The price of personalizing politics: Political distrust and economic performance in Latin America, 1996–2006

While research has provided evidence that culture and institutional performance shape individual level trust in political institutions, scholars have neglected to adequately estimate the effect of political institutions and macroeconomic conditions on trust. Using data from the World Value Surveys for eleven Latin American cases, we test if countries with “partyizing” electoral systems - those with rules that encourage voters to hold the party, not individuals, accountable for government performance - experience lower levels of distrust in political parties and the legislature in times of poor economic conditions than those countries with “personalizing” electoral rules. Our analysis shows that the macro political and economic context largely conditions the impact of culture and institutional performance on political trust.     

Reconsidering individual-level heterogeneity in economic voting

This paper proposes a general theory of individual-level heterogeneity in economic voting based on the perspective that the strength of the relationship varies with factors that influence the relevance of the economic evaluation to the vote choice. We posit that the electoral relevance of the economic evaluation increases with the strength of partisanship as well as political sophistication. Given the strong correlation between partisanship and sophistication, this theoretical perspective casts doubt on extant evidence that more sophisticated voters are more likely to hold the incumbent party electorally accountable for macroeconomic performance since this result might be an artifact of failing to control for the economic evaluation being more relevant to the vote choice of stronger partisans. Our statistical investigation of this question finds no significant evidence that sophistication conditions the economic voting relationship once the conditioning effect of partisanship is included in the model. This finding suggests that individual-level heterogeneity in the strength of the economic voting relationship is largely due to stronger partisans voting more consistently with their national economic evaluation than to more sophisticated voters being more policy-oriented by holding the incumbent party more electorally accountable for macroeconomic performance.     

Die Politik wirtschaftlichen Wachstums in autoritären Staaten

The article analyses the widely debated impact of democracy on economic growth. It is argued that an increase of political participation causes a shift in the support-seeking strategies of opportunistic governments. Pure autocrats rationally ensure political support by providing rents to a small group of supporters. With growing political participation, however, public goods become a more efficient political instrument. While rents are assumed to be economically neutral, public goods have an positive impact on economic performance. Hence, growing participation in autocracies is related to higher growth rates of per capita income. This hypotheses is supported by the data.     

The stock market and U.S. presidential approval

Since the 1970s research has demonstrated a strong relationship between national economic performance and presidential approval. Traditionally, these popularity models rely on macroeconomic conditions; however, other economic performance measures may more fully capture the direction of the economy. One such measure, the stock market index, captures elements of national and household economic well-being. Therefore, market performance should impact presidential ratings. Our presidential approval model, based on quarterly data covering 1960–2011, demonstrates that approval is highly sensitive to the stock market's acceleration or deceleration, even with strong controls in the model for the other economic and political determinants of popularity. A rapid fall in the stock market index reduces president approval, while a sharp acceleration in the index growth boosts U.S. presidential approval.     

Macroeconomic performance,political trust and the Great Recession: A multilevel analysis of the effects of within‐country fluctuations in macroeconomic performance on political trust in 15 EU countries, 1999–2011

Recent cross‐national comparative studies have found no effect of countries’ macroeconomic performances on trust in national political institutions, once political explanations (most notably corruption) are taken into account. Although political trust is not determined by the comparison of national economic performance to other countries, it is argued in this article that it is affected by comparisons to their own past performance. In a multilevel, fixed effects analysis of Eurobarometer data (21 waves in 15 European Union Member States between 1999 and 2011) the extent to which within‐country variations in economic performance affect political trust longitudinally is tested. Three major conclusions are reached. First, within‐country, longitudinal changes in performance (growth, deficits, unemployment and inflation) affect political trust. Second, the impact of macroeconomic performance is stronger among the lower educated. Third, even in times of economic duress, budgetary deficits tend to undermine political trust.     

Democracy,Government Spending,and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect

The paper develops a political economicargument for the recently observed inverseu-shaped relation between the level ofdemocracy and economic performance. A modelis constructed that shows why and howpolitical participation influences thespending behavior of opportunisticgovernments that can choose an optimalcombination of rents and public goods toattract political support. If the level ofdemocracy remains comparably low,governments rationally choose rents as aninstrument to assure political support.With increasing democratic participation,however, rents become an increasinglyexpensive instrument while the provision ofpublic goods becomes more and moreefficient in ensuring the incumbentgovernment's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy tends toraise growth rates of per capita income.However, the beneficial impact of democracyon growth holds true only for moderatedegrees of political participation. If –in semi-democratic countries – politicalparticipation increases further,governments have an incentive toover-invest in the provision of publicgoods. This model allows to derive and testthree hypothesis: Firstly, based on asimple endogenous growth model, weempirically substantiate our hypothesis ofa non-linear, inverse u-shaped relationbetween the level of democracy and growthof per capita income. Secondly, we showthat the impact of government spending oneconomic growth is higher in moredemocratic countries. Thirdly, wedemonstrate that the level of democracy andgovernment share of GDP are correlated in au-shaped manner.     

