Ideology,Parties and Social Politics in Europe

This article aims at ‘bringing ideology back in’ for the analysis of party politics and, more specifically, for the discussion of the delicate dyad ‘responsiveness vs. responsibility’. The article starts with an analytical discussion on the concept of ideology and on how to study its adaptation and change. It then reviews the ideological shifts that have characterised welfare state discourse and politics since the 1980s: first, the neoliberal turn and its attack on the old social democratic consensus; then the gradual emergence of a new ideological perspective that is called here liberal neo-welfarism. The main argument is that ideology plays an important role in framing partisan strategies in the delicate and increasingly prominent field of social politics. Ideological change reflects not only exogenous socio-economic transformations but also endogenous and relatively autonomous epistemic dynamics that bridge intellectual and partisan arenas.     

Making sense of party strategy innovation: challenge to ideology and conflict-mobilisation as dimensions of party competition

Abstract

This article develops a pooled comparative analysis aimed at addressing two of the three overarching research questions of the special issue. It first discuss an ‘end of ideology’ research question: that is, whether party constituencies and party strategy show clear challenges to classic twentieth century ideological alignments. Second, it investigates the type of issue strategy that parties employ in this new ideological environment, expecting mainstream parties to stress a problem-solving approach, while challenger parties should favour a conflict-mobilisation strategy. Finally, the article combines these two fundamental dimensions (ideological consistency; reliance on problem-solving vs. conflict-mobilisation strategies) in order to identify party strategy innovations in current West European elections.     

Word on the Street: The Persistence of Leftist-dominated Protest in Europe

Classic studies of protest politics have traditionally defended the dominant left-wing orientation of protesters. However, some recent research has highlighted the general spread of protest by the increasing participation of right-wing individuals. Has this process meant an ‘ideological normalisation’ of protesters? The present article tackles this question by examining competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between ideology and political protest. Through a hierarchical multilevel design, the article tests whether left-wing (or right-wing) supporters are more likely to stay at home when left-wing (right-wing) parties are in power and whether they intensify their protest activities when they are more distant from the government’s ideological position. The article shows that left-wing individuals protest more under right-wing governments than under left-wing governments and yet, they are the group which protest the most also under left-wing governments. Both party mobilisation and values appear to be behind these individuals' greater propensity to participate regardless of the governments' ideological orientation.     

Political Partisanship and Welfare Service Privatization: Ideological Attitudes among Local Politicians in Sweden

This article ties in with a growing international literature examining the link between party politics and welfare service privatization in modern welfare states. In recent decades, a central aspect of policy change in Sweden is that private actors have come to produce publicly financed welfare services on a more regular basis. This overall privatization trend is furthermore characterized by substantial geographical variation across Sweden's 290 municipalities. The ideological attitudes of local politicians have been recognized as particularly important for understanding this development. This article examines the extent to which local politicians’ ideological attitudes regarding welfare service privatization are best explained with a partisan approach emphasizing between‐party polarization as opposed to a critical perspective that points to the proclaimed significance of ideological consensus between left and right parties in certain municipal contexts. Using multilevel modelling and survey data collected from elected politicians in municipal governments, the empirical findings show substantial differences in attitudes between Conservatives and Social Democrats, irrespective of municipal characteristics – most notably the degree of welfare service privatization. Hence, the results strongly indicate that the partisan approach is much more fruitful compared to the consensus approach as a general explanation for local politicians’ attitudes towards welfare service privatization in Sweden. Accordingly, a conclusion is that comparisons at the subnational level within countries are important as a complement to country‐comparative studies when attempting to understand the link between political partisanship and welfare service privatization in modern welfare states.     

Dimensionality,ideology and party positions towards European integration

The rise of political contestation over European integration has led many scholars to examine the role that broader ideological positions play in structuring party attitudes towards European integration. This article extends the existing approaches in two important ways. First, it shows that whether the dimensionality of politics is imagined in a one-dimensional ‘general left?right’ form or a two-dimensional ‘economic left?right/social liberal-conservative’ form leads to very different understandings of the way ideology has structured attitudes towards European integration, with the two-dimensional approach offering greater explanatory power. Second, existing approaches have modelled the influence of ideology on attitudes towards European integration as a static process. This article shows that the relationship between ideology and European integration has changed substantially over the history of European integration: divisions over social issues have replaced economic concerns as the main driver of party attitudes towards European integration.     

Ideological congruence over government mandates under majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems

The existing literature on ideological congruence has typically looked at congruence immediately after elections when governments are formed. This article goes beyond that comparative static approach by examining changes in citizen-government ideological congruence between two fixed points in time, namely at the beginning and end of government mandates. Building on a veto player approach and dynamics of party competition under majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, the results indicate, first, that government positions are more stable in between elections, as the number of parties and their ideological distance increase in cabinet. Second, it appears that single-party and homogeneous coalition governments decrease ideological congruence between elections under low levels of polarisation, while they increase congruence under very high levels of polarisation. Third, it was found that governments under majoritarian systems slightly decrease congruence between elections while congruence stays stable on average under PR systems. The different levels of party system polarisation across majoritarian and PR electoral systems mostly explain this difference.     

Do parties matter for local revenue policies? A comparison of Denmark and Norway

Abstract.  This article investigates the impact of party ideology on revenue politics. Theoretically, claims can be made that party ideology should matter for revenue policies. First, leftist governments are more favourable towards government intervention and a large public sector. To accomplish this, leftist governments need more revenue than bourgeois governments. Second, revenue policy is a redistributive policy area well suited for ideological positioning. However, the claim that party ideology does not matter can also be made since raising revenue is unpopular and politicians may shy away from new initiatives. Empirically, the question is unsettled. The article investigates the problem by looking at three revenue policy areas (income and property taxation, and user charges) in two countries (Denmark and Norway). The data used is from the municipal level, providing several hundreds of units to compare. The evidence favours the 'parties matter' argument, particularly in the Danish case.     

Social Media and Revolutionary Waves: The Case of the Arab Spring

This article argues that during the Arab Spring social media served as a tactical tool of mobilization, communication, and coordination; as an instrument of domestic and international revolutionary contagion; and, critically, as a means of enhancing pan-Arab consciousness which, in turn, was fertile soil for that contagion. These three interrelated functions are best analyzed using a revolutionary wave theoretical approach. In its absence, the Arab Spring becomes a patchwork of analytically incoherent “cascade protests.” In fact, the Arab world witnessed an extremely coherent process of revolutionary contagion whose liberal and democratic ideology was disseminated transnationally by social media. The impressive speed, scale, and effectiveness of this contagion would have not been possible without the effect of the Arab public sphere—itself partially enabled by social media—on the increasingly cohesive pan-Arab consciousness. Fundamentally, the Arab Spring was the first revolutionary wave ever to reflect the change in power relations originating in the rise of new communication networks.     

The periphery-dominated centre

Abstract Irish political parties cannot be easily fitted into a conventional left-right framework. The Lipset-Rokkan centre-periphery concept is employed to explain this situation, and, in particular, to throw light on the persistent success of Fianna Fáil, the nationalist-populist party which has dominated the system since 1932. It is argued that Ireland affords an example of a polity in which the political concerns and style of the rural periphery came to 'invade' and dominate the urban centre for more than a generation. Evidence from a study of urban party activists indicates a persistence of rural political styles and ideological perspectives in a social context which has been for well over half a century.     

Government turnover: Concepts, measures and applications

Abstract.  While government turnover is often thought of as an adverse source of instability, it may also be viewed as a favourable source of competition and institution-building. To articulate and test such hypotheses, this article describes two main concepts of government turnover: leadership turnover , or change in rulers, and ideological turnover , or change in the rulers' ideology. Refinements involve the mode, outcome and timing of turnover. The article discusses measurement issues that arise when there are multiple power institutions and when parliaments are controlled by changing majority coalitions. The measures of turnover are illustrated by examining the post-communist world. The article considers the possibility that higher cumulative post-transition turnover – in terms of leaderships or ideologies – has assisted in establishing the rule of law.     

Voter perceptions of parties’ left–right positions: The role of party strategies

Left–right semantics help voters simplify the complex political reality as they reduce party views on a variety of issues to a single dimension. Less studied, however, is the question of how voters arrive at parties’ left–right positions and how parties can influence voter perceptions. In this article, I demonstrate that the party can shape the voter’s understanding of the content of its left–right ideology by using three strategies: avoidance, ambivalence, or ambiguity. Specifically, the party may avoid or de-emphasize, embrace a conflicting position, or becloud its position on the controversial issue; by so doing, it induces voters to place less weight on this issue when perceiving the party’s left–right position. The empirical analysis connects voter and party data from 21 European democracies in the period 1996–2014 and finds empirical support for the effectiveness of these strategies. In particular, the study finds robust empirical evidence that strategic avoidance, ambivalence, and ambiguity strongly moderate the association between the party’s perceived ideological brand and its underlying issue content.     

Party survival in parliament: Explaining party durability in lower-house parliaments

Approximately 70 per cent of the parties emerging in the post-Second World War era failed to keep their seats in parliament. Party survival is an important issue, especially in parliamentary democracies, where parties are the means through which voters’ preferences are linked to government policy outputs. Using an event history modeling framework, and data from 37 democracies, covering 830 parties, this article analyses two questions regarding party durability. First, when do parties fail? Second, which parties survive longer? The article shows that most parties fail at the beginning of their lifespan, and disappear before the end of their fourth term in parliament. Moreover, it is found that moderate policy position, distinct ideology and participation in governing coalitions increase the duration of party survival, even when controlling for party size. This article contributes to the extensive literature about the electoral benefits of ideological moderation and distinct policy positions by showing the long-term benefits of these factors. Moreover, the long-term benefit of party participation in government in terms of survival overcomes the short-term cost of ruling.     

Polarization and ideological congruence between parties and supporters in Europe

The relationship between parties and their supporters is central to democracy and ideological representation is among the most important of these linkages. We conduct an investigation of party-supporter congruence in Europe with emphasis on the measurement of ideology and focusing on the role of party system polarization, both as a direct factor in explaining congruence and in modifying the effects of voter sophistication. Understanding this relationship depends in part on how the ideology of parties and supporters is measured. We use Poole’s Blackbox scaling to derive a measure of latent ideology from voter and expert responses to issue scale questions and compare this to a measure based on left–right perceptions. We then examine how variation in the proximity between parties ideological positions and those of their supporters is affected by the polarization of the party system and how this relationship interacts with political sophistication. With the latent ideology measure, we find that polarization decreases party-supporter congruence but increases the effects of respondent education level on congruence. However, we do not find these relationships using the left–right perceptual measure. Our findings underscore important differences between perceptions of left–right labels and the ideological constraint underlying issue positions.     

Ideological identity,issue-based ideology and bipolar affective polarization in multiparty systems: The cases of Argentina,Chile, Italy,Portugal and Spain

In multiparty contexts, we know that affective polarization tends to cluster in ideological blocs, although the factors driving this process are still quite unexplored. In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap in the literature by exploring the capacity of ideological identity vis-à-vis issue-based ideology to polarize sentiments towards party voters into two opposing left-right blocs. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence that affective attachments to ideological labels increase the affective distance between ideological blocs to a greater extent than issue extremity and issue consistency. These bipolarizing effects of ideological identity persist even when the identity is inconsistent with issue-based ideology. Additionally, we show that bipolar affective polarization exerts little reverse influence on ideological identity. We support these arguments using an original survey from the TRI-POL project carried out in five multiparty systems: Argentina, Chile, Italy, Portugal and Spain.     

Economic evaluations vs. ideology: Diagnosing the sources of electoral change in Turkey, 2002–2011

Turkish elections reflect two competing influences. One concerns a long-term increasingly conservative ideological orientation; the other, more short-term pragmatic evaluations primarily on the economic policy front. This article uses three nationwide representative surveys from 2002, 2007 and 2011 to assess the relative merits of these competing hypotheses. The findings indicate that the critical election of 2002 is not shaped by economic performance evaluations but rather by indicators of ideology at large and left–right ideology in particular. The influence of ideology appears to rise from 2002 to 2007 and 2011. Economic performance evaluations increase in salience from 2002 to 2007 but seem to have somewhat lost their power for 2011. Implications of these findings for the Turkish party system and further research questions are discussed in the concluding section.     

Ideology,Learning, and Policy Diffusion: Experimental Evidence

We introduce experimental research design to the study of policy diffusion in order to better understand how political ideology affects policymakers’ willingness to learn from one another's experiences. Our two experiments–embedded in national surveys of U.S. municipal officials–expose local policymakers to vignettes describing the zoning and home foreclosure policies of other cities, offering opportunities to learn more. We find that: (1) policymakers who are ideologically predisposed against the described policy are relatively unwilling to learn from others, but (2) such ideological biases can be overcome with an emphasis on the policy's success or on its adoption by co‐partisans in other communities. We also find a similar partisan‐based bias among traditional ideological supporters, who are less willing to learn from those in the opposing party. The experimental approach offered here provides numerous new opportunities for scholars of policy diffusion.     

The narrative properties of ideology: the adversarial turn and climate skepticism in the USA

A central concern in policy studies is understanding how multiple, contending groups in society interact, deliberate, and forge agreements over policy issues. Often, public discourse turns from engagement into impasse, as in the fractured politics of climate policy in the USA. Existing theories are unclear about how such an “adversarial turn” develops. We theorize that an important aspect of the adversarial turn is the evolution of a group’s narrative into what can be understood as an ideology, the formation of which is observable through certain textual-linguistic properties. Analysis “of” these narrative properties elucidates the role of narrative in fostering (1) coalescence around a group ideology, and (2) group isolation and isolation of ideological coalitions from others’ influence. By examining a climate skeptical narrative, we demonstrate how to analyze ideological properties of narrative, and illustrate the role of ideological narratives in galvanizing and, subsequently, isolating groups in society. We end the piece with a reflection on further issues suggested by the narrative analysis, such as the possibility that climate skepticism is founded upon a more “genetic” meta-narrative that has roots in social issues far removed from climate, which means efforts at better communicating climate change science may not suffice to support action on climate change.     

Cleavage Formation in Norway: The Contextual Dimension

To explore the mechanism underlying the formation and persistence of cleavage structures the author applies a contextual approach in the case of Norway where regional variation in political cleavages persists over time. This study focuses on the time period between 1890 and 1930, the formative years of the Norwegian party system. The premise of the argument is that a factor contributing to persisting patterns of electoral mobilization is the location of new voters in patterns of social interaction deriving from the class composition in different regions. Initial electoral mobilizations coupled with enduring social structures can be carried on for a long time. These social conditions may pose high costs of mobilization to new parties in a political system. The article shows the persistence of a distinct class composition across regions in Norway and demonstrates the contextual effect by examining the behaviour of new voters in the 1900 election. It evaluates the contextual argument against other party incentives for mobilization by means of a statistical model that incorporates contextual incentives in addition to incentives deriving from electoral rules and political competition.     

The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe

The electoral consequences of the Great Recession are analysed in this article by combining insights from economic voting theories and the literature on party system change. Taking cues from these two theoretical perspectives, the impact of the Great Recession on the stability and change of Western, Central and Eastern European party systems is assessed. The article starts from the premise that, in order to fully assess the impact of the contemporary crisis, classic economic voting hypotheses focused on incumbent parties need to be combined with accounts of long‐term party system change provided by realignment and dealignment theories. The empirical analysis draws on an original dataset of election results and economic and political indicators in 30 European democracies. The results indicate that during the Great Recession economic strain was associated with sizable losses for incumbent parties and an increasing destabilisation of Western European party systems, while its impact was significantly weaker in Central and Eastern European countries, where political rather than economic failures appeared to be more relevant. In line with the realignment perspective, the results also reveal that in Western Europe populist radical right, radical left and non‐mainstream parties benefited the most from the economic hardship, while support for mainstream parties decreased further.     

A voter-centric explanation of the success of ideological candidates for the U.S. house

In recent years, ideological candidates for the U.S. House have become increasingly successful, to the point where their chances of being elected are indistinguishable from moderates. However, scholars have still not uncovered exactly why this is happening. Using survey data from the American National Election Studies, I find that voter-centric explanations of vote choice – a voter's partisanship, ideology, and presidential approval rating – have increasingly predicted their vote choice in U.S. House elections from 1980 to 2016. Using data on candidate ideology, I find that candidate ideology is an increasingly poor predictor of individual vote choice over time. Original experimental data supports these claims, finding only a small electoral advantage for moderates, compared to ideologues of their own party, and evidence suggesting that, at least among Democrats, ideological candidates are rated more favorably than moderates. Taken together, these results suggest that the increased electoral success of ideological candidates can be attributed to changes in voters' decision calculus, rather than structural or candidate-centric explanations.