'I'm Proud of the British Empire': Why Tony Blair Backs George W. Bush

This article considers the three main reasons behind Tony Blair's support for the post-9/11 foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration, especially the war on Iraq: first, Blair is on a neo-imperial mission, with deep roots in his personal development, to re-order the world to better suit British interests; secondly, Bush and Blair independently agree that the post-1989 period represents wasted time, years of drift that could have been used to press home Anglo-American dominance; and thirdly, an agreement that 9/11 opened the space for a radical restructuring of international relations and the setting of a more interventionist global agenda.     

John Macmurray and the'Forgotten'Lessons on Capitalism and Community

Tony Blair has made no secret of his admiration for the philosophical works of John Macmurray. This article shows that Blair recognises Macmurray's contribution to the understanding of the individual in society. Blair readily acknowledges Macmurray's overriding desire for philosophy to place individuals in their rightful social setting. Yet Blair views this philosophical shift as a reinforcement of modern notions of community that emphasise an obligation to others as well as to oneself. It is my contention that this may be a misreading of the specifics that lay behind the works of Macmurray. By implication, this error in understanding could have led New Labour to pursue a social policy direction that contradicts Macmurray's visions of capitalism and its effects upon human agency, behaviour, rationality and morality. Consequently, this article examines the works of Macmurray in an attempt to show that Tony Blair and New Labour are in danger of making false assumptions on how to revive a contemporary sense of community through the bedrock of a traditional family unit supported by the model of the 'rational economic man'.     

Michael Howard: The First Jewish Prime Minister?

Initially, Michael Howard seemed the saviour of the divided and disheartened Conservative party, reuniting it in the hope of victory at the next general election. Initially, also, he seemed a match for his fellow barrister, Tony Blair. Though successful at winning over Tory MPs, he was much less effective in relation to all those ex-Tory voters who deserted the party in 1997 and 2001. This failure was confirmed after less than nine months of his leadership, when his party polled poorly at the European elections of June 2004 (where a large slice of the anti-European vote went to UKIP) and came an ignominious third in the Parliamentary by-elections of July 2004. These results, combined with Howard's lacklustre response to the Butler Report, sapped Howard's personal ratings and reopened civil war within the Conservative party.     

'It Wasn't Us and We Didn't Benefit': The Discourse of Opposition to an Apology by Britain for Its Role in the Slave Trade

2007 was the bicentennary of the abolition of slave trading in British ships. It was marked by renewed calls for an apology for Britain's role in the slave trade. Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed his regret for the trade but did not issue an apology.This article examines the discourse of popular opposition to an apology, as articulated in newspapers and on websites, and offers a commentary and critique on the positions adopted.'     

The Spies Who Loved Them: The Blairs in Barcelona, 1937

In recent years, and particularly around the time of his birth-centenary in 2003, George Orwell's reputation has come under a cloud. Both his unexampled honesty as a writer and his stainless political idealism have been brought into question. This article takes a further tentative step into this hitherto forbidden region by exploring the connections of Eric Blair and Eileen O'Shaughnessey with various espionage agents and intelligence networks in Barcelona in the spring of 1937. Although the argument is founded on a range of original contemporary documentation, as with many Spanish Civil War stories, facts are complicated and conclusions necessarily provisional.     

The Postwar Premiership League

The article reports the results from the latest survey of academic experts polled on the performance of post‐1945 prime ministers. Academic specialists in British politics and history rate Clement Attlee as the best postwar prime minister, with Margaret Thatcher in second place just ahead of Tony Blair in third place. Gordon Brown's stint in Number 10 was the third‐worst since the Second World War, according to the respondents to the survey that rated his premiership as less successful than that of John Major. The article compares public and academic opinion and rankings of prime ministers and their performance, noting significant discrepancies in contemporary and retrospective evaluations. Academic respondents to the survey also provided detailed ratings and evaluations of the performance and policy impact of the four prime ministers since 1979: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.     

