Informality and Circumscription: The Blair Style of Government in War and Peace

In the latest of his periodic 'overflights' of the Blair style of government since 1997, Peter Hennessy examines the significance of the 2004 Butler Report (on intelligence and weapons of mass destruction prior to the Iraq War) for Tony Blair both as war premier and also as an indicator of his governing practices in general. He concludes that the Cabinet's overall performance on the road to war was seriously inadequate, and is especially critical of its failure to test out fully the Attorney General's opinion in the legality of the war.     

Syria crisis highlights importance of Chemical Weapons Convention

Allegations in March by both Syria's Assad regime and its opponents that the other side had used chemical weapons in the country's increasingly bitter civil war have served to highlight the challenges surrounding their prohibition.     

Responsibility to Peace: A Critique of R2P

Abstract

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 led to the doctrine of R2P, which envisages the use of force in defence of human rights. But as the Kosovo conflict demonstrates, nothing is more destructive of human rights than war. The protection and promotion of human rights should be done through lawful and non-lethal means. This essay argues that citizens and states have a responsibility to peace as much as to human rights because human rights can only flourish in a condition of peace. This essay seeks to restore peace to its proper place in the discussion of international politics and human rights.     

Continuity and Change in British Thinking about Nuclear Weapons

For almost fifty years there has been constant argument between those who have supported the development and possession of nuclear weapons by Britain and those opposed to those policies. This article argues that there has been a continuity in the arguments made by policy-makers and their critics, both operating within an unchanging series of linked assumptions forming a paradigm or mind-set. This article sets out the character of the assumptions of the orthodox and alternative thinkers, as they are termed in the article, examining their coherence and differences, particularly during the cold war. It concludes by attempting to draw out some implications for the British security policy debate in the post-cold war period.     

The price of alliance: Anglo-American intelligence cooperation and Imperial Japan’s criminal biological warfare programme, 1944–1947

From 1932 to 1945, Imperial Japan secretly developed the largest state biological warfare (BW) programme of its time, which was unique in its use of biological weapons in warfare and in its inhumane experiments on captive Chinese civilians. After Japan’s surrender, US military intelligence teams searched for any evidence of BW activities, whilst sharing all it could find with its close partner, the UK. Despite the UK offering little intelligence material in return, it secured detailed US intelligence reports on Japanese BW war crimes, and colluded with the United States to keep these Japanese war crimes a secret.     

Immigrant protests in Toronto: diaspora and Sri Lanka's civil war

As Sri Lanka's civil war escalated in the spring of 2009, protests led by the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in Toronto appealed for an immediate ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Held simultaneously in Chennai, London, and Oslo, the protests called for an end to the hostilities in Sri Lanka as well as recognition of the legitimacy of Tamil Eelam, a separate nation state for Tamils in Sri Lanka. Based on interviews and media coverage in Toronto, this article investigates how these ‘immigrant protests’ constituted ‘transnational acts of citizenship’. I examine the Toronto protests through three acts in the protest that challenged the exclusions of national citizenship by moving from Toronto's streets, statist discourses of Canadian citizenship, and the violence of war in Sri Lanka. Although these transnational acts of citizenship were rendered inaudible in public culture, the article concludes by exploring the possibilities of citizenship and belonging in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora following the defeat of the LTTE.     

Sabotage! The Origins,Development and Impact of the IRA's Infrastructural Bombing Campaigns 1939–1997

At various moments in the twentieth century the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in its various incarnations have used the tactic of infrastructural bombing, notably in their 1939 attacks in England on electricity pylons and in the summer of 1971 in Northern Ireland on its electrical distribution network. In 1996 the British Security Service (MI5) foiled an attack by the IRA aimed at causing a total electrical blackout of the greater London area, a plan that would have seen major disruption in the capital for many weeks or months. Using recently declassified material this paper seeks to re-evaluate the impact of these IRA infrastructural sabotage campaigns that have until now either been ignored or judged to have been derisory or incongruous failures. This paper demonstrates the historical development of this tactic from both the IRA's perspective, and that of those who were tasked with hindering it, highlighting the devastating potential of such tactics in the future.     

US Media and Post-9/11 Human Rights Violations in the Name of Counterterrorism

This article adds to earlier research revealing that the American news media did not discharge their responsibility as a watchdog press in the post-9/11 years by failing to scrutinize extreme and unlawful government policies and actions, most of all the decision to invade Iraq based on false information about Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction arsenal. The content analyses presented here demonstrate that leading US news organizations, both television and print, did not expressly refer to human rights violations when they reported on the torturing of foreign detainees during “enhanced interrogations” in US-run prison facilities abroad and the killing of civilians, including children, in US drone strikes overseas and outside theaters of war. Moreover, by framing torture and the “collateral damage” caused by drone-launched missile attacks episodically rather than in the context of human rights, the news media failed to alert the American public to the grave humanitarian violations in the so-called war on terrorism during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.     

The Iraq War and the Responsibility to Protect: Uses,Abuses and Consequences for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention

Before the 2003 Iraq war, the political leadership of the United States and United Kingdom had to sell the case for war to their people and the world. This was attempted through a number of speeches that employed rhetorical justifications for the war. Two prominent justifications used during this period involved the employment of security and humanitarian narratives. The security narrative focused on claims regarding Iraq's undermining of international law, possession of weapons of mass destruction and threat to the world. The humanitarian narrative revolved around claims about human suffering in Iraq and the need to liberate its people. While it is widely assumed that security is the dominant casus belli in the post-9/11 world, there is much evidence to suggest that the humanitarian justifications that played a critical role in the military interventions of the 1990s were still important after 9/11. The use of humanitarian justifications for the Iraq war clearly has implications for the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ movement, which has gained prominence since the December 2001 publication of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report. Based on an extensive content analysis of speeches by the US and UK political leadership before the war, this article will quantify the relative importance of each narrative and analyse what the findings mean for the ongoing debates within the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ movement.     

The Just War Tradition and the Moral Character of Nuclear Deterrence

The paper begins with a brief conceptualization of deterrence as a category of state institutionalized threats which are characterized by the risk of use of nuclear weapons. Using this as justification, it continues with a discussion of the principles of thejust war tradition and, in the third section, examines a specific attempt to describe an alternative, more morally acceptable, structure of deterrence. The shortcomings of this attempt provide the springboard for a discussion of an alternative conceptualization of deterrence which moves beyond the bounds of the tradition's obsession with intent as the source of ethical evaluations of deterrence. The philosophical limits of the tradition, particularly its lack of a theory of rights, are finally discussed.     

Beyond borders: The human rights imperative for intervention in Kosovo

Conclusion A close reading of the United Nations Charter supports humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. While the explicit Charter provisions permitting force do not appear to be applicable, the Charter implicitly permitted and even mandated the action. The strongest justifications for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are linked to affirmative human rights concerns, subject to substantive and procedural limitations. While the intervention in Kosovo was fully legal at the outset, any claims that the bombing campaign violated the laws of war should be investigated. Meaningful humanitarian intervention does not threaten world order. Rather, it vindicates the fundamental principles for which the United Nations was created. The author acknowledges the tremendous assistance of Katherine Guernsey and Barbara Wilson in the preparation of this article.     

Problems in the Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Rethinking Korea,Tet, and Afghanistan

Accusations of failure by elements of the US intelligence community (IC) have followed in the wake of nearly every war and terrorist bombing since Japan's successful strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This article will illustrate how some problems that exist inside the ‘intelligence-policy nexus’ are beyond the control of the IC. By investigating the dynamics and tensions that exist between producers of intelligence (the IC) and the consumers of those products (policy-makers), we review three different types of alleged failure. First, by revisiting the Chinese intervention in Korea, we show that a rarely listed case in the literature is in fact a classic example of producer-based failure generated from within the IC. However, in our study of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War (1968), we show that the alleged intelligence failure by producers should be more accurately described as a ‘failure of intelligence’ by consumers. Third, by revisiting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), we conclude that there existed neither a producer nor a consumer failure. The Carter Administration made a conscious policy choice to act surprised (when it was not).     

Preemptive strikes and the war on Iraq: a critique of Bush administration unilateralism and militarism

Bush administration foreign policy has exhibited a marked unilateralism and militarism in which US military power is used to advance US interests and geopolitical hegemony. The policy was first evident in the Afghanistan intervention following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, and informed the 2003 war against Iraq. In From 9/11 to Terror War, I sketched out the genesis and origins of Bush administration foreign policy and its application in Afghanistan and the build‐up to the Iraq war. In this study, I update and develop my critique of the Bush doctrine of preemptive strikes and its application in the 2003 Iraq invasion, concluding with a critique of unilateralism and militarism, and defense of multilateral and global solutions to problems such as terrorism, so‐called “weapons of mass destruction,” and “rogue regimes.”     

British attitudes on nuclear weapons

• In an increasingly unstable world post‐911, the political landscape seems to be continually shifting, with many of the old certainties around combatants and how to wage war being subject to revision—not least the role of nuclear weapons in a post‐Cold War age. But have our attitudes towards the development and use of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed over the past 50 years? Andy Byrom, Associate Director at Ipsos MORI, examines data from the previous half‐century which lead to some surprising conclusions.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inventing the ‘axis of evil’: the myth and reality of us intelligence and policy-making after 9/11

George W. Bush has claimed that the latest intelligence estimates single out Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an ‘axis of evil’ fomenting terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. However, the intelligence itself demonstrates that this concept has been largely manufactured and the CIA bypassed in favor of a pre-existing political consensus among right-wing Republicans. In reality, the ‘axis’ serves to perpetuate an American ‘preponderance of power’. It justifies specific policies which had already been decided before Bush came to power and which now have popular acceptance through their association with the successful war on terrorism.     

Postmodern War in the Age of Bush II

This study charts the genealogy and development of new trends in high-tech warfare that have emerged in the past decade, focusing on both the challenges and dangers. Attention is devoted to the Bush administration's military program and foreign policy moves, highlighting the ways Bush II intensifies the dangers of high-tech war while undermining efforts at collective security, environmental protection, and global peace. The argument here is that the volatile mixture of highly regressive, unilateralist, and militarist tendencies combined with high-tech weapons provides a clear and present danger of a protracted and frightening period of war. This mixture dramatically erupted in Bush's military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 and is currently intensifying dangers to world peace in the campaign some are labeling "World War III."     

Eagle's-eye View: An American Assessment of the 1973 Yom Kippur War

The United States displayed a keen interest in the nature, progress and results of the Yom Kippur War, because the fighting was thought to reflect how non-nuclear hostilities between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (WP) would unfold on the plains of central Europe in case war broke out there. In contrast to many observers of the war, who concluded that the losses suffered by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) at the hands of Egyptian and Syrian anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons had rendered the aircraft and the tank largely impotent, thereby revolutionizing how wars would be waged in the future, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts and United States Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Command officers, based upon an in-depth review of the nature, progress and results of the fighting, re-affirmed the centrality of these weapons systems on the modern battlefield. Rather than focus obsessively on technological developments, they concluded that training, leadership and tactics were ultimately the decisive elements in the Yom Kippur War.     

Taps and Terrorism: A German Approach?

The United States is more than six years into its global war on terrorism, relying ever more on expanded wiretapping powers to halt its spread. However, looking at Germany, a country which has made far more extensive use of wiretaps for a far longer period of time, suggests that reliance on wiretaps, while not entirely ineffectual, might be more of a panacea to make people feel they are being protected than a fully functional tool in breaking up terror plots. Should the United States keep investing in these programs, or should it consider other weapons against terror?     

The Terror that Failed: Public Opinion in the Aftermath of the Bombing in Oklahoma City

Did the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City affect the public's perception of terrorism as a political issue and their perceptions of individual risk and personal vulnerability? The author finds that the bombing in Oklahoma City altered neither the public's assessment of personal risk nor its reported behavior. Public opinion on terrorism and crime share three patterns: (1) perceived risk of victimization and the likely consequences affect public apprehension; (2) the voiced sense of personal security bears a direct relationship to the relative familiarity of the setting; and (3) the public shows resistance to the media's portrayal of risk. Opinion data indicate that domestic terrorism is likely to be seen as important in general and in the abstract, but with low personal risk, little impact on individuals' routine behavior, and, consequently, low political salience. In light of terrorism's purpose of inducing fear and the public's generally placid response on a personal level, the author concludes that the bombing failed as an act of domestic terrorism.     

Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War

Aerial bombardment has been an important component of counterinsurgency practice since shortly after it became a viable military technology in the early twentieth century. Due to the nature of insurgency, bombing frequently occurs in and around settled areas, and consequently it tends to generate many civilian casualties. However, the effectiveness of bombing civilian areas as a military tactic remains disputed. Using data disaggregated to the level of the smallest population unit and measured at multiple points in time, this article examines the effect of aerial bombardment on the pattern of local control in the Vietnam War. A variety of estimation methods, including instrumental variables and genetic matching, show that bombing civilians systematically shifted control in favor of the Viet Cong insurgents.