State Capacity,Regime Type,and Sustaining the Peace after Civil War

About half of the nations that experience civil war eventually relapse into renewed conflict within a few years after the original war ends. This observation has motivated a stream of research into the factors that affect the risk of peace failure in the aftermath of civil war. While the outcome of the previous civil war—for example, military victory versus peace agreement—structures the post-war environment in ways that affect the risk of peace failure, the capacity of the post-war state to enact and implement policies that affect the incentives for and capacity of groups to undertake armed violence as a means of advancing their interests should also affect the risks of peace failure. Using Geddes’ categories of nondemocratic regime types, we will present a theory of how different regime types have varying capacities to repress and/or implement accommodative policies that affect the risk of peace failure. We test propositions derived from this theory with a series of event history models. Our findings suggest that while peace agreements significantly increase the duration of post-civil war peace, peace agreements involving some types of nondemocratic regimes actually increase the risk of post-civil war peace failure.     

Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War

This article examines international interventions in the aftermath of civil wars to see whether peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when they are absent. Because peacekeeping is not applied to cases at random, I first address the question of where international personnel tend to be deployed. I then attempt to control for factors that might affect both the likelihood of peacekeepers being sent and the ease or difficulty of maintaining peace so as to avoid spurious findings. I find, in a nutshell, that peacekeeping after civil wars does indeed make an important contribution to the stability of peace.     

Towards a more peaceful world? A critical view

Contemporary scholars do not agree on whether there is a declining prospect of war and armed conflict. A substantial number of authors of quantitative studies have concluded that the current worldwide trend is towards peace. I argue that this conclusion builds on insufficient evidence and possibly on misleading categorisations. The complacent view on the contemporary international system is based on inadequate awareness of the changing patterns of violence. The so-called new wars are not played out on the traditional battlefield. Valid conclusions about present trends would require a reconsideration of definitions, empirical evidence, and coding rules. Moreover, the current wave of democratisation and the increasing number of international interventions probably do not make the world more peaceful. Therefore, the conclusions in some of the most extensive recent analyses of war and peace, that the world is becoming more peaceful, are flawed.     

Colombian peace communities: the role of NGOs in supporting resistance to violence and oppression

Colombia's chronic war is one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. Amid armed actors, pervasive violence, and increasing militarisation, many citizens experience hostility from all sides. This violence continues the historical marginalisation of Afro-descendant, indigenous, and campesino communities and is intensified by the ‘global war on terror’. Some ‘peace communities’ are rejecting violence and seeking ways to survive within war—becoming protagonists in their own protection. This is risky: it draws accusations, threats, and attacks by all armed actors, including the state. Over time, the lack of sustainable livelihoods, weak internal cohesion, and antagonistic external dynamics test the determination of such communities. This article examines four peace communities and explores factors that generate and sustain grassroots protagonism. It ends by suggesting ways in which development organisations can enhance community-level protection and reinforce local peace processes, in order to contribute to broader peace building.     

The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia

Most contemporary intrastate military conflicts have a criminalized dimension: In various ways and to varying degrees they use smuggling networks and criminal actors to create and sustain the material basis for warfare. Despite its importance, the criminalized side of intrastate war and its legacy for postwar reconstruction is not a central focus of analysis in most scholarly accounts of armed conflict. A detailed examination of the Bosnian conflict illustrates the explanatory usefulness of a "bottom up," clandestine political economy approach to the study of war and post-war reconstruction. Drawing on interviews with former military leaders, local and international officials, and in-country observers, I argue that the outbreak, persistence, termination, and aftermath of the 1992–1995 war cannot be explained without taking into account the critical role of smuggling practices and quasi-private criminal combatants. The article suggests the need for greater bridging and broadening of the study of security, political economy, and crime.     