Collective and individual economic judgments and voting in West Germany, 1961–1984

Abstract: : This article attempts to provide individual-level support to findings of longitudinal macro-level studies of the relation between economic variables and electoral outcomes in the Federal Republic. The theoretical framework is one of incumbency-oriented vs. policy-oriented political responses to collective vs. individual economic judgments (Kiewiet, 1983). The data base consists of 25 surveys from 1961 through 1984. Empirical analysis comprises three steps: First, the relation between economic judgments and partisan sympathies is analyzed, since it appears likely that part of the covariations between voting and such judgments is spurious due to a common dependence upon partisan orientations. Second, the impact of both kinds of economic judgments upon voting over time is investigated with and without controls for partisan affiliation. Finally, the impact over time of macropolitical and macroeconomic variables on individual political response patterns to economic judgments is estimated at the longitudinal macro-level. The analysis demonstrates that collective economic judgments are generally a more potent predictor of electoral choice than individual economic judgments, and that there is clear empirical evidence both for the incumbency-oriented and the policy-oriented hypothesis linking such judgments to the vote.     

Economic effects on the vote in Norway

A body of accumulating evidence appears to support the finding that collectivist economic concerns and assessments of government economic performance directly influence voting behavior independent of other predispositions and cleavages. This seems reasonable and is well documented across both cultures and time periods. What remains more inconclusive is how to explain fluctuations in the electoral impact of personal economic worries. Our comparison of Norwegian and U.S. data has suggested that cognitive, social and political factors may all influence this association. The political information and cues for connecting the two spheres may be absent for most elections and for most people. Nevertheless, in some elections and under certain conditions individual economic worries can have a significant, independent impact on election outcomes. A major goal of future political-economy research, therefore, should be to specify more completely those factors that facilitate the linkage of personal and collectivist economic concerns.     

Evolutionary voter sophistication and political business cycles

The concept of the sophisticated electorate is central to many contemporary political economic models. However, no existing studies have yet clarified how voters could develop a sophisticated way of evaluating economic performance. This study suggests a transitional hypothesis that removes the constraint that voters have prior knowledge about the macroeconomic environment and the true economic intent of the incumbent government. The hypothesis permits behavioral innovation from learning and predicts that the evolutionary process toward sophistication may be triggered by socially suboptimal political business cycles that reveal the self-serving characteristic of the government. The empirical analyses using recent Japanese experiences show that Japanese political support behavior shifted from naivete to sophistication in the early 1970s after political manipulation occurred in the 1969 and 1972 parliamentary elections.     

Economic influences on presidential popularity among key political and socioeconomic groups: A review of the evidence and some new findings

This paper analyzes presidential popularity among important political and socioeconomic groups in the United States from 1965 to 1980, making use of the Gallup Poll indicators of support for the incumbent president among the main socioeconomic, regional, generational, sexual, and racial groups, and among Democratic, Republican, and independent voters. The analysis allows fully for both economic and noneconomic influences on incumbent popularity and includes in an integrated rational model underlying partisan orientations. The conclusions suggest the strong importance of partisanship, with the public's political response to the economy depending largely on the political affiliation of the incumbent president. Beyond this, we find economic predictors generally are more important than any of the systematic political or cyclical predictors tested here, with unemployment the single most important influence on presidential popularity. For all presidents, macroeconomic conditions have greater political significance than do the government's redistributive policies designed to influence economic well-being. And with minor exceptions, the economy's political importance is equally strong for all economic classes in American society.     

Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes

Abstract. The political support of citizens of new democracies reflects two sets of experiences. Initially, people are socialized into an undemocratic regime; then, they must re-learn political support in relation to a new regime. In an established democracy, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of early socialization and current performance because both refer to the same regime. However, this is both possible and necessary in countries where there has been a change in regime. Critical questions then arise: When, whether and how do citizens determine their support for their new regime? At the start of a new regime past socialization should be more important but, after a few years, current performance should become more important. We draw on 47 Barometer surveys between 1991 and 1998 in ten more or less democratic post-communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to test the relative importance of early socialization influences, the legacy of the communist past, and the political and economic performance of new regimes. We find that economic and political performance explains the most variance in support and, secondarily, the communist legacy. Early socialization is insignificant. However, contrary to economic theories of voting, the impact of political performance is greater than the impact of economic performance in post-communist countries – and its impact is increasing.     

Political freedom, economic freedom, and income convergence: Do stages of economic development matter?

In the literature, theory and empirical evidence on the nexus of political freedom, economic freedom, and economic growth are mixed. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the effect of political freedom on promoting economic growth is realized and detectable at later stages of social and economic development. Using panel data for a sample of 104 countries between 1970 and 2003, we find strong support for our hypothesis. While economic freedom has greater effects on income convergence in the OECD countries, political freedom clearly promotes the convergence among those OECD countries.     