From Blair to Brown: The Condition of British Government

Peter Hennessy examines the conduct of central government since 1997, especially Cabinet processes during the build-up to the Iraq war of 2003. He discusses the degree to which both Blair and Brown over the past months have appeared to run against aspects of the governing style of the administrations they have jointly dominated. He assesses what Gordon Brown's floated idea of a written constitution might mean in practical terms and makes a particular case for a War Powers Act.     

The First MBA President: George W. Bush as Public Administrator

President Bush was praised early in his first term as a tough-minded decision maker who knows how to get things done. This essay argues that President Bush possesses formidable political skills that have helped him achieve many of his policy goals, focusing on his most important national security policies: the war in Iraq, the war on terrorism and the treatment of detainees, the use of intelligence leading up to the war, and the reorganization of the executive branch. In the end, however, President Bush's deficiencies as a public administrator have undermined his policy successes.     

Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet War Scare: The Untold Story

Abstract

During the Soviet war scare of the 1980s, British intelligence shared vital information from KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky with its American partners. The US intelligence community, however, was suspicious of the message and the messenger, dismissing Soviet ‘war talk’ as disinformation. Some officials even believed that the British had tweaked their reports to influence US policy. President Ronald Reagan, however, on the advice of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, listened to Gordievsky rather than his intelligence advisors. The war scare had a profound influence on Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and Soviet–American relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation.?Subsequent events and post-Cold War revelations vindicated Gordievsky. Reagan sought his advice on the eve of his first summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and later expressed his gratitude during a private meeting in the Oval Office.     

Liberal Interventionism

David Lipsey analyses the arguments made by former Labour prime minister Tony Blair in his Chicago speeches for armed liberal intervention in states which are abusing the human rights of their citizens. He traces these arguments back to previous advocates of such intervention such as W. E. Gladstone and Woodrow Wilson. The arguments of Blair and advocates are often compelling in principle. However, in most cases—Iraq and Libya are examples—the practical consequences of military action turn out to be disastrous. Though opposing pacifism, and the ill‐thought‐out hostility to all things military of Labour's current leader Jeremy Corbyn, Lipsey's advice to those thinking of intervening is: don't.     

Monarchy and Democracy: A Progressive Agenda

The Blair governments since 1997 have seen the single most significant period of constitutional reform in Britain for over a century. However, they leave the monarchy, the institution at the apex of the unwritten constitution, untouched. It is argued that neither inaction nor abolition is advisable, but that reform should be undertaken, with particular attention to the rules of succession and to the royal prerogative powers, notable examples being the powers to declare war, to dismiss parliament, to assent to legislation and to appoint the Prime Minister. Those powers now exercised by the executive should be formally and linguistically separated from the office of head of state, and put on a statutory basis. The achievement of these reforms depends, however, on political will and cannot be initiated by the monarchy itself.     

The Free Economy and the Schizophrenic State: Ideology and the Conservatives

This article focuses on Michael Howard's ideas to illustrate ideological developments within the Conservative party. It recognises that the ideas of a democratic organisation cannot be represented by the thoughts of a single individual, but Howard provides useful insights. He won the leadership unopposed in November 2003 partly because he seemed likely to perform well in debates with Tony Blair, but also because he offered the prospect of policy reform on a range of issues without a radical departure from the Thatcher legacy.
Soon after becoming leader Howard issued an unusually detailed statement of his beliefs. This showed him to be a convinced economic liberal, whose thinking has been heavily influenced by America. The main departure from Thatcherism is that he is even more antipathetic towards the state. This is difficult to reconcile with his support for UK 'sovereignty' within the EU, his hard line on law and order issues, and his insistence that there are no plans to privatise the NHS. It is unlikely to provide a platform for a significant Tory recovery.     

24‐hours media

Democratically elected governments are having to respond to an increasingly media‐driven society. The pressures imposed by 24‐hour news media are unrelenting: growing demands for access and information show no sign of abating. Tony Blair and his personal spin doctor, the Downing Street director of communications, Alastair Campbell, are at the cutting edge in developing media techniques which seem likely to be tested as never before, as democracies around the world have to grapple with astute propagandists like Osama bin Laden. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

New Labour in Power: Five Problems of Contemporary History

The history of New Labour is highly politicised, deployed either for its policy lessons (good or bad) or as a weapon in Labour's factional struggles. But, just as historians in the 1990s reassessed the premierships of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, so the distance of time and the opening of archives offers an opportunity to reappraise New Labour as history. Such work raises five methodological challenges: the lack of sufficient distance from the subject to tell whether policy innovations will remain popular and permanent; the long shadow the Iraq war casts over this whole period; the deluge of data and sources available; the continuing and controversial part that key actors, such as Tony Blair, are still playing; and the lack of expertise any one author will inevitably face in some policy areas. This article addresses each of those difficulties in turn.     

Prime Ministers, Presidentialism and Westminster Smokescreens

This article asks, 'how do practitioners understand the relationship between the prime minister, ministers and the rest of Westminster and Whitehall?' We focus on three topics. First, we review tales of a Blair presidency. Second, we explore the governance paradox in which people tell tales of a Blair presidency as they recount stories of British governance that portray it as fragmented with several decision-makers. Finally, we argue that this paradox reveals the distorting influence the Westminster model still exerts on many accounts of British politics. It acts as a smokescreen for the changes in executive politics.     

General templer and counter-insurgency in Malaya: hearts and minds,intelligence, and propaganda

General Sir Gerald Templer's period as High Commissioner for Malaya (1952–54) has provoked considerable and enduring controversy. To his admirers, he turned the tide of the Malayan Emergency in Britain's favour by combining a more vigorous prosecution of the war against the communist insurgents with a well-judged civilian campaign designed to win ‘hearts and minds’. To his detractors, he arrived with the turning tide, benefiting from the policies of his predecessors, particularly in the field of population control and rural resettlement. This article scrutinizes recent contributions to the debate which attempt to downgrade Templer's importance, and seeks to reach a balanced judgement on his role in defeating communist insurgency in Malaya.     

Pearl Harbor and Midway: the decisive influence of two men on the outcomes

Beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the war in the Pacific was a largely losing campaign for the Americans until the Battle of Midway, on 4–5 June 1942. The American ability to predict this Japanese attack the second time around served as the turning point for the war in the Pacific. And the story of how the Americans turned a catastrophic failure into an impressive cryptological achievement involved the story of one man, Joe Rochefort, convincing another man, Admiral Chester Nimitz who commanded the Pacific Fleet, that he could trust his analysis of the intelligence he compiled and analyzed.     

War and Economic Crisis: What Would Veblen Say?

The nation’s recent experience with war and economic crisis would hardlyshock Thorstein Veblen. America’s most original radical voice, Veblen has much to teach us about the common predatory origins of war and finance and the tragic consequences of their pursuit. This brief survey of the contemporary relevance of Veblen’s observations about war and economic collapse emphasizes the political foundation of his critical theory. Though widely regarded as an economic thinker, Veblen’s critique of modern business enterprise and its alliance with government rests on an essentially political dissection of what he termed barbaric exploit, the ancient root of war, power politics, the state, and latter day financial conquest. For Veblen, barbarism did not end with the coming of liberal democracy, rule of law or capitalism; its habits of exploit, waste and destruction go marching on.     

Changing Horses in Wartime? The 2004 Presidential Election

The literature makes clear that foreign policy affects voting, but it does not lead to clear expectations as to how a war will affect voting. Will views about the advisability of the war predominate? Or will the indirect effect through the incumbent’s image be more important? Will a war crowd out other potential issues, particularly domestic ones? This paper addresses these questions through a series of focused analyses of NES survey data. We find that an increase in strong Republican partisans clinched the election for President Bush. The Iraq War was not a direct vote gainer for the President, but the larger War on Terrorism burnished his image as a leader, at least long enough to win the election. Likewise, the cultural war allowed President Bush to retain some of the votes that he might otherwise have lost due to the unpopularity of the Iraq War.     

Clausewitz's Political and Ethical World View

This article challenges the accepted view that Clausewitz did not deal with the ethical status of war. It attempts to show that his views on this matter are well documented in his works; that they were part and parcel of a comprehensive outlook regarding the nature of both international relations and the state; and that this outlook reflected the emerging world view in the Germany of national awakening.