战争、和平与全球治理

战争与和平是人类社会面临的重大问题。战争的爆发与和平的实现既受国际政治经济因素的影响,也是国内政治力量相互作用的结果。裁军是决定战争与和平的重要因素,然而,当今国际社会在裁军方面的进展十分缓慢。随着全球化步伐的加快,尤其进入21世纪以来,国际安全形势令人担忧。大规模杀伤性武器的有增无减以及恐怖主义的蔓延继续威胁着国际社会,原先的国际治理逻辑已不再适用。为消除战争、增进和平,重塑全球治理机制的呼声愈加高涨。为此,国际社会需要引入新的治理机制,对影响国际安全的因素加以管理。世界各国日益加深的相互依赖意味着以议题关联为核心的治理手段能够发挥更大作用。为提升和改进全球治理的效果,国际社会必须引入具有动机的激励机制,建立起可信和可核查的制度,对违反协议的国家实施惩罚和制裁,这不仅是国际协议和国际行动成功的关键,也是确保全球治理有效性的不二选择。     

Max Weber,modernity and the project of international organization

In this essay I discuss programmatic proposals for international organization in the light of Max Weber's account of modernity. I argue that the authors known in international relations (IR) as ‘functionalists’ have pursued the extension of the modernization process that Weber analysed in national societies into the international sphere. Between 1900 and 1945, functionalists advocated a transformation of international politics, at that time still the domain of a lot of jingoism and aggression, into rational public administration. In the first part of the article I outline Weber's account of societal modernization with a focus on the sharp contrast between politics and bureaucratic administration. In the second section I engage with the writings of three political scientists who represent the early ‘functionalist’ tradition in IR: Paul Reinsch, James Arthur Salter and David Mitrany. I show how they planned to modernize IR by establishing a technocratic mode of governance and hence a Versachlichung der Gewaltherrschaft, that is, a depersonalization and rationalization of authority. The turn to international organizations in the early twentieth century thus can be seen in the context of the universal process of societal modernization as rationalization that Weber analysed.     

Electoral Reforms and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements

One of the most common features found within peace agreements is provisions that call for post-civil war elections. Unfortunately, the initial post-war elections often increase the risk of civil war recurrence. While past research has consistently confirmed this finding, it focuses only on one element of the democracy. Rather than focusing solely on elections, this article examines the laws surrounding the electoral process. Specifically, I examine how changes in electoral laws that are called for in peace agreements impacts the risk of renewed civil war. Building on research that examines the context of post-civil war elections, I argue that reforms to electoral laws that precede the initial post-war election substantially reduce the risks associated with that election. This proposition is supported with evidence from survival models of peace failures following the establishment of comprehensive peace agreements from 1989 to 2010, demonstrating that electoral reforms reduce the risk of civil war recurrence.     

Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace

Is peace more likely to prevail when the peace accord includes civil society actors such as religious groups, women's organizations, and human rights groups? This is the first statistical study that explores this issue. The article develops key claims in previous research regarding the role of civil society actors and durable peace, and proposes a set of hypotheses that focus on legitimacy in this process. The hypotheses are examined by employing unique data on the inclusion of civil society actors in all peace agreements in the post–Cold War period. The statistical analysis shows that inclusion of civil society actors in the peace settlement increases the durability of peace. The results further demonstrate that peace accords with involvement from civil society actors and political parties in combination are more likely to see peace prevail. The findings also suggest that inclusion of civil society has a particularly profound effect on the prospects for overall peace in nondemocratic societies.     

Lost in Translation: The Problem of Perceptual Limitations in Civil War Peace Negotiation

This article examines the negative role that actors' perceptual limitations play in civil war peace negotiation by reviewing the Sino-Khmer Rouge interplay during the Cambodian peace negotiations (1987–1993). The study contends that China continually failed to challenge the Khmer Rouge's negotiation strategies, which were founded on the faction's flawed understanding of its situation. Moreover, the inadequate communication between China and its client faction and the Khmer Rouge's lack of institutions for obtaining and analyzing information are identified as the two main reasons for the failure of Chinese intervention.     

Electoral Competition,the State,and Communal Violence: A Reply

In a review of my 2004 book Votes and Violence,Ashutosh Varshney and Joshua Gubler criticize various aspects of the book and its electoral incentives theory. The implication is that Varshney's own local civic engagement theory provides a superior explanation for communal violence. This article responds to the specific criticisms of my arguments about the role of electoral incentives and state action, or inaction, in leading to communal violence, showing why these are wrong or unimportant. I cite three important recent studies, by scholars working independently of me, who come to the same conclusions I do about the key role of electoral incentives and the importance of the state. I also cite the work of other scholars, based on careful fieldwork, who have questioned Varshney's characterization of the causes of conflict and peace in the cities he discusses in his own 2002 book Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life.     