Political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility: a survey

There is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected, in part, by economic performance, suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage. Simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s, but fell out of fashion with the advent of new-classical economics. However, modern theories of the political business cycle, which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature, assume rational expectations, and lead to forms of political business cycle, driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another. The international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply, although definitive conclusions are – as we might expect – hard to come by.     

Notes on contributors

This article investigates the political impact of the introduction of state subsidies to political parties. The arguments for and against subsidising political parties are outlined. Different models of party subsidies, and their regulatory frameworks, are discussed. We find little evidence of a cross‐national impact of the introduction of party subsidies. The subsidies cannot explain the decline in party membership. Nor is there evidence to suggest that the subsidies were introduced as a response to membership decline. There is no support for the allegation that party subsidies lead to the petrification of party systems. The subsidies have not meant that other income sources have lost their significance for political parties.     

Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies

Using hierarchical linear models fitted to data from the World Values Survey and national statistics for 35 countries, this article builds on the postmaterialist thesis by assessing the impact of economic inequality across and within nations on attitudes toward homosexuality. It provides evidence that tolerance tends to decline as national income inequality rises. For professionals and managers, the results also support the postmaterialist argument that economic development leads to more tolerant attitudes. On the other hand, attitudes of the working class are generally less tolerant, and contrary to expectations of the postmaterialist thesis, are seemingly unaffected by economic development. In other words, economic development influences attitudes only for those who benefit most. These findings have political implications, suggesting that state policies that have the goal of economic growth but fail to consider economic inequality may contribute to intolerant social and political values, an attribute widely considered detrimental for the health of democracy.     

Economic Performance and Regime Legitimacy in Post-Communist Bulgaria

It is commonly assumed that socio-economic conditions strongly influence political attitudes. Since democratic rule is based on the consent of the ruled, a secure and stable democracy cannot be established and maintained without broad-based popular endorsement, which is especially important for nascent post-communist democracies. Painful economic difficulties may engender deep anti-system sentiments at the mass level, encouraging anti-regime activism at the elite level. From this perspective, democratic legitimacy is a function of regime performance. But the Bulgarian evidence fails to validate the hypothesis that system legitimacy depends on regime effectiveness or that socio-economic conditions determine mass-level political attitudes. In spite of the economic fiasco, Bulgaria's democratic regime remains capable of commanding popular support. While the economic performance deficit of catastrophic proportions has become a source of widespread popular dissatisfaction threatening regime stability, it has not led to democratic backsliding or collapse.     

The Chávez vote and the national economy in Venezuela

Hugo Chávez has attracted considerable political support since his emergence on the Venezuela political scene. But what are the bases of this support? More specifically, is economic voting a significant component of his support? Through investigation of the 2010 LAPOP Barometer data, we estimate the various components of a Chávez vote model. In a series of logistic regression analyses, the weight of sets of explanatory variables is assessed, as well as the weight of the overall model. In particular, the role of the economy is carefully explored. First, is Chávez held accountable for the economy? Second, does his personal leadership image dominate his economic policy image? We find evidence of a significant economic voting component in popular support for Chávez, although several other explanatory variables also exert a substantial impact on it.     

The political economics of agricultural price support in Turkey: An empirical assessment

The present study is an attempt to explain the variations in the extent of protection provided to the producers of four selected agricultural crops in Turkey by a set of independent variables representing various economic and political events of the 1962–1983 period. The economic variables were selected in order to assess the divergence between the intentions of the policy makers and their actions as reflected in the level of support actually provided; while the political variables were chosen to assess the impact of elections, military takeovers and noticeable shifts in the underlying philosophy of the policy makers on the support provided. The regression analysis suggested that the political power of the agricultural producers was an important determinant of the policies implemented, especially during times of democratic practices; that during times of military regimes, the agricultural sector tends to be less protected; that there is indirect evidence for the existence of political business cycles synchronized to political elections: and, that general conditions in the economy can influence the behavioral rule of the policy makers.     

The retention of state governors

In this paper, we have provided some support for several hypotheses about the determinants of which governors get reelected. The benefit from being a member of a particular party varies from state to state and from year to year. Personal characteristics such as age are also important. The logits give some support to the importance of coalition formation; reelection is easier in states with low voter turnout and in farm states. The paper is most concerned with the connection between the economic performance and the electoral success of incumbent candidates for governor, and we find support for a model of electoral acountability, in which governors are powerful in state governments and state governments have the ability to differentially tax fixed factors relative to neighboring states.This paper raises some important issues regarding the measurement of variables in political economy, which have wide applicability to other studies in the economics of politics. Peltzman (1988) finds that the difference between the growth rate in state personal income and the national growth rate over a one to four year period prior to the election does not affect gubernatorial electoral outcomes. Concurrently, we find that the current year's growth rate in state personal income and its difference from the national growth rate are not significantly related to electoral success but that the average deviation from predicted state personal income during the governor's tenure in office is significantly related to the odds of getting reelected. That is, the data reject simplistic views of voter behavior and support a sophisticated model of voter behavior. Similarly, Peltzman (1988) has greater success using more sophisticated, cumulative measures of national economic performance.