into a unified framework. From this perspective, East Asian regional order is sustained by a delicate coupling of regional economic and security configurations: ‘hot economics’ is accompanied with cooperative security interactions. Although China and the United States are not the dominant actors in either field, their relatively benign interactions in both realms collectively play a significant role by shaping the strategic environment for regional actors, allowing them to enjoy a large degree of strategic flexibility and increase their security and prosperity.