Thinking about terrorism and just war

Since 2001 a new urge to moralize the use of violence as an instrument of state policy has appeared in liberal democracies. The American idea of a War against Terror, and the European notion of confronting a global terrorist threat, have together merged with a discourse on humanitarian military action: the political/moral ‘responsibility to protect’ is no longer to be confined to one's own citizens. Renewed interest among academics in ‘just war’ theory, the tradition that seeks to humanize war through law, reflects this development. This article questions the assumption that there is an essential difference between war (civilized violence) and terrorism (barbaric violence). It argues that their similarity appears more clearly if we set intentions aside—such as the deliberate or accidental killing of ‘innocents’—and focus instead on three main facts: (a) modern war strategies and technologies are uniquely destructive, (b) armed hostilities increasingly occupy a single space of violence in which war and peace are not clearly demarcated, and (c) the law of war does not provide a set of ‘civilizing’ rules but a language for legal/moral argument in which the use of punitive violence is itself a central semantic element.     

Of ‘witch's brews’ and scholarly communities: the dangers and promise of academic parrhesia

In a series of lectures in the early 1980s, Michel Foucault resurrected the Greek word for frankness or truth-telling—‘parrhesia’—to investigate the inter-relationships and tensions that existed between freedom, truth-telling and political power. He concluded that in order for one to ‘tell the truth’ against a powerful superior, one needs the courage to oppose a community of which the parrhesiastes (‘truth teller’) is a member. This paper uses parrhesia to investigate the practice of the international relations (IR) scholar in speaking out against his or her scholarly community. Tony Smith's 2007 book Pact with the devil is used as an example of academic-intellectual parrhesia not only to illustrate the content of a potential form of parrhesia, but to demonstrate the challenges IR scholars who wish to practise academic parrhesia face in criticizing members of their academic community. Smith's critique of democratic peace theory specifically, and liberal IR theory more generally, is particularly noteworthy considering Smith's former position as a leading liberal proponent. The paper reviews, and then supplements and extends, Smith's critique of democratic peace theory.     

Refugee Flows,Ethnic Power Relations,and the Spread of Conflict

Why do some refugee flows cause conflict in the host state and others do not? Drawing on bargaining models of war, I argue refugees are especially likely to cause conflict when they alter the host state's ethnic balance of power. More specifically, I explain why multiple informational and commitment problems arise when refugee flows produce a rapid shift in relative power between ethnic groups. As an empirical strategy, I examine a unique controlled comparison made possible by the influx of Kosovar refugees into Albania and Macedonia in 1999 that eliminates over a dozen competing explanations for civil conflict. I then use process tracing to demonstrate how a change in relative power between ethnic groups fostered violence in Macedonia, whereas the preservation of the ethnic balance facilitated a peaceful refugee flow into Albania. This evidence, though tentative, indicates that a refugee flow's effect on the host state's ethnic balance of power can help explain whether the state experiences peace or conflict.     

Developing policy on integration and re/construction in Kosova

The Gender Audit (GA) and associated reports and reviews drawn upon in this article enable an evaluation of how far the intervention processes at work in Kosova since 1999 have been inclusive of gender analysis and supportive of women's and girls' needs and interests. This assessment considers the strengths and drawbacks of various attempts to use and implement gender-sensitive projects. The GA was designed to support the emerging feminist reconstructive politics in Kosova. Its findings and recommendations tackle aspects of empowerment, equity, and opportunities, outlining some developments from community activism as well as outcomes of the international administration. By considering developments over a two-year period, it is possible to place issues of equity and opportunities in the context of change over time, with change at local and national levels linked with developing international dialogues. The article analyses local work undertaken by the Kosova Women's Network to overcome violence against women in war and domestic peace, and reviews international work engaged in by the Kosovo [sic] Women's Initiative (KWI). Many Kosovar women (of all ethnicities) do fully acknowledge their community membership, and recognise the risks involved in talking across their differences to achieve everyday security and reconciliation. International reports and reviews such as those produced in 2002 by the UN Secretary-General and UNIFEM on women, war, peace, and security, as well as the review of the KWI, allow an assessment of how dialogues are changing and what the potential impact of such change might be on policy development and implementation.     

E–governance and e-publicanism: preliminary perspectives on the role of the Internet in South African democratic processes

Abstract

The idea of peace has gained a hegemonic place in the discourse of intellectuals and the mass media. From being a preoccupation of religious and utopian sages throughout history, a vision of a peaceful world emerged as a fashionable occupation for peace activism in the 1960s and ultimately in the 21^st century peace research has become a fast-growing industry. The assumed need to end wars and violence and to enforce peaceful existence on individuals, groups, societies and the entire world has been unquestionably accepted as if a self evident truth. By accepting such dubious claims many scholars have consciously and unconsciously distorted historical data in order to produce an image of an ideal peaceful world. Yet increasingly the belief in the ability to abolish war and eliminate conflict is being questioned and conflict prevention is seen as unrealistic, undesirable and based on misguided assumptions. Thus, if achieving peace is counterproductive what are the motives, aims and consequences of peace enforcement? This article begins a critical interrogation of the idea of peace and peace discourse and the formative value of war as human reality. The article uncovers the genealogy of peace, evaluates the relationships between peace and war and exposes the deceptive strategies and tactics of peace discourse as it manipulates language and the mass media. The article concludes that the consequences of enforcing peace do not produce a beautiful society but a nightmare where war is seen once again as a blessing.     

Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA,Sinn Fein,the Peace Process and Democracy

By characterizing the relationship between political fronts and their terrorist organizations this article sets out to explain the underlying reason for the impasse that has come about in the Northern Ireland peace process over decommissioning. It argues that political fronts are subordinate to their terrorist groups and that dual membership between the two is a common feature. Sinn Fein, at least until the autumn of 2001, has been subordinate to the IRA Army Council and so was unable to deliver IRA disarmament. It is then suggested that this misunderstanding, or willingness to overlook the fact, in 1998 has led to the legitimization of Sinn Fein by three democratic states and this has been fundamental in bringing about the party's electoral advance. Loyalist disenchantment, with both this advance and what it has perceived to be the flood of concessions to republicans because of the implied threat of violence, could ultimately have led to violence on a worse scale than the 30 years of the 'Troubles'. The international strategic environment that the republican movement was confronted with changed this. The departure of President Bill Clinton from office and the election of George W. Bush, the Colombian episode, and the declared 'war on terrorism' following the 11 September attacks, were all significant factors behind the IRA's first act of putting weapons beyond use. The possibility, however, that the move was a tactical one-off merely to stave off American pressure and cement Sinn Fein's position in the new political dispensation (and thereby confirm Sinn Fein's status as a political front subordinate to the IRA) should not be discounted. It could also be argued, however, that, because of the apparent shift in control that took place within the Army Council after the events of August and September 2001 towards the 'Sinn Fein element' that supported putting weapons beyond use, the act represents the beginning of an incremental process that will, events permitting, lead to further such moves and the ultimate disbandment of the IRA. If this is the case then the autumn of 2001 is the time that Sinn Fein ceased to be a political 'front', and was henceforth the senior partner in the Republican movement. Nevertheless, the party would still have a long way to go before becoming a democratic party.     

The failure of a liberal peace: Sri Lanka's counter-insurgency in global perspective

The victory by the Sri Lankan government over the LTTE in 2009 apparently ended over 25 years of civil war. However, the ramifications of the government's counter-insurgency go far beyond Sri Lanka's domestic politics. The military campaign against the LTTE poses a significant challenge to many of the liberal norms that inform contemporary models of international peace-building—the so-called ‘liberal peace’. This article suggests that Sri Lanka's attempts to justify a shift from peaceful conflict resolution to counter-insurgency relied on three main factors: the flawed nature of the peace process, which highlighted wider concerns about the mechanisms and principles of international peace processes; the increased influence of ‘Rising Powers’, particularly China, in global governance mechanisms, and their impact on international norms related to conflict management; and the use by the government of a discourse of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency to limit international censure. The article concludes that the Sri Lankan case may suggest a growing contestation of international peace-building norms, and the emergence of a legitimated ‘illiberal peace’.     

Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict

We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion–intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.     

Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace

While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